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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2667

BlueLocker Ransomware Resurfaces After Three-Year Dormancy, Breaches Pakistan Petroleum Limited

highACTIVE

BlueLocker (Blue Locker) ransomware, dormant since Microsoft's December 2021 signature addition, resurfaced in August 2025 with a confirmed attack on Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) that encrypted servers/VMs, deleted backups via wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE, and suspended PPL's financial operations for two days. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2667
Also known asBlue Locker, BlueLocker, Bule Cryptor, Ransom:Win32/BlueLocker.MK!MTB
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (desktops, laptops, servers, and virtualized environments); N/A Network-attached storage (NAS) and cloud backup infrastructure
AttributionBlue Locker ransomware operators (low confidence)
MalwareBlueLocker (Blue Locker), Cipher, Limba, MemeCryptor, Shinra, Trust, proton, zola
ToolsMemeCryptor (github.com/DarkFunct/MemeCryptor)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1012 Query Registry, T1057 Process Discovery, T1070.006 Timestomp, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1489 Service Stop, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsoil and gas, energy, government administration, critical infrastructure, technology
Target regionspakistan, South Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-26, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2667 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 19 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: BlueLocker Persistence, UAC Bypass and Timestomp Chain

Detects the registry Run-key persistence, UAC-bypass registry/binary manipulation (fodhelper, computerdefaults, sdclt, eventvwr), and file timestomping BlueLocker performs after initial execution to survive reboot, escalate privilege silently, and frustrate forensic timeline analysis.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1548.002, T1070.006
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| eval TargetObject=lower(coalesce(TargetObject,"")), CommandLine=lower(coalesce(CommandLine,""))
| where (EventCode=13 AND like(TargetObject,"%\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\run\\%"))
    OR (EventCode=13 AND (like(TargetObject,"%\\classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command%") OR like(TargetObject,"%\\software\\classes\\folder\\shell\\open\\command%")))
    OR (EventCode=1 AND (like(CommandLine,"%fodhelper%") OR like(CommandLine,"%computerdefaults%") OR like(CommandLine,"%sdclt%") OR like(CommandLine,"%eventvwr%")))
    OR (EventCode=2)
| eval reason=case(EventCode=13,"registry_run_key_or_uac_bypass_key", EventCode=1,"uac_bypass_binary_invocation", EventCode=2,"timestomp_filecreatetime_modified")
| stats count by ComputerName, User, EventCode, reason, TargetObject, CommandLine, Image
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

union
(
    DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RegistryKey has "Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Run" or RegistryKey has_any ("Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command", "Classes\\Folder\\shell\\open\\command")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, EventType="registry_persistence_or_uac_bypass"
),
(
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ ("fodhelper.exe","computerdefaults.exe","sdclt.exe","eventvwr.exe")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey=ProcessCommandLine, RegistryValueData="", EventType="uac_bypass_binary_invocation"
)
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: BlueLocker Registry Run-Key Persistence and UAC Bypass Chain
id: 4e5f6071-8293-4a5b-b6c7-d8e9f0a1b2c3
status: experimental
description: Detects registry Run-key persistence and known UAC-bypass binary invocation (fodhelper, computerdefaults, sdclt, eventvwr) consistent with BlueLocker's post-execution persistence and privilege-escalation behavior.
references:
    - https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-blue-locker-ransomware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1070.006
    - attack.tool.bluelocker
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_uac_bypass:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\fodhelper.exe'
            - '\computerdefaults.exe'
            - '\sdclt.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
    selection_run_key_write:
        CommandLine|contains: 'CurrentVersion\Run'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative deployment tools legitimately writing Run-key entries for approved software
    - Sanctioned red-team/blue-team exercises exercising UAC-bypass binaries for testing
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrative deployment tools legitimately writing Run-key entries for approved software
  • Sanctioned red-team/blue-team exercises exercising UAC-bypass binaries for testing

Tuning notes: Cross-reference the writing process's parent chain against a known-software-deployment allowlist, and prioritize alerts where the Run-key value path points outside Program Files/Windows to cut noise from legitimate installers.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • BlueLocker Initial Access - Encoded/Obfuscated Script Execution from Phishing Attachment · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Sandbox/VM Evasion and Discovery Sweep Pre-Encryption · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Backup/SQL Service Stop and Data-Staging Before Encryption · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Malicious Attachment Drop-and-Execute from User-Writable Path · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Forced Chrome Termination for Credential Access and Security Service Impairment · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Network-Share Propagation - Mass .blue File Writes Across SMB/NAS Paths · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Initial Access - Office Document Spawning Living-off-the-Land Binary · unlock with TL Creds
  • BlueLocker Shadow Copy Deletion, Mass .blue Encryption and Ransom Note Drop · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-26, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 19 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2667.

Sample indicators (3 of 19)

  • File hash: d3cc6cc4538d57f2d1f8a9d46a3e8be73ed849f7fe37d1d969c0377cf1d0fadc
  • File hash: e6bd4ed287d1336206f5b4b65011e570267418799eb60c2d0d7496d5d9e95a33
  • File hash: 6eeb20cc709a18bf8845f7b678967b7f0ff96475cf51a261da87244886bbfd2e

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 19 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

19 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Attribution is contested between an open-source MemeCryptor (Conti-inspired) codebase lineage identified by researcher rivitna and a Resecurity-assessed link to the Iranian-associated Proton ransomware family (Limba/Zola/Shinra/Cipher/Trust), with embedded Chinese-language strings assessed as a likely false flag.

BlueLocker first appeared in the wild around November 2021; Microsoft added the detection signature Ransom:Win32/BlueLocker.MK!MTB on December 1, 2021, and the malware then went quiet for roughly three years. It resurfaced dramatically on August 6, 2025 with a confirmed breach of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), the country's second-largest oil and gas producer, responsible for roughly 20% of national natural gas supply. The operators encrypted servers and virtual machines, ran `wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE` to destroy shadow-copy backups, and claimed to have exfiltrated approximately 1TB of data — including Petrel Studio exploration files, production databases, operations plans, financial records, and TMC data tied to the Sui and Adhi fields — though PPL publicly denied that sensitive data was compromised. The intrusion suspended PPL's financial operations and meter-reading capability for roughly two days.

Technically, two competing profiles exist. Researcher rivitna classifies the .blue/restore_file.txt artifacts as "BlueLocker (MemeCryptor)", tying them to an open-source, Conti-inspired ransomware project published on GitHub by user DarkFunct. That codebase implements multithreaded ChaCha20 file encryption, an XOR-obfuscated RSA public key used to wrap per-file symmetric keys, and BMP steganography to hide ChaCha20 keys inside meme images; it explicitly credits Conti for its multi-threading approach and its abuse of the Windows Restart Manager API to forcibly terminate processes (including Chrome.exe) that lock target files, such as Chrome's password database. Separately, Resecurity's reverse-engineering of acquired PPL-campaign binaries describes an AES+RSA hybrid scheme and assesses BlueLocker as a recent modification of the Proton ransomware family, which Israel's National Cyber Directorate (INCD) has linked to probable Iranian origins since 2023. Prior Proton-lineage strains cited as related include Limba (which has targeted Chinese victims), Zola, Shinra (detected April 2024, itself carrying suspicious Chinese-language strings such as "ZhuDongFangYu" and references to the Chinese AV vendor Qihoo 360), Cipher, and Trust. Analysts treat the Chinese-language artifacts as a probable false flag rather than evidence of Chinese origin, and note that Pakistan's stable diplomatic relations with both Iran and China make either direct-state explanation awkward, pointing instead to a third-party actor or reused/sold source code. Both explanations may be simultaneously true: Proton's source code has reportedly circulated for sale on the dark web, and MemeCryptor's codebase is public, so the same or different operators could be drawing on either or both lineages, or independently reusing the "Blue Locker" brand and ".blue" extension — a real risk given at least three unrelated malware families (Blue Locker/MemeCryptor, Proton/Shinra V2, and Phobos Blue) currently use ".blue"-style extensions.

Operationally, the malware persists via a Registry Run key (`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run`), bypasses UAC through registry manipulation, uses XOR-encoded strings (including Chinese-character encodings of process names such as "Chrome.exe") to frustrate static analysis, performs timestomping and virtualization/sandbox checks, and enumerates the registry, running processes, and the file system before encrypting. It avoids OS-critical paths (Windows, System32, ProgramFiles, System Volume Information, Boot) and skips certain extensions (.cat, .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs) to keep the machine bootable enough to display the ransom note, dropped as `restore_file.txt` (and, per some reporting, `HOW_TO_BACK_FILES.html`). The note is headed "[ Hello! ]", signed "BY BLUE LOCKER", threatens to "report the hack to mainstream media and release your data to social media and competitors", gives no fixed ransom figure, and directs victims to a ProtonMail address and an XMPP/Jabber contact (with a Tox ID also referenced); the group deliberately runs no dedicated Tor leak site. Distribution is via phishing emails with malicious attachments, trojanized downloads, unsecured file-sharing platforms, and compromised websites, with capability to propagate across networks, removable storage, cloud environments, and network-attached storage.

In response, Pakistan's National Cyber Emergency Response Team (NCERT) issued advisory NCA-38.081025 ("Critical Global Ransomware Threat: Blue Locker & Shinra Campaign") on August 10-11, 2025 to 39 government ministries and institutions — including Cabinet, Interior, Foreign Affairs, the Election Commission, the National Assembly, and the FBR — rating the threat "extremely high" severity and confirming its own systems were "detecting and blocking it continuously". No CVE or exploited vulnerability underlies this campaign; initial access is social-engineering-driven, not exploit-driven.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1012 Query Registry; T1057 Process Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1070.006 Timestomp; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Execution

T1204.002 Malicious File

Impact

T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Privilege Escalation

T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Isolate and take offline all backup and NAS systems immediately upon suspected compromise to prevent wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE-style backup destruction
  • Block the ransom-note communication channels (ProtonMail and XMPP/Jabber addresses) at email and network gateways and hunt for prior contact with them
  • Hunt across endpoints for the mutex artifact `wbizecif48njqgpprzkm6769`, the ransom note filename `restore_file.txt`, and the `.blue` file extension

Workarounds

  • Restrict and monitor use of wmic.exe and vssadmin.exe on servers to detect and block shadow-copy deletion attempts
  • Enforce network segmentation between IT and OT/financial systems to limit encryption blast radius in oil & gas operational environments
  • Apply strict email attachment filtering and user-execution controls given the phishing/trojanized-download delivery vector

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection tuned to Registry Run-key persistence, UAC-bypass activity, Restart-Manager-style forced process termination, and mass file-rename/encryption patterns
  • Enforce offline, immutable, air-gapped backups for critical-infrastructure and OT-adjacent environments so shadow-copy deletion cannot eliminate recovery options
  • Reduce reliance on browser-stored credentials (harden or migrate off Chrome's local password store) given the malware's demonstrated targeting of browser password databases

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (desktops, laptops, servers, and virtualized environments)
    Vulnerable versions: all Windows versions lacking adequate EDR and offline-backup isolation
  • N/A — Network-attached storage (NAS) and cloud backup infrastructure
    Vulnerable versions: any internet-reachable or non-isolated backup/NAS systems

Timeline

  • BlueLocker ransomware first observed in the wild, per Microsoft telemetry and later researcher retrospectives.
  • Microsoft Defender adds the detection signature Ransom:Win32/BlueLocker.MK!MTB to its threat encyclopedia.
  • The Proton ransomware family - later assessed by Resecurity as sharing lineage with Blue Locker - is first observed operating, with probable Iranian origins per Israel's INCD.
  • Shinra, a Proton-family variant carrying suspicious Chinese-language strings such as 'ZhuDongFangYu', is detected; NCERT later frames the August 2025 campaign as a joint 'Blue Locker & Shinra' threat.
  • Israel's National Cyber Directorate (INCD) publishes its Shinra Malware Profile, assessing probable Iranian origins for the Proton lineage.
  • Blue Locker operators breach Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), encrypting servers and virtual machines, deleting backups via wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE, and suspending PPL's financial operations for roughly two days; operators claim ~1TB of exfiltrated data including Petrel Studio exploration files and TMC data from the Sui and Adhi fields.
  • Threat-intel monitoring accounts publicly flag the PPL breach and its two-day operational impact.
  • Pakistan's National Cyber Emergency Response Team (NCERT) issues advisory NCA-38.081025 ('Critical Global Ransomware Threat: Blue Locker & Shinra Campaign') to 39 government ministries and institutions.
  • Resecurity publishes a reverse-engineering analysis of acquired Blue Locker binary samples, assessing links to the Proton ransomware family (Limba, Zola, Shinra, Cipher, Trust) and flagging embedded Chinese-language strings as a likely false flag.
  • SOCRadar publishes a 'Dark Web Profile' retrospective on Blue Locker, citing researcher rivitna's classification of the .blue/locked-ioc-6 artifacts as 'BlueLocker (MemeCryptor)' tied to the open-source DarkFunct/MemeCryptor GitHub project.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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