Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2819
2CLoader: New Malware Loader Delivering Vidar, Remus and XWorm
Zscaler ThreatLabz analyzed 2CLoader, a new Windows malware loader first identified in August 2026 that delivers the Vidar and Remus information stealers and the XWorm RAT. It combines Hell's Gate indirect syscalls, layered XOR/AES-GCM payload decryption, extensive anti-VM/anti-debug checks and configurable persistence, and beacons to its C2 via XOR-encrypted HTTP POST.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2819 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | 2CLoader, Win64.Loader.2CLoader |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Malware | 2CLoader, Remus, Vidar, XWorm |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1012 Query Registry, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows), T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection, T1055.012 Process Hollowing, T1057 Process Discovery, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1106 Native API and 13 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2819 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 35 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: 2CLoader User-Level Autostart Persistence (Run/RunOnce, Startup, Logon Script, Load) — Post-Exploitation
Detects the configurable 2CLoader persistence options: HKCU Run/RunOnce values named SecurityHealthService.exe pointing at _SecurityHealthService.exe, a Startup-folder copy of that name, the HKCU Environment UserInitMprLogonScript logon-script value, and the HKCU Windows NT CurrentVersion Windows Load value. The masquerading name mimics the Windows Security Health component.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1037.001, T1112, T1036.005
- Data sources: sysmon, DeviceRegistryEvents, DeviceFileEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
((EventCode=13 TargetObject="HKU\\*" (TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" OR TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*") (TargetObject="*SecurityHealthService.exe" OR Details="*_SecurityHealthService.exe*"))
OR (EventCode=13 TargetObject="HKU\\*" (TargetObject="*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript" OR TargetObject="*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load"))
OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*SecurityHealthService.exe"))
| eval persistence=case(EventCode=11,"Startup folder copy",like(TargetObject,"%UserInitMprLogonScript"),"UserInitMprLogonScript logon script",match(TargetObject,"(?i)Windows.Load$"),"Windows Load value",like(TargetObject,"%RunOnce%"),"RunOnce value",true(),"Run value")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetObject) as registry_key values(Details) as registry_data values(TargetFilename) as startup_file by host, User, Image, persistence
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)Microsoft KQL
let lookback = 24h;
let autostart = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey startswith "HKEY_CURRENT_USER" or RegistryKey startswith "HKEY_USERS"
| where ((RegistryKey endswith @"\CurrentVersion\Run" or RegistryKey endswith @"\CurrentVersion\RunOnce") and (RegistryValueName has "SecurityHealthService.exe" or RegistryValueData has "_SecurityHealthService.exe"))
or (RegistryKey endswith @"\Environment" and RegistryValueName =~ "UserInitMprLogonScript")
or (RegistryKey endswith @"\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" and RegistryValueName =~ "Load")
| extend Persistence = case(RegistryValueName =~ "UserInitMprLogonScript", "Logon script", RegistryValueName =~ "Load", "Windows Load value", RegistryKey endswith "RunOnce", "RunOnce value", "Run value")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Persistence, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName;
let startup = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath has @"\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" and FileName has "SecurityHealthService.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Persistence = "Startup folder copy", RegistryKey = "", RegistryValueName = "", RegistryValueData = FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName;
union autostart, startup
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: 2CLoader Masqueraded Run Key, Logon Script or Windows Load Persistence
id: b2d5f8e3-63c9-4a72-8d14-9f8c3e6a2b02
status: experimental
description: Detects 2CLoader user-level autostart persistence - Run/RunOnce values using the SecurityHealthService.exe masquerade name, the UserInitMprLogonScript logon-script value and the Windows NT CurrentVersion Windows Load value under HKCU.
references:
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/2cloader-new-malware-loader-delivering-vidar-and-remus
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/30
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1037.001
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1036.005
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_run_name:
TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run'
TargetObject|endswith: '\SecurityHealthService.exe'
selection_run_data:
TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run'
Details|contains: '_SecurityHealthService.exe'
selection_logon_script:
TargetObject|startswith: 'HKU\'
TargetObject|endswith: '\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript'
selection_load:
TargetObject|startswith: 'HKU\'
TargetObject|endswith: '\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legacy administrative logon scripts set through UserInitMprLogonScript
- Old software that uses the Windows Load value
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legacy admin logon scripts deployed via UserInitMprLogonScript
- Legacy software using the Windows Load registry value
Tuning notes: Needs Sysmon EventCode 13 (registry value set) and 11 (file create) enabled for the Run, Environment and Windows keys and the Startup folder. The legitimate Windows component is SecurityHealthService.exe in System32 started as a service, and its Run entry is SecurityHealth for SecurityHealthSystray.exe in HKLM, so Run-key hits are high fidelity. Allow-list the UserInitMprLogonScript and Load matches by account if a legacy script exists. The source names the Load key as HKCU Software Microsoft NT CurrentVersion Windows, which is likely a typo for Windows NT, so both spellings are worth checking.
- 2CLoader Known Sample Hash, [indicator] Payload and aw_.lk Lock File — Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader RunPE Process Hollowing into dllhost.exe — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader Periodic Web Beaconing from User-Writable Binaries or Non-COM dllhost.exe — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader CLR Hosting by Unsigned Binary in a User-Writable Path — Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader SeDebugPrivilege Enabled by User-Writable Process (Flag 0x80 PPID Spoofing Path) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader LogonTrigger Scheduled Task Masquerading as SecurityHealthService.exe — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader Payload Host and C2 Infrastructure Contact — Exploitation/Delivery · unlock with TL Creds
- 2CLoader C2 Beacon — POST /api/beacon with Chrome/127 User-Agent — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 35 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2819.
Sample indicators (3 of 35)
- IP address:
62.60.226[.]185 - Domain:
aware-cr1[.]com - File hash:
5edcaa75a28e5cd700bf7643b275fe5d28649aa41a0711f391ec1fca795a4e8a
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 35 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
4 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
2CLoader is a previously undocumented Windows loader analyzed by Zscaler ThreatLabz (published 2026-09-30, first identified August 2026). The source does not state the initial access vector; the loader carries its payloads as PE resources inside the executable. Resource layout is [final payload][optional payload][optional MessageBox][0xDC-byte configuration with magic 2C 3D 4E 5F]. Delivered families are the Vidar and Remus information stealers and the XWorm RAT (secondary).
Strings are protected with inline XOR (key 0x37 in the analyzed sample). Native APIs (NtProtectVirtualMemory, NtUnmapViewOfSection, NtQueryInformationProcess, NtDelayExecution, NtSetContextThread, NtGetContextThread) are invoked through Hell's Gate indirect syscalls: the loader maps a fresh ntdll.dll from disk, extracts syscall numbers from stub patterns, and locates a 0F 05 C3 syscall gadget in the in-memory ntdll, falling back to GetProcAddress if initialization fails. The payload is decrypted in stages: two rolling-XOR layers, an AES key derived from the SHA-256 of the first executable section (.text) combined with XOR seeds from the configuration and validated by a byte-sum checksum (binding decryption to the unmodified binary), AES-GCM decryption, and optional Xpress Huffman decompression. An anti-emulation loop (3,000,000 iterations, fewer than 2,000,000 CPU cycles) corrupts the derived key.
Anti-analysis is configurable through an opt_flag bitmask: CPUID hypervisor and vendor checks (VMware, VirtualBox, KVM, Xen, Parallels and QEMU are blocked; Hyper-V is allowed), module/process/MAC/registry VM artifact checks, a 200 ms timing check, a score-based sandbox model (base 5, pass at 8 or more, using process count, CPU count, RAM, disk size, uptime, ProcessDebugPort, Recent-files count, screen resolution, username/computer name and cursor movement), IsDebuggerPresent/CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent and timing debugger checks, and a user-activity check (cursor movement, left click or Enter within 5 seconds). Optional inline trampoline hooks spoof the environment: InternetReadFile/WinHttpReadData results have the last two octets of IPv4 addresses randomized, RegQueryValueEx spoofs system info, GetUserName returns random names (admin, user, gamer, john, alex, player), and GetComputerName returns random DESKTOP-* names. A lock file at %TEMP%\aw_.lk enforces a single instance.
Payloads run through LoadPE (manual in-process PE mapping, command line spoofed to svchost.exe, new thread), RunPE (suspended dllhost.exe by default, a delete-pending temp file, SEC_IMAGE section via NtCreateSection, PEB image base fix-up and thread redirection) or CLR hosting via mscoree.dll for .NET assemblies. With flag 0x80 the secondary payload's process spoofs explorer.exe as its parent and enables SeDebugPrivilege. Persistence is selectable: HKCU Run and RunOnce values, a Startup folder copy, a LogonTrigger scheduled task (all named _SecurityHealthService.exe, masquerading as a Windows component), the HKCU\Software\Microsoft NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Load value (as written in the source) and HKCU\Environment UserInitMprLogonScript.
C2 uses HTTP POST to /api/beacon with a Chrome/127 user-agent and a JSON body XOR-encrypted with a static 32-byte key. The registration message carries the beacon ID, OS version, PID, elevation, opt flags, CPU count, RAM, locale, sample path and a process name (e.g. default.exe), followed by event messages. Observed infrastructure: C2 aware-cr1.com and payload host 62.60.226.185 (t0907.exe). Zscaler lists 20 sample hashes and detects the family as Win64.Loader.2CLoader. No CVE, threat actor or campaign attribution is stated in the source.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1012 Query Registry; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection; T1055.012 Process Hollowing; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails; T1497.001 System Checks; T1497.003 Time Based Checks; T1620 Reflective Code Loading; T1622 Debugger Evasion
Persistence
T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows); T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
Execution
defense-impairment
T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
Privilege Escalation
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block aware-cr1.com and 62.60.226.185 at DNS, proxy and firewall
- Hunt for HTTP POST requests to /api/beacon with the Chrome/127 user-agent
- Hunt for scheduled tasks, Run/RunOnce values or Startup files named _SecurityHealthService.exe
- Search endpoints for the listed SHA-256 hashes and the %TEMP%\aw_.lk lock file
- Rotate credentials, session cookies and crypto wallets on hosts where a stealer may have run
Workarounds
- Alert on services or tasks named SecurityHealthService.exe outside the legitimate System32 location
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with detection for indirect syscalls, process hollowing and PPID spoofing
- Alert on user-writable persistence values under HKCU Run, RunOnce, Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript
- Enforce application allow-listing and restrict execution from user-writable paths
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows 10/11 x64 (registration message observed on build 10.0.19044)
Timeline
- Analyzed sample registers with C2 via POST /api/beacon (Chrome/127 user-agent, Content-Type application/octet-stream) sending beacon ID, OS build 10.0.19044, PID, opt flags 1152, CPU/RAM and locale; process name locked-ioc-30 (exact date not stated).
- Samples observed with configurable persistence (HKCU Run/RunOnce, Startup folder, LogonTrigger scheduled task, Windows Load value, UserInitMprLogonScript) using the masquerading name locked-ioc-26 (exact date not stated).
- Loader observed delivering Vidar and Remus information stealers and the XWorm RAT (secondary payload).
- 2CLoader samples beacon to locked-ioc-24 using XOR-encrypted JSON over HTTP POST (exact date not stated).
- Payload locked-ioc-31 observed hosted at http://locked-ioc-28/ (in-the-wild download URL; exact date not stated).
- Zscaler ThreatLabz first identifies the 2CLoader malware loader in the wild (August 2026; exact day not stated, first of month used).
- Zscaler releases network IOCs (locked-ioc-27/api/beacon, locked-ioc-28/locked-ioc-31) and ATT&CK mapping for 2CLoader.
- Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes technical analysis, 20 sample SHA-256 hashes and detection name Win64.Loader.2CLoader.
Sources cited
- 2CLoader: A New Malware Loader Delivering Vidar and Remus (Zscaler ThreatLabz) zscaler.com · Research · 2026-09-30
- MITRE ATT&CK T1106 Native API MITRE · Research · 2026-09-30
- MITRE ATT&CK T1055.012 Process Hollowing MITRE · Research · 2026-09-30
- MITRE ATT&CK T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing MITRE · Research · 2026-09-30
- MITRE ATT&CK T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion MITRE · Research · 2026-09-30
- XWorm's Shape-Shifting Arsenal: Loader and Stager Variants in the Wild (Splunk) splunk.com · Blog · 2026-09-30
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.