Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2858
ClickFix Campaign Uses Fake CAPTCHA Lures and Browser-Cache Staging to Execute Malicious Commands on Windows (Trojan:Win32/ClickFix, TermFix)
Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports a ClickFix campaign in which compromised websites show fake CAPTCHA-style verification prompts that trick Windows users into pasting a clipboard command into the Run dialog. The command locates a script pre-fetched into the browser cache as a fake PNG, copies it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp .vbs and runs it via wscript.exe, leading to a PowerShell payload (v.ps1), .NET compilation via csc.exe, and persistence through a scheduled task launching a Python payload with pythonw.exe. First disclosed .
Key facts
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2858 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ClickFix Run-Dialog cmd.exe Staging t.vbs from Firefox Cache — Exploitation Phase
Detects cmd.exe spawned by explorer.exe (the Windows Run dialog paste) whose command line searches the Firefox profile directories and copies/executes a cached fake-PNG script as t.vbs through wscript.exe. This is the novel browser-cache staging step of the ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA campaign: no download occurs in the pasted command, so command-line lineage is the primary signal.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1059.003, T1036
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```ClickFix: Run dialog pastes cmd.exe that hunts Firefox cache (f_* fake PNG) and stages it as t.vbs```
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\cmd.exe" ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" CommandLine="*Firefox*" CommandLine="*Profiles*" (CommandLine="*t.vbs*" OR CommandLine="*wscript*")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, ParentImage
| convert ctime(first_seen)Microsoft KQL
// ClickFix: Run dialog pastes cmd.exe that hunts Firefox cache and stages t.vbs
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe" and FileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Firefox" and ProcessCommandLine has "Profiles"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "t.vbs" or ProcessCommandLine has "wscript"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLineSigma
title: ClickFix Run Dialog cmd.exe Staging Script from Firefox Cache
id: a3f1c2d4-5b6e-4f70-8a91-2c3d4e5f6071
status: experimental
description: Detects cmd.exe launched by explorer.exe (Run dialog paste) that searches Firefox profile directories and stages or runs a script as t.vbs via wscript, per the ClickFix browser-cache staging campaign.
references:
- https://gbhackers.com/microsoft-warns-clickfix-attacks-use-fake-captcha/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/03
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_proc:
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Firefox'
- 'Profiles'
selection_stage:
CommandLine|contains:
- 't.vbs'
- 'wscript'
condition: selection_proc and selection_stage
falsepositives:
- Administrators manually scripting against Firefox profile folders from the Run dialog
level: highKnown false positives:
- Administrators or power users running cmd one-liners against Firefox profile folders from the Run dialog
Tuning notes: Alert on any hit; exclude known IT-admin accounts if profile-maintenance scripts are run from Run. Extend the Firefox/Profiles pair with Chrome/Edge cache paths if the campaign expands to other browsers.
- ClickFix Command Recorded in [indicator] Registry Key — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix .NET Compile After Delivery and [indicator] Injection — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Script Host and Injected Process Outbound Connections — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix WScript Execution of Staged [indicator] — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix PowerShell Launched by Script Host and PowerShell Profile Tampering — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix DNS Resolution of Campaign Domains or by Script Hosts — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Python Payload Persistence — [indicator] Extraction and pythonw Scheduled Task — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix Campaign C2 and Staging Domains (cocojambo, capsysnet, ciliabula) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2858.
Sample indicators (3 of 20)
- Domain:
cocojambo[.]us[.]com - Domain:
capsysnet[.]vg - Domain:
ciliabula[.]cc
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Per GBHackers' 2026-10-03 reporting on a Microsoft Threat Intelligence / Microsoft Security Intelligence announcement, a ClickFix campaign delivers its first stage through compromised websites that display a fake CAPTCHA-style verification prompt. The page places a command on the victim's clipboard and instructs the user to open the Windows Run dialog, paste it and press Enter (the command is recorded in the RunMRU registry key).
The novel element is browser-cache staging: the malicious script is pre-fetched by the lure page into the browser cache disguised as a PNG image (cache files beginning with f_). The pasted command runs cmd.exe, which recursively searches the Firefox profile directories under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles for the cached file, copies it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\t.vbs and executes it with wscript.exe. This avoids any network download in the pasted command itself.
The VBScript gathers system information through WMI and downloads the PowerShell script v.ps1 (the article cites cocojambo[.]us[.]com/alfa for PowerShell script retrieval). PowerShell runs with execution policy bypassed, and the per-user PowerShell configuration is modified. A further payload (cab.dat) is downloaded and executed; capsysnet[.]vg is cited for retrieval of a memory-resident stage and ciliabula[.]cc for C2 connections. The chain uses .NET compilation through csc.exe and cvtres.exe, code injection into timeout.exe, extraction of Python components with tar.exe, and a scheduled task that launches the Python payload via pythonw.exe for persistence.
Microsoft detections named in the source are Trojan:Win32/ClickFix, Trojan:Win32/TermFix and a 'Possible ClickFix activity' alert. Recommended defenses: Defender SmartScreen and Defender for Office 365 blocking of malicious sites and lures, cloud-delivered protection, web/network protection, application control, PowerShell script-block logging, monitoring of the RunMRU key, WScript/PowerShell child processes and newly created scheduled tasks. The source does not identify the final payload, a threat actor or a victim count, and the primary Microsoft post was not located; facts here are limited to the GBHackers article, with related Microsoft ClickFix reporting (TerminalFix, Aug 2026) used only as context.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027.004 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery; T1036 Masquerading; T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type; T1055 Process Injection; T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic; T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1546.013 Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Initial Access
Credential Access
T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block cocojambo.us.com, capsysnet.vg and ciliabula.cc at DNS, proxy and firewall
- Hunt for %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\t.vbs, cab.dat and wscript.exe launched from cmd.exe spawned by the Run dialog
- Review the RunMRU registry key for pasted cmd/PowerShell commands referencing browser profile paths
- Review recently created scheduled tasks launching pythonw.exe and per-user PowerShell profile changes
Workarounds
- Enable Defender SmartScreen, Defender for Office 365, cloud-delivered protection and web/network protection
Longer-term hardening
- Enable PowerShell script-block logging
- Deploy application control to restrict wscript.exe, csc.exe and PowerShell for standard users
- Consider blocking or auditing the Windows Run dialog for non-administrative users
- Train users that legitimate CAPTCHAs never ask them to paste commands into Run
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 2× · latest source
- Microsoft publishes 'Think before you Click(Fix)' analyzing the ClickFix social engineering technique (background context)
- Microsoft reports the CrashFix ClickFix variant deploying a Python RAT (related Python-payload precedent)
- A builder for ClickFix payload delivery that stores malware in the browser cache is advertised on underground forums (USD 300 builder/source/setup, USD 200 custom template rewrites), showing the technique is commercially available beyond this cluster.
- Microsoft publishes the TerminalFix ClickFix-variant campaign analysis (related campaign, distinct IOCs)
- Crimson7 publishes an independent analysis of browser cache smuggling with ClickFix: payloads served with image Content-Type headers, cached under random hex names, then located and run by a pasted command.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence posts that it identified compromised websites leading to ClickFix attacks that pre-fetch script payloads into the browser cache as PNG files; stages include .NET assemblies injected into timeout.exe that steal browser and device credentials (date approximate, derived from the LinkedIn post ID).
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence discloses on X a cluster of compromised websites pre-fetching a script payload into the browser cache disguised as a PNG for ClickFix attacks. This confirms the 2026-10-03 date, which was previously approximated.
- Threat ingested by Threadlinqs; no CVE, actor attribution or victim count published in the source
- Microsoft Defender detections named: Trojan:Win32/ClickFix, Trojan:Win32/TermFix and 'Possible ClickFix activity' alert
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence announcement of ClickFix browser-cache staging campaign reported by GBHackers
- Infosecurity Magazine, iTnews and The Hacker News report that the pasted command compares the size of Firefox cache files prefixed f_ with an expected value, rather than searching for a content marker as earlier cache smuggling did. This also bypasses the Run dialog character limit.
- SOC Prime publishes detection content for the cache-smuggling ClickFix chain (rules created 2026-10-08).
Update history
- 2026-10-10 — ClickFix Attacks Evolve to Hide Payloads via DNS TXT Records and Browser Cache Smuggling: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; the record is already HIGH/ACTIVE. Only the technique detail and timeline are enriched. New indicators (0) Indicator values are withheld at this access level. New MITRE (0) None.
- 2026-10-04 — ClickFix campaign via compromised websites staging VBScript payloads in browser cache (Microsoft Threat Intelligence): What changed No severity, exploitability or status change (already HIGH / ACTIVE). The newer report adds impact detail: injected .NET assemblies in timeout.exe steal browser and device credentials, which makes this an infostealer chain.
Sources cited
- TerminalFix campaign deploys reverse tunnel through multistage intrusion Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-08-28
- Think before you Click(Fix): Analyzing the ClickFix social engineering technique Microsoft · Vendor report · 2025-08-21
- ClickFix variant CrashFix deploying Python RAT trojan Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-02-05
- Microsoft Warns ClickFix Attacks Use Fake CAPTCHA Lures to Execute Malicious Commands gbhackers.com · News · 2026-10-03
- Microsoft Discloses DNS-Based ClickFix Attack Using Nslookup for Malware Staging The Hacker News · News
- ClickFix Attacks Expand Using Fake CAPTCHAs, Microsoft Scripts, and Trusted Web Services The Hacker News · News
- BleepingComputer: Microsoft warns of TerminalFix attacks deploying reverse tunnels BleepingComputer · News
Previous and next in malware
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .