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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2713

Vexy Ransomware Claims Data-Extortion Attack on Majani Insurance Brokers (Kenya)

mediumACTIVE

Emerging ransomware/data-extortion group Vexy Ransomware has listed Majani Insurance Brokers, a Kenyan independent insurance broker, on its TOR data-leak site, claiming 2.1 GB of exfiltrated data and threatening release absent negotiation. The claim follows a pre-existing infostealer-driven credential/cookie exposure and an unresolved external vulnerability in Majani's environment, and remains independently unverified.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2713
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsMajani Insurance Brokers Ltd Corporate identity/SaaS environment (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365) and public-facing web infrastructure (majaninsure.com)
AttributionVexy Ransomware (low confidence)
ToolsParanoidLab, Tox
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078 Valid Accounts, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1583.001 Domains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1591 Gather Victim Org Information, T1657 Financial Theft
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsinsurance, finance
Target regionsEast Africa
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-25, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2713 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Cloud Identity Sign-In Consistent with Infostealer-Harvested Credentials/Cookies (M365 + Google Workspace)

Detects Microsoft 365/Entra ID and Google Workspace sign-ins that bypass MFA via legacy/native auth or OAuth-token/session-cookie reuse, especially from users flagged in an exposure lookup or showing multi-country/multi-IP velocity within a short window. Directly models Majani's pre-claim exposure: 55 exposed passwords (4 critical), 7 stolen session cookies, and 1 confirmed end-user plus 1 third-party/vendor account compromised ahead of the Vexy Ransomware leak-site listing.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1078, T1078.004, T1539, T1555.003
  • Data sources: azure_ad_signin_logs, office365_management_activity, google_workspace_login_audit, entra_id_risk_detections
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Operation IN ("UserLoggedIn","ServiceLoginFailed")
| eval mfa_satisfied=if(match(ExtendedProperties, "requestMFAResults.*(fail|none)"), "no", "yes")
| eval auth_type=if(match(ExtendedProperties, "(?i)ClientAppUsed.*(Mobile Apps and Desktop clients|Exchange ActiveSync|Other clients)"), "legacy_or_native", "browser")
| eval platform="microsoft365"
| append
    [ search index=gws sourcetype="gws:reports:login" event_name IN ("login_success","login_failure")
    | eval mfa_satisfied=if(is_suspicious="true" OR login_challenge_status="challenge_not_issued", "no", "yes")
    | eval auth_type="oauth_or_cookie"
    | eval UserId=coalesce(actor.email, actor_email)
    | eval ClientIP=coalesce(ip_address, ip_addr)
    | eval platform="google_workspace" ]
| lookup recently_flagged_accounts.csv user AS UserId OUTPUT flagged
| where flagged="true" OR mfa_satisfied="no"
| iplocation ClientIP
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen dc(ClientIP) as distinct_ips values(Country) as countries values(platform) as platforms by UserId
| where distinct_ips > 2 OR mvcount(countries) > 1
| table UserId first_seen last_seen distinct_ips countries platforms

Microsoft KQL

let RecentlyFlaggedAccounts = datatable(UserPrincipalName:string) ["vendor.employee@majaninsure.com"];
AADUserRiskEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RiskEventType in ("leakedCredentials","anonymizedIPAddress","unfamiliarFeatures","anomalousToken")
| project RiskTime = TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, RiskEventType, RiskLevel, IpAddress, Location
| join kind=inner (
    SigninLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where ResultType == 0
    | where AuthenticationRequirement == "singleFactorAuthentication" or ConditionalAccessStatus == "notApplied"
    | extend IsLegacyAuth = ClientAppUsed in ("Exchange ActiveSync","IMAP4","POP3","Other clients")
    | project SigninTime = TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, ClientAppUsed, IsLegacyAuth, Location
) on UserPrincipalName
| where abs(datetime_diff('minute', RiskTime, SigninTime)) < 60
| summarize RiskEvents = make_set(RiskEventType), SigninCount = count(), Apps = make_set(AppDisplayName) by UserPrincipalName, IpAddress = IPAddress
| where SigninCount > 0

Sigma

title: Cloud Sign-In Bypassing MFA via Legacy Auth or Token/Cookie Reuse
id: 7c9e4f1a-2b3d-4e6f-8a1c-5d9b7e2f4c6a
status: experimental
description: Detects M365/Entra ID or Google Workspace sign-ins that bypass MFA through legacy/native authentication protocols or reused OAuth refresh tokens/session cookies, consistent with infostealer-harvested credential and cookie abuse.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
    - https://www.dexpose.io/vexy-ransomware-strikes-majani-insurance-brokers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.t1539
logsource:
    category: authentication
    product: m365
logsource_alt:
    category: authentication
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection_legacy_auth:
        ClientAppUsed:
            - 'Exchange ActiveSync'
            - 'IMAP4'
            - 'POP3'
            - 'Other clients'
        ResultType: 0
    selection_no_mfa:
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
        ResultType: 0
    selection_risk:
        RiskEventType|contains:
            - 'leakedCredentials'
            - 'anomalousToken'
            - 'unfamiliarFeatures'
    condition: selection_legacy_auth or selection_no_mfa or selection_risk
falsepositives:
    - Legacy line-of-business integrations (printers, scan-to-email, fax gateways) that legitimately use basic/legacy auth
    - Break-glass emergency-access accounts exempted from Conditional Access by design
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legacy printer/scanner or fax-gateway integrations using basic auth
  • Break-glass accounts intentionally excluded from Conditional Access/MFA policy
  • Legitimate travel causing multi-country sign-ins within a short window

Tuning notes: Seed recently_flagged_accounts.csv / RecentlyFlaggedAccounts from the ParanoidLab exposure output (the 1 confirmed end-user + 1 third-party/vendor account) and refresh weekly against fresh dark-web exposure scans; tighten the distinct_ips/countries thresholds once a baseline travel pattern is established, and correlate hits against the community-observed 'Microsoft 365 MFA phishing' and 'Microsoft phishing hosted on Backblaze B2' campaign patterns (TL_OSINT_Scan, medium confidence) as a likely initial-access vector for the harvested credentials.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Cloud Identity Sign-In Consistent with Infostealer-Harvested Credentials/Cookies (M365 + Google Workspace) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Public-Facing App Exploitation + Bulk SharePoint/OneDrive/Drive Staging Following Recon · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tor Multi-Hop Proxy Egress + Bulk Exfiltration Over Web/File-Sharing Services · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cloud Sign-In Bypassing MFA via Legacy Auth or Token/Cookie Reuse · unlock with TL Creds
  • Web Exploitation Attempt Plus Mass Cloud-Repository Download Staging · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tor Multi-Hop Proxy Egress With High-Volume Outbound Transfer to Unsanctioned Storage · unlock with TL Creds
  • Public-Facing App Exploitation + Bulk SharePoint/OneDrive/Drive Staging Following Recon · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tor Multi-Hop Proxy Egress + Bulk Exfiltration Over Web/File-Sharing Services · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-25, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2713.

Sample indicators (3 of 12)

  • Domain: majaninsure[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://www[.]ransomware[.]live/id/TWFqYW5pIEluc3VyYW5jZSBCcm9rZXJzQFZleHkgUmFuc29td2FyZQ==
  • Domain: vexytsr3chimdz6siwaqi2lvxxwfkxvffkpwyanr2llequ2hkm56jvqd[.]onion

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 12 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

12 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Majani Insurance Brokers Ltd, a Kenyan independent insurance brokerage operating at majaninsure.com and arranging general business, motor, medical, life, investment, marine, liability, property and agricultural coverage for corporate and individual clients, was named on September 25, 2026 at 13:24 UTC as a victim on the TOR-hosted data-leak site of Vexy Ransomware, an emerging ransomware/data-extortion operation first observed roughly three weeks earlier (earliest tracked victim dated September 2, 2026). The group's leak-site statement claims Majani has been compromised and that sensitive data will be released unless negotiations commence; the listing claims 2.1 GB of exfiltrated data. As of this writing, Vexy's claim is unverified and Majani has issued no public confirmation.

Prior to the leak-site posting, a third-party exposure assessment (ParanoidLab, cited by DeXpose) of Majani's environment identified an active infostealer-driven credential-exposure footprint: 55 passwords (4 flagged critical), 7 session cookies, and compromised credentials tied to 1 confirmed end-user account plus 1 third-party/vendor employee account, alongside detected use of Google Workspace and Microsoft 365, and one identified external attack-surface vulnerability. This combination -- infostealer-harvested credentials and session cookies plus an unresolved internet-facing weakness -- is consistent with, though does not by itself prove, a credential- or exploit-driven initial-access path into a cloud-identity environment ahead of the extortion claim. No encryptor sample, ransom note, or confirmation of file/system encryption has been publicly identified for this specific victim, which distinguishes the incident, at least in its currently public form, as a data-theft/extortion claim rather than confirmed encryption-based ransomware.

Vexy Ransomware itself is a newly emerged, fast-moving data-broker / double-extortion operation first tracked in early September 2026. Across its first three-to-four weeks of activity it posted 16-17 victim listings spanning 11 countries -- concentrated in India, with additional victims in Brazil, Vietnam, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador and now Kenya -- and roughly 580 GB of cumulative claimed exfiltrated data, most heavily targeting technology, retail/e-commerce and manufacturing organizations. The group operates a TOR (.onion) data-leak site (Apache 2.4.68 on Debian, intermittently available across trackers) and negotiates through a published Tox messenger ID, with two Bitcoin wallet addresses associated with ransom collection. As a licensed insurance intermediary, Majani falls under Kenya's Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) rules -- introduced in 2025 -- which mandate disclosure of major cyber incidents, including unauthorized access to customer data, within 24 hours of detection.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy

Collection

T1213 Data from Information Repositories

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1591 Gather Victim Org Information

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Patches

  • No CVE or vendor patch has been publicly identified for this claim; remediation centers on closing the external attack-surface vulnerability and completing a full compromise assessment

Immediate actions

  • Rotate credentials for all Google Workspace and Microsoft 365 accounts, prioritizing the 1 confirmed compromised end-user account and 1 third-party/vendor employee account identified in the ParanoidLab exposure scan
  • Invalidate active session cookies/tokens for the affected accounts to neutralize the 7 leaked cookies and force re-authentication
  • Engage incident-response and dark-web-monitoring resources to validate the scope of the claimed 2.1 GB exfiltration and to monitor the Vexy Ransomware TOR leak site for any published data
  • Report the incident to Kenya's Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) within the mandatory 24-hour disclosure window applicable to licensed insurance intermediaries

Workarounds

  • Until credential rotation and MFA enforcement are complete, restrict access to Google Workspace/Microsoft 365 admin consoles and sensitive data repositories to a monitored allow-list of source IPs/devices

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant MFA across all SaaS/identity providers (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365) to blunt reuse of infostealer-harvested credentials
  • Stand up continuous external attack-surface monitoring to identify and close internet-facing vulnerabilities such as the one flagged in the pre-claim scan
  • Harden against browser-credential and session-cookie theft (browser credential-store protections, cookie re-binding, EDR detection for stealer-style browser-data access)
  • Establish a vendor/third-party risk program covering credential hygiene for outsourced or partner staff with access to Majani systems

Affected and fixed versions

  • Majani Insurance Brokers Ltd — Corporate identity/SaaS environment (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365) and public-facing web infrastructure (majaninsure.com)
    Vulnerable versions: N/A - targeted organization/tenant environment, not a versioned software product
    Fixed in: N/A

Timeline

  • Kenya's Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) introduces a framework requiring licensed insurers/intermediaries to report major cyber incidents, including unauthorized access to customer data, within 24 hours of detection -- the regulatory backdrop Majani now falls under.
  • Vexy Ransomware's earliest tracked victim listing (a Brazilian manufacturing organization) marks the group's first public activity, per WatchGuard's Ransomware Tracker.
  • Vexy Ransomware claims Engefitas, a Brazilian adhesive manufacturer, with 27.25 GB of allegedly exfiltrated data, an early indicator of the group's double-extortion data-broker model.
  • Vexy Ransomware claims Sancity Soft Touch, an Indian IT services company, continuing a pattern of rapid, geographically dispersed victim postings.
  • GalaxyWarden publishes breach analysis of the Sancity listing, noting Vexy's practice of posting claims that are frequently unverified and sometimes recycle older data.
  • DeXpose publishes a threat-intelligence blog documenting the Vexy Ransomware claim against Majani Insurance Brokers and recommending dark-web monitoring, compromise assessment, and MFA deployment.
  • Vexy Ransomware lists Majani Insurance Brokers on its TOR data-leak site at 13:24 UTC, claiming 2.1 GB of exfiltrated data and threatening release absent negotiation.
  • A ParanoidLab exposure scan (cited by DeXpose) of Majani Insurance Brokers' environment identifies 55 exposed passwords (4 critical), 7 session cookies, 1 compromised end-user account, 1 compromised third-party/vendor employee account, and 1 external attack-surface vulnerability, alongside detected Google Workspace and Microsoft 365 usage.
  • Ransomware-tracking services (ransomware.live, RansomLook) show Vexy Ransomware with 16-17 total victim postings across 11 countries and roughly 580 GB of cumulative claimed exfiltrated data since its early-September emergence; the group's TOR leak site shows intermittent availability (52%-90% uptime depending on tracker).

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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