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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2765

CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard (Storm-2945) Hospitality Captive-Portal AiTM Campaign

highACTIVE

Microsoft Threat Intelligence attributes CaptiveCrunch to Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of Russia's SVR-linked Midnight Blizzard, active since early May 2026. The actor compromises captive-portal gateways at hotels and conference venues, forges DNS/HTTP responses to push corporate travelers to Microsoft Entra device-code phishing and ClickFix/fake-update lures, and delivers the CornFlake RAT and ChocoShell infostealer, run from the FruitStone operator panel.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2765
Also known asCaptiveCrunch
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsVarious hospitality operators Captive-portal gateways / guest Wi-Fi (hotels, conference centers, airports, co-working spaces, universities, healthcare facilities); Microsoft Microsoft Entra ID / Microsoft 365 (device code authentication flow, Token Broker cache); Microsoft Windows endpoints used by corporate travelers (CornFlake and ChocoShell targets)
AttributionUNC2452 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareChocoShell, CornFlake, FruitStone, Storm
ToolsChromeKatz, FakeUpdates
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1113 Screen Capture, T1123 Audio Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste, T1497.003 Time Based Checks, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie and 12 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorshospitality, finance, professional-services, legal, health, energy, retail, government administration
Target regionsunited states of america, india, saudi arabia, Europe, Worldwide
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2765 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: CaptiveCrunch — CornFlake svchost32 Service, Run Key and Scheduled Task Persistence

Detects CornFlake, the Go RAT delivered by Storm-2945, persisting from %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe via a Windows service named svchost32 (display name 'Cloud Sync Service'), a Run-key value and a scheduled task with watchdog. A masquerading svchost32 binary running from a user profile is not a legitimate Windows component.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1543.003, T1547.001, T1053.005
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_system_event_log, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:System") earliest=-24h
```CornFlake persistence: service 7045, process from AppData, service/Run registry keys, schtasks. Path separators matched with . to avoid backslash escaping```
| eval svc_name=lower(coalesce(Service_Name, ServiceName)), svc_path=lower(coalesce(Service_File_Name, ImagePath)), img=lower(Image), cmd=lower(CommandLine), reg=lower(TargetObject), regval=lower(coalesce(Details, "")), user=coalesce(user, User, "-")
| eval hit=case(
    EventCode="7045" AND (match(svc_name,"^(svchost32|cloud sync service)") OR match(svc_path,"appdata.*svchost32.svchost32[.]exe")), "service_install_7045",
    EventCode="1" AND match(img,"appdata.roaming.svchost32.svchost32[.]exe$"), "cornflake_process_from_appdata",
    (EventCode="12" OR EventCode="13") AND match(reg,"services.svchost32"), "service_registry_key",
    EventCode="13" AND match(reg,"currentversion.run") AND match(regval,"svchost32.svchost32[.]exe"), "run_key_persistence",
    EventCode="1" AND match(img,"schtasks[.]exe$") AND match(cmd,"svchost32"), "scheduled_task_persistence",
    true(), null())
| where isnotnull(hit)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(hit) as indicators values(img) as image values(cmd) as command_line values(reg) as registry_key by host, user
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")

Microsoft KQL

// CornFlake persistence: svchost32 in AppData, service/task creation, service and Run registry keys
let lookback = 24h;
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where FileName =~ "svchost32.exe" and FolderPath has "AppData" and FolderPath has "svchost32"
 | extend Indicator = "cornflake_process_from_appdata"),
(DeviceProcessEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where (FileName =~ "sc.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has_all ("create", "svchost32") or ProcessCommandLine has "Cloud Sync Service"))
     or (FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "svchost32")
 | extend Indicator = "service_or_task_creation"),
(DeviceRegistryEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where ActionType in ("RegistryValueSet", "RegistryKeyCreated")
 | where RegistryKey has_all ("Services", "svchost32")
     or (RegistryKey has "CurrentVersion" and RegistryKey has "Run" and RegistryValueData has "svchost32.exe")
 | extend Indicator = "registry_persistence"),
(DeviceEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
 | extend SvcName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).ServiceName)
 | where SvcName has "svchost32" or SvcName =~ "Cloud Sync Service"
 | extend Indicator = "service_installed")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, SvcName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName

Sigma

title: CornFlake svchost32 Masquerading Implant Persistence
id: 8c21d4e7-6a13-4b9f-b0d5-2e7f9a3c6d18
status: experimental
description: Detects the CornFlake Go RAT (Storm-2945 / CaptiveCrunch) running from %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe, or creating persistence through a service named svchost32 / 'Cloud Sync Service' or a scheduled task referencing svchost32.
references:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/31/captivecrunch-midnight-blizzard-targets-travelers-worldwide-for-malware-delivery-and-credential-theft/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/29
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1543.003
  - attack.t1547.001
  - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|endswith: '\AppData\Roaming\svchost32\svchost32.exe'
  selection_sc:
    Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'create'
      - 'svchost32'
  selection_sc_display:
    Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'Cloud Sync Service'
  selection_schtasks:
    Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'svchost32'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - None expected; the legitimate Windows svchost.exe never runs from a user profile and is not named svchost32
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Internal software that legitimately names a service or task svchost32 (very rare)
  • Security researchers detonating the sample in a lab

Tuning notes: High-fidelity as written; no exclusions expected. Ensure Sysmon EventCodes 1, 12, 13 and System EventCode 7045 are collected. If the environment renames the index or sourcetype, adjust the base search only. Extend with the SHA256 918fa52ae45ed60ba7cc8bdc99c3cbe9ab92e0375ec31fc05d0d4513be11c593 hash match if file-hash telemetry is available.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • CaptiveCrunch — ClickFix Command Pasted into Run Dialog or Windows Terminal · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — ChocoShell Silent UAC Bypass (windir, sdclt Folder Hijack, wsreset COM Hijack) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — ChocoShell PowerShell AMSI Bypass via .NET Reflection · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — DNS Resolution of Storm-2945 Look-Alike Microsoft 365 / OWA Domains · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — ChocoShell Token Broker (.tbres) and Browser Credential Theft in PowerShell · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — Endpoint Network Connections to Storm-2945 C2 or from CornFlake Implant · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — Entra ID Device Code Flow Sign-In (Captive-Portal AiTM Lure) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CaptiveCrunch — ChocoShell C2 Beacon, Payload Fetch and Exfil URIs / Storm-2945 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2765.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 31.57.243[.]154
  • Domain: ms365-device[.]com
  • File hash: 918fa52ae45ed60ba7cc8bdc99c3cbe9ab92e0375ec31fc05d0d4513be11c593

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

CaptiveCrunch is a cyber-espionage campaign that Microsoft Threat Intelligence attributes to Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard (APT29 / NOBELIUM), the threat actor tied to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Microsoft reports the campaign has manipulated DNS/HTTP traffic since early May 2026 and published its findings on 2026-07-31, following a ReliaQuest report of 2026-07-23 that documented DNS poisoning on hospitality Wi-Fi and first compared it to FrostArmada (APT28) before Microsoft's attribution. Microsoft notes earlier device-code/OAuth phishing operations from February 2026 and technical overlap with the Storm-2372 device-code cluster.

Initial position: the actor controls captive-portal gateways at hotels, conference centers and other shared venues. On the networks ReliaQuest investigated, the gateway also served as the DNS resolver handed to clients, so administrative control let the actor forge DNS answers and redirect traffic without touching the victim device. ReliaQuest suspects exploitation of exposed management interfaces (SSH, SNMP, web administration) combined with weak credentials, and observed WPAD abuse. Microsoft states the initial compromise vector for the portals is still under investigation; commonalities in equipment and management systems suggest shared service access rather than isolated compromises. Victim venues reported by ReliaQuest span multiple US cities, India and Saudi Arabia (hotels, conference centers, airports, co-working spaces, universities, healthcare facilities), and targeted users came from financial services, professional services, legal, healthcare, energy and retail.

User-facing lures: connectivity-check (NCSI/captive-detection) requests are redirected to fake browser or OS updates and to ClickFix pages (fake Windows Driver Repair Utility, verification-failure prompts, instructions to run commands via Windows Terminal); Android variants instruct APK download. Since 2026-07-16 some landing pages redirect guests into Microsoft's legitimate device-code sign-in flow, so entering the actor-supplied code grants the actor's session MFA-satisfied access. AiTM infrastructure uses look-alike Microsoft 365/OWA domains. Infection is not silent: the victim must download or execute the payload.

Malware: CornFlake is a Go Windows RAT that installs to %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe and registers a service (display name 'Cloud Sync Service'), plus Run-key and scheduled-task persistence with a watchdog. It uses ECDH P-256 key exchange with SHA-256-derived session keys over a custom JSON protocol, and supports keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshots, microphone and webcam capture, a ChromeKatz-derived browser credential stealer (Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass, Firefox NSS decryption), extension-based file exfiltration (up to 1,000 files / 500MB per cycle), USB monitoring, an 18-category security posture sweep, a remote shell, and a localhost HTTP API (/upload, /reload, /status) with hot reconfiguration through sync.dat. ChocoShell is an in-memory PowerShell infostealer that disables AMSI via .NET reflection, exits on timing-based VM checks, tries three silent UAC bypasses (SilentCleanup windir hijack, wsreset.exe COM hijack, sdclt.exe folder hijack) with a visible RunAs fallback, and steals Chromium/Firefox cookies and passwords, Wi-Fi keys and M365 Token Broker .tbres tokens for session replay. It beacons to 213.145.86.112 over HTTPS using tracking-pixel-style URIs (/t/pixel.gif?m=<status>), fetches its payload from /cdn/chunks/polyfill-7e2b.min.js and exfiltrates GZip+Base64 JSON to /t/event. FruitStone is the operator SPA branded 'CloudSync Console': JWT multi-operator auth, SSE agent dashboard, remote shell and file browser, a four-step campaign/dropper builder with evasion options, proxy relays, beacon profiles with SNI spoofing (teams.microsoft.com) and staging servers. Microsoft assesses the actor uses AI to support a significant portion of operations (ChocoShell comments suggest AI-assisted code); Anthropic and OpenAI collaborated on the investigation.

Defender relevance: corporate travelers on untrusted Wi-Fi are the exposure. Priority controls are always-on full-tunnel VPN with corporate DNS, blocking device-code flow via Conditional Access, phishing-resistant MFA, refusing updates or tools offered through captive portals, and hunting for the published IOCs and the svchost32 service artifacts. No CVE is cited by the sources.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1543.003 Windows Service; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1056.001 Keylogging; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Collection

T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture

Defense Evasion

T1497.003 Time Based Checks

Privilege Escalation

T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking; T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control

Lateral Movement

T1550.001 Application Access Token

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1584.008 Network Devices

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block and hunt the published Storm-2945 domains and IPs (ms365-device.com, ms365-live.com, m365-owa.com, owa-ms365.com; 31.57.243.154, 38.146.28.75, 38.146.28.132, 104.194.159.150, 107.189.26.194, 213.145.86.112)
  • Hunt for %APPDATA%\svchost32\svchost32.exe and a svchost32 service named 'Cloud Sync Service'
  • Review Entra sign-in logs for device code flow authentications and revoke sessions and tokens for affected users
  • Reset credentials and revoke M365 tokens for users who connected to hotel or conference Wi-Fi and ran a fake update or ClickFix command

Workarounds

  • Block the OAuth device code flow with Conditional Access where it is not required
  • Disable WPAD via Group Policy where unnecessary
  • Do not download updates, certificates or utilities offered through captive portals
  • Do not reuse corporate credentials on hotel or conference registration pages

Longer-term hardening

  • Require always-on full-tunnel VPN so DNS resolves through corporate resolvers
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (passkeys) and sign-in risk policies
  • Prevent managed devices from joining non-provisioned networks (policy-csp-wifi allowmanualwificonfiguration)
  • Issue enterprise-managed travel routers or use mobile hotspots and eSIM cellular instead of public Wi-Fi
  • Train users to recognize ClickFix prompts and never paste commands into cmd, PowerShell or Windows Terminal from a web page

Affected and fixed versions

  • Various hospitality operators — Captive-portal gateways / guest Wi-Fi (hotels, conference centers, airports, co-working spaces, universities, healthcare facilities)
    Vulnerable versions: Unspecified; initial compromise vector under investigation
  • Microsoft — Microsoft Entra ID / Microsoft 365 (device code authentication flow, Token Broker cache)
    Vulnerable versions: Tenants permitting device code flow
  • Microsoft — Windows endpoints used by corporate travelers (CornFlake and ChocoShell targets)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows clients whose users execute the fake update or ClickFix payload

Timeline

  • locked-ioc-14, later identified as ChocoShell C2 / DNS resolver infrastructure, is first seen by Microsoft. Microsoft also notes earlier Storm-2945 device-code/OAuth phishing operations in February 2026.
  • AiTM infrastructure IP locked-ioc-12 first seen.
  • Per Microsoft, Storm-2945 begins the CaptiveCrunch campaign in early May 2026, manipulating DNS/HTTP traffic on compromised hospitality captive portals (date approximate).
  • Device-code redirect domain locked-ioc-13 first seen.
  • ChocoShell C2 locked-ioc-15 and AiTM IP locked-ioc-20 first seen.
  • CornFlake sample (SHA256 918fa52a...1c593) first seen; ChocoShell sample (SHA256 be998574...d42c) follows on 2026-07-10.
  • Some CaptiveCrunch landing pages begin redirecting guests into Microsoft's legitimate device-code sign-in flow; AiTM domain locked-ioc-16 and IP locked-ioc-17 first seen the same day.
  • ReliaQuest publishes its Threat Spotlight on DNS poisoning of hospitality Wi-Fi (activity since June 2026; venues in multiple US cities, India, Saudi Arabia); locked-ioc-11 first seen the same day.
  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence publishes CaptiveCrunch attribution to Storm-2945 (Midnight Blizzard), names CornFlake, ChocoShell and the FruitStone C2 panel, and releases IOCs and hunting queries. Anthropic and OpenAI collaborated on the investigation.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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