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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-2806

Mini Shai-Hulud: Compromised @antv npm Packages Steal Developer and CI/CD Credentials (TeamPCP)

highACTIVE

On 2026-05-19 a compromised maintainer account ('atool') published 637-639 malicious versions across ~323 npm packages in the @antv ecosystem, including echarts-for-react, size-sensor and timeago.js. A preinstall hook runs an obfuscated Bun payload that harvests cloud, GitHub, npm, Vault, Kubernetes and 1Password credentials from workstations and GitHub Actions runners, then self-propagates. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2806
Also known asMini Shai-Hulud, Shai-Hulud wave 5, AntV npm compromise
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsAntV / npm ecosystem @antv/* npm packages (g2, g6, x6, l7, s2, f2, g, g2plot, graphin, data-set, scale); npm ecosystem echarts-for-react, size-sensor, timeago.js, canvas-nest.js
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-522
AttributionTeamPCP (medium confidence)
MalwareBackdoor:Python/ShaiWorm, Shai-Hulud
ToolsBun
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.007 Proc Filesystem, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1543.001 Launch Agent, T1543.002 Systemd Service, T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching, T1552.001 Credentials In Files and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, cloud, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2806 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Mini Shai-Hulud — Bun Payload Launched From npm Preinstall Chain

Detects the Mini Shai-Hulud execution chain in which a compromised @antv/npm package's preinstall hook runs node, then a shell, then the Bun runtime executing the ~499 KB obfuscated index.js payload (bun run index.js). Bun launched by a shell/lifecycle script against index.js is the install-time execution point for credential theft on developer workstations and CI runners.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195.001, T1059.007, T1059.004
  • Data sources: sysmon, sysmon_for_linux, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype IN ("XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational","sysmon:linux") EventCode=1 (Image="*/bun" OR Image="*bun.exe")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), pcl=lower(ParentCommandLine), pimg=lower(ParentImage)
``` Bun running index.js, or spawned by a shell whose command line references preinstall / index.js ```
| where like(cl,"%run index.js%") OR like(pcl,"%preinstall%") OR (like(pcl,"%index.js%") AND (like(pimg,"%/sh") OR like(pimg,"%/bash") OR like(pimg,"%/dash")))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as bun_cmd values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('bun', 'bun.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ('run', 'index.js')
    or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has 'preinstall'
    or (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has 'index.js' and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('sh', 'bash', 'dash', 'zsh', 'cmd.exe'))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Bun Runtime Executing index.js Payload From npm Lifecycle Hook (Mini Shai-Hulud)
id: 7c1e4a52-9b3d-4f68-a2e7-1d5c8b09f3a1
status: experimental
description: Detects Bun executing index.js or being spawned from an npm preinstall lifecycle command, the execution chain used by the Mini Shai-Hulud @antv npm compromise.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/20/mini-shai-hulud-compromised-antv-npm-packages-enable-ci-cd-credential-theft/
    - https://snyk.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-antv-npm-supply-chain-attack/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/30
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1195.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1059.004
    - detection.emerging_threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_bun:
        Image|endswith: '/bun'
    selection_payload:
        CommandLine|contains: 'run index.js'
    selection_lifecycle:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'preinstall'
    condition: selection_bun and (selection_payload or selection_lifecycle)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate projects that build or run with Bun and an index.js entry point
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Projects that legitimately use Bun as their runtime and start it with index.js
  • Developer bootstrap scripts that install and run Bun from an npm script

Tuning notes: Allowlist repositories and hosts that intentionally use Bun. Highest fidelity on CI runners and build hosts where Bun is not part of the standard toolchain; there, alert on any Bun execution. Bun on Windows is covered by the bun.exe image match in SPL/KQL only.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — Install of Compromised npm Packages or Payload Hash Present · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — kitty-monitor, Claude Hook and VS Code Task Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — GitHub Dead-Drop Marker and cat.py Commit-Polling C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — Bun Runtime Bootstrap From npm Lifecycle Context · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — Passwordless Sudoers Rule Injection on CI Runner · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — Node/Bun Cloud Instance Metadata Credential Probe · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — GitHub Actions Runner.Worker Memory Secret Extraction · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mini Shai-Hulud — Exfiltration to [indicator] OTel-Masquerade Endpoint · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 23 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2806.

Sample indicators (3 of 23)

  • Domain: t[.]m-kosche[.]com
  • File hash: a68dd1e6a6e35ec3771e1f94fe796f55dfe65a2b94560516ff4ac189390dfa1c
  • File hash: fb5c97557230a27460fdab01fafcfabeaa49590bafd5b6ef30501aa9e0a51142

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 23 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

23 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Qualys and GBHackers (2026-09-28/30) frame it as attackers moving beyond source-code theft to developer credentials for cloud account takeover.

Mini Shai-Hulud is a fifth-wave continuation of the Shai-Hulud npm worm lineage (Sep 2025 original, Nov 2025 'SHA1-Hulud', Apr 2026 SAP CAP-JS wave with Claude Code hook injection, 2026-05-11 TanStack wave with valid SLSA provenance via OIDC hijack). On 2026-05-19 UTC, in two waves (about 01:39-01:56 with ~317 versions and 02:05-02:06 with ~314 versions), the npm account 'atool', which maintains the @antv scope and roughly 547 packages, was used to publish malicious versions. Snyk counts 637 versions across 323 packages and about 16 million weekly downloads; Microsoft and SecurityWeek count 639 versions. Downstream packages such as echarts-for-react (over 1M weekly downloads), size-sensor and timeago.js were affected. The method of maintainer-account compromise was still under investigation.

Execution chain: the package's preinstall hook runs node, then a shell, then Bun (installed if absent), then a ~499 KB obfuscated index.js that replaces the legitimate file. Obfuscation has two layers: 1,732 Base64 strings in a rotated array (shuffle key 0xa31de), and PBKDF2/SHA-256-encrypted critical strings (C2 domain, env var names) decrypted at runtime. The payload gates on GitHub Actions on Linux and skips main, master, dependabot/, renovate/ and gh-pages branches. It reads secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory (/proc/<pid>/mem), which bypasses GitHub secret masking. It also probes AWS IMDS (169.254.169.254) and ECS (169.254.170.2) metadata, and scans 80+ environment variables and 100-130+ file paths (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, .npmrc, .netrc, Vault token paths, SSH keys, database strings, SaaS tokens). Targeted credential stores include GitHub, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes, npm (including OIDC-to-npm token exchange) and 1Password.

Exfiltration: data is JSON-serialized, gzip-compressed and AES-256-GCM encrypted with the key wrapped by an attacker RSA-OAEP public key. It goes to t.m-kosche[.]com:443 at /api/public/otel/v1/traces, disguised as OpenTelemetry traces. The fallback is public GitHub 'dead-drop' repositories created under victim accounts (2,200+ observed) with the reversed description 'niagA oG eW ereH :duluH-iahS' and Dune-themed names, plus commits through the Git Data API. Persistence and escalation: an injected passwordless sudoers rule, a .claude/settings.json SessionStart hook, a .vscode/tasks.json folderOpen task, a Python C2 daemon (~/.local/share/kitty/cat.py) run through a systemd user unit or macOS LaunchAgent, and a GitHub token monitor. The payload also forges Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) SLSA provenance and injects a malicious GitHub workflow. Attribution to TeamPCP (DeadCatx3, PCPcat) comes from Snyk and SecurityWeek citing researchers. Microsoft did not name an actor.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.007 Proc Filesystem; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Execution

T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Initial Access

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools

Persistence

T1543.001 Launch Agent; T1543.002 Systemd Service

Privilege Escalation

T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching

Exfiltration

T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository

Remediation

Patches

  • Pin to known-good versions published before 2026-05-19; GitHub removed ~640 malicious packages and invalidated 61,274 npm tokens

Immediate actions

  • Search lockfiles and package.json for @antv/*, echarts-for-react, size-sensor, timeago.js, canvas-nest.js and other packages published 2026-05-19
  • Rotate all exposed GitHub tokens/PATs, AWS keys, npm publish tokens, Vault tokens, kubeconfig credentials and CI/CD secrets
  • Audit GitHub accounts for repos with description 'niagA oG eW ereH :duluH-iahS' and the branch chore/add-codeql-static-analysis
  • Block and alert on t.m-kosche.com; review CI/CD egress logs
  • Remove persistence: .claude/settings.json SessionStart hook, .vscode/tasks.json folderOpen task, kitty-monitor systemd/LaunchAgent units, gh-token-monitor.sh

Workarounds

  • Set ignore-scripts=true in .npmrc / npm install --ignore-scripts with explicit allowlisting
  • Enforce lockfile integrity (npm ci)

Longer-term hardening

  • Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived OIDC-federated workload credentials
  • Enforce IMDSv2 and egress filtering for 169.254.169.254
  • Use a private registry/proxy with cooldown and behavioral scanning
  • Least-privilege CI/CD secrets and immutable audit logging

Affected and fixed versions

  • AntV / npm ecosystem — @antv/* npm packages (g2, g6, x6, l7, s2, f2, g, g2plot, graphin, data-set, scale)
    Vulnerable versions: Versions published 2026-05-19 UTC (637-639 versions across ~323 packages)
    Fixed in: Removed by GitHub; use pre-2026-05-19 releases
  • npm ecosystem — echarts-for-react, size-sensor, timeago.js, canvas-nest.js
    Vulnerable versions: Malicious versions published 2026-05-19
    Fixed in: Pre-compromise releases

Timeline

  • First Shai-Hulud self-propagating npm worm wave (~4 packages, e.g. @ctrl/tinycolor)
  • SHA1-Hulud second wave: 600+ packages (Zapier, PostHog, Postman) with backdoor and destructive capabilities
  • Mini Shai-Hulud SAP CAP-JS/MBT wave (4 packages) introduces Claude Code hook injection
  • TanStack wave: 84 versions across 42 packages published with valid SLSA provenance via OIDC hijack
  • Public detection around 02:18 UTC; researchers file reports; malicious packages spread to downstream echarts-for-react, size-sensor, timeago.js
  • Compromised 'atool' maintainer account publishes ~317 malicious @antv versions between 01:39 and 01:56 UTC; a second wave of ~314 follows at 02:05-02:06 UTC
  • Microsoft, Snyk and SecurityWeek publish analyses; GitHub removes ~640 malicious packages and invalidates 61,274 npm tokens
  • Qualys publishes 'Developer New Perimeter' analysis tying Shai-Hulud to developer-credential-driven cloud breaches
  • GBHackers reports attackers targeting developer credentials to expand supply chain intrusions beyond source code

Sources cited

More from TeamPCP

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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