Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2875
BPFDoor, Rekoobe and AVERAT Linux Implants Impersonate SpamSniper and ShareTech Mail Security Appliances (SMTP/TCP 25 C2)
Rapid7 documents two overlapping Linux implant campaigns that impersonate Asian email security appliances: new BPFDoor variants and a modified Rekoobe backdoor posing as South Korean anti-spam software SpamSniper, and a novel modular RAT, AVERAT, posing as Taiwanese ShareTech mail security appliances.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2875 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | SMTP is the key campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | SpamSniper (South Korean anti-spam software) Linux mail security appliances (impersonated); ShareTech Mail security appliances (impersonated by dropper); Synology NAS (compromised as relay); Dahua XVR5116HS-I3 DVR (compromised as relay) |
| Attribution | Red Menshen (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | AVERAT, BPFDoor, Rekoobe, tsh |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1070.006 Indicator Removal: Timestomp, T1071.003 Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery and 10 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | telecoms, email security mail gateways, network edge appliances, cctv dvr |
| Target regions | south korea, taiwan |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2875 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 33 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: AVERAT ShareTech Dropper Staging - /HDD, /addpkg and /sbin Artifacts and Known Hashes
Detects the AVERAT delivery chain on Linux edge appliances (Synology NAS, DVR, SMB devices): the ShareTech-themed dropper script /HDD/ms6x2xTo64/updIptable.php, the /tmp/flag gate file, payloads written to /addpkg/sbin/update and /addpkg/sbin/agetty, the alternate /sbin staging names udevds and ntpdate, and the 12 SHA-256 hashes published by Rapid7 for AVERAT, the dropper and the BPFDoor/Rekoobe builds. Two or more distinct artifacts on a host, or any high-fidelity artifact, raises the alert.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1480, T1036.005, T1059.004, T1027.013
- Data sources: linux_auditd, sysmon_for_linux, defender_for_endpoint_linux (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=linux (sourcetype=linux:audit OR sourcetype=sysmon:linux) earliest=-24h
("updIptable.php" OR "/HDD/ms6x2xTo64" OR "/addpkg/sbin/update" OR "/addpkg/sbin/agetty" OR "/sbin/udevds" OR "/sbin/ntpdate" OR "/tmp/flag"
OR "bf8135f46ecedfe5bd06fcecbb2e721c2367ff765b18f4aa3f868e6597f49e47" OR "4925bcca085ec504f51191645da278d8e96698d91f3c6df44146336c697b4de8"
OR "a4379e115d3c4420f5d4b92561022d6e0897990e7297be65c033d47de68e6a6a" OR "925c041807d4fb9dfe2ad84f963c2a4c60ea1289f6a0bdccbfb944478ffc2cf2"
OR "2fe2dd402ee6f9c578fce6dd4b36daaa407e99133e5dd502f2afca80feb60150" OR "a65048eb30661e27f8edc2dd8d8c77ec87faec1f1750f6e04e7ecaf069a32858"
OR "2bedc26d4b29b435c21962beed7db21188a0219a0d28334bba8b4fb1656d7b15" OR "a37ea9897221d4495b538de72b74f2aa1d2ff09b7b6dcedd395aee58931adbf3"
OR "7e667ba5f9df912e02275d3cfe3809d16f822fe776f4035c84b118ebd925b1b5" OR "652508a9cf40bee883dc0e5e219dfeba71fe7dac591d01c89f74c21f73b4963f"
OR "4435fcd6862921092614dbeaa880e4192352984686ebcd98f0ba13ee8e226ef9" OR "a6f3b7f932761fb1fd5e74123f2482e36c65dd13e769af2ce08c65da195bfa7a")
``` classify which artifact each event carries (hash prefixes are unique 16-char SHA-256 heads) ```
| eval artifact=case(match(_raw,"(?i)updIptable[.]php|/HDD/ms6x2xTo64"),"dropper_script", match(_raw,"/addpkg/sbin/(update|agetty)"),"payload_path", match(_raw,"(?i)(bf8135f46ecedfe5|4925bcca085ec504|a4379e115d3c4420|925c041807d4fb9d|2fe2dd402ee6f9c5|a65048eb30661e27|2bedc26d4b29b435|a37ea9897221d449|7e667ba5f9df912e|652508a9cf40bee8|4435fcd686292109|a6f3b7f932761fb1)"),"known_hash", match(_raw,"/sbin/udevds"),"udevds_staging", match(_raw,"/sbin/ntpdate"),"ntpdate_staging", match(_raw,"/tmp/flag"),"gate_file", true(),"other")
| stats count as events dc(artifact) as artifact_types values(artifact) as artifacts min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by host
``` /sbin/ntpdate and /tmp/flag alone are weak (legitimate ntpdate exists); require 2+ artifacts or a high-fidelity one ```
| where artifact_types>=2 OR mvfind(artifacts,"^(dropper_script|payload_path|known_hash|udevds_staging)$")>=0
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
let ioc_paths = dynamic(['/HDD/ms6x2xTo64/', 'updIptable.php', '/addpkg/sbin/update', '/addpkg/sbin/agetty']);
let ioc_hashes = dynamic(['bf8135f46ecedfe5bd06fcecbb2e721c2367ff765b18f4aa3f868e6597f49e47', '4925bcca085ec504f51191645da278d8e96698d91f3c6df44146336c697b4de8', 'a4379e115d3c4420f5d4b92561022d6e0897990e7297be65c033d47de68e6a6a', '925c041807d4fb9dfe2ad84f963c2a4c60ea1289f6a0bdccbfb944478ffc2cf2', '2fe2dd402ee6f9c578fce6dd4b36daaa407e99133e5dd502f2afca80feb60150', 'a65048eb30661e27f8edc2dd8d8c77ec87faec1f1750f6e04e7ecaf069a32858', '2bedc26d4b29b435c21962beed7db21188a0219a0d28334bba8b4fb1656d7b15', 'a37ea9897221d4495b538de72b74f2aa1d2ff09b7b6dcedd395aee58931adbf3', '7e667ba5f9df912e02275d3cfe3809d16f822fe776f4035c84b118ebd925b1b5', '652508a9cf40bee883dc0e5e219dfeba71fe7dac591d01c89f74c21f73b4963f', '4435fcd6862921092614dbeaa880e4192352984686ebcd98f0ba13ee8e226ef9', 'a6f3b7f932761fb1fd5e74123f2482e36c65dd13e769af2ce08c65da195bfa7a']);
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where SHA256 in~ (ioc_hashes)
or ProcessCommandLine has_any (ioc_paths)
or FolderPath has_any (ioc_paths)
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (ioc_paths)
or FolderPath =~ '/sbin/udevds'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountNameSigma
title: AVERAT Dropper and Payload Staging on Linux Edge Devices
id: 6f1a3c52-8d47-4e0b-9b21-5c3e7a91d4f0
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the AVERAT ShareTech-themed dropper script, the payload paths /addpkg/sbin/update and /addpkg/sbin/agetty, the /sbin/udevds staging name, or any of the published AVERAT / BPFDoor / Rekoobe SHA-256 hashes on Linux.
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-smtp-is-the-key-bpfdoor-averat-hitting-the-network-edge/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-03
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1480
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.t1027.013
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_script:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/HDD/ms6x2xTo64/'
- 'updIptable.php'
selection_image:
Image:
- '/addpkg/sbin/update'
- '/addpkg/sbin/agetty'
- '/sbin/udevds'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- 'bf8135f46ecedfe5bd06fcecbb2e721c2367ff765b18f4aa3f868e6597f49e47'
- '4925bcca085ec504f51191645da278d8e96698d91f3c6df44146336c697b4de8'
- 'a4379e115d3c4420f5d4b92561022d6e0897990e7297be65c033d47de68e6a6a'
- '925c041807d4fb9dfe2ad84f963c2a4c60ea1289f6a0bdccbfb944478ffc2cf2'
- '2fe2dd402ee6f9c578fce6dd4b36daaa407e99133e5dd502f2afca80feb60150'
- 'a65048eb30661e27f8edc2dd8d8c77ec87faec1f1750f6e04e7ecaf069a32858'
- '2bedc26d4b29b435c21962beed7db21188a0219a0d28334bba8b4fb1656d7b15'
- 'a37ea9897221d4495b538de72b74f2aa1d2ff09b7b6dcedd395aee58931adbf3'
- '7e667ba5f9df912e02275d3cfe3809d16f822fe776f4035c84b118ebd925b1b5'
- '652508a9cf40bee883dc0e5e219dfeba71fe7dac591d01c89f74c21f73b4963f'
- '4435fcd6862921092614dbeaa880e4192352984686ebcd98f0ba13ee8e226ef9'
- 'a6f3b7f932761fb1fd5e74123f2482e36c65dd13e769af2ce08c65da195bfa7a'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Vendor firmware tooling that legitimately uses an /addpkg package directory
level: highKnown false positives:
- Vendor firmware or package-manager tooling on NAS/DVR appliances that legitimately uses /addpkg or /HDD directories
- Legitimate /sbin/ntpdate invocations (only alerts when combined with a second artifact)
Tuning notes: Requires auditd file/exec watches (-w /addpkg -p wa, -w /HDD -p wa, -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve) or Sysmon for Linux on appliances that can run an agent; for agentless NAS/DVR devices forward syslog/FIM events instead. Hash matching is only effective where the telemetry carries SHA-256 (Sysmon for Linux, MDE). Baseline vendor use of /addpkg before enabling alerting on that path alone.
- Linux Executable Unlinked Shortly After Launch from /sbin or /addpkg (AVERAT Self-Deletion) · unlock with TL Creds
- SpamSniper and Daemon-Name Process Spoofing (BPFDoor / Rekoobe Masquerade) · unlock with TL Creds
- Contact with Compromised Taiwanese Edge-Device Relays and PPTP/1723 Listener Foothold · unlock with TL Creds
- AVERAT Encrypted State File Creation in /var/lib (.db, .sencha, .us, .a) · unlock with TL Creds
- Rekoobe Shell History Suppression ([indicator], HISTSIZE=0, VIMINIT) · unlock with TL Creds
- Implant-Spawned Shell and Host Discovery from Temp, /addpkg or [indicator] Parent (AVERAT / Rekoobe Operator Activity) · unlock with TL Creds
- BPFDoor-Style AF_PACKET Raw Socket with Attached Classic BPF Filter on Non-Capture Host · unlock with TL Creds
- AVERAT SMTP-Disguised C2 Beaconing - Non-MTA Hosts Connecting to TCP/25 at 600-699s Intervals · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 33 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2875.
Sample indicators (3 of 33)
- IP address:
59.125.211[.]65 - Domain:
mx[.]zxopfds[.]com - File hash:
bf8135f46ecedfe5bd06fcecbb2e721c2367ff765b18f4aa3f868e6597f49e47
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 33 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Both abuse TCP port 25 for C2 and relay through compromised edge devices (Synology NAS, DVRs, SMB appliances). The BPFDoor cluster targets South Korean telecom/mail environments and is likely tied to Chinese-linked espionage.
Rapid7 (published 2026-10-02, 'SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge') analyzes a cluster of Linux malware that copies the filenames, PID files, process names and firewall-permitted traffic profile of email security appliances. Two overlapping campaigns are described.
Campaign 1 (South Korea): two new BPFDoor variants and one modified Rekoobe variant impersonate SpamSniper. The BPFDoor builds reuse the SpamSniper PID file (/var/run/spamsniper.pid) as a mutex and rotate through ten Linux daemon names (watchdogd, chronyd, polkitd, rsyslogd, crond, NetworkManager, python/tuned, scsi_tmf_6, charger_manager, kaluad_sync). They remain dormant until a magic value is observed in packets delivered through a raw packet socket with an attached classic BPF filter (variant magic values 0x6693 UDP, 0x4274 TCP, 0x7820 ICMP), with a new variant also supporting HTTP tunneling over HTTPS POST. The Rekoobe variant (652508a9...) installs a BPF filter on TCP/UDP/SCTP over IPv4 and UDP over IPv6 for port 25, spoofs SpamSniper process paths (/sniper/bin/crond, /sniper/bin/earsd, /sniper/apache/bin/httpd, /sniper/snipe/bin/snipe-smtpd, /sniper/autorun/rblsmtpd) and suppresses shell history (VIMINIT, HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTSIZE=0, HISTFILESIZE=0). Data-plane variants spoof ora_ppmond, /sniper/snipe/bin/dtnpd and /sniper/bin/ofgmd and embed Tiny Shell.
Campaign 2 (Taiwan): AVERAT, a novel modular RAT, ships in six builds against embedded appliances, Synology NAS and CCTV/DVR devices, delivered by a ShareTech-themed dropper whose payload is AES-128-ECB encrypted with a key derived from SHA1('ShareTech'). The dropper is gated by /tmp/flag, runs /HDD/ms6x2xTo64/updIptable.php, copies two binaries into /sbin under alternate names (ntpdate, udevds), launches them and unlinks each about ten seconds later while processes keep running; payloads land at /addpkg/sbin/update and /addpkg/sbin/agetty. AVERAT beacons every 600-699 seconds over a SMTP/STARTTLS-looking channel on TCP/25, reporting hostname, user, OS version, interfaces and logged-in users, and persists 276-byte encrypted state in /var/lib/.db (or .sencha, .us, .a). Its command set includes directory enumeration, chunked/resumable file transfer, recursive delete, process enumeration/termination, up to 10 concurrent interactive shells, shared-object module loading, config override, reboot, and port forwarding/proxying.
C2 relays are compromised Taiwanese edge devices on Chunghwa Telecom (AS3462): a Synology NAS (59.125.211.65), an SMB network appliance (122.116.138.33) and a Dahua XVR5116HS-I3 recorder (1.34.200.85), all with byte-identical PPTP (TCP/1723) banners, indicating a dual-purpose design: outbound SMTP-disguised implant relay plus an operator-installed inbound routed VPN foothold. Rapid7 assesses the relay pattern as consistent with China-nexus operational relay box (ORB) networks described in the April 2026 CISA/NCSC-UK advisory AA26-113A, but did not confirm membership in any named network (LapDogs/UAT-7810, SPACEHOP, FLORAHOX). Attribution of the BPFDoor cluster to Chinese-linked telecom espionage is reported as likely; no CVE or initial-access vulnerability is stated in the sources.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service; T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1070.006 Indicator Removal: Timestomp; T1205.002 Traffic Signaling: Socket Filters; T1480 Execution Guardrails; T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
Discovery
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution
T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell; T1129 Shared Modules
Command and Control
T1071.003 Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for processes whose /proc/<pid>/exe resolves to (deleted), especially daemon-named processes (watchdogd, chronyd, polkitd, rsyslogd, crond, NetworkManager, abrtd) under /sbin
- Identify unexpected PF_PACKET raw sockets with classic BPF filters on hosts that are not packet-capture systems
- Alert on outbound TCP/25 from non-mail processes and on mail-role hostnames resolving to consumer/embedded device IPs
- Check for /var/run/spamsniper.pid, /HDD/ms6x2xTo64/, /addpkg/sbin/update, /addpkg/sbin/agetty and /var/lib/.db, .sencha, .us, .a
- Block or investigate the listed domains and relay IPs
Workarounds
- Network-segment mail security appliances and disallow unsolicited inbound traffic to the appliance management plane
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict outbound SMTP so only designated MTAs can reach TCP/25
- Retire or isolate end-of-life NAS, DVR and edge appliances exposed to the internet
- Monitor for PPTP (TCP/1723) listeners on appliances where it is not expected
- Collect auditd/EDR telemetry for socket(AF_PACKET), setsockopt(SO_ATTACH_FILTER) and prctl(PR_SET_NAME)
Affected and fixed versions
- SpamSniper (South Korean anti-spam software) — Linux mail security appliances (impersonated)
Vulnerable versions: Impersonated by malware; no product vulnerability stated - ShareTech — Mail security appliances (impersonated by dropper)
Vulnerable versions: Impersonated by malware; no product vulnerability stated - Synology — NAS (compromised as relay)
Vulnerable versions: Relay at 59.125.211.65 running exposed MariaDB 5.5.62 - Dahua — XVR5116HS-I3 DVR (compromised as relay)
Vulnerable versions: Relay at 1.34.200.85
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Red Menshen BPFDoor activity against telecom providers in the Middle East and Asia is tracked from at least 2021 (year-level date).
- Rapid7 publishes 'BPFDoor: Telecom Networks Sleeper Cells' (March 2026; day not specified in source)
- CISA/NCSC-UK advisory AA26-113A on China-nexus ORB networks built from end-of-life NAS, edge appliances and DVRs (April 2026; month-level date used)
- Rapid7 publishes 'Stealthy BPFDoor Variants are a Needle That Looks Like Hay' introducing BPFDoor controller source code (April 2026; day not specified)
- Dark Reading and other outlets report the campaigns, noting likely Chinese-linked espionage against telecoms
- Rapid7 publishes 'SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge' documenting SpamSniper- and ShareTech-impersonating implants
- Threat ingested into Threadlinqs platform; no CVE or initial-access vulnerability identified in sources
- The Hacker News covers the Rapid7 findings and attributes the BPFDoor activity to Red Menshen (Earth Bluecrow, DecisiveArchitect, Red Dev 18).
Update history
- 2026-10-06 — Red Menshen Linux Backdoors (BPFDoor variant, BPF Rekoobe, AVERAT) Impersonate Email Security Tools in Korea and Taiwan: What changed Attribution moves from Unattributed (LOW) to Red Menshen (MEDIUM). Severity, exploitability and status unchanged. New indicators (6) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge Rapid7 · Research · 2026-10-02
- SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge (daily.dev mirror) daily.dev · Blog · 2026-10-02
- SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge (hendryadrian mirror) hendryadrian.com · Blog · 2026-10-02
- Malicious Linux Implants Mimic Asian Mail Security Products Dark Reading · News · 2026-10-02
- Malicious Linux Implants Mimic Asian Mail Security Products (daily.dev mirror) daily.dev · News · 2026-10-02
- BPFDoor and AVERAT Mimic Email Security Appliances to Hide Linux Backdoors (Mallory) mallory.ai · News · 2026-10-02
- New Linux malware mimics network edge appliances to evade detection (SC Media) scworld.com · News · 2026-10-02
More from Red Menshen
Previous and next in malware
- ClickFix Campaign Uses Fake CAPTCHA Lures and Browser-Cache Staging to Execute Malicious Commands on Windows (Trojan:Win32/ClickFix, TermFix) Previous report
- TIKTOUK Toolkit Harvests AWS, SMTP and Database Credentials from Exposed WordPress Backups and Config Files (CVE-2026-60137, CVE-2026-63030) Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .