Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-3335
Kimsuky-Linked Funhouse Ransomware (Endpoint Ransomware Variant) Distributed via Malicious Hangul Resume Documents and Quasar RAT
AhnLab ASEC reports Kimsuky-linked distribution of Funhouse ransomware, an evolution of the previously disclosed Endpoint ransomware, via weaponized HWP resume documents. The multi-stage chain (Batch, VBS, PowerShell) uses a Quasar RAT injected into msbuild.exe as an intermediate stage before RuntimeBroker.exe runs the ransomware, and marks a shift from LNK files to HWP as the initial vector.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3335 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Funhouse ransomware, Endpoint ransomware |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Hancom Hangul Word Processor (HWP) |
| Attribution | Kimsuky (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Malware | Funhouse ransomware, Quasar RAT, xRAT |
| Tools | Quasar RAT |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1127.001 MSBuild, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | general, corporate |
| Target regions | south korea |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3335 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 37 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Funhouse Persistence and UAC Bypass - Scheduled Task 1.vbs, Themes fox.ps1 Loader, uac41.ps1
Detects the Funhouse/Kimsuky post-exploitation stage: UAC bypass via uac41.Ps1, scheduled task creation that runs 1.Vbs, which executes C:\Themes\fox.Ps1; fox.Ps1 loads the BMP-named containers 1s5t45.Bmp and 2serges.Bmp that inject the Quasar RAT into msbuild.exe.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.005, T1548.002, T1059.005, T1059.001, T1027
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_process_creation, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
```Funhouse persistence and UAC bypass: scheduled task launching 1.vbs, Themes folder fox.ps1 loader, uac41.ps1, BMP-embedded payload containers```
(
(Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*/create*" (CommandLine="*1.vbs*" OR CommandLine="*\\Themes\\*" OR CommandLine="*fox.ps1*"))
OR (Image="*\\wscript.exe" CommandLine="*1.vbs*")
OR (Image="*\\powershell.exe" (CommandLine="*uac41.ps1*" OR CommandLine="*\\Themes\\fox.ps1*" OR (CommandLine="*fox.ps1*" CommandLine="*.bmp*")))
OR CommandLine="*1s5t45.bmp*" OR CommandLine="*2serges.bmp*"
)
| eval technique=case(match(lower(Image),"schtasks[.]exe$"),"T1053.005 scheduled task persistence", match(lower(CommandLine),"uac41[.]ps1"),"T1548.002 UAC bypass script", match(lower(CommandLine),"[.]bmp"),"T1027 BMP-embedded payload loader", true(),"T1059.005 VBS/PowerShell launcher")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(technique) as techniques values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, ParentImage
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
// Funhouse persistence / UAC bypass / BMP loader (1.vbs -> Themes fox.ps1 -> 1s5t45.Bmp -> 2serges.Bmp)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/create" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("1.vbs", @"\Themes\", "fox.ps1"))
or (FileName =~ "wscript.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "1.vbs")
or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("uac41.ps1", @"\Themes\fox.ps1"))
or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "fox.ps1" and ProcessCommandLine has ".bmp")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("1s5t45.bmp","2serges.bmp")
| extend Technique = case(FileName =~ "schtasks.exe", "T1053.005 Scheduled task persistence",
ProcessCommandLine has "uac41.ps1", "T1548.002 UAC bypass script",
ProcessCommandLine has ".bmp", "T1027 BMP-embedded payload loader",
"T1059.005 VBS/PowerShell launcher")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Technique, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLineSigma
title: Funhouse Ransomware Persistence - Scheduled Task Running 1.vbs, fox.ps1 Loader and uac41.ps1 UAC Bypass
id: e4a9b3d7-5c20-4f18-8a6e-92d1c7b04f55
status: experimental
description: Detects the Kimsuky Funhouse persistence and privilege escalation stage including schtasks creating a task for 1.vbs or the Themes folder fox.ps1 loader, wscript running 1.vbs, PowerShell running uac41.ps1 or fox.ps1 and BMP containers (1s5t45.Bmp, 2serges.Bmp) that inject Quasar RAT.
references:
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/95775/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1548.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1027
- attack.s0262
- attack.g0094
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_schtasks:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/create'
selection_schtasks_target:
CommandLine|contains:
- '1.vbs'
- '\Themes\'
- 'fox.ps1'
selection_wscript:
Image|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '1.vbs'
selection_powershell:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'uac41.ps1'
- '\Themes\fox.ps1'
selection_bmp:
CommandLine|contains:
- '1s5t45.bmp'
- '2serges.bmp'
condition: (selection_schtasks and selection_schtasks_target) or selection_wscript or selection_powershell or selection_bmp
falsepositives:
- Administrators deploying scheduled tasks that call a script named 1.vbs
- Custom logon scripts stored in a Themes directory
level: high
Known false positives:
- Administrators deploying scheduled tasks that call a script named 1.vbs
- Custom logon scripts stored in a Themes directory
Tuning notes: Exclude sanctioned deployment tooling by ParentImage. The 1s5t45.bmp, 2serges.bmp and uac41.ps1 strings are campaign-specific and can be raised to critical. Also enable Windows Security 4698 (task created) for coverage when Sysmon is missing.
- Funhouse Stage 1 File Artifact Drops - [indicator], lpe Batch Files, [indicator], [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Funhouse [indicator] Masquerade and MSBuild Launched by Script Host · unlock with TL Creds
- Quasar RAT C2 and Kimsuky Sibling Infrastructure Network Connections · unlock with TL Creds
- Funhouse Batch Stage Payload Download from Kimsuky Staging Servers · unlock with TL Creds
- Funhouse Ransomware - Ransom Note and .Funhouse Encrypted File Creation · unlock with TL Creds
- DNS Resolution of Funhouse Payload Hosts and Community-Observed Kimsuky Domains · unlock with TL Creds
- Funhouse Ransomware (Kimsuky) - HWP Resume Lure, [indicator] Executor and lpe Batch Downloader Chain · unlock with TL Creds
- Quasar RAT in msbuild.exe - Outbound Connections to External Hosts (Funhouse C2) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 37 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3335.
Sample indicators (3 of 37)
- IP address:
70.36.97[.]236 - Domain:
makeway2017[.]gethompy[.]com - File hash:
17d97e3ee3185d82812a4014444c36f3
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 37 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
ASEC (AhnLab Security Intelligence Center) published on 2026-10-01 an analysis of Funhouse ransomware, a variant of the Endpoint ransomware family that ASEC previously disclosed in cases dated February and June 2026. The campaign is attributed to the Kimsuky group (North Korea-linked) on the basis of the multi-stage attack flow, reuse of the VbsEdit-based executor (pdf.Exe) seen in earlier Kimsuky malware distribution, batch script code similar to scripts in previously reported Kimsuky Python-backdoor cases, and a Quasar RAT variant using the same mutex (_QQ_XCZ_VCXZ) across all documented cases.
Initial access is a malicious Hangul (HWP) document disguised as a resume (Resume.Hwp) with embedded OLE data, replacing the malicious LNK files used in earlier Kimsuky cases. Opening the document drops pdf.Exe (a VbsEdit script executor) and pdf.Exe.Manifest in %TEMP%; a hyperlink to resume_{name}.Pdf in the document triggers pdf.Exe, which creates a randomly named lpe{random}.Bat (e.g. lpe_75285.Bat). Batch files (lpe_75285.Bat, b7a093f.Bat) download further payloads from several compromised or attacker-controlled web servers (dl.Zip containing ch.Bat and poef0od.Vbs; ch.Bat acts as an update mechanism). VBS and PowerShell scripts (uac41.Ps1) perform a UAC bypass. A scheduled task runs 1.Vbs, which executes C:\Themes\fox.Ps1; fox.Ps1 loads 1s5t45.Bmp, which injects 2serges.Bmp (Quasar RAT, embedded in a BMP-named container) into msbuild.exe. The Quasar RAT reads its configuration (C2 address, TAG, mutex) from a file with a .DWG extension (dog.Dwg in this case, v4.4.3, C2 70.36.97.236:443, TAG format {Company Name}_it1; earlier cases used se.Dwg, v1.1.8, C2 45.43.60.53:80 and 45.95.186.232:80). RuntimeBroker.exe then executes the Funhouse ransomware payload.
Funhouse encrypts files with the extension .Funhouse using HC-128, with key generation based on CryptGenRandom, Curve25519 and SHA-512. A 72-byte footer containing the marker string 'Choung Dong looks like a hot dog!!' is appended, the ransom note is 'How To Restore Your Files.Txt', and the mutex is DoYouWantToHaveSexWithCuongDong. The current variant lists funhouse8764@tutamail.com as the contact. The February 2026 Endpoint variant used the .Endpoint extension, ChaCha20, a 1,592-byte footer, the mutex Mutexisfunnylocal, SHA-256-based key generation and the contact schipkealfred@gmail.com; the June 2026 variant already used HC-128, .Funhouse and funhouseraas@proton.me. Encryption characteristics were retained after June while contact details and C2 infrastructure changed. No CVE or CVSS score is stated in the source; the lure relies on user execution of the malicious document.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055 Process Injection; T1127.001 MSBuild
Persistence
Execution
T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1204.002 Malicious File
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1219 Remote Access Tools
Privilege Escalation
T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control
Initial Access
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block the listed IPs, domains and URLs at the perimeter and proxy
- Hunt for Resume.Hwp, pdf.Exe, pdf.Exe.Manifest, lpe*.Bat, fox.Ps1 and C:\Themes\ artifacts on endpoints
- Hunt for .DWG-extension files read as Quasar RAT configuration and for the mutex _QQ_XCZ_VCXZ
- Isolate hosts where msbuild.exe runs outside a build context or makes outbound network connections
Workarounds
- Restrict execution of VBScript and Windows Script Host where not required
- Alert on scheduled-task creation that launches wscript/powershell from non-standard directories
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for process injection into msbuild.exe and UAC bypass
- Restrict or sandbox HWP documents with embedded OLE objects from external email
- Maintain offline, tested backups to recover from file-encrypting ransomware
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints opening malicious HWP documents (versions not specified in source) - Hancom — Hangul Word Processor (HWP)
Vulnerable versions: Not specified in source; lure format abused (embedded OLE object)
Timeline
- ASEC identifies the initial Endpoint ransomware variant in Kimsuky-related cases: .Endpoint extension, ChaCha20, 1,592-byte footer, mutex Mutexisfunnylocal, contact locked-ioc-14 (month precision per ASEC).
- Earlier Kimsuky cases use Quasar RAT v1.1.8 configured via se.Dwg with C2 locked-ioc-22:80 and locked-ioc-19:80 and mutex _QQ_XCZ_VCXZ (February/June 2026 cases; month precision, day set to avoid collision).
- Updated variant observed: switch to HC-128 with CryptGenRandom, Curve25519 and SHA-512 key generation, 72-byte footer with 'Choung Dong looks like a hot dog!!' marker, .Funhouse extension, contact locked-ioc-15 (month precision per ASEC).
- Funhouse variant distributed via malicious HWP resume documents (locked-ioc-27), replacing LNK as initial vector; contact changes to locked-ioc-12 (month precision per ASEC).
- Quasar RAT v4.4.3 configured via locked-ioc-32 with C2 locked-ioc-21:443 in the Funhouse case, injected into msbuild.exe from locked-ioc-26 (September 2026 case; month precision, day set to avoid collision).
- AhnLab ASEC publishes 'From Endpoint to Funhouse' with IOCs and Kimsuky attribution analysis.
- BeaconBeagle lookup for C2 IP locked-ioc-21 returns HTTP 404 (no beacon record) during TL-2026-3335 research.
Sources cited
- From Endpoint to Funhouse: Evolution of Ransomware Families and Kimsuky-Linked Distribution Cases asec.ahnlab.com · Research · 2026-10-01
- Malicious LNK Files Distributing a Python-Based Backdoor and Changes in Distribution Techniques (Kimsuky Group) - ASEC asec.ahnlab.com · Research
- April 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea) - ASEC asec.ahnlab.com · Research
- ASEC Kimsuky tag archive asec.ahnlab.com · Research
- Kimsuky Deploys Malicious LNK Files - Cyber Security News cybersecuritynews.com · News
- Kimsuky Group Adds New Tool Into Play - Cyware social.cyware.com · News
More from Kimsuky
- October 2026 Major APT Group Trends: State-Sponsored Targeting of Dev Environments, Cloud and Network Equipment (CVE-2022-21894, CVE-2026-20127)
- NodeLinkRAT: New North Korea-Linked (Kimsuky, moderate confidence) Node.js RAT Abusing Public Note Services as C2
- Kimsuky (APT43) Dot-Padded LNK Spear-Phishing Tradecraft: Detection and Exploitation Analysis
- North Korean Threat Actors Operationalize AI Across Tradecraft (Jade/Coral/Jasper/Diamond/Onyx/Pearl/Sapphire/Emerald Sleet; ProcmacSteal)
- NSFOCUS Monthly APT Insights August 2026: Lazarus MISTPEN/ForestTiger/RelayShell Campaign with CVE-2026-68820, UAC-0099 LUNCHPOKE/BURNYBEAR/MATCHBOIL.V2, CVE-2026-42897 Exchange OWA Exploitation
- QR-Code Phishing (Quishing) Bypassing Corporate Email Security; Kimsuky QR Spearphishing
Previous and next in ransomware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.