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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2821

Coordinated Campaign of 32 Malicious Chrome/Edge Productivity Extensions Conducting Surveillance and Affiliate-Fraud Traffic Redirection

mediumACTIVE

Akamai (LayerX Research) reports a coordinated campaign of 32 malicious browser extensions on the Chrome Web Store and Microsoft Edge Add-ons Store, installed by 6,150+ users. The extensions pose as productivity tools but monitor browsing and redirect tabs, driven by attacker-controlled remote configuration; artifacts point to Korean-speaking operator(s) and Coupang affiliate-fraud monetization.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2821
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsGoogle Chrome Web Store extensions (Chrome users); Microsoft Microsoft Edge Add-ons Store extensions (Edge users)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1176.001 Browser Extensions, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation, T1583.006 Web Services
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, technology, ecommerce
Target regionssouth korea, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2821 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Web Store Install/Update Traffic for Known Malicious Extension IDs — Delivery

Detects proxy-logged Chrome Web Store / Edge Add-ons install or update requests (CRX update2 / extensionwebstorebase / store detail pages) that carry one of the 20 published extension IDs from the 32-extension surveillance and Coupang affiliate-fraud family reported by Akamai (LayerX). Covers the delivery stage: users pulling a masqueraded 'productivity' extension from an official store.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1199, T1176.001
  • Data sources: zscaler_web_proxy, bluecoat_proxysg, palo_alto_url_logs, cef_common_security_log
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy sourcetype IN ("zscalernss-web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog","pan:threat") earliest=-24h (url="*clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx*" OR url="*clients2.googleusercontent.com/crx*" OR url="*edge.microsoft.com/extensionwebstorebase*" OR url="*chromewebstore.google.com/detail*") ```narrow to store traffic first, then match the TL-2026-2821 extension IDs inside the URL``` | where match(url, "(?i)(fkddfdhkgfneiibakfdhgpbkkcnnlook|mfnlknmbkfnlgcjebdogolbakcekohfj|ofgiffiieajicdflklkoapgndinhfacm|kdkfbahpggclmigankbnjgmhimfoijkk|dblfldpldecohjpjgmhnigajjdjloega|nokclhllnnnahhfbpibpmnahpepahklo|hgcmokdfbgnakiifclhfifdphfofmngp|ffjagifkdpammmgijbglgkklomipinem|coohonllohmhpbklloifbjjibeggijol|ddbhcdcfllihhljfboihdbpfddibkjjg|iclkfegmbldfjjlgngidahinmhogbfna|eobmkhocignkllbfigodhemdefbjldcb|nehmipanmmnkdpbjjfinnnlficndfhhd|cogfipmojjaephpnihpeemgdmofhnaaj|pifjjafdfdkglnnkeahlcndkmknlgocm|ebkkpkifaojdccgpaldnpclompdojmbh|bodnffdkjnpeholiplcncfegnliheamk|jocoenanieejnoookkphbljadiahaopd|ekoglbhkaeljnakpledcdpfojbjdllmb|bjdlhcllmhaiigiaibaoihlmheomjjgo)") | stats count AS hits min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(url) AS urls by user src | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen) | sort - last_seen

Microsoft KQL

let ext_re = '(?i)(fkddfdhkgfneiibakfdhgpbkkcnnlook|mfnlknmbkfnlgcjebdogolbakcekohfj|ofgiffiieajicdflklkoapgndinhfacm|kdkfbahpggclmigankbnjgmhimfoijkk|dblfldpldecohjpjgmhnigajjdjloega|nokclhllnnnahhfbpibpmnahpepahklo|hgcmokdfbgnakiifclhfifdphfofmngp|ffjagifkdpammmgijbglgkklomipinem|coohonllohmhpbklloifbjjibeggijol|ddbhcdcfllihhljfboihdbpfddibkjjg|iclkfegmbldfjjlgngidahinmhogbfna|eobmkhocignkllbfigodhemdefbjldcb|nehmipanmmnkdpbjjfinnnlficndfhhd|cogfipmojjaephpnihpeemgdmofhnaaj|pifjjafdfdkglnnkeahlcndkmknlgocm|ebkkpkifaojdccgpaldnpclompdojmbh|bodnffdkjnpeholiplcncfegnliheamk|jocoenanieejnoookkphbljadiahaopd|ekoglbhkaeljnakpledcdpfojbjdllmb|bjdlhcllmhaiigiaibaoihlmheomjjgo)';
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any ('clients2.google.com', 'clients2.googleusercontent.com', 'edge.microsoft.com', 'chromewebstore.google.com')
| where RequestURL matches regex ext_re
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Urls = make_set(RequestURL, 10) by SourceUserName, SourceIP, DeviceVendor
| order by LastSeen desc

Sigma

title: Web Store Install or Update Traffic for Known Malicious Browser Extension IDs (TL-2026-2821)
id: 3f6a1c52-8d47-4b19-a0e3-5c7d92b1e401
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy-logged Chrome Web Store or Edge Add-ons install/update requests that reference an extension ID from the 32-extension surveillance and Coupang affiliate-fraud family reported by Akamai (LayerX).
references:
    - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/2026/sep/when-productivity-extensions-become-attack-platforms
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1199
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1176.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_store:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx'
            - 'clients2.googleusercontent.com/crx'
            - 'edge.microsoft.com/extensionwebstorebase'
            - 'chromewebstore.google.com/detail'
    selection_id:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'fkddfdhkgfneiibakfdhgpbkkcnnlook'
            - 'mfnlknmbkfnlgcjebdogolbakcekohfj'
            - 'ofgiffiieajicdflklkoapgndinhfacm'
            - 'kdkfbahpggclmigankbnjgmhimfoijkk'
            - 'dblfldpldecohjpjgmhnigajjdjloega'
            - 'nokclhllnnnahhfbpibpmnahpepahklo'
            - 'hgcmokdfbgnakiifclhfifdphfofmngp'
            - 'ffjagifkdpammmgijbglgkklomipinem'
            - 'coohonllohmhpbklloifbjjibeggijol'
            - 'ddbhcdcfllihhljfboihdbpfddibkjjg'
            - 'iclkfegmbldfjjlgngidahinmhogbfna'
            - 'eobmkhocignkllbfigodhemdefbjldcb'
            - 'nehmipanmmnkdpbjjfinnnlficndfhhd'
            - 'cogfipmojjaephpnihpeemgdmofhnaaj'
            - 'pifjjafdfdkglnnkeahlcndkmknlgocm'
            - 'ebkkpkifaojdccgpaldnpclompdojmbh'
            - 'bodnffdkjnpeholiplcncfegnliheamk'
            - 'jocoenanieejnoookkphbljadiahaopd'
            - 'ekoglbhkaeljnakpledcdpfojbjdllmb'
            - 'bjdlhcllmhaiigiaibaoihlmheomjjgo'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Users who legitimately installed one of the listed extensions before public disclosure
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Users or security researchers who intentionally browsed or downloaded one of the listed extensions for analysis
  • Extension-reputation or store-scraping tooling that fetches listing pages by ID

Tuning notes: Requires URL-level visibility (TLS inspection or explicit-proxy logging) for the store hosts. The ID list covers the 20 IDs published by Akamai; extend it as the remaining 12 IDs are disclosed. Exclude analyst/sandbox source IPs.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Extension Remote-Config Fetch from jsDelivr chosanghyeon-dev Repository — Dead-Drop Resolver · unlock with TL Creds
  • Navigation to Campaign Coupang Affiliate Short Links — Traffic Redirection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Config Fetch Followed by C2 or Affiliate Redirect from Same Host — Config-Driven Hijack Chain · unlock with TL Creds
  • Access to Operator GitHub Account chosanghyeon-dev — Attacker-Controlled Web Service · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS Resolution of Extension C2 [indicator] — Command and Control · unlock with TL Creds
  • Base64-Encoded Remote Config Content (Coupang / pvmf Workers Hostnames) in HTTP Response — Encoded Config Decoded at Runtime · unlock with TL Creds
  • Known Malicious Extension IDs Present in Chrome/Edge Profile — Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • HTTP Connection to Extension C2 [indicator] — Command and Control · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2821.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • Domain: api[.]pvmf[.]workers[.]dev
  • URL: hxxps://link[.]coupang[.]com/a/dUnRI6
  • Email address: indie05hacker[@]gmail[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Akamai Security Research (Natalie Zagarov, published 2026-09-30) documents a family of 32 browser extensions published to the Chrome Web Store and Microsoft Edge Add-ons Store since March 2025, with ongoing development and new variants published over subsequent months. The extensions are branded as ordinary utilities: Youtube Detox, Eye Rest Reminder, Quick Memo, KoreaDropdown, Language Learning, YouTube Summary, SnapShot, Copy as Markdown, YouTube Enhancer, SEO Toolkit, Text Counter, Web Highlighter, Page Ruler, Video Speed Controller, Tab Manager, Scroll to Top, Holiday D-day, Reaction Time Test, Reading Time, Image Downloader, Auto Scroll, Air Quality Monitor and GitHub Korean (the largest at about 4,000 installs). Total reach is over 6,150 users.

Despite different branding, the variants share one background service worker implementation, identical telemetry events and storage structures, and common navigation logic. They request broad permissions (<all_urls>, webNavigation, tabs, session storage and chrome.tabs.update()), which are unrelated to their advertised functions.

At runtime each extension retrieves an attacker-controlled configuration from a GitHub-hosted file served via the jsDelivr CDN (cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/chosanghyeon-dev/chosanghyeon-dev@main/cf.json), with a secondary Cloudflare Workers endpoint (api.pvmf.workers.dev) identified as command-and-control infrastructure. Hostnames, redirect targets and identifiers in the config are Base64-encoded and decoded in the extension. Because behavior is driven by external configuration, the operator can change it without a store update; Akamai observed configuration changes including temporary empty states and new affiliate rules.

The extensions continuously watch browsing activity through the webNavigation API (onCompleted event) and, when the remote rules match, rebuild a destination URL from the config and redirect the tab using chrome.tabs.update(). Observed redirect targets are two Coupang affiliate short links (link.coupang.com/a/dUnRI6 and link.coupang.com/a/ej6z6U), indicating affiliate-fraud monetization. Akamai notes the same infrastructure could support broader malicious navigation manipulation.

Attribution is limited to Korean-speaking actor(s): Korean-language identifiers, embedded Korean localization resources and Korean development comments, a Korean-market affiliate program, and an associated email (indie05hacker@gmail.com) and GitHub account (chosanghyeon-dev). The public GitHub profile lists a Seoul location and UTC+9 timezone. The profile's ownership is not independently verified, and it could be a compromised or impersonated account. Severity is analyst-assigned (no CVE/CVSS). At analyst check on 2026-10-01 the jsDelivr cf.json URL returned HTTP 404 and BeaconBeagle returned no config match for api.pvmf.workers.dev.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver

Persistence

T1176.001 Browser Extensions

Initial Access

T1199 Trusted Relationship

Impact

T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation

Resource Development

T1583.006 Web Services

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Remove the 32 listed extensions (match by extension ID) from Chrome and Edge profiles
  • Block or alert on requests to api.pvmf.workers.dev and the chosanghyeon-dev jsDelivr path
  • Review browser inventory for extensions requesting <all_urls>, webNavigation and tabs that are unrelated to their stated function

Workarounds

  • Remove unnecessary extensions with broad permissions
  • Restrict extension installation to approved IDs

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce an extension allowlist via Chrome/Edge enterprise policy
  • Monitor for extensions that retrieve remote configuration and manipulate navigation
  • Treat remotely controlled extensions as persistent attack platforms

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Chrome Web Store extensions (Chrome users)
    Vulnerable versions: 32-extension family; see IOC extension IDs
  • Microsoft — Microsoft Edge Add-ons Store extensions (Edge users)
    Vulnerable versions: 32-extension family; see IOC extension IDs

Timeline

  • Campaign active since March 2025 (month-level precision per Akamai); first extensions published to the Chrome Web Store and Edge Add-ons Store
  • New extension variants published continuously in the months after launch; the remote config was observed changing (temporary empty states, new affiliate rules). Date is a placeholder for an undated interval
  • Akamai announced intent to acquire LayerX (May 2026); the research is published under Akamai Security Research from the LayerX team
  • Campaign described as ongoing at publication; extensions still being developed
  • Akamai published 'When Productivity Extensions Become Attack Platforms', disclosing 32 extensions, 6,150+ users and the shared remote-config infrastructure
  • Analyst check: jsDelivr cf.json URL returned HTTP 404 and BeaconBeagle config search for locked-ioc-5 returned no matches

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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