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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-3041

Malicious Bookmark (Bookmarklet) Phishing Campaign Hijacks Logged-In FOMO Web Platform Accounts

highACTIVE

SlowMist flagged an emerging phishing campaign against users of the FOMO web platform on 2026-10-08. Phishing pages show a fake human-verification (CAPTCHA) step that tricks victims into dragging malicious JavaScript into their browser bookmarks; clicking the bookmark 2-3 times hijacks the already logged-in FOMO account and the crypto assets inside are stolen immediately.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3041
Also known asFOMO bookmark phishing, Bookmarklet phishing against FOMO
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsFOMO FOMO web platform (logged-in web sessions)
ToolsJavaScript bookmarklet
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1059.007 JavaScript, T1185 Browser Session Hijacking, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1566 Phishing, T1657 Financial Theft
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorscryptocurrency, web3, social-trading, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources12 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3041 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 6 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: FOMO Web Session Used From Multiple ASNs or User-Agents

Detects a single FOMO web session ID observed from more than one network ASN or browser user-agent. If the bookmarklet sends the victim's session or tokens to the attacker (SlowMist reports the account is 'hijacked' from the logged-in session; the 2023 friend.tech precedent targeted password/2FA and Privy embedded-wallet tokens), the stolen session is replayed from attacker infrastructure as a valid account. Operators of or integrators with the FOMO platform audit log can run this directly; consumers need a platform or CASB log feed. A bookmarklet acting only inside the victim's browser would not trigger this, which is why SPL-003, KQL-002 and KQL-003 cover that case.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1185, T1539, T1550.004, T1078
  • Data sources: fomo:audit (platform/CASB audit log: user, session_id, src_ip, src_asn, user_agent, client_type, action), FomoAudit_CL, sigma:fomo/audit
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=fomo sourcetype="fomo:audit" client_type=web session_id=*
| stats dc(src_ip) AS ip_count dc(src_asn) AS asn_count dc(user_agent) AS ua_count values(src_ip) AS src_ips values(user_agent) AS user_agents values(action) AS actions min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen by user, session_id
| where asn_count>=2 OR ua_count>=2
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen, "%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen, "%F %T")
| sort - asn_count

Microsoft KQL

FomoAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where client_type_s =~ "web" and isnotempty(session_id_s)
| summarize IPs=dcount(src_ip_s), ASNs=dcount(src_asn_s), UAs=dcount(user_agent_s), SrcIPs=make_set(src_ip_s, 10), UserAgents=make_set(user_agent_s, 5), Actions=make_set(action_s, 20), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by user_s, session_id_s
| where ASNs >= 2 or UAs >= 2
| order by ASNs desc, UAs desc

Sigma

title: FOMO Web Session Event
name: fomo_web_session_event
id: 2b8e41d6-95a3-4c07-8f12-a6d3e7c90b54
status: experimental
description: Base rule - any FOMO web-client audit event carrying a session ID. Used only by the correlation rule below.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-08
logsource:
  product: fomo
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    client_type: 'web'
  condition: selection
level: informational
---
title: FOMO Web Session Token Reuse Across ASNs
id: 91f4a7c3-6d28-4e5b-b0a9-3c1e8d2f7a65
status: experimental
description: One FOMO web session ID seen from two or more ASNs within an hour. Consistent with a session or token stolen by the bookmarklet in the FOMO bookmark-phishing campaign and replayed from attacker infrastructure.
references:
  - https://panews.io/articles/01a11910-3eac-71d4-9f8d-2db938cf8f3e
  - https://slowmist.medium.com/beware-of-phishing-attacks-by-fake-journalists-9cc3ed09d7c9
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-08
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1185
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1539
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1550.004
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - fomo_web_session_event
  group-by:
    - session_id
  timespan: 1h
  condition:
    gte: 2
    field: src_asn
falsepositives:
  - Mobile users roaming between carrier and Wi-Fi networks
  - Corporate VPN or proxy egress changes mid-session
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Mobile users roaming between carrier and Wi-Fi networks
  • VPN or corporate proxy egress changes within one session

Tuning notes: Field names (session_id, src_asn, client_type) are a normalised schema; map them to your FOMO audit or CASB feed. Add a geo-distance or country-change condition to cut roaming noise, and exclude known corporate egress ASNs. The Sigma correlation requires a backend with Sigma v2 correlation support; otherwise use the SPL/KQL forms.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Browser Bookmarks File Modified Shortly After Visiting a FOMO Lookalike Site · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cross-Origin POST From a FOMO Page to a Non-FOMO, Non-Allowlisted Host · unlock with TL Creds
  • FOMO Withdrawal to a Newly Added Address Within 15 Minutes · unlock with TL Creds
  • macOS Browser Bookmark Store Written (Safari/Chromium) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser Bookmark Containing a javascript: URI (Bookmarklet) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Repeated Sensitive FOMO Action Within 60 Seconds From One Web Session · unlock with TL Creds
  • FOMO Lookalike Domain Access — Bookmark-Phishing Lure Page · unlock with TL Creds
  • FOMO Rapid Multi-Transfer Account Drain From Web Session · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 6 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3041.

6 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-10-08 SlowMist (via researcher Cos and the @SlowMist_Team account, with a longer Medium analysis titled 'Threat Intelligence Analysis of a Malicious Bookmark Phishing Attack Targeting FOMO Users') warned of bookmark phishing aimed at the FOMO web platform.

Reported attack chain: (1) the victim lands on an attacker-controlled phishing page; (2) the page presents a fake CAPTCHA / human-verification step; (3) the 'verification' instructs the user to drag a snippet of JavaScript into the browser bookmarks bar and save it as a bookmark (a bookmarklet, i.e. a javascript: URI stored as a bookmark); (4) after the user clicks that bookmark 2-3 times while a FOMO web session is open, the script runs in the context of the logged-in FOMO page and the attacker hijacks the account; (5) the attacker immediately steals the crypto assets held in the account. Because the code runs from the user's own bookmark inside the authenticated page, no exploit, malware download or CVE is required and the victim performs the execution step themselves.

SlowMist stated this is not a new technique but a familiar method presented in a new way. The same primitive was documented by SlowMist earlier: its 2022 annual phishing review listed malicious browser bookmarks (JavaScript inserted via phishing pages, fired only when the victim is logged in, used against Discord accounts and project-owner permissions), and in October 2023 a fake-journalist campaign against friend.tech KOLs used a link whose malicious JavaScript was saved by victims and then targeted the account password/2FA and Privy embedded-wallet tokens.

Evidence limits: the primary SlowMist Medium article returned HTTP 403 to automated retrieval, so its full body was not reviewed. None of the secondary outlets (PANews, Coinfomania, KuCoin, ChainCatcher, TokenPost, Phemex) publish phishing domains, script source, exfiltration endpoints, hashes, victim counts or loss totals. Phemex states researchers preserved attacker wallet addresses but did not publish them. No threat actor is named. This incident is distinct from the earlier FomoPeek iOS malware reporting. Detection should therefore focus on behavior (bookmark creation with a javascript: URL, fake-CAPTCHA drag-to-bookmark lure pages, anomalous FOMO session actions) until SlowMist's IOCs are available.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.001 Malicious Link

Collection

T1185 Browser Session Hijacking

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Never drag, paste or save JavaScript into browser bookmarks or the console at the request of a web page, including 'human verification' pages
  • If you saved such a bookmark: delete it, log out of FOMO and revoke active sessions, and move remaining funds to a wallet you control
  • Change FOMO account credentials and review the account for unauthorized activity

Workarounds

  • Use a dedicated browser profile for crypto platforms with no bookmarklets saved
  • Enterprise browser policy to block or alert on bookmark additions with javascript: schemes where supported

Longer-term hardening

  • Reach FOMO only via typed or official bookmarked URLs and verify the domain before logging in
  • Platforms: harden web sessions with step-up authentication/confirmation for withdrawals and transfers, and a strict Content-Security-Policy that blocks javascript: URL execution where feasible
  • Security teams: monitor browser bookmark stores for javascript: entries on managed endpoints

Affected and fixed versions

  • FOMO — FOMO web platform (logged-in web sessions)
    Vulnerable versions: Web version; no platform vulnerability reported - abuse of user-executed bookmarklets

Timeline

  • SlowMist's 2022 phishing review (reported 2023-01-17) lists malicious browser bookmarks as a common technique: JavaScript inserted via phishing pages fires when a logged-in Discord user clicks the bookmark.
  • October 2023 (day approximate): SlowMist reports a fake-journalist campaign against friend.tech KOLs in which victims saved malicious JavaScript to target account password/2FA and Privy embedded-wallet tokens.
  • SlowMist publishes 'Threat Intelligence Analysis of a Malicious Bookmark Phishing Attack Targeting FOMO Users' on Medium (body not retrievable by this pipeline: HTTP 403).
  • PANews, ChainCatcher, Phemex, TokenPost, KuCoin and Coinfomania relay the alert; none publish phishing domains, script code, wallet addresses or loss figures.
  • @SlowMist_Team publishes a TI Alert on the campaign, stating it is a familiar technique in a new presentation and that a full analysis will follow.
  • SlowMist's Cos posts on X that bookmark phishing against the FOMO web platform is emerging (fake human verification, drag JavaScript into bookmarks, 2-3 clicks hijack logged-in account).

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.

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