Skip to navigation

Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2788

Phishing Campaigns Abuse RMM Tools (MSP360, ScreenConnect) for Persistent Access

highACTIVE

Microsoft Defender Experts observed phishing campaigns in July 2026 that deliver a masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer, which is then used to silently deploy ConnectWise ScreenConnect for redundant remote access, credential theft and data collection. The activity is unattributed and targets organizations across multiple industries.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2788
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (endpoints where unapproved RMM software can be installed); MSP360 MSP360 RMM Agent (legitimate software abused, v2.5.0.67); ConnectWise ScreenConnect (legitimate software abused)
ToolsConnectWise ScreenConnect, MSP360, MSP360 RMM, ScreenConnect
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry, T1204 User Execution, T1218.007 Msiexec, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1543.003 Windows Service and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsmultiple industries
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2788 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 34 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 Installer Execution

Detects execution of a lure-themed installer named <lure>_rmm_v2.5.0.67_oid<id>.exe (a masqueraded MSP360 RMM package delivered by July 2026 phishing: ZoomSetup_Installation, VIP_ECARD_INVITATION, Adobe Acrobat update, RSVP e-card, SSA.GOV_STATEMENT) or a process matching the published installer hashes. This is the user-execution step that lands the first of two redundant remote-access tools. Community telemetry (TL_OSINT_Scan) saw installer SHA256 108ef7e6...73dc four times, and before the Microsoft report, so hash coverage is corroborated.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204, T1036.005, T1566.002
  • Data sources: sysmon EventCode 1 (XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational), DeviceProcessEvents, windows process_creation
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

```Masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer, TL-2026-2788```
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
    (Image="*_rmm_v2.5.0.67*.exe"
     OR Hashes IN ("*108ef7e628d7a20bd6241a5b57149e27a6061f467123eb64061975559f8f73dc*", "*f094b8263471c7b76dbed03d420736449920368fa0eca2ed6b1aea2645138d97*", "*857c2f283de799faa74b56e862c0a9f96e67aa1b4fa4a9e46395098365b99de3*", "*6a89de024ca62536de6f5fc10e49896bb1ac330ca39dce30203afdcc45ae237e*", "*4188c6588f3dcda881c3f2d12df580051179a999f040b799af506edeb3211a26*", "*f34330d4c6e0aa978dc3af40360c14b31ad51127*"))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_line values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(User) as user values(Hashes) as hashes by host Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let RmmInstallerHashes = dynamic(["108ef7e628d7a20bd6241a5b57149e27a6061f467123eb64061975559f8f73dc","f094b8263471c7b76dbed03d420736449920368fa0eca2ed6b1aea2645138d97","857c2f283de799faa74b56e862c0a9f96e67aa1b4fa4a9e46395098365b99de3","6a89de024ca62536de6f5fc10e49896bb1ac330ca39dce30203afdcc45ae237e","4188c6588f3dcda881c3f2d12df580051179a999f040b799af506edeb3211a26"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)_rmm_v2\.5\.0\.67.*\.exe$" or SHA256 in~ (RmmInstallerHashes) or SHA1 =~ "f34330d4c6e0aa978dc3af40360c14b31ad51127"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: Masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 Installer Execution
id: 3f6a1c52-8b7d-4e29-9a41-6c2d5e7b0a11
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a lure-themed installer named like _rmm_v2.5.0.67_oid (masqueraded MSP360 RMM) or a process matching known sample hashes, as delivered by July 2026 phishing campaigns.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/29/phishing-abuses-rmm-tools-persistent-access/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-29
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|contains: '_rmm_v2.5.0.67'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - '108ef7e628d7a20bd6241a5b57149e27a6061f467123eb64061975559f8f73dc'
            - 'f094b8263471c7b76dbed03d420736449920368fa0eca2ed6b1aea2645138d97'
            - '857c2f283de799faa74b56e862c0a9f96e67aa1b4fa4a9e46395098365b99de3'
            - '6a89de024ca62536de6f5fc10e49896bb1ac330ca39dce30203afdcc45ae237e'
            - '4188c6588f3dcda881c3f2d12df580051179a999f040b799af506edeb3211a26'
            - 'f34330d4c6e0aa978dc3af40360c14b31ad51127'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate MSP360 deployment by an approved IT provider using a per-tenant installer built with the same version
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Approved IT/MSP team deploying MSP360 RMM 2.5.0.67 with a vendor-generated installer
  • Software packaging tests that reuse the _rmm_v2.5.0.67 naming convention

Tuning notes: Allow-list the SHA256 of your own sanctioned MSP360 tenant installer and the deploying management account. The filename pattern is intentionally broad because the lure prefix changes per email; keep the _rmm_v2.5.0.67 suffix match and add new versions as they are reported.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Masqueraded RMM Installer Downloaded from Cloud Hosting · unlock with TL Creds
  • MSP360 RMM Autorun Key and UDP 48678 Firewall Allow Rule · unlock with TL Creds
  • Silent ScreenConnect MSI Install Launched from MSP360 Agent · unlock with TL Creds
  • MSP360 RMM Agent Spawning PowerShell or Cmd · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tools Staged in ScreenConnect Temp Directory · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser Credential Viewer or Fake Credential Prompt Launched via ScreenConnect · unlock with TL Creds
  • MSP360 RMM Agent Registered as a Windows Service · unlock with TL Creds
  • MSP360 Actor Domains and RMM Agent UDP 48678 Traffic · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 34 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2788.

Sample indicators (3 of 34)

  • Domain: adswre[.]cfd
  • File hash: 108ef7e628d7a20bd6241a5b57149e27a6061f467123eb64061975559f8f73dc
  • Domain: trews[.]cfd

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 34 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

34 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Microsoft Defender Experts identified phishing campaigns, active from July 2026, that distribute legitimate MSP360 remote monitoring and management (RMM) software masqueraded as something else. Lures include workplace meeting requests, Zoom and Google Meet installation prompts, Adobe Acrobat / PDF reader updates, RSVP invitations and e-cards, job offer documents, document review/signature requests and DHL package delivery content. Phishing emails point to actor-controlled landing pages that impersonate document portals, invitation workflows, Adobe Reader pages, Zoom installers and collaboration platforms. Victims are then redirected to download locations on attacker infrastructure and on legitimate cloud services (Amazon S3, Cloudflare R2, Dropbox, GitLab and Supabase). Observed installer file names follow a pattern of a themed lure name plus '_rmm_v2.5.0.67_oid<id>.exe', for example VIP_ECARD_INVITATION_rmm_v2.5.0.67, ZoomSetup_Installation_v2.5.0.67, 'PDF Reader & Editor the Adobe Acrobatte_rmm_v2.5.0.67', RSVP_INVITATION_E_CARD_rmm_v2.5.0.67 and SSA.GOV_STATEMENT_rmm_v2.5.0.67.

The installer is an NSIS-style package that drops System.dll, nsExec.dll, UAC.dll, RMM.Agent.exe and RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe under C:\Program Files\RMM Agent\. RMM.Agent.exe and RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe are registered as Windows services, registry autorun entries are created for the MSP360 UI components, and an inbound firewall allow rule is created for RMM.Agent.exe on UDP port 48678. Microsoft's report names seven actor-associated domains used with the RMM agent (adswre.cfd, trews.cfd, adsaw.cfd, swedcorry.stefneyv.com, ojsuyw.niyari.org, bunstar.harej.si and sdfghj.rd-team.ru).

Once the MSP360 agent is running, the actor uses it to execute PowerShell that downloads ClientSetup.msi from actor infrastructure and installs ConnectWise ScreenConnect silently with msiexec.exe /qn, giving a second, redundant remote access channel (ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe and ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe). Through ScreenConnect the actor stages further tooling in ...\Documents\ScreenConnect\Temp\ (including under the OneDrive-redirected Documents folder). The transferred tools include fake Windows security/PIN/password prompt executables (WindowsSecurity_PIN.exe, WindowsSecurity_Password.exe, WindowsPassKey.exe, PIN.exe, Passwords.EXE), Phone Link themed executables, Defender control utilities (DefenderControl.exe, DefenderDT.exe), UI-hiding utilities (SCHider.exe, HideFromControlPanel.exe, BannerHider.exe, HideCursor.exe, HideMouse.exe, MouseHiderGUI.exe, HideUL.exe, HideMouseApp.dll) and NirSoft-style browser credential viewers (WebBrowserPassView.exe, WebBrowserBookmarksView.exe). The tooling is consistent with credential theft, browser data collection and concealment of the remote session from the user.

Because both MSP360 and ScreenConnect are legitimate, signed administration products, the activity blends with normal IT operations and may bypass controls that only look for malware. Microsoft has not attributed the activity to a named threat actor. Defenders should inventory approved RMM tools, enforce MFA on them, use application control (WDAC/AppLocker) to block unapproved RMM software, hunt for the listed hashes/paths/services, and reset credentials on any host with an unapproved RMM install.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1218.007 Msiexec; T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Persistence

T1543.003 Windows Service; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1583.006 Web Services

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Search for unapproved RMM software (MSP360 RMM Agent, ScreenConnect) and remove it; reset credentials for users on affected devices
  • Hunt for RMM.Agent.exe / RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe services, C:\Program Files\RMM Agent\ and ScreenConnect\Temp staging directories
  • Block the published domains and file hashes at the proxy, DNS and EDR layers

Workarounds

  • Restrict unauthorized software with Application Control for Windows (WDAC) and AppLocker
  • Block specific signed applications using certificate indicators

Longer-term hardening

  • Govern approved RMM tools and enforce MFA on them
  • Enable cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus
  • Deploy attack surface reduction rules (ransomware protection, PsExec/WMI process creation blocking)
  • Train users to recognize meeting, document-signature, Adobe/Zoom update and package-delivery lures

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (endpoints where unapproved RMM software can be installed)
  • MSP360 — MSP360 RMM Agent (legitimate software abused, v2.5.0.67)
    Vulnerable versions: 2.5.0.67
  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (legitimate software abused)

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • Actor transfers credential-prompt, browser password viewer, Defender control and UI-hiding tools through ScreenConnect into ScreenConnect\Temp staging directories
  • locked-ioc-28 runs PowerShell to download locked-ioc-25 from actor infrastructure and installs ConnectWise ScreenConnect silently via msiexec /qn for redundant access
  • Victim runs the themed *_rmm_v2.5.0.67_oid*.exe; MSP360 agent installs to locked-ioc-15, registers services, autoruns and a UDP 48678 inbound firewall rule
  • Phishing emails with meeting, Zoom/Google Meet, Adobe update, RSVP/e-card, job offer, document-signature and DHL themes link to actor-controlled landing pages and cloud-hosted downloads (S3, R2, Dropbox, GitLab, Supabase)
  • Microsoft Defender Experts identify phishing campaigns (July 2026; exact day not published) distributing masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installers across multiple industries
  • Microsoft Security Blog publishes 'Phishing abuses RMM tools for persistent access' with IOCs, detections, mitigations and advanced hunting queries; activity remains unattributed
  • MSP360 publishes guidance on RMM abuse, and community blocklists (hagezi dns-blocklists, Phishing-Database) add the campaign's phishing and C2 domains, including two not in Microsoft's list.
  • The Cyber Express reports on the MSP360-to-ScreenConnect dual-RMM phishing campaign.

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats