Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-3066
Midnight Mimosa: Low-cost MediaTek Android phones ship with firmware-level ad-fraud and residential proxy malware
Bitdefender found the Midnight Mimosa malware preinstalled in the firmware of low-cost MediaTek-based Android phones (e.g. Doogee S200 X, Cubot KINGKONG X, and counterfeit Samsung/Apple-branded devices). A platform-signed system app silently installs and removes apps, loads remote code, commits ad fraud and enrolls devices as residential proxy nodes; activity spans about two years and 150+ countries with no attribution.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3066 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Midnight Mimosa |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Doogee S200 X, Fire 3 Max (MediaTek-based Android phones); Cubot KINGKONG X (MediaTek-based Android phones); Various / counterfeit (impersonating Samsung and Apple) Low-cost MediaTek Android phones branded S24/S25/S26 Ultra, i16/i17 Pro Max, Note 18 Ultra and region-coded ODM builds J10_EEA, A9_EEA, T13_EEA, Q6_EEA |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-1357 |
| Malware | Midnight Mimosa |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1400 Modify System Partition, T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1407 Download New Code at Runtime, T1418 Software Discovery, T1426 System Information Discovery, T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1474.003 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1509 Non-Standard Port, T1517 Access Notifications, T1521.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, T1544 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1575 Native API and 8 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | consumer, enterprise-byod, advertising |
| Target regions | mexico, france, italy, united states of america, germany, brazil, spain, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3066 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 66 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Midnight Mimosa — Preinstalled Platform-Signed Enabler Package on Android Device (MDM Inventory)
Detects the Midnight Mimosa firmware-level enabler (com.android.system.lite, com.android.sys.prot, com.android.sys.gmsprot, com.android.sys.bcprot, com.android.non.szcz) in MDM/EMM Android app inventory, and flags whether the package is signed with the Shenzhen Zediel platform certificate (CN=ZED, O=ZED, L=ShenZhen, C=CN). The enabler ships in the system partition before first boot, runs as the system user with INSTALL_PACKAGES / DELETE_PACKAGES / GRANT_RUNTIME_PERMISSIONS / WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS, and cannot be uninstalled normally. Presence on a device means the firmware supply chain is compromised.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1474.003, T1655.001
- Data sources: mdm_android_app_inventory (custom ingestion: index=mdm sourcetype=mdm:android:app_inventory / MdmAndroidAppInventory_CL)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
``` Midnight Mimosa: preinstalled enabler packages in Android MDM app inventory. Requires an MDM inventory feed with package_name, signer_dn, version_code ```
index=mdm sourcetype="mdm:android:app_inventory" earliest=-24h
| search package_name IN ("com.android.system.lite","com.android.sys.prot","com.android.sys.gmsprot","com.android.sys.bcprot","com.android.non.szcz")
``` Platform-key certificate associated with Shenzhen Zediel Co., Ltd. ```
| eval zed_signed=if(match(signer_dn,"(?i)CN=ZED.*O=ZED.*L=ShenZhen"),1,0)
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(package_name) as packages values(version_code) as version_codes max(zed_signed) as zed_signed by device_id device_model device_brand user
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen device_id user device_brand device_model packages version_codes zed_signedMicrosoft KQL
// Midnight Mimosa: preinstalled enabler packages in Android MDM app inventory (custom-ingested table)
MdmAndroidAppInventory_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where PackageName_s in~ ('com.android.system.lite','com.android.sys.prot','com.android.sys.gmsprot','com.android.sys.bcprot','com.android.non.szcz')
| extend ZedSigned = SignerDn_s matches regex @'(?i)CN=ZED.*O=ZED.*L=ShenZhen'
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Packages = make_set(PackageName_s), VersionCodes = make_set(VersionCode_s), ZedSignedCount = countif(ZedSigned) by DeviceId_s, DeviceModel_s, DeviceBrand_s, UserPrincipalName_s
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceId_s, UserPrincipalName_s, DeviceBrand_s, DeviceModel_s, Packages, VersionCodes, ZedSignedCountSigma
title: Midnight Mimosa Preinstalled Enabler Package on Android Device
id: 3f6c1a52-8d47-4b19-9a0e-5c2e7b4d1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects Midnight Mimosa firmware-level enabler packages (platform-signed system apps) in Android application inventory telemetry. The enabler is preinstalled in the system partition of low-cost MediaTek phones and holds INSTALL_PACKAGES, DELETE_PACKAGES and WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS.
references:
- https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/labs/midnight-mimosa-malware
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/low-cost-android-phones-ship-with-residential-proxy-malware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1474.003
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1655.001
logsource:
product: android
category: application_inventory
definition: 'Requires MDM/MTD application inventory with package_name per device'
detection:
selection:
package_name:
- 'com.android.system.lite'
- 'com.android.sys.prot'
- 'com.android.sys.gmsprot'
- 'com.android.sys.bcprot'
- 'com.android.non.szcz'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown; these package names are not part of AOSP or known OEM images outside the affected firmware builds
level: highKnown false positives:
- Internal test builds or custom ODM firmware that reuse the same package names for unrelated system components (verify signer_dn and version_code 900000)
Tuning notes: Map index/sourcetype, table and field names (package_name, signer_dn, version_code) to your MDM export (Intune, Workspace ONE, Jamf, MTD). Treat zed_signed=1 as confirmed compromise. Joining on device_model against Doogee S200 X / Fire 3 Max, Cubot KINGKONG X and region-coded J10_EEA/A9_EEA/T13_EEA/Q6_EEA builds helps prioritise triage.
- Midnight Mimosa — Spoofed Google Play Installer on Dropped Payload or ZED-Signed App · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — Payload Download from [indicator] (Modules Disguised as PNG) · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — Outbound TCP/6000 Proxy Relay to [indicator] or {productId}.apple.<domain> · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — [indicator] / [indicator] Native Core and Framework Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — [indicator] Module Config and Ad-Fraud Telemetry Endpoints · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — DNS Lookups for Framework C2, Payload CDN and Legacy Operator Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — Google Play Store Disabled via pm Command Around Silent Install · unlock with TL Creds
- Midnight Mimosa — Proxyware C2 DNS Lookups ({productId}.apple.<domain>) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 66 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3066.
Sample indicators (3 of 66)
- IP address:
85.17.70[.]38 - Domain:
api[.]weatherlive[.]world - File hash:
a8847b68428fde206b6dff8001051f92
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 66 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Bitdefender Labs (reported by BleepingComputer on 2026-10-08) describes Midnight Mimosa as a malware framework present in the system partition of low-cost Android phones before the user first powers them on. Affected devices are built on MediaTek platforms (board k62v1_64_bsp / MT6762 observed) and include genuine budget brands (Doogee S200 X, Doogee Fire 3 Max, Cubot KINGKONG X), region-coded ODM builds (J10_EEA, A9_EEA, T13_EEA, Q6_EEA) and counterfeit flagship-named devices (S24/S25/S26 Ultra, i16/i17 Pro Max, Note 18 Ultra). Bitdefender's App Anomaly Detection flagged a suspicious system application; the campaign was observed on thousands of devices across 150+ countries over roughly two years, with Mexico, France, Italy, the United States, Germany, Brazil and Spain the most affected.
The enabler is a system app (com.android.system.lite, versionCode 900000, plus variants com.android.sys.prot, com.android.sys.gmsprot, com.android.sys.bcprot and, per BleepingComputer, com.android.non.szcz) signed with a platform key whose certificate is associated with Shenzhen Zediel Co., Ltd. (DN CN=ZED, O=ZED, L=ShenZhen, C=CN). Researchers stress this does not establish that the firmware vendor knowingly distributed the malware. The enabler runs as the system user and holds INSTALL_PACKAGES, DELETE_PACKAGES, GRANT_RUNTIME_PERMISSIONS, WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS and MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS. Before installing payloads it runs 'pm disable com.android.vending' and re-enables Play afterwards, and it sets the installer package to com.android.vending without Play's frosting signature block to fake Google Play provenance. Manifest-declared capabilities also include Accessibility Service, Notification Access and SMS read/write.
A native library, libeasy.so, RC4-decrypts (key 'rc4@sec.com') the dropped framework cn.kw.lib.hex. Strings are protected with AES-128-CFB (keys derived as MD5 of fixed base64-looking constants). The framework contacts api.weatherlive.world (module config via /br_upgrade/upgradeV2/getConfigs, telemetry via /odborwer_dot/cm) and downloads modules from oss.showtimetool.com disguised as .png files. Stage-3 plugins include 'wz' (com.wz.sdk.DxFactory, ad fraud: fake impressions and clicks driven by a RemoteConfig object with silentPercent, notClickPercent, notClickInterval and tap-placement rate parameters, with auto-conversion reports after 60 seconds), 'earn' (com.earnsdk.lib.DxFactory, silent installation) and 'gogo' (com.gogo.third.lib.DxFactory, silent installer with WebView).
The proxyware component is the dropped app com.mobile.applock.en (EnLoaderLib v1.0.6). It registers a device UUID and fingerprint (Model#Release#SDK_INT#Build.ID#Brand), opens a raw TCP socket to {productId}.apple.{domain}:6000 (and 85.17.70.38:6000) and relays bytes full-duplex between the controller and target hosts, turning the phone into a residential proxy node. The same ad-fraud code appears in 13 apps on Google Play published under at least two developer accounts (fivedev, CPS Developer) with 13 distinct signing certificates; they masquerade as weather, file manager, app locker, OCR/picture-translate and audio editor utilities.
Bitdefender links the operation by shared infrastructure to earlier malware: Android.Joker.310.origin (2021, premium-SMS fraud, shared domain zhuifengzhe.top) and Android.Phantom.5 / Android.Click.429.origin (2025, dropper and click fraud). Because the enabler is platform-signed and lives in the system partition, standard uninstall does not work; removal needs firmware-level cleanup or ADB disabling. No CVE or CVSS applies. Attribution to a named actor is not established.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Persistence
Defense Evasion
T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1407 Download New Code at Runtime; T1629.003 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools; T1630.001 Indicator Removal on Host: Uninstall Malicious Application; T1630.002 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion; T1632 Subvert Trust Controls; T1655.001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
Discovery
T1418 Software Discovery; T1426 System Information Discovery
Command and Control
T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1509 Non-Standard Port; T1521.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography; T1544 Ingress Tool Transfer
Initial Access
T1474.003 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Collection
Execution
defense-evasion
Impact
T1643 Generate Traffic from Victim
Exfiltration
Remediation
Patches
- No vendor patch identified in the sources; removal requires a firmware-level cleanup (clean reflash) from a trusted source
Immediate actions
- Inventory fleet and BYOD Android devices for com.android.system.lite, com.android.sys.prot, com.android.sys.gmsprot, com.android.sys.bcprot and com.android.non.szcz
- Block api.weatherlive.world, oss.showtimetool.com, 85.17.70.38 and the other listed domains at DNS/proxy/firewall, including outbound TCP/6000 from mobile segments
- Quarantine or deny corporate access to affected Doogee, Cubot and counterfeit-branded devices pending remediation
Workarounds
- Disable the malicious packages via ADB (standard uninstall is blocked by system-level privileges)
- Stop using the device for sensitive activity if firmware cannot be replaced
Longer-term hardening
- Procure devices only from vendors with verified firmware supply chains and Play Protect certification
- Use mobile threat defense / app anomaly detection to flag unexpected platform-signed system apps and installer-spoofing
- Add device attestation and compliance checks to MDM access policies
Affected and fixed versions
- Doogee — S200 X, Fire 3 Max (MediaTek-based Android phones)
Vulnerable versions: Preinstalled firmware builds observed by Bitdefender - Cubot — KINGKONG X (MediaTek-based Android phones)
Vulnerable versions: Preinstalled firmware builds observed by Bitdefender - Various / counterfeit (impersonating Samsung and Apple) — Low-cost MediaTek Android phones branded S24/S25/S26 Ultra, i16/i17 Pro Max, Note 18 Ultra and region-coded ODM builds J10_EEA, A9_EEA, T13_EEA, Q6_EEA
Vulnerable versions: Preinstalled firmware builds observed by Bitdefender
Timeline
Last updated · 4 updates · revalidated 4× · latest source
- Android.Joker.310.origin (premium-SMS fraud) observed sharing the domain locked-ioc-32 with this operator lineage (year only per Bitdefender)
- MAC OUI A0:53:94 associated with the platform-key certificate holder registered with IEEE
- Bitdefender App Anomaly Detection behavioral monitoring in place since 2023 (year only per Bitdefender)
- Midnight Mimosa preinstalled enabler, ad fraud and proxyware activity begins (2024-2025 window; about two years before disclosure)
- Build tag 20240425 observed in the enabler's nativeInit(), anchoring the start of the roughly two-year campaign window.
- Android.Phantom.5 / Android.Click.429.origin dropper and click-fraud malware share infrastructure with the campaign (year only per Bitdefender)
- Payload path locked-ioc-27/ssc/2025/12-07/ observed serving disguised .png modules.
- Payload path locked-ioc-27/ssc/2026/03-09/ observed serving disguised .png modules.
- Payload path locked-ioc-27/ssc/2026/07-04/ observed serving disguised .png modules.
- Payload path locked-ioc-27/ssc/2026/08-13/ observed serving disguised .png modules, the most recent staging date in the published IOCs.
- BleepingComputer reports Bitdefender's findings: Midnight Mimosa in firmware of low-cost Android phones across 150+ countries
- Bitdefender updates its report, correcting that locked-ioc-36 (TCP/6000) is a sinkhole rather than active proxyware C2; press (SecurityWeek, The Record, eSecurity Planet) covers 150+ countries.
- PolySwarm publishes a supply-chain analysis of Midnight Mimosa with sample SHA-256 hashes, plugin classes and MITRE mapping; notes actual proxy relaying was not observed in its testing.
- Cyber Security News reports thousands of phones across 150+ countries ship with the malware; the firmware supply-chain entry point remains undetermined.
Update history
- 2026-10-20 — Midnight Mimosa: Pre-installed Android firmware malware (platform-signed com.android.system.lite) enables ad fraud and residential proxyware on low-cost MediaTek phones in 150+ countries: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change; the record gains sample hashes, techniques and timeline entries. New indicators (6) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-13 — Midnight Mimosa: Preinstalled Firmware Malware on Low-Cost MediaTek Android Phones Turns Devices into Residential Proxies: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; existing values (HIGH / ACTIVE) remain correct. New indicators (10) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-12 — Midnight Mimosa: Android Malware Pre-Installed in Firmware of Low-Cost MediaTek Devices: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; HIGH / ACTIVE stand. Additive intelligence only. New indicators (3) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-09 — Midnight Mimosa: Pre-Installed Firmware Malware on Budget MediaTek Android Devices in 150+ Countries: What changed No field escalation: severity HIGH, exploitability ACTIVE, status ACTIVE and attribution (Unattributed, LOW) are unchanged and corroborated by the newer report.
Sources cited
- Related: Increased Android.BadBox2 malware infection (NG-CERT) cert.gov.ng · Advisory · 2026-10-09
- The phone was compromised before the user turned it on: the rise of Midnight Mimosa (Bitdefender Labs) bitdefender.com · Research · 2026-10-08
- Related: BadBox botnet expands to over 192,000 devices worldwide (Bitdefender) bitdefender.in · Blog · 2026-10-09
- Low-cost Android phones ship with residential proxy malware BleepingComputer · News · 2026-10-08
- Midnight Mimosa Malware Found Preinstalled on Low-Cost Android Phones (Hackread) hackread.com · News · 2026-10-09
- Some cheap Android phones come with malware in their firmware (Android Authority) androidauthority.com · News · 2026-10-09
Previous and next in supply chain
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .