Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-3186
Akira Ransomware Attack Mapped by Huntress: RDP Initial Access, GOST Tunneling, Rclone Exfiltration
Huntress analyzed an Akira ransomware intrusion that began with RDP access from a workstation not owned by the customer. The actor disabled BitDefender, dumped lsass.exe with procdump, deployed the GOST tunneling tool, exfiltrated data with Rclone, then removed volume shadow copies and ran Akira against multiple Shares subfolders.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3186 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (RDP / Terminal Services endpoints and file shares); Bitdefender Bitdefender Endpoint Security (services stopped via console by the actor) |
| Malware | elf.akira, win.akira |
| Tools | GOST, ProcDump, Rclone - S1040 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1489 Service Stop, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1572 Protocol Tunneling, T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | education, manufacturing, information-technology, health, finance, food-and-agriculture |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 5 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3186 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Akira C2 - GOST Tunnel Masquerading As svchost.exe With config.dll
Correlates the GOST tunneling artifacts from the Akira case: process creation from C:\PerfLogs (svchost.exe, config.dll), DLL load of C:\PerfLogs\*\config.dll by svchost.exe, network connections to 64.227.4.134, and svchost.exe network activity from outside System32/SysWOW64. GOST ran as SYSTEM about four hours before encryption.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1572, T1090, T1036.005, T1574.001
- Data sources: sysmon, index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational (EventCode 1, 3, 7), DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
((EventCode=1 Image="C:\\PerfLogs\\*" (Image="*\\svchost.exe" OR OriginalFileName="gost*" OR CommandLine="*config.dll*"))
OR (EventCode=3 DestinationIp="64.227.4.134")
OR (EventCode=3 Image="*\\svchost.exe" NOT Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\*" NOT Image="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")
OR (EventCode=7 Image="*\\svchost.exe" ImageLoaded="C:\\PerfLogs\\*\\config.dll"))
```GOST (Go Simple Tunnel) dropped as C:\PerfLogs\Temp\svchost.exe, loading config.dll, tunnelling to 64.227.4.134```
| eval stage=case(EventCode=1,"process_create",EventCode=3,"network_connect",EventCode=7,"dll_load")
| stats count min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(stage) AS stages values(Image) AS images values(DestinationIp) AS dest_ips values(CommandLine) AS cmdlines by host, UserMicrosoft KQL
let gostC2 = "64.227.4.134";
let gostHash = "d00833318a04caa019c6f95dcb3598ad947d405010bfb2f3cbd04530a00bc3a4";
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FolderPath startswith @"C:\PerfLogs\" and (FileName =~ "svchost.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName startswith "gost" or ProcessCommandLine has "config.dll")) or SHA256 =~ gostHash
| extend Stage = "process_create"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Stage, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, SHA256),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP == gostC2 or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\System32\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\"))
| extend Stage = "network_connect"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Stage, FileName = InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, SHA256 = InitiatingProcessSHA256, RemoteIP, RemotePort)
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: GOST Tunnel Connection To Akira Infrastructure Or From Non-System svchost
id: a94e3b07-1d52-4c6f-8e90-2b7f5d1c3a03
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound connections to 64.227.4.134, the GOST tunnel destination in the Huntress Akira case, or network connections from a svchost.exe running outside System32/SysWOW64, matching GOST masquerading as svchost.exe in C:\PerfLogs\Temp.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/mapping-akira-ransomware-attack
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-10
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036.005
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_ip:
DestinationIp: '64.227.4.134'
selection_svchost:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
filter_legit:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: selection_ip or (selection_svchost and not filter_legit)
falsepositives:
- Unlikely for the destination IP; non-standard svchost locations may occur with unusual OS images or security tooling
level: high
Known false positives:
- Third-party software installed outside System32 that legitimately includes a file named svchost.exe (rare)
- Authorized use of GOST by network administrators
Tuning notes: EventCode 7 requires Sysmon ImageLoad logging for the relevant processes. Add further GOST infrastructure to the IP list as it is discovered and block 64.227.4.134 at the perimeter. Hunt retroactively across the last 30 days.
- Akira Credential Access - ProcDump Dumping LSASS From [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Exfiltration - Rclone Cloud Synchronisation From Staging Directory · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Impact - Shadow Copy Deletion Via PowerShell WMI · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Impact - Ransom Note, Encrypted Extension And win.exe Payload · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Persistence - config.dll Side-Loaded By svchost.exe From [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira C2 - svchost.exe Masquerade From Non-System Path (GOST) · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Initial Access - RDP Logon From Unmanaged Workstation ([indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- Akira Defense Evasion - Bitdefender Endpoint Services Stopped (SCM 7036) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3186.
Sample indicators (3 of 15)
- IP address:
64.227.4[.]134 - File hash:
1f1bb322591b6d27fd2946e373d7d2efc2f4e1e66818846060d391600b600fba - File hash:
d00833318a04caa019c6f95dcb3598ad947d405010bfb2f3cbd04530a00bc3a4
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 15 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
In September 2026 the Huntress agent was deployed on an organization that had already been hit by an Akira ransomware attack. Forensic review of the impacted endpoint (Windows Event Logs, Shellbags, PowerShell logs and Akira log files) showed that the actor logged in over Remote Desktop Protocol (Terminal Services) from a workstation named C1IFRYXI that was not owned by the customer. The report does not state how the actor obtained access or credentials, and the source gives no threat actor attribution.
Once on the host, the actor opened the BitDefender console and stopped four BitDefender services (Endpoint Update, Endpoint Integration, Endpoint Protected and Endpoint Security services); Service Control Manager event 7036 recorded the terminations. The actor then ran procdump.exe from C:\PerfLogs against lsass.exe to harvest credentials. C:\PerfLogs is a world-writable directory that was used as the staging area for the actor's tools.
About four hours before encryption began, the actor deployed the open-source GOST (Go Simple Tunnel) proxy. It was dropped as C:\PerfLogs\Temp\svchost.exe, loaded a configuration from C:\PerfLogs\temp\config.dll, ran as SYSTEM, and tunneled to 64.227.4.134. Huntress assesses it was likely used for persistence. The actor also launched Rclone from C:\PerfLogs for file synchronization to cloud storage, which Huntress documents as the data exfiltration step. The destination configuration is not given in the source.
For impact, the actor ran PowerShell (powershell.exe -Command Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy , Remove-WmiObject) to delete volume shadow copies, then executed the Akira ransomware binary from C:\storage\win.exe in several runs against subfolders of a Shares folder. The actor checked the results through Windows Explorer. Malpedia catalogs the report under the families win.akira and elf.akira.
Background from the CISA advisory AA24-109A (published 2024-04-18, updated 2025-11-13): Akira operators target SMBs and organizations in education, manufacturing, IT, healthcare, financial services and food and agriculture. They use VPN and backup-software vulnerabilities for initial access, and use RDP, Rclone, procdump, Mimikatz, AnyDesk, WinRAR and Ngrok. Ransom notes are named fn.txt or akira_readme.txt, and encrypted files get extensions such as .akira, .powerranges, .akiranew or .aki. These CISA details are general Akira context and were not observed in the Huntress case.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Exfiltration
T1020 Automated Exfiltration; T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Initial Access
Command and Control
T1090 Proxy; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Impact
T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
stealth
T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block outbound traffic to 64.227.4.134 and hunt for connections to it
- Hunt for executables and tools (procdump.exe, rclone, svchost.exe, config.dll) in C:\PerfLogs and C:\PerfLogs\Temp
- Review RDP logon events (Terminal Services) for source workstations not in the asset inventory, such as C1IFRYXI
- Alert on stops of Bitdefender Endpoint services (SCM event 7036)
- Isolate hosts showing lsass.exe dumping, GOST tunneling or Rclone execution
Workarounds
- Restrict write and execute permissions on C:\PerfLogs
- Block unsanctioned tunneling and cloud-sync tools (GOST, Rclone) with application control
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all remote access including RDP
- Keep an accurate asset inventory and restrict RDP to managed workstations
- Enable tamper protection on endpoint security products
- Protect LSASS (credential protection) and monitor process access to lsass.exe
- Maintain offline, tested backups and segment the network
- Apply attack surface reduction rules
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (RDP / Terminal Services endpoints and file shares)
Vulnerable versions: Systems exposing RDP without MFA - Bitdefender — Bitdefender Endpoint Security (services stopped via console by the actor)
Vulnerable versions: Deployments without tamper protection or console access control
Timeline
- CISA publishes joint advisory AA24-109A on Akira ransomware TTPs, tools (Rclone, procdump) and IOCs
- CISA significantly updates AA24-109A with new CVEs, TTPs and ransom note/extension details
- September 2026: shadow copies removed via PowerShell; Akira (locked-ioc-5) run several times against Shares subfolders
- September 2026: Rclone launched from locked-ioc-9 for cloud file synchronization (data exfiltration)
- September 2026: GOST deployed as locked-ioc-3 with config.dll about 4 hours before encryption began
- September 2026: locked-ioc-8 is run from locked-ioc-9 against lsass.exe
- September 2026: actor opens the BitDefender console and stops four Bitdefender Endpoint services (SCM event 7036 logged)
- September 2026 (exact day not published): actor logs in via RDP to the endpoint from non-customer workstation C1IFRYXI
- Huntress publishes 'Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack'; Malpedia catalogs it the same day
Sources cited
- CISA #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (AA24-109A) CISA · Government advisory · 2025-11-13
- Up a Creek Without a Command Line: Mapping an Akira Ransomware Attack (Huntress) Huntress · Research · 2026-10-06
- Malpedia library entry (win.akira, elf.akira) malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de · Research · 2026-10-06
- Malware Spotlight: Akira Ransomware (Arete) areteir.com · Vendor report · 2026-10-10
- Threat Brief: Understanding Akira Ransomware (Qualys) blog.qualys.com · Blog · 2024-10-02
Previous and next in ransomware
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.