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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-3319

Centrii: Nation-State Pre-Positioning (Volt Typhoon, IRGC-Affiliated PLC Exploitation) and Renewable Supply-Chain Risk Raise Energy Sector Exposure

highACTIVE

Centrii analysis (2026-10-01, reported by Industrial Cyber 2026-10-06) describes converging energy-sector threats: Volt Typhoon living-off-the-land footholds in U.S. critical infrastructure, Iranian-affiliated exploitation of internet-facing PLCs (CISA AA26-097A), Russian-attributed physical sabotage in Europe, and supply-chain risk from grid-connected inverters and batteries. First disclosed .

Key facts for Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning

IdentifiersTL-2026-3319
Also known asAA26-097A, AA24-038A, Centrii GRIDLOCK
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Exploitation statusExploited in the wild
Affected productsRockwell Automation Allen-Bradley CompactLogix / Micro850 PLCs; Schneider Electric Modicon M340 / BMX P34 PLCs; Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLCs; Cisco / NETGEAR End-of-life SOHO routers (KV botnet); Various Grid-connected solar inverters and battery energy storage systems
AttributionVolt Typhoon - G1017, IRGC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina, Iran
ToolsDropbear SSH, FRP - S1144, Rockwell Studio 5000 Logix Designer
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.003 NTDS, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1027.002 Software Packing, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1565 Data Manipulation and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationDESTRUCTION
Target sectorsenergy, utilities, water-wastewater, government administration, communications, transport, critical-infrastructure
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, united kingdom
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage for Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning

As of 2026-10-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3319 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Volt Typhoon FRP Reverse Proxy Client (BrightmetricAgent.exe / SMSvcService.exe) — C2

Detects Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP, ATT&CK S1144) clients used by Volt Typhoon for C2 tunnelling (AA24-038A): the known masquerade filenames BrightmetricAgent.exe (UPX-packed) and SMSvcService.exe, frpc started with an .ini/.toml config, and the C:\users\public\documents\user.dat staging file. The renamed, packed binary evades hash and signature controls, so detection uses names, paths and command lines.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1090.003, T1219, T1027.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=11) (Image="*BrightmetricAgent.exe" OR Image="*SMSvcService.exe" OR TargetFilename="*BrightmetricAgent.exe" OR TargetFilename="*SMSvcService.exe" OR CommandLine="*BrightmetricAgent*" OR CommandLine="*SMSvcService*" OR (Image="*frpc.exe" OR (CommandLine="*frpc*" (CommandLine="*.ini*" OR CommandLine="*.toml*"))) OR (TargetFilename="*user.dat" TargetFilename="*public*documents*"))
```comment: FRP (S1144) client masquerading as a service or monitoring agent; EventCode 1 process, 3 network, 11 file create```
| eval signal=case(EventCode=1, "process_start", EventCode=3, "network_connect", EventCode=11, "file_create")
| stats count values(signal) AS signals values(Image) AS images values(CommandLine) AS commands values(TargetFilename) AS files values(DestinationIp) AS dest_ips min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| eval threat_id="TL-2026-3319"

Microsoft KQL

let FrpNames = dynamic(['BrightmetricAgent.exe', 'SMSvcService.exe', 'frpc.exe']);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where FileName in~ (FrpNames)
     or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ (FrpNames)
     or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('BrightmetricAgent', 'SMSvcService')
     or (ProcessCommandLine contains 'frpc' and (ProcessCommandLine contains '.ini' or ProcessCommandLine contains '.toml'))
 | project TimeGenerated = Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Kind = 'Process', Detail = ProcessCommandLine, Path = FolderPath),
(DeviceFileEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
 | where FileName in~ (FrpNames) or (FileName =~ 'user.dat' and FolderPath has_all ('users', 'public', 'documents'))
 | project TimeGenerated = Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Kind = 'File', Detail = ActionType, Path = FolderPath)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: Volt Typhoon FRP Client Execution Under Masquerade Filenames
id: 4f6a8c05-2e7a-4c6a-9dbb-f5a7c9e1fd32
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Fast Reverse Proxy clients named BrightmetricAgent.exe or SMSvcService.exe, or frpc started with a config file, as reported for Volt Typhoon in AA24-038A.
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
  - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144/
author: AII-Detector — ThreadLinqs Intelligence
date: 2026/10/11
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1090.003
  - attack.t1219
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1027.002
  - attack.s1144
  - attack.g1017
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_name:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\BrightmetricAgent.exe'
      - '\SMSvcService.exe'
  selection_frpc:
    CommandLine|contains: 'frpc'
  selection_cfg:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.ini'
      - '.toml'
  condition: selection_name or (selection_frpc and selection_cfg)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate FRP use by developers to expose test services
  - A vendor product that happens to ship an executable named SMSvcService.exe
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Developers or admins running frpc legitimately to expose a test service
  • Unrelated software that ships a binary named SMSvcService.exe

Tuning notes: Filenames are trivially changed, so supplement with hashes of the FRP builds you collect, any Sysmon OriginalFileName of frpc.exe, and egress review of long-lived outbound sessions from servers. Allowlist sanctioned FRP use by host. Add unsigned or UPX-packed executables in ProgramData and Windows\Temp as a hunting follow-up. For network corroboration, check outbound connections from the flagged host toward small-office routers, which is how Volt Typhoon relays traffic.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • AA26-097A Actor IP Contact Across Firewall and Endpoint Telemetry — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Volt Typhoon Living-off-the-Land Logon Harvesting, WMI Execution and Host Recon — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • netsh interface portproxy Rule Creation for Traffic Relay (Volt Typhoon) — C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • Internet-Sourced Access to PLC Industrial Protocol Ports (EtherNet/IP, S7comm, Modbus) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil, Clear-EventLog or Log-Cleared Events · unlock with TL Creds
  • PLC Engineering Software Connecting to Public Addresses or AA26-097A Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • AA26-097A Actor Infrastructure or PLC Port Sweep from Internet — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Volt Typhoon NTDS.dit Extraction via ntdsutil, vssadmin and ESENT Events — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise for Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning

As of 2026-10-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3319.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 185.82.73[.]175
  • IP address: 141.11.164[.]153
  • IP address: 175.110.121[.]42

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

How Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning works

Utility ransomware incidents rose sharply in Q1 2026.

This record is strategic context built from a secondary analysis (Centrii, covered by Industrial Cyber on 2026-10-06) and anchored to two primary government advisories that the analysis relies on. The article itself states no CVEs, malware, or IOCs; the technical content below comes from the primary advisories.

China-linked Volt Typhoon: CISA/NSA/FBI advisory AA24-038A (2024-02-07) assesses with high confidence that Volt Typhoon is pre-positioning on IT networks of Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems and Water/Wastewater organizations to enable lateral movement to OT assets and disruption. Access has persisted for at least five years in some victims. The actor relies on living-off-the-land tooling (PowerShell, WMI, netsh portproxy, ntdsutil, vssadmin, wevtutil) with valid credentials, extracts NTDS.dit repeatedly, uses Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) clients (UPX-packed), and routes C2 through compromised end-of-life Cisco and NETGEAR SOHO routers (KV botnet) and multi-hop proxies. Centrii assesses the intent as enabling disruption rather than intelligence gathering.

Iranian-affiliated PLC exploitation: joint advisory AA26-097A (published 2026-04-07, updated 2026-07-22) by FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE and U.S. Cyber Command reports Iranian-affiliated APT actors, previously associated with the IRGC Cyber Electronic Command and the CyberAv3ngers persona, exploiting internet-facing PLCs (Rockwell CompactLogix and Micro850, Schneider Modicon M340/BMX P34, Siemens S7-1200) in Government Services, Water/Wastewater and Energy sectors. Operators connected from leased VPS infrastructure using vendor engineering software (Rockwell Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider EcoStruxure Control Expert, Siemens TIA Portal), modified project files, manipulated HMI/SCADA display data, and caused operational disruption and financial loss. Targeted ports: 44818, 2222, 102, 502, 22 (Dropbear SSH observed).

Supply chain and other drivers cited by Centrii: Chinese-manufactured solar inverters dominate European installations; researchers found remote-shutdown weaknesses and undocumented cellular hardware in inverters and batteries that can bypass utility firewalls; Centrii's GRIDLOCK model (September 2026) estimates a 92% probability of a major coordinated attack on UK battery storage by 2031 (61% with mandatory IEC 62443 certification). Russian-attributed physical sabotage in Europe (undersea cable plots, drone attacks) and Q1 2026 utility-sector ransomware across more than a dozen countries are also cited. Regulatory context: NIS2 enforcement, CER Directive, NERC CIP-015, TSA pipeline directives, and a U.S. executive order restricting foreign-linked grid equipment.

Severity is an analyst judgment. The source is secondary; IOCs here derive from AA26-097A and AA24-038A. BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 (no record) for the sampled IP 185.82.73.175.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.003 NTDS

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol

Defense Evasion

T1027.002 Software Packing

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 PowerShell

Persistence

T1078 Valid Accounts

Command and Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Impact

T1565 Data Manipulation

defense-impairment

T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs

Remediation for Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning

Patches

  • Apply vendor patches for internet-facing appliances and PLC firmware per Rockwell, Schneider Electric and Siemens PSIRT guidance

Immediate actions

  • Disconnect PLCs from the public internet; use secure gateways/VPN with MFA for remote access
  • Block and hunt for AA26-097A IPs and traffic to ports 44818, 2222, 102, 502 and 22 from untrusted sources
  • Place Rockwell PLC mode switches in RUN; enable programming protection in Siemens TIA Portal
  • Change default PLC passwords; secure cellular modems with strong authentication
  • Hunt for NTDS.dit copying (ESENT events 216/325/326/327), Security 1102 log clearing, and netsh portproxy changes

Workarounds

  • Review PLC project files for unauthorized changes using vendor integrity-checking tools
  • Restrict PLC communications with firewall rules/ACLs

Longer-term hardening

  • Continuous, dated OT monitoring evidence (Centrii recommendation); align with IEC 62443 and NERC CIP-015
  • Centralized logging and phishing-resistant MFA
  • Decommission end-of-life edge devices (SOHO routers)
  • Assess inverter/battery suppliers for undocumented cellular or remote-control interfaces
  • Maintain tested offline backups of PLC logic and configurations

Affected and fixed versions

  • Rockwell Automation — Allen-Bradley CompactLogix / Micro850 PLCs
    Vulnerable versions: Internet-exposed devices
  • Schneider Electric — Modicon M340 / BMX P34 PLCs
    Vulnerable versions: Internet-exposed devices
  • Siemens — SIMATIC S7-1200 PLCs
    Vulnerable versions: Internet-exposed devices
  • Cisco / NETGEAR — End-of-life SOHO routers (KV botnet)
    Vulnerable versions: End-of-life models
  • Various — Grid-connected solar inverters and battery energy storage systems
    Vulnerable versions: Supply-chain risk, no specific versions stated

Timeline of Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning

  • IRGC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers begin compromising internet-exposed Unitronics Vision Series PLCs with default credentials on TCP 20256 (earliest activity cited in AA23-335A)
  • FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA and Israel's National Cyber Directorate publish AA23-335A on IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting PLCs in water and other sectors, a precursor to the 2026 AA26-097A activity
  • CISA, NSA and FBI publish AA24-038A: Volt Typhoon pre-positioned in U.S. critical infrastructure IT networks for at least five years using living-off-the-land techniques
  • FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE and USCYBERCOM publish AA26-097A on Iranian-affiliated actors exploiting internet-facing PLCs, with confirmed operational disruption and financial loss
  • AA26-097A updated with a new table of actor IP addresses (July 2026 update)
  • Centrii publishes analysis of nation-state access, renewable supply-chain risk and energy-sector financial exposure
  • Industrial Cyber reports Centrii's findings, including the rise in Q1 2026 utility ransomware and the GRIDLOCK battery-storage model

Sources cited for Volt Typhoon energy pre-positioning

More from Volt Typhoon - G1017

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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