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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2802

CSuite Phishing Operation Steals Microsoft 365 Sessions via Device-Code Phishing and Deploys ScreenConnect/Action1 RMM Tools Against US and EU Organizations

highACTIVE

ANY.RUN documented CSuite, a phishing-and-remote-access operation using Adobe, DocuSign, Zoom, Google Meet, Dropbox and Microsoft 365 lures that either steals Microsoft 365 credentials/sessions (including device-code OAuth phishing) or drops BAT/VBS/MSI installers for legitimate RMM agents (ScreenConnect, Action1, Atera, Syncro, PDQ Connect).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2802
Also known asCSuite, CSuite v1.1
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 / Entra ID (OAuth device-code flow, user sessions); ConnectWise ScreenConnect (abused legitimate client); Action1 Action1 RMM agent (abused legitimate client); Microsoft Windows endpoints (msiexec, PowerShell, LSA authentication packages)
ToolsAction1, Atera, PDQ Connect, ScreenConnect, Syncro
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1547.002 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package, T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, manufacturing, government administration, consulting, education, finance
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, india, philippines, australia, united kingdom, canada
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2802 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 31 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: CSuite — Endpoint Connections to Operator ScreenConnect Relays and Infrastructure

Detects outbound connections to CSuite operator-controlled ScreenConnect servers/relays (ports 8040/8041), the hardcoded cloud relay instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com, and related panel, kit-origin and PowerMTA sending infrastructure, indicating an installed RMM agent is checking in to the operator.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1219, T1090.003
  • Data sources: sysmon (EventCode 3), DeviceNetworkEvents
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3 (DestinationIp IN ("207.189.19.40","91.92.41.114","212.189.40.73","155.254.26.180","64.204.180.203","185.174.102.34","190.123.46.122","188.127.227.18","141.133.174.208") OR DestinationHostname="*instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com" OR (Image="*ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" DestinationPort IN (8040,8041))) ```ScreenConnect client beaconing to operator relay/infra``` | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationPort) as ports values(DestinationHostname) as dest_hosts by host Image User | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let csuite_ips = dynamic(["207.189.19.40","91.92.41.114","212.189.40.73","155.254.26.180","64.204.180.203","185.174.102.34","190.123.46.122","188.127.227.18","141.133.174.208"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt")
| where RemoteIP in (csuite_ips)
    or RemoteUrl endswith "instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com"
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" and RemotePort in (8040, 8041))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Connection to CSuite ScreenConnect Relay or Operator Infrastructure
id: 9c3f6b21-8e04-4d75-b1a9-5a7e2c4d8f03
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound connections to CSuite operator IPs, the hardcoded ScreenConnect cloud relay, or ScreenConnect client traffic on ports 8040/8041.
references:
    - https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/csuite-attack-analysis/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/30
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219
    - attack.t1090.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ip:
        DestinationIp:
            - '207.189.19.40'
            - '91.92.41.114'
            - '212.189.40.73'
            - '155.254.26.180'
            - '64.204.180.203'
            - '185.174.102.34'
            - '190.123.46.122'
            - '188.127.227.18'
            - '141.133.174.208'
    selection_relay:
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com'
    selection_sc:
        Image|endswith: '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
        DestinationPort:
            - 8040
            - 8041
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Your own sanctioned ScreenConnect instance if it listens on 8040/8041
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Sanctioned corporate ScreenConnect instance hosted on ports 8040/8041 (port-only branch)
  • IP reuse if operator infrastructure is later reassigned

Tuning notes: IP/relay matches are high fidelity; the port-8040/8041 branch should be scoped to exclude your own ScreenConnect server. Refresh the IP list against updated ANY.RUN/TL indicators and pivot on the source host for msiexec/dropper activity.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • CSuite — Shared Anti-Analysis Gate [indicator] and Operator Lure Domains · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — LSA Authentication Package / Credential Provider Persistence via ScreenConnect · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — Unsanctioned RMM Agent Execution (ScreenConnect, Action1, Atera, Syncro, PDQ Connect) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — Lure Installer/Dropper File Creation (Fake Adobe/DocuSign Viewers, BAT/VBS) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — Signed Adobe Loader SSAStatement.exe Side-Loading Substituted msvcp140.dll · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — DNS Resolution of Operator Lure, Panel and ScreenConnect Relay Domains · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — Successful Entra ID Device-Code Sign-In (Token Theft Path) · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSuite — Silent msiexec Install From Remote/GitHub URL and PowerShell RunAs Self-Elevation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 31 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2802.

Sample indicators (3 of 31)

  • IP address: 207.189.19[.]40
  • Domain: maillive[.]sbs
  • File hash: c0eb04dcfa745653c466c34978a1f3b4e5041f526be8c2e46b8c722498ca746a

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 31 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

31 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

351 sandbox analyses across 170 hosts; 51% of submissions from the US, 18% from India.

CSuite is a multi-path phishing operation reported by ANY.RUN (22 Sep 2026) and covered by The Hacker News on 30 Sep 2026. Victims receive document-themed lures (Adobe Document Cloud share invitations from hijacked Adobe tenants, DocuSign envelopes, Zoom/Google Meet invites, Dropbox documents, Microsoft 365 voicemail, SharePoint, Teams, WeTransfer, DocSend), delivered either through hijacked Adobe tenants or dedicated SMTP relays (PowerMTA on port 2525, DKIM published). Landing pages sit on operator domains and on compromised legitimate websites (e.g. an Australian escrow site) behind a shared anti-analysis gate, /m/js/utils.js (66 KB, header 'Enhanced CAPTCHA Protection Utilities'), reused across 170 hosts over roughly seven months. The gate filters on user-agent (crawler/automation and security-vendor signatures), IP blocklists and geolocation, browser fingerprinting, reCAPTCHA v3 score and human-interaction telemetry, and adds honeypot fields, suppressed dev-tools shortcuts and a resource-exhaustion trap.

Path 1 (endpoint): a counterfeit Adobe Reader/DocuSign viewer auto-triggers a synthetic download click and serves an archive (e.g. AdobePdf_Reader.zip containing ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi), a direct MSI, or a BAT/VBS dropper. The 324-byte batch dropper tests for admin rights, self-elevates through PowerShell Start-Process -Verb RunAs, and runs msiexec /i against a raw GitHub URL with /quiet /norestart. Other droppers write the installer to a temp directory and show a fake 'Application Error' popup. Installed agents register to operator-controlled tenants: ScreenConnect with a hardcoded relay, a credential-provider CLSID and an LSA authentication package (ScreenConnect.WindowsAuthenticationPackage.dll) that loads at boot and survives safe mode with networking; Action1, Atera, Syncro and PDQ Connect agents are staged under Adobe/Dotloop/Zoom names. One observed loader used a signed Adobe binary (SSAStatement.exe) that side-loads a substituted msvcp140.dll.

Path 2 (identity): traffic is routed by email provider. Microsoft accounts go to device-code OAuth pages (Next.js frontend calling /api/lure/config, /api/initiate and /api/status; the victim is sent to the real Microsoft device-login page and the operator receives access and refresh tokens without capturing a password), Google accounts go to a separate capture flow, and others go to a 'Chameleon' credential harvester (providers/chameleon.php) that impersonates the victim's organization with logos and screenshots. The 'CSuite v1.1' admin panel (host maillive.sbs) has Sessions, Adobe Sender, Offline File Generator, DocForge, Auto Redirect and Worker Links modules; Cloudflare workers.dev reverse proxies hide origin domains and a Telegram bot API reports each visitor. The panel showed 29 captured Microsoft 365 sessions, 1,593 documents sent through hijacked Adobe tenants, and 15,955 harvested email addresses; 216 unique Chameleon victims were seen. Captured mailboxes were worked by hand over a remote-desktop host, creating invoice-fraud and payment-redirection risk. ANY.RUN reports the operator accidentally sent hosting-panel and remote-desktop credentials to the same recipient on 7 Aug 2026, tying delivery and capture infrastructure together. No named threat actor is attributed in the sources. Targeted sectors: technology, manufacturing, government/administration, consulting, education and mortgage licensees.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1556 Modify Authentication Process; T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Collection

T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection

Defense Evasion

T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1574.001 DLL

Persistence

T1547.002 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing

Initial Access

T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Hunt proxy/DNS/EDR telemetry for requests to the path /m/js/utils.js and block the listed CSuite domains and IPs
  • Revoke refresh tokens and active sessions for any user who entered a device code or visited a suspected lure page; review Entra sign-in logs for the device-code authentication flow
  • Inventory and remove unsanctioned ScreenConnect, Action1, Atera, Syncro and PDQ Connect agents, especially those registering to relays or tenants you do not own (e.g. instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com)
  • Search mailboxes for Adobe/DocuSign share invitations and quarantine matching messages

Workarounds

  • Restrict outbound access to RMM vendor cloud endpoints to the tenants your organization uses
  • Block execution of .bat/.vbs files delivered in archives from email or browser downloads

Longer-term hardening

  • Block the OAuth device-code flow with Conditional Access for users who do not need it
  • Application-allowlist RMM software (WDAC/AppLocker) and alert on msiexec installing from remote HTTPS or raw GitHub URLs
  • Alert on new LSA authentication packages and credential-provider CLSID registrations
  • Train users to distrust prompts to copy a verification code into a Microsoft sign-in page

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Entra ID (OAuth device-code flow, user sessions)
    Vulnerable versions: Tenants permitting device-code authentication
  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (abused legitimate client)
  • Action1 — Action1 RMM agent (abused legitimate client)
  • Microsoft — Windows endpoints (msiexec, PowerShell, LSA authentication packages)

Timeline

  • Earliest sample of the shared /m/js/utils.js anti-analysis gate observed in ANY.RUN sandbox corpus
  • Earliest public submission of the PHP kit build; CSuite panel domain-registry additions begin (lure hosts added 2 Apr through 14 Aug)
  • Complete gate-plus-Chameleon credential capture deployment observed on compromised site locked-ioc-14 under /upload/cgi/
  • Four TLS certificates issued on shared hosting (locked-ioc-23) for locked-ioc-22, ghs.coorpes.com, greaterheights.sbs and mmswerod.sbs
  • Operator sent hosting-panel and remote-desktop (locked-ioc-24:26688) credentials to the same recipient, linking delivery and capture infrastructure
  • ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi uploaded to GitHub repositories mobi and jppp under account Ivan3900
  • Further ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi uploaded to the Ivan3900/test repository
  • Final kit path observed in sandbox telemetry
  • ANY.RUN published its CSuite attack analysis (351 sandbox analyses across 170 hosts)
  • The Hacker News reported the US-focused CSuite campaign

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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