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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-3012

US posts $10M Rewards for Justice bounty for accused Hafnium hacker Zhang Yu (MSS-directed intrusion campaign)

mediumACTIVE

The US State Department's Rewards for Justice program is offering up to $10 million for information on Zhang Yu, a Chinese national and director of Shanghai Firetech Information Science and Technology, accused of leading the Hafnium campaign at the direction of China's MSS and Shanghai State Security Bureau. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3012, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065
Also known asHAFNIUM campaign, Shanghai Firetech, Shanghai Powerock
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2021-26855 (added ), CVE-2021-26857 (added ), CVE-2021-26858 (added ), CVE-2021-27065 (added )
EPSSCVE-2021-26855: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2021-27065: 99.8% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2021-26857: 95.7% (99.8th percentile)
Affected productsMicrosoft Exchange Server
AttributionHAFNIUM - G0125 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwarePowerCat
Tools7-Zip, China Chopper, Nishang, PowerCat, ProcDump
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell, T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorseducation, health, legal, defense, government administration, think tanks, ngo
Target regionsNorth America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3012 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: LSASS Memory and NTDS.dit Credential Dumping (ProcDump / comsvcs / ntdsutil / VSS)

Detects HAFNIUM post-exploitation credential theft: ProcDump (-ma) against lsass.exe, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, suspicious LSASS process access masks (Sysmon EID 10), LSASS dump files, and Active Directory database extraction via ntdsutil ifm, Volume Shadow Copy creation or ntds.dit copies. Maps to LSASS Memory (T1003.001) and NTDS (T1003.003).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1003.001, T1003.003
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_xdr_devices
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
    ((EventCode=1 (((Image="*procdump.exe" OR Image="*procdump64.exe" OR OriginalFileName="procdump") (CommandLine="*lsass*" OR CommandLine="* -ma *")) OR (CommandLine="*comsvcs*" CommandLine="*MiniDump*") OR (Image="*ntdsutil.exe" CommandLine="*ifm*") OR (Image="*vssadmin.exe" CommandLine="*create*" CommandLine="*shadow*") OR CommandLine="*ntds.dit*"))
     OR (EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess="0x1fffff" OR GrantedAccess="0x1010" OR GrantedAccess="0x1410" OR GrantedAccess="0x143a" OR GrantedAccess="0x1438") NOT (SourceImage="*MsMpEng.exe" OR SourceImage="*csrss.exe" OR SourceImage="*wininit.exe" OR SourceImage="*svchost.exe" OR SourceImage="*taskmgr.exe"))
     OR (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*lsass*.dmp" OR TargetFilename="*ntds.dit")))
| eval cl=lower(coalesce(CommandLine,"")), tf=lower(coalesce(TargetFilename,""))
| eval lsass_dump=if(EventCode=10 OR like(cl,"%lsass%") OR like(cl,"%minidump%") OR like(tf,"%lsass%"),1,0)
| eval ntds_dump=if(like(cl,"%ntds%") OR like(cl,"%shadow%") OR like(cl,"% ifm%") OR like(tf,"%ntds.dit"),1,0)
| stats count AS events dc(EventCode) AS event_types values(Image) AS tools values(SourceImage) AS access_sources values(CommandLine) AS cmdlines values(TargetFilename) AS dumped_files max(lsass_dump) AS T1003_001 max(ntds_dump) AS T1003_003 min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - events

Microsoft KQL

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName in~ ("procdump.exe", "procdump64.exe") and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)lsass|\s-ma\b")
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "comsvcs" and ProcessCommandLine has "MiniDump")
    or (FileName =~ "ntdsutil.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "ifm")
    or (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "create" and ProcessCommandLine has "shadow")
    or ProcessCommandLine has "ntds.dit"
    or (ActionType == "FileCreated" and (FileName matches regex @"(?i)^lsass.*\.dmp$" or FileName =~ "ntds.dit"))
| extend Technique = iff(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ntds", "shadow", "ifm") or FileName =~ "ntds.dit", "T1003.003", "T1003.001")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Technique, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: LSASS and NTDS Credential Dumping Tooling (HAFNIUM ProcDump)
id: 2b9f6d34-8c17-4a52-9e0b-71d4a3c85f19
status: experimental
description: Detects ProcDump targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, ntdsutil IFM extraction, Volume Shadow Copy creation and ntds.dit references used by HAFNIUM operators after Exchange compromise to harvest credentials.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-07
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.tool.procdump
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_procdump:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\procdump64.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'lsass'
            - ' -ma '
    selection_comsvcs:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'MiniDump'
    selection_ntdsutil:
        Image|endswith: '\ntdsutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'ifm'
    selection_vss:
        Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'create'
            - 'shadow'
    selection_ntds:
        CommandLine|contains: 'ntds.dit'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators using ProcDump to troubleshoot application crashes
    - Backup software creating volume shadow copies or reading ntds.dit on domain controllers
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Administrators using ProcDump to capture application crash dumps
  • Backup agents creating shadow copies or reading ntds.dit on domain controllers

Tuning notes: Allowlist backup and EDR service accounts for the VSS and ntds.dit branches and sanctioned ProcDump use from admin jump hosts. Sysmon EID 10 requires an lsass.exe-targeted ProcessAccess rule in the Sysmon config. Prioritize hits on Exchange servers and domain controllers.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Exchange Worker Process Spawning Shell or Recon Tooling (Web Shell Execution) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange Mailbox Export via PowerShell Snap-in (Remote Email Collection) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange Worker or Exchange-Spawned PowerShell Outbound Connections to HAFNIUM IPs / Non-Standard Ports · unlock with TL Creds
  • ASPX Web Shell Written to Exchange/IIS Directories · unlock with TL Creds
  • 7-Zip Archiving of Mailbox, Credential or Exchange-Spawned Data (Staging for Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange Web Shell Interactive Command and Control (China Chopper Follow-on Activity) · unlock with TL Creds
  • HAFNIUM Exchange ProxyLogon Exploitation Requests (IIS) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nishang / PowerCat PowerShell Reverse Shell · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3012.

Sample indicators (3 of 30)

  • IP address: 103.77.192[.]219
  • File hash: b75f163ca9b9240bf4b37ad92bc7556b40a17e27c2b8ed5c8991385fe07d17d0
  • IP address: 104.140.114[.]110

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

30 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

A nine-count indictment covers intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021 that targeted over 60,000 US entities and victimized more than 12,700.

On 2026-10-07 the US State Department announced a Rewards for Justice offer of up to $10 million for information on Zhang Yu (reported age 44), a Chinese national and director of Shanghai Firetech Information Science and Technology. He is accused of leading the HAFNIUM (Microsoft: Silk Typhoon) hacking campaign at the behest of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB). Zhang remains at large. FBI Assistant Director Brett Leatherman said that through HAFNIUM the CCP targeted over 60,000 US entities and successfully victimized more than 12,700.

The nine-count indictment, prosecuted in the Southern District of Texas, covers computer intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021, the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Charges reported against the co-defendant include wire fraud, conspiracy to damage and obtain information from protected computers through unauthorized access, and aggravated identity theft. Victims included US research universities (at least one in the Southern District of Texas), immunologists and virologists whose COVID-19 vaccine, treatment and testing research was stolen, and law firms; a global law firm with Washington offices was reportedly targeted for information on US policymakers. Reporting also lists defense contractors and policy think tanks among HAFNIUM targets.

Co-defendant Xu Zewei (34), employed by Shanghai Powerock Network Co. Ltd., was arrested in Milan in July 2025 on a US warrant, extradited from Italy, and made his first appearance in federal court in Houston on 2026-04-27. Prosecutors describe Powerock and Shanghai Firetech as private 'enabling' companies used to conceal MSS/SSSB direction. SentinelLabs reported that the July 2025 indictment expanded known Hafnium membership to at least four individuals across three companies, a tiered contracting structure under direct SSSB tasking, and found at least 10 Shanghai Firetech patents for forensics tooling with offensive applications (Apple device evidence collection, router traffic collection, remote automated evidence collection).

The source article reports no CVEs, malware or IOCs. The technical context below comes from the 2021 public HAFNIUM reporting by Microsoft and CISA/FBI, which the indictment period overlaps: chained Microsoft Exchange Server zero-days (CVE-2021-26855 SSRF, CVE-2021-26857 insecure deserialization in Unified Messaging, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065 post-authentication arbitrary file write), ASPX web shells (China Chopper variants) in Exchange and IIS directories, LSASS dumping with Procdump, Nishang and PowerCat reverse shells, 7-Zip staging, and mailbox export via Exchange PowerShell snap-ins. Microsoft attributed the exploitation to HAFNIUM in March 2021 and the US government attributed it to the PRC MSS on 2021-07-19. The IOCs here are historical 2021 indicators and should be used for retrospective hunting rather than as current infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Collection

T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection; T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence

T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply Microsoft March 2021 Exchange security updates for CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065

Immediate actions

  • Retrospectively hunt Exchange servers for ASPX web shells in aspnet_client, FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth and ecp\auth directories
  • Check historical proxy/firewall logs for the 2021 HAFNIUM IP indicators
  • Review for LSASS dumps via Procdump and Exchange mailbox export activity (New-MailboxExportRequest) from the 2021 window

Workarounds

  • Run Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool / IOC scanning script where patching is delayed

Longer-term hardening

  • Keep on-premises Exchange fully patched and minimize internet exposure of OWA/ECP
  • Monitor Exchange worker process (w3wp.exe, UMWorkerProcess.exe) child-process creation
  • Harden research and law-firm environments holding sensitive pre-publication data

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Exchange Server
    Vulnerable versions: 2013; 2016; 2019 (pre-March 2021 security updates)
    Fixed in: March 2021 security updates; April 2021 updates

Timeline

  • Start of the intrusion period charged in the nine-count indictment (February 2020).
  • Exploitation of Exchange Server zero-days observed from early January 2021 onward.
  • Microsoft discloses HAFNIUM exploitation of four Exchange zero-days and releases patches.
  • FBI and CISA issue joint advisory on Exchange Server compromise.
  • End of the intrusion period charged in the indictment (June 2021).
  • US government attributes the Exchange exploitation to the PRC Ministry of State Security.
  • Co-defendant Xu Zewei arrested in Milan on a US warrant; indictment of Xu Zewei and Zhang Yu made public in July 2025.
  • Xu Zewei extradited from Italy and appears in federal court in Houston, Texas.
  • State Department Rewards for Justice offers up to $10 million for information on Zhang Yu, who remains at large.

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2021-26855

Other reports on CVE-2021-26857

Previous and next in apt

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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