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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-2785

PhantomSub: 101 Malicious npm Baileys Forks Force Developers' WhatsApp Accounts into Attacker-Controlled Groups/Channels

mediumACTIVE

PhantomSub is a supply-chain campaign of 101 malicious npm packages that are modified forks of the Baileys WhatsApp library. At runtime they use the developer's authenticated WhatsApp session to follow attacker-chosen channels and join attacker-chosen groups without consent, and they inject promotional URLs into bot-sent media.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2785
Also known asPhantomSub
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsnpm ecosystem Baileys WhatsApp library forks (101 malicious packages)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506
Malwarenewsletter JID 120363406068468165@newsletter, newsletter JID 120363418582531215@newsletter, newsletter JID 120363420514587725@newsletter, newsletter JID 120363426706961217@newsletter
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools, T1497.003 Time Based Checks, T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation, T1583.006 Web Services
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software-development
Target regionsGlobal, Southeast Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2785 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: PhantomSub - Known-Malicious Baileys Fork Files Written to node_modules

Detects file creation under a node_modules directory belonging to a known PhantomSub package, including the library socket/newsletter modules (lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/Socket/socket.js) where the auto-follow logic is injected. Catches lockfile-driven installs (npm ci, CI runners, Docker builds) that leave no package name on the command line. Directory/path matching is used on purpose: variant 3 (14 packages) hides its channel IDs and GitHub URL in encoded form, so content-string matching would miss it.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195.001, T1059.007, T1027
  • Data sources: Sysmon EventCode 11 (XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational), Microsoft Defender DeviceFileEvents, Sigma file_event
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 earliest=-24h TargetFilename="*node_modules*"
``` file creation inside a known PhantomSub package directory ```
| regex TargetFilename="(?i)node_modules[^\w.]+(chromestaff-baileys|my-auto-follow|@fyxzpediaa|@dappaoffc[^\w.-]+baileys-mod|@skyzopedia|naileys|ourin-baileys|@nexustechpro[^\w.-]+baileys|@badzz88[^\w.-]+baileys|@ostyado[^\w.-]+baileys|levvleys|neuralwhatsapp|noxleyss|cloud-baileys)([^\w.-]|$)"
| eval payload_file=if(match(TargetFilename,"(?i)(newsletter|socket)\.js$"),1,0)
| stats count as files_written sum(payload_file) as payload_files min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(TargetFilename) as sample_paths by Computer User Image
| eval sample_paths=mvindex(sample_paths,0,4)
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - payload_files

Microsoft KQL

// PhantomSub - files written into known-malicious package directories
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where FolderPath has "node_modules"
| where FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)node_modules[^\w.]+(chromestaff-baileys|my-auto-follow|@fyxzpediaa|@dappaoffc[^\w.-]+baileys-mod|@skyzopedia|naileys|ourin-baileys|@nexustechpro[^\w.-]+baileys|@badzz88[^\w.-]+baileys|@ostyado[^\w.-]+baileys|levvleys|neuralwhatsapp|noxleyss|cloud-baileys)([^\w.-]|$)"
| extend PayloadFile = FileName in~ ("newsletter.js","socket.js")
| summarize FilesWritten=count(), PayloadFiles=countif(PayloadFile), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), SamplePaths=make_set(FolderPath, 5) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by PayloadFiles desc, FilesWritten desc

Sigma

title: PhantomSub Known-Malicious Baileys Fork Written to node_modules
id: c4a8f6b0-9e21-47d3-a5c7-6b1e0d2f3a84
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation inside node_modules directories of known PhantomSub malicious Baileys fork packages, where the newsletter auto-follow payload is delivered.
references:
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/101-malicious-npm-packages-add.html
    - https://xygeni.io/blog/malicious-npm-package-in-baileys-fork-skyzopedia-case/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/29
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1195.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_nm:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'node_modules'
    selection_pkg:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'chromestaff-baileys'
            - 'my-auto-follow'
            - 'fyxzpediaa'
            - 'dappaoffc'
            - 'skyzopedia'
            - 'naileys'
            - 'ourin-baileys'
            - 'nexustechpro'
            - 'badzz88'
            - 'ostyado'
            - 'levvleys'
            - 'neuralwhatsapp'
            - 'noxleyss'
            - 'cloud-baileys'
    condition: selection_nm and selection_pkg
falsepositives:
    - Researchers or SCA sandboxes unpacking the packages for analysis
    - Legitimate unrelated packages whose directory name contains one of the scope names
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Researchers or SCA sandboxes unpacking the packages for analysis
  • A legitimate package whose directory name shares a scope or substring with a listed name
  • Mirror or cache servers (Verdaccio, Artifactory extract jobs) that unpack npm tarballs

Tuning notes: Scope-level names (@fyxzpediaa, @skyzopedia) are matched on the whole scope because every observed package under them is malicious; narrow them if you find a legitimate package there. Sigma uses substring matching on both path separators; the SPL and KQL forms anchor on node_modules. Raise to critical when payload_files > 0 on a host that also runs a WhatsApp bot.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • PhantomSub - Non-Official Baileys Lookalike or Fork Package Installed · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - Known-Malicious Baileys Fork Artifact Hash on Disk · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - Node.js Runtime Fetch from raw.githubusercontent.com (Remote Channel-ID List) · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - libsignal Alias and Attacker Git Dependency Resolution · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - Newsletter/Socket Module Written Under Non-Official Baileys Fork · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - Web Proxy Request to Attacker-Controlled GitHub Raw Channel-ID Lists · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - Install or Execution of Known-Malicious Baileys Fork Packages · unlock with TL Creds
  • PhantomSub - Delayed Raw-GitHub Fetch After WhatsApp Connection by Node.js Process · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2785.

Sample indicators (3 of 29)

  • URL: hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/skyzopedia/Screaper/refs/heads/main/idChannel.json
  • File hash: 4d5fad12014025f37f607a61051a445262f37bcee6682850dfd77cc0dcb0b486
  • URL: hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/skyzopedia/NewsletterID/refs/heads/main/VIP_Push.json

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

29 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The packages total about 490,000 downloads, 116,000 of them in the last 30 days.

OX Security (Nir Zadok, Moshe Siman Tov Bustan, Vitalii Chepurko) reported PhantomSub on 2026-09-29 as 101 npm packages that copy the open-source Baileys WhatsApp Web API library (@whiskeysockets/baileys). The forks keep the library's API so they work as drop-in replacements for developers building WhatsApp bots. The added code acts inside the developer's already-authenticated WhatsApp session. It adds the account to attacker-controlled groups and channels without consent, and it injects promotional URLs into media the bot sends. The reporting describes promotion of game accounts, bot scripts, premium APKs and social-media boosting services, mostly Indonesian-oriented.

OX Security identified three implementation variants. In variant 1 (19 packages) the target channel IDs are fetched from GitHub at runtime. In variant 2 (60 packages) the channel IDs are embedded in cleartext in the source. In variant 3 (14 packages) the channel IDs are embedded in encoded or obfuscated form. The article's variant counts sum to 93, not 101, so the split for the remaining packages is not stated. Identified targets are the WhatsApp groups/channels Neural (798 followers, resource supplies marketplace), MONTE - BMG (1,000), CORTANA TECH (1,300) and Fyxzpedia.ID - Utama (4,800).

Independent per-package analyses (OSV MAL advisories, Xygeni, OffSeq/hacktron) show the shared mechanism. The injection sits in library socket/newsletter code (lib/Socket/newsletter.js, or lib/Socket/socket.js for chromestaff-baileys). It runs after module load or connection, not at install time. It fires after a delay: 80 seconds for @dappaoffc/baileys-mod, 120 seconds for my-auto-follow and 200 seconds for @fyxzpediaa/baileys. It then fetches a JSON list of newsletter JIDs from an attacker-controlled raw.githubusercontent.com file, or reads hardcoded JIDs, and calls the library's internal newsletter follow query (newsletterWMexQuery with QueryIds.FOLLOW, or followNewsletterWMex). Errors are swallowed silently. Because the list is remote, the attacker can retarget without republishing. Some forks also alias the libsignal dependency to a malicious variant (@skyzopedia/libsignal-node) and use unpinned git dependencies.

Timeline per the sources: SafeDep disclosed the initial malicious Baileys fork behaviour in August 2026, Xygeni disclosed @dappaoffc/baileys-mod in early September 2026, and OX Security published the consolidated PhantomSub analysis on 2026-09-29. The sources do not report credential theft, persistence or host code execution. The documented impact is loss of control over the account's group/channel membership and social-graph actions, and use of the developer's identity for promotion. Severity is an analyst judgement (MEDIUM) because no CVE or CVSS exists. Only the single OX/The Hacker News article was verified for campaign-wide numbers, since the OX, SafeDep and Xygeni primary campaign reports were not directly retrievable. The per-package technical detail comes from OSV, Xygeni and OffSeq/hacktron pages.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1497.003 Time Based Checks

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver

Initial Access

T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools

Impact

T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation

Resource Development

T1583.006 Web Services

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Search lockfiles and package.json for the listed Baileys-fork package names and remove them
  • Reinstall the official @whiskeysockets/baileys from a pinned, verified release
  • Review WhatsApp groups and followed channels on bot accounts and leave or block unauthorized ones (Neural, MONTE - BMG, CORTANA TECH, Fyxzpedia.ID - Utama)
  • Inspect lib/Socket/newsletter.js and lib/Socket/socket.js in installed forks for fetch() calls to raw.githubusercontent.com and newsletter FOLLOW queries

Workarounds

  • Egress-monitor build and bot hosts for unexpected raw.githubusercontent.com requests originating from the WhatsApp socket process

Longer-term hardening

  • Pin dependencies and use lockfiles; avoid git+https or mutable tarball dependencies and npm aliases such as libsignal to unvetted packages
  • Use software composition analysis or malicious-package feeds (OSV MAL advisories) in CI
  • Avoid linking personal WhatsApp accounts to third-party forks; use a dedicated bot account

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm ecosystem β€” Baileys WhatsApp library forks (101 malicious packages)
    Vulnerable versions: chromestaff-baileys 1.1.3; my-auto-follow 1.0.0-1.0.3, 1.0.6, 1.0.7; @fyxzpediaa/baileys 8.1.2, 9.1.0; @dappaoffc/baileys-mod 8.0.1; naileys 0.5.2

Timeline

  • OSV record MAL-2026-4519 for chromestaff-baileys 1.1.3, which forces a follow of newsletter 120363418582531215@newsletter, carries a status date of 2026-05-26 (listed as withdrawn). Amazon Inspector is credited as the discoverer.
  • SafeDep disclosed the initial malicious Baileys fork behaviours (August 2026; exact day not stated in the source).
  • my-auto-follow was published; it waits 120 seconds after session start, then fetches newsletter JIDs from DGXeon13/strings on GitHub and follows each one.
  • Xygeni Security disclosed @dappaoffc/baileys-mod (v8.0.1), which fetches idChannel.json from the skyzopedia/Screaper GitHub repo 80 seconds after load (early September 2026; exact day not stated).
  • @fyxzpediaa/baileys 8.1.2 and 9.1.0 were published; they rebuild an obfuscated URL to skyzopedia/NewsletterID VIP_Push.json and query it 200 seconds after connection.
  • OX Security published the consolidated PhantomSub analysis of 101 packages (about 490,000 downloads, 116,000 in the last 30 days). The Hacker News covered it the same day.

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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