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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6338

China-nexus APT Campaigns Targeting Global Banks for Financial Intelligence and Microsoft 365 Espionage (ShadowPad, Vshell, Fscan, ORB Networks)

highACTIVE

Team Cymru (17 Nov 2026), building on CrowdStrike's 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape report, describes China-nexus espionage against banks and financial institutions in the Americas, Middle East and Southeast Asia aimed at intelligence collection rather than theft.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6338
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsCheck Point VPN gateways (edge VPN devices; no CVE named in sources); Microsoft Microsoft 365 (Exchange Online email accounts); Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) - ShadowPad IIS listener module risk
AttributionHOLLOW PANDA, GENESIS PANDA, HAFNIUM - G0125 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareShadowPad, VShell
ToolsFscan, ShadowPad
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1046 Network Service Discovery, T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy, T1114.002 Remote Email Collection, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1505.004 IIS Components, T1584.008 Network Devices, T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning, T1608.001 Upload Malware
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsfinancial services, banking, central banks, payment gateways, fintech
Target regions005 - South America, Southeast Asia, North America, Middle East, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6338 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 13 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Fscan Network Scanner Execution (GENESIS PANDA Toolset) — Recon / Internal Scanning

Detects execution of the open-source Fscan scanner (binary named fscan/fscan64, or its characteristic -h <target> with -np/-nobr/-nopoc/-hf/-pwdf flags). Team Cymru (TL-2026-6338) found an Fscan binary named 'fscan' next to the Vshell binary 'vs' in an open directory; GENESIS PANDA used Fscan with Vshell against a Southeast Asian financial institution and a North American fintech to map internal networks (T1046, T1595.002).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1046, T1595.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
| eval img=lower(Image), cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| where like(img,"%\\fscan.exe") OR like(img,"%\\fscan64.exe") OR match(cmd,"(^|[^a-z0-9])fscan(64)?([.]exe)?([^a-z0-9]|$)") OR (match(cmd,"\\s-h\\s+\\S+") AND match(cmd,"\\s-(np|nobr|nopoc|hf|pwdf|userf)(\\s|$)"))
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as CommandLine values(ParentImage) as ParentImage by host, User, Image
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("fscan.exe", "fscan64.exe", "fscan")
    or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(^|[^a-z0-9])fscan(64)?(\.exe)?([^a-z0-9]|$)"
    or (ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"\s-h\s+\S+" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\s-(np|nobr|nopoc|hf|pwdf|userf)(\s|$)")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256

Sigma

title: Fscan Network Scanner Execution
id: 3b1f6c52-8a47-4d0e-9c1a-6e2d7f4a1b01
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the Fscan internal network scanner used by GENESIS PANDA alongside Vshell (TL-2026-6338).
references:
  - https://www.team-cymru.com/post/china-nexus-advanced-persistent-threat-financial-services
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1046
  - attack.reconnaissance
  - attack.t1595.002
  - attack.tool.fscan
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\fscan.exe'
      - '\fscan64.exe'
  selection_flag_target:
    CommandLine|contains: ' -h '
  selection_flag_opts:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' -np'
      - ' -nobr'
      - ' -nopoc'
      - ' -hf '
      - ' -pwdf '
  condition: selection_img or (selection_flag_target and selection_flag_opts)
falsepositives:
  - Authorized internal vulnerability scanning or red-team tooling
  - Admin scripts that happen to use -h together with -np style options
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Authorized red-team or internal vulnerability-scan exercises using Fscan
  • Security-engineering hosts that legitimately run open-source scanners

Tuning notes: Allow-list authorized scanner hosts/accounts by host and User. Fscan is Go-based and often renamed, so the flag-combination branch (-h with -np/-nobr/-nopoc/-hf/-pwdf) is the durable signal; keep it. Pair with EventCode=3 volume (many distinct dest ports from one process) for confirmation. On Linux, use sourcetype=sysmon:linux or auditd execve with the same command-line logic.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Check Point VPN Gateway: One External Source Authenticating as Multiple Users — HOLLOW PANDA Edge Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • IIS Worker Process Loading DLL from User-Writable Path — ShadowPad IIS Listener Module · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange Online Sign-ins for Many Users from One External IP — MURKY PANDA ORB Relay · unlock with TL Creds
  • Linux Download or chmod of [indicator]/Vshell Binaries ([indicator], vs) — Open-Directory Staging · unlock with TL Creds
  • IIS Worker Process Spawning Command Shell or Recon Utility — Post-Exploitation on IIS · unlock with TL Creds
  • IIS Worker Process Initiating Outbound Connection to Public IP — ShadowPad IIS Relay / Multi-hop Proxy · unlock with TL Creds
  • IIS Native Module Installation via appcmd/PowerShell — ShadowPad IIS Listener Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • M365 MailItemsAccessed Across Many Mailboxes from One External IP — MURKY PANDA ORB Email Collection · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 13 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6338.

13 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

HOLLOW PANDA (Check Point VPN exploitation, ShadowPad), GENESIS PANDA (Vshell, Fscan) and MURKY PANDA (ORB network to reach Microsoft 365 email) are the CrowdStrike-labelled groups; Team Cymru tracked 64 ShadowPad C2 and 115 Vshell servers between 1 Jan and 1 Jun 2026 but did not attribute them to any specific group.

CrowdStrike's 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape report (published 14 May 2026) identifies Chinese state-linked activity as the most significant intelligence-gathering threat to the financial sector. Team Cymru's follow-up infrastructure research (Will Thomas, 17 Nov 2026) maps the toolsets used by three of the named PANDA groups to network infrastructure. VAULT PANDA and VERTIGO PANDA are also named in the CrowdStrike report, but no details on them are given in the Team Cymru post or the press coverage.

HOLLOW PANDA is described as targeting Check Point VPN devices at financial institutions in South America and Southeast Asia (CrowdStrike coverage cites intrusions in the Philippines, Indonesia and Brazil) and deploying the ShadowPad modular backdoor after access. No CVE identifier is named in the Team Cymru post or the Cyber Security News article. GENESIS PANDA is reported to have compromised a Southeast Asian financial institution and a North American fintech using Vshell and Fscan. Team Cymru found an exposed open directory on a Vshell-tagged IP containing files named 'fscan' and 'vs', which were the Fscan network scanner and Vshell binaries respectively. MURKY PANDA uses an Operational Relay Box (ORB) network of compromised devices to access Microsoft 365 email accounts globally; CrowdStrike coverage reports the ORB network spanned more than 150 endpoints in 36 countries, and that MURKY PANDA targeted 340 organizations across more than 30 sectors, with financial services among the most frequently targeted.

Team Cymru identified 64 servers matching known ShadowPad C2 patterns and 115 servers matching known Vshell patterns between 1 January and 1 June 2026. It states explicitly that it has not attributed them to HOLLOW PANDA or any other specific actor, because ShadowPad, Vshell and ORB infrastructure are shared across many China-nexus actors. The post publishes no IP addresses, domains or hashes in text (the figures are images), so the IOCs recorded here are limited to tool, malware, filename and actor indicators. Team Cymru tracks ORB networks through NetFlow intelligence, and the ORBITAL (Operational Relay Box Intelligence, Tracking, & Analysis Lexicon) project was released in July 2026 to centralize ORB tracking. Cyber Security News additionally cites the ShadowPad IIS listener module, which turns compromised servers into relay points, as something defenders should watch for; that module is documented separately by Check Point Research in connection with a different cluster.

Stated motivations include economic intelligence on trade, currency and investment trends, PII collection to profile officials and dissidents, downstream pivots to government networks, clearinghouses and multinationals, and alignment with China's Belt and Road Initiative interests in South and Southeast Asia.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery

Command and Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy

Collection

T1114.002 Remote Email Collection

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence

T1505.004 IIS Components

Resource Development

T1584.008 Network Devices; T1608.001 Upload Malware

Reconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply current Check Point VPN security hotfixes and vendor guidance

Immediate actions

  • Patch and harden Check Point VPN gateways; review VPN logs for anomalous logins and credential misuse
  • Hunt for ShadowPad, Vshell and Fscan artifacts (binaries named fscan and vs) on perimeter and internet-facing hosts
  • Review Microsoft 365 sign-in and mailbox access logs for logins originating from residential or IoT/SOHO IP space consistent with ORB relays
  • Inspect IIS servers for unauthorized modules, including ShadowPad IIS listener modules

Workarounds

  • Restrict management and VPN exposure to required source ranges; disable unused remote-access blades

Longer-term hardening

  • Monitor NetFlow for internal scanning and communication with known ShadowPad/Vshell C2 infrastructure
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and conditional access (device compliance, geo/IP policy) on Microsoft 365
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral coverage on edge and server systems; do not leave perimeter appliances unmonitored
  • Ingest ORB tracking intelligence (e.g., ORBITAL, Team Cymru) into network blocking and detection

Affected and fixed versions

  • Check Point — VPN gateways (edge VPN devices; no CVE named in sources)
  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 (Exchange Online email accounts)
  • Microsoft — Internet Information Services (IIS) - ShadowPad IIS listener module risk

Timeline

  • Start of Team Cymru's tracking window for ShadowPad and Vshell C2 servers.
  • CrowdStrike publishes its 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape report naming HOLLOW PANDA, GENESIS PANDA, MURKY PANDA, VAULT PANDA and VERTIGO PANDA.
  • End of tracking window: 64 ShadowPad C2 and 115 Vshell servers identified between 1 Jan and 1 Jun 2026; none attributed to a specific group.
  • ORBITAL (Operational Relay Box Intelligence, Tracking, & Analysis Lexicon) ORB-tracking project released (July 2026; exact day not stated in sources).
  • Team Cymru publishes 'China-nexus Espionage Against Financial Services: Tracking the Infrastructure Behind the Toolsets'.
  • Cyber Security News reports on the Team Cymru findings.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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