Skip to navigation

Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-3085

Tensorlake npm Package Compromised (0.5.144) to Spread Shai-Hulud Worm Variant and Steal Developer Secrets

criticalACTIVE

The tensorlake npm package (100,000+ lifetime installs) was backdoored after the maintainer's GitHub identity was compromised; malicious version 0.5.144 runs a preinstall loader that fetches the Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated credential-stealing worm payload, a new build of the Shai-Hulud / Mini Shai-Hulud family.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3085
Also known asShai-Hulud variant, Mini Shai-Hulud, Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again
SeverityCRITICAL
Affected productsTensorlake tensorlake (npm package)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-522
MalwareHackBrowserData, Shai-Hulud, phantom
ToolsHackBrowserData
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.007 OS Credential Dumping, T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1102.001 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 15 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, artificial-intelligence, cryptocurrency, cloud-services
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3085 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 47 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Shai-Hulud gh-token-monitor Dead-Man's Switch Persistence — Post-Exploitation Phase

Detects installation of the gh-token-monitor persistence used by the Shai-Hulud variant: files written under ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh, ~/.config/gh-token-monitor/ (systemd user service / macOS LaunchAgent) or %LOCALAPPDATA%\gh-token-monitor\monitor.ps1 (scheduled task), and service/task registration commands referencing it. The monitor polls the GitHub API every 60 seconds and wipes the home directory if the stolen token is revoked, so responders must find it BEFORE revoking tokens.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1543.002, T1543.001, T1053.005, T1059.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, edr_process_telemetry, edr_file_telemetry
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=11) earliest=-24h
```gh-token-monitor persistence: systemd user service, LaunchAgent, scheduled task```
| eval cmd=lower(coalesce(CommandLine,"")), tf=lower(coalesce(TargetFilename,""))
| eval signal=case(
    match(tf, "gh-token-monitor"), "monitor_file_written",
    match(cmd, "gh-token-monitor") AND match(cmd, "systemctl|launchctl|schtasks|scheduledtask|launchagents|monitor\.ps1"), "monitor_service_registered",
    true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| eval artifact=coalesce(TargetFilename, Image)
| fillnull value="unknown" User
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(artifact) as artifacts values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

// gh-token-monitor dead-man's switch persistence
let monitor = "gh-token-monitor";
union
(DeviceFileEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
 | where FolderPath has monitor or FileName has monitor
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal = "monitor_file_written",
           Artifact = strcat(FolderPath, "/", FileName), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceProcessEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where ProcessCommandLine has monitor
 | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("systemctl", "launchctl", "schtasks", "ScheduledTask", "LaunchAgents", "monitor.ps1")
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signal = "monitor_service_registered", Artifact = FileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where ActionType == "ScheduledTaskCreated" and AdditionalFields has monitor
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal = "monitor_scheduled_task",
           Artifact = tostring(AdditionalFields), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Shai-Hulud gh-token-monitor Persistence Service or Scheduled Task
id: 1e8b6d34-5a7c-4f21-b9d0-3085a0000002
status: experimental
description: Detects registration or execution of the gh-token-monitor dead-man's switch (systemd user service, macOS LaunchAgent, Windows scheduled task running monitor.ps1) planted by the Shai-Hulud variant.
references:
    - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/tensorlake-npm-package-compromised
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/tensorlake-npm-compromised-hostage-token-worm
    - https://safedep.io/tensorlake-npm-compromise-mini-shai-hulud/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.002
    - attack.t1543.001
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_name:
        CommandLine|contains: 'gh-token-monitor'
    selection_persist:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'systemctl'
            - 'launchctl'
            - 'schtasks'
            - 'ScheduledTask'
            - 'LaunchAgents'
    selection_ps:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'gh-token-monitor'
    condition: (selection_name and selection_persist) or selection_ps
falsepositives:
    - Incident responders disabling or removing the monitor with systemctl/launchctl/schtasks (expected during remediation)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Incident responders running systemctl/launchctl/schtasks commands that name gh-token-monitor while removing the monitor (expected during remediation)

Tuning notes: The string gh-token-monitor is unique to this malware, so no exclusion of normal activity is needed; tag known responder hosts/accounts to avoid paging on remediation commands. Requires Sysmon for Linux or EDR file-create events for Linux/macOS coverage.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Shai-Hulud tensorlake Payload Artifacts and Known-Bad Hashes — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud Credential Harvesting by Node/[indicator] Child Processes — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud Ethereum Smart-Contract C2 Fallback via Public RPC — C2 Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud Loader Dropping [indicator] Runtime from Node — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud Dead-Man's Switch Home Directory Wipe — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud GitHub Dead-Drop, Persistence Commit and Secret-Exfil Workflow Indicators — C2 Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud tensorlake Preinstall Loader and [indicator] Payload Execution — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shai-Hulud [indicator] C2 and Exfiltration Traffic — C2 Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 47 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3085.

Sample indicators (3 of 47)

  • Domain: iseekaigogo[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://github[.]com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/
  • File hash: 25a0735d0db7dc40e5d45ce42d9c106067e6a66e184d967cfecfab17c3bcb5ef

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 47 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

47 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The payload steals cloud, CI/CD, SSH, browser, AI-tool and crypto-wallet secrets, propagates via stolen npm and GitHub tokens, and installs a dead-man's switch that deletes the victim's home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked.

On 2026-10-07 an attacker with control of a verified maintainer identity pushed a series of commits directly to the tensorlake GitHub repository through the GitHub web interface (first malicious commit ~01:20 UTC, additional payload-modifying commits through the morning, reported as 8 commits by SafeDep and StepSecurity). The commits added lib/setup.mjs (32,645 bytes) and lib/Math_Symbol.js (856,501 bytes) and a preinstall hook in package.json. The release workflow published tensorlake@0.5.144 to npm on 2026-10-08 (about 20 hours after the repository was first modified). SafeDep's automated detection flagged the release within minutes. npm removed the version, maintainers reverted the source (PR #1016) and released 0.5.145. Aikido reported that the package's PyPI and Cargo distributions showed no sign of compromise.

Execution chain: the preinstall script runs `node lib/setup.mjs`, a heavily obfuscated loader (RC4 plus custom string cipher) that skips CI runners, downloads Bun (1.3.13 per SafeDep) and uses it to execute the obfuscated lib/Math_Symbol.js. Using Bun instead of Node.js helps evade Node-focused security tooling. The payload sets a global WORMTAG build marker (value 'tensrlake'), uses AES-256-GCM to protect embedded files and shares a cipher salt (svksjrhjkcejg) with the earlier keyv/cacheable Mini Shai-Hulud wave. Aikido assessed the operator as more focused on quickly monetising developer endpoints than on proliferation, citing enhanced crypto-wallet targeting.

Collection: the worm gathers 46 environment variables (AWS, CI/CD identifiers, Vault tokens, cloud provider config) and 80+ credential file paths (SSH keys, .npmrc, .env, Docker and Kubernetes configs, cloud CLI configs, shell history, ~/.claude.json, ~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json, wallet files such as wallet.dat, Exodus, Electrum, Ledger Live, .ethereum/keystore, .monero). It targets 14 browser wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Rabby, Trust Wallet, TronLink, Ronin, Solflare, Keplr, Exodus, OKX, Rainbow, UniSat, SafePal) and pulls a HackBrowserData-style binary from C2 for browser passwords. It also queries AWS STS/SSM/Secrets Manager, reads GitHub Actions secrets from Runner.Worker process memory and harvests Kubernetes/Vault service tokens.

Command and control: primary C2 is HTTPS POST to iseekaigogo.com:443/router (with a /hbd/ endpoint). On failure the malware falls back to (1) reading an actor-controlled Ethereum smart contract (0xb614155Fd88114d40549b259457Bcf921Df091B9, selector 0x53ed5143, last updated 2026-09-21) through public RPC endpoints (35 queried, including eth.llamarpc.com, rpc.ankr.com, ethereum.publicnode.com), (2) searching GitHub for signed commits from the account thebeautifulmarchoftime, and (3) public dead-drop repositories with the description 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again'. C2 responses are JSON whose `code` field is passed to eval(), giving remote code execution; beaconing recurs every 45-90 seconds after the initial exfiltration.

Propagation and persistence: with a stolen npm token the worm injects the payload and a preinstall hook into the victim's publishable packages, bumps the patch version and republishes (SafeDep notes spread requires ./dist/Math_Symbol.js on disk and a loader/filename mismatch, ai_init.js vs math_init.js, limiting reliability). With a stolen GitHub token it commits .claude/settings.json and .vscode/tasks.json persistence hooks as the fake author claude@users.noreply.github.com, adds a 'Run Copilot' workflow on branch dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter that exfiltrates repository secrets and then deletes the run and branch.

Destructive dead-man's switch: a `gh-token-monitor` service (systemd user service with ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh, macOS LaunchAgent under ~/.config/gh-token-monitor/, Windows scheduled task running %LOCALAPPDATA%\gh-token-monitor\monitor.ps1) checks the embedded GitHub token against the GitHub API every 60 seconds for up to 24 hours. If GitHub rejects the token it runs `rm -rf ~/` (Linux/macOS) or `Remove-Item -LiteralPath $env:USERPROFILE -Recurse -Force` (Windows). Responders must remove the monitor before revoking credentials.

No CVE or CVSS applies; this is a software supply-chain compromise. Actor attribution is unknown. Note on source discrepancy: SafeDep's page lists some timestamps as 2026-10-07 for the npm publish, while Aikido, StepSecurity and the news article place the publish on 2026-10-08; this record uses 2026-10-08.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.007 OS Credential Dumping; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials; T1552.005 Unsecured Credentials; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service; T1567.001 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1543.001 Launch Agent; T1543.002 Systemd Service; T1546 Event Triggered Execution

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1568 Dynamic Resolution

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction

Remediation

Patches

  • Maintainers reverted the malicious source (PR #1016) and released tensorlake 0.5.145; 0.5.143 is the last known-good pin

Immediate actions

  • Check for tensorlake@0.5.144 with `npm ls tensorlake` and lockfile inspection; pin to tensorlake@0.5.143 or upgrade to 0.5.145
  • BEFORE revoking any GitHub token, remove the token monitor: Linux `systemctl --user disable --now gh-token-monitor.service`; macOS `launchctl bootout` the gh-token-monitor LaunchAgent; Windows remove the gh-token-monitor scheduled task
  • Block iseekaigogo.com at DNS/proxy and alert on HTTPS POSTs to /router and /hbd/
  • Hunt for GitHub repositories with description 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again' and commits authored by claude@users.noreply.github.com

Workarounds

  • Run npm install with --ignore-scripts for unverified packages
  • Restrict egress from build hosts to approved registries and block public Ethereum RPC endpoints where not needed

Longer-term hardening

  • Rotate all exposed credentials (GitHub, npm, cloud, SSH, Vault, Kubernetes, AI-tool API keys) after the monitor is removed
  • Audit .claude/settings.json, .vscode/tasks.json and GitHub workflows for unauthorized additions, including the dependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatter branch and 'Run Copilot' workflow
  • Disable npm lifecycle scripts (ignore-scripts) in CI and developer environments and use package age/cooldown policies
  • Move crypto wallet funds if wallet extensions or keystores were present on an affected host; rebuild hosts when remediation completeness is uncertain

Affected and fixed versions

  • Tensorlake — tensorlake (npm package)
    Vulnerable versions: 0.5.144
    Fixed in: 0.5.145; 0.5.143 (last known-good)

Timeline

Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source

  • Earlier ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud variant compromised npm packages including keyv and flat-cache (August 2026; exact day not stated in sources, per The Register).
  • Actor-controlled Ethereum contract locked-ioc-8 (wallet locked-ioc-9) last updated with C2 address, per Aikido, before the tensorlake compromise.
  • Eighth and final malicious commit pushed to tensorlake main at 03:57:54 UTC (SafeDep).
  • First malicious commit pushed to the tensorlake main branch around 01:20 UTC via the GitHub web interface under a verified maintainer identity; further commits through the morning added locked-ioc-27, locked-ioc-21 and the preinstall hook (payload commit 41b38f09; StepSecurity reports seven additional payload-modifying commits until about 07:00 UTC).
  • OX Security observed 5 public GitHub repositories (description 'Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again') holding stolen credentials following the attack; the 0.5.144 release run 37706134202 also published six tensorlake-native-*@0.5.144 packages.
  • Socket flagged the malicious release about 11 minutes after publication (SafeDep reports about 8 minutes).
  • Cyber Security News published coverage of the compromise, noting 100,000+ lifetime installs and the token-revocation wipe behavior.
  • npm removed the malicious version; maintainers reverted the source in PR #1016 and released tensorlake 0.5.145 (per SafeDep).
  • Aikido, StepSecurity and SafeDep published technical analyses identifying the Shai-Hulud variant, the locked-ioc-25 C2, the Ethereum contract fallback and the gh-token-monitor dead-man's switch.
  • Release workflow published tensorlake@0.5.144 to npm roughly 20 hours after the first malicious commit (StepSecurity: 01:12 UTC); SafeDep's automated detection flagged it within minutes.

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats