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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-2969

indexed-btree npm supply-chain campaign bypasses npm's default-disabled install scripts via runtime prototype hook

highACTIVE

A family of malicious npm packages led by indexed-btree (impersonating sorted-btree) hides its loader in BTree.prototype.set, so it runs when an application uses the library rather than at install time, sidestepping npm 12's default disabling of lifecycle scripts. The payload fingerprints the host, reports to hardcoded Slack and Telegram channels, and pulls an encrypted second stage from an Ethereum Sepolia smart contract (EtherHiding). First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2969
Also known asindexed-btree campaign, btree npm malware campaign
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsnpm ecosystem (Node.js) indexed-btree and related btree-themed packages
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-829
MalwareEtherHiding loader (indexed-btree)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1480 Execution Guardrails, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2969 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Detached Node Child Executing sharedLoad.min.js / withLoad.min.js Loader

Detects the runtime trigger of the campaign: the hooked BTree.prototype.set (indexed-btree) or Mutex.runExclusive (mutex-forge) launches an obfuscated minified JavaScript loader, sharedLoad.min.js or withLoad.min.js, as a detached node child process of the host application. A generic branch also flags a node process spawned by node that runs a .min.js file from node_modules, which catches renamed loaders in other family members.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.007, T1027, T1195.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

```Runtime loader launch: detached node child running the obfuscated loader files, plus a generic node->node .min.js from node_modules branch```
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval named_loader=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(sharedLoad|withLoad)[.]min[.]js"),1,0)
| eval node_child_min_js=if(match(Image,"(?i)node(.exe)?$") AND match(ParentImage,"(?i)node(.exe)?$") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)node_modules") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)[.]min[.]js"),1,0)
| where named_loader=1 OR node_child_min_js=1
| table _time host User ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine ProcessGuid named_loader node_child_min_js

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sharedLoad.min.js", "withLoad.min.js")
    or (FileName in~ ("node.exe", "node")
        and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node")
        and ProcessCommandLine has "node_modules"
        and ProcessCommandLine has ".min.js")
| extend MatchType = iff(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sharedLoad.min.js", "withLoad.min.js"), "named_loader", "node_child_min_js")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, MatchType, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId

Sigma

title: Node Process Launching sharedLoad.min.js or withLoad.min.js Loader
id: 0b9e7a14-3c2d-4f68-a1d5-7e84b2c93f61
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the obfuscated loader files used by the indexed-btree and mutex-forge npm campaign, launched as a detached node child process by the hooked library method, plus a generic node-spawned-by-node pattern running a minified script from node_modules.
references:
  - https://checkmarx.com/zero-post/npm-btree-malware-campaign-affects-millions-of-downloads-no-need-for-install-script/
  - https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13955
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/06
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.007
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1027
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1195.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_named:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'sharedLoad.min.js'
      - 'withLoad.min.js'
  selection_generic:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\node.exe'
      - '/node'
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\node.exe'
      - '/node'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'node_modules'
      - '.min.js'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Build tooling that spawns node workers on minified files inside node_modules (generic branch only)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Build or bundling tools that spawn node workers on minified files under node_modules (generic branch only)

Tuning notes: The named_loader branch is near-zero false positive. If the generic branch is noisy, restrict it to hosts that run production application workloads or add known tooling parent command lines to an exclusion list. Treat any hit as host compromise: isolate and rotate secrets reachable from the application process.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Node Process Querying Ethereum Sepolia RPC (EtherHiding Second-Stage Fetch) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Node Drops, Executes and Deletes Second-Stage Payload in Temp Directory · unlock with TL Creds
  • Node Process Beaconing to Slack API (Command Polling Every ~10s) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Campaign Loader Files [indicator] / withLoad.min.js Written to Disk · unlock with TL Creds
  • Campaign Telegram Chat ID, Slack Channel ID or Sepolia Contract in Web Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
  • Network Fetch of [indicator] Family Package or Fake [indicator] GitHub Repository · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Family Malicious npm Package Install or Presence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Node Process Reaching Telegram Bot API or Slack (Host Fingerprint Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2969.

Sample indicators (3 of 22)

  • Domain: api[.]telegram[.]org
  • Domain: slack[.]com
  • Domain: eth-sepolia[.]g[.]alchemy[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 22 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

22 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Checkmarx Zero (published 2026-09-17) and ReversingLabs (2026-10-06) describe a campaign in which the npm package indexed-btree mimics the legitimate sorted-btree library. Unlike typical npm malware, the package contains no preinstall or postinstall script and has a clean package.json, so it is unaffected by npm 12 (released 2026-07-08), which turns off dependency lifecycle scripts and implicit node-gyp builds by default (allowScripts defaults to off). Instead the loader is embedded in BTree.prototype.set, a core method applications call during normal use. Per reporting, the loader checks whether the key equals 100 and then launches an obfuscated JavaScript file (sharedLoad.min.js) from the package as a detached process, so the payload runs with the full privileges and network access of the host application. The package was backed by cover infrastructure: a GitHub repository (INDEXED-BTREE/indexed-btree) with a plausible commit history and a fabricated developer profile with an AI-generated photograph.

The first-stage loader fingerprints the host (OS/architecture, hostname, CPU, memory; the sibling mutex-forge loader also collects platform, release and uptime) and posts the data to a hardcoded Telegram chat (-1003952553968) and Slack channel (C0B8XPGCKQS) using bot tokens shipped inside the file. It then connects to an Ethereum Sepolia testnet smart contract (0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31), using the contract as a pointer/dead-drop for an encrypted second-stage payload, an approach (EtherHiding) that is more resilient to takedown than a conventional C2 domain. Per analysis of the earlier related package mutex-forge, the payload is AES-GCM encrypted with a key derived via ECDH from an X25519 keypair, written to disk and executed, and a persistent command channel is kept by polling the Slack API for attacker commands. Researchers note the same contract and the same Slack/Telegram identifiers appeared in mutex-forge, linking the two clusters.

Scale: indexed-btree reportedly reached about 2 million weekly downloads before detection, and the family of roughly ten related packages (ordered-kv-index, btree-leaderboard, priority-slot-queue, btree-range-store, btree-core, btree-time-index, btree-lru-cache, neighbor-key-map, sliding-score-window) was tied to over 5 million cumulative downloads over roughly eleven weeks. Checkmarx cautions that download counts are not a count of compromised hosts, because execution requires application code to actually call the hooked method. The operator reportedly collected about 109 ETH (about EUR 231,000 / USD 265-300K) through the contract. As of late reporting the campaign was described as ongoing with C2 still operational and the GitHub repository still online; packages were reported removed. No threat actor has been named.

Note: the attacker-embedded Slack and Telegram bot tokens and RPC API keys disclosed by researchers are deliberately not reproduced here; only non-secret identifiers are listed as IOCs.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Initial Access

T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services; T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts; T1587.001 Malware; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Patches

  • No CVE or vendor patch; the malicious packages were reported removed from npm

Immediate actions

  • Search lockfiles, SBOMs and node_modules for indexed-btree, ordered-kv-index, btree-leaderboard, priority-slot-queue, btree-range-store, btree-core, btree-time-index, btree-lru-cache, neighbor-key-map, sliding-score-window and mutex-forge (2.0.0-2.0.2)
  • Remove the packages and treat any host or CI runner whose application called the library as compromised; rotate secrets reachable from those processes
  • Hunt for outbound connections from node processes to api.telegram.org, slack.com (chat.postMessage / API polling) and Sepolia RPC endpoints, and for detached node processes launching sharedLoad.min.js or withLoad.min.js
  • Block or alert on the Telegram chat ID -1003952553968, Slack channel C0B8XPGCKQS and contract 0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31 where egress inspection permits

Workarounds

  • Run untrusted dependencies in sandboxed or egress-restricted environments
  • Keep npm 12 allowScripts off, but treat it as one layer only since this campaign does not use lifecycle scripts

Longer-term hardening

  • Do not rely on npm's disabled install scripts alone; add runtime behaviour monitoring for dependencies (unexpected network egress, child process spawn, file writes)
  • Verify package provenance and review unexpected code changes in dependencies; be skeptical of new look-alike packages with fabricated repository history
  • Restrict egress from build and application hosts to required destinations; use allow-listed outbound traffic for Node processes
  • Pin and review dependencies, use a private registry or package firewall with malware scanning

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm ecosystem (Node.js) — indexed-btree and related btree-themed packages
    Vulnerable versions: indexed-btree (all versions); ordered-kv-index; btree-leaderboard; priority-slot-queue; btree-range-store; btree-core; btree-time-index; btree-lru-cache; neighbor-key-map; sliding-score-window
    Fixed in: Packages removed from npm; remove and rotate secrets

Timeline

  • npm 12 released with dependency lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) and implicit node-gyp builds disabled by default (allowScripts off).
  • OSV publishes MAL-2026-13955 for mutex-forge (2.0.0-2.0.2), the earlier sibling package that shares the Sepolia contract, Slack channel and Telegram chat; its loader triggers in runExclusive when meta.jobId is 'cross-chain-transfer'.
  • OSV record MAL-2026-13955 for mutex-forge is modified; it notes a third stage polling Slack every 10 seconds for attacker commands and advises rotating credentials from a clean machine.
  • Checkmarx Zero publishes analysis of the indexed-btree campaign and its nine related btree packages, with Sepolia contract, Slack and Telegram IOCs.
  • SecurityWeek and DevOps.com report indexed-btree reached ~2M weekly downloads, 5M+ total across the family, ~109 ETH collected; campaign described as ongoing and the fake GitHub repo still up.
  • Cloud Security Alliance publishes a research note on npm runtime-execution supply-chain attacks.
  • Hive Security publishes analysis stressing that installing or importing the package is not by itself evidence the second stage executed; the payload fires only when BTree.prototype.set is called with key 100.
  • ReversingLabs publishes analysis stating npm's default install-script mitigation is already defeated by the indexed-btree runtime prototype hook; C2 infrastructure still operational.

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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