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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6105

NodeLinkRAT: New North Korea-Linked (Kimsuky, moderate confidence) Node.js RAT Abusing Public Note Services as C2

highACTIVE

Genians Security Center reports a spearphishing campaign against a South Korean National Assembly seminar attendee that uses an LNK disguised as an HWP file, PowerShell loaders and a scheduled task to pull code from a public note page (anotepad.com). Payloads evolved from XenoRAT to Dropbox/MEGA information stealers and a document stealer, and on October 16, 2026 to the Node.js-based NodeLinkRAT.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6105
Also known asNodeLinkRAT
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Hancom Hangul Word Processor (HWP) users, spoofed as LNK lure
AttributionKimsuky (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusNorth Korea
MalwareNodeLinkRAT, XenoRAT
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, policy and security research, think tanks, academia
Target regionssouth korea
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6105 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: NodeLinkRAT LNK Lure Chain - cmd to Hidden PowerShell iex and curl.exe Stage-2 Fetch (Exploitation)

TL-2026-6105 (NodeLinkRAT, Kimsuky moderate confidence): detects the initial execution chain of the HWP-disguised LNK lure. The LNK launches cmd.exe, which starts a hidden/minimized PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command and runs it with iex, and curl.exe fetches the polymorphic stage-2 loader from epaper.dothome.co.kr. Behaviour-first: matches the hidden-PowerShell-with-iex child of cmd.exe, any curl.exe request to a dothome.co.kr host, or the known loader host in any command line. Sysmon EventCode 1 process-creation telemetry is required.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
((Image="*curl.exe" CommandLine="*.dothome.co.kr*") OR CommandLine="*epaper.dothome.co.kr*" OR (ParentImage="*cmd.exe" (Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe") (CommandLine="*-WindowStyle Hidden*" OR CommandLine="*-w hidden*" OR CommandLine="*-win hidden*" OR CommandLine="*-w 1*") (CommandLine="*iex *" OR CommandLine="*iex(*" OR CommandLine="*Invoke-Expression*")))
| eval stage=case(like(CommandLine,"%epaper.dothome.co.kr%"),"stage2_loader_fetch", like(Image,"%curl.exe"),"curl_dothome_fetch", true(),"lnk_cmd_hidden_powershell_iex")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(stage) as stages values(ParentImage) as parents values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "curl.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "epaper.dothome.co.kr"
    or (FileName =~ "curl.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has ".dothome.co.kr")
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
        and FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-WindowStyle Hidden", "-w hidden", "-win hidden")
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex", "Invoke-Expression"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: NodeLinkRAT LNK Lure Spawns Hidden PowerShell Loader
id: 7c1e4a52-3b9d-4f6a-8e21-5d0a9c3b7f10
status: experimental
description: Detects the TL-2026-6105 NodeLinkRAT initial execution chain where a double-clicked HWP-disguised LNK launches cmd.exe and a hidden PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command and runs it with iex, or where curl.exe fetches the stage-2 loader from a dothome.co.kr free host.
references:
  - https://www.genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_intelligence/nodelinkrat
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.001
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1027
  - attack.t1140
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_chain:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-WindowStyle Hidden'
      - '-w hidden'
      - '-win hidden'
  selection_exec:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' iex '
      - 'iex('
      - 'Invoke-Expression'
  selection_curl:
    Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: '.dothome.co.kr'
  condition: (selection_chain and selection_exec) or selection_curl
falsepositives:
  - Administrative batch scripts that start hidden PowerShell and use Invoke-Expression
  - Legitimate use of curl.exe against Dothome-hosted Korean sites
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrative batch scripts that launch hidden PowerShell and run content with Invoke-Expression
  • Legitimate curl.exe requests to Dothome-hosted Korean websites by developers or web administrators

Tuning notes: Exclude known software-deployment and management parents (SCCM, Intune, RMM agents) from the cmd.exe to hidden-PowerShell branch. Keep the epaper.dothome.co.kr and curl-to-dothome branches unfiltered. Extend the host list with other free-hosting domains seen in your telemetry and review the related_community_iocs dothome subdomains (outlook365livee, renovar365, portalmsn365, liveeee365).

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • HWP Double-Extension LNK Lure and Honorarium Decoy File Activity (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT Poller-Driven Host Reconnaissance - ipconfig /all, AV Query and Process Discovery (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT, XenoRAT and Related Infrastructure Network Contact (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT Stage-2 Loader Artifacts - Decoy Delimiter, zybJ0F.txt Log and [indicator] (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT Exfiltration Tooling - MEGAcmd Silent Install, Dropbox API and [indicator] Upload (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT Note-Page Dead-Drop Poller - [indicator] Markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBl (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT Persistence - CommonMaintenanceHost Scheduled Task, VBScript Launcher and [indicator] Poller (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeLinkRAT Node.js Runtime Staging - njs Folder, npm Socket.IO Packages and [indicator] (C2 Implant) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6105.

Sample indicators (3 of 25)

  • IP address: 207.148.112[.]166
  • Domain: epaper[.]dothome[.]co[.]kr
  • URL: hxxps://github[.]com/norrisk983/hukushima

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

GSC assesses Kimsuky with moderate confidence.

The campaign targets South Korean policy and security professionals. In the documented case, the lure impersonated a senior aide in a lawmaker's office and was sent as a reply-based spearphish on September 12-13, 2026. The first email asked for an honorarium payment application form and carried no attachment. After the victim replied that nothing was attached, the actor sent a ZIP through a webmail large-attachment feature, named '사례비 지급 신청_개인정보 동의서.zip'. The ZIP holds '사례비 지급 신청_개인정보 동의서.hwp.lnk'. The hidden .lnk extension makes it look like an HWP document, and its icon is fetched from a remote GitHub path (norrisk983/hukushima).

The LNK launches cmd.exe and a hidden, minimized PowerShell that rebuilds an obfuscated command and runs it with iex. The command uses curl.exe to fetch a polymorphic stage-2 loader from epaper.dothome.co.kr. The loader decodes a hex ciphertext with a 256-character XOR key, forces TLS 1.2 and decodes Base64 strings. It drops a VBScript and a PowerShell script (UPA.ps1) into %APPDATA% and registers the scheduled task 'CommonMaintenanceHost' (first run after 1 minute, then every 38 minutes). It also finds the original LNK (51,200-56,200 bytes) in the current directory, Downloads or %TEMP%, extracts an embedded decoy HWP after the delimiter 'Akcq39XFG5uEOZbN', opens it, deletes the LNK, and logs to %APPDATA%\zybJ0F.txt. The decoy is a legitimate honorarium form that asks for name, bank and account number.

The persistent poller (UPA.ps1, started by the VBScript) waits a random period of up to about 10 minutes. It then fetches an anotepad.com note page and extracts Base64 between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBl using the regex (?<=887wgJs8)(.*?)(?=nfJgcBl). It HTML-decodes and Base64-decodes the content and runs it in memory. The operator can therefore swap payloads without touching the initial infection. Payloads observed by GSC: a XenoRAT variant on June 18 (C2 103.81.116.10:443); three per-victim collection scripts exfiltrating to the Dropbox API on September 18; a MEGAcmd-based variant on September 27; and four samples on September 28 (three collection scripts with new Dropbox app keys plus a document stealer that uploads to oppsite.dothome.co.kr). On October 16 the actor delivered NodeLinkRAT.

Collection scripts gather installed AV products, OS information, ipconfig /all output, drives, processes, a check for a Telegram folder, and files modified in the last 24 hours under C:\Users. The Dropbox variant uses a hardcoded app key and refresh token and uploads to /[victim ID]/[internal IP]/[time]_info.log. The MEGA variant checks for MEGAcmd, silently installs it if missing, logs into a hardcoded account, uploads the log and logs out. The document stealer keeps a reference time in %APPDATA%\ts.txt and uploads doc(x), xls(x), ppt(x), pdf, txt, hwp and image files to oppsite.dothome.co.kr/[identifier]/index.php. Because the poller re-runs every 38 minutes, new documents are stolen in near real time.

NodeLinkRAT downloads node-v24.21.0-win-x64.zip from nodejs.org to %TEMP% under a random three-letter name, extracts it to C:\Users\Public\Music and renames the folder to njs. It installs the npm packages socket.io-client (C2), screenshot-desktop (screen capture) and ps-node (process listing) in a hidden cmd.exe. Marker files are the empty unins000.dat (prevents reinstall) and teamview.js (the Base64-decoded JavaScript RAT, named to resemble TeamViewer). node.exe runs teamview.js hidden. A ps-node check prevents duplicate instances and the poller restarts the RAT if it is killed. The RAT speaks Socket.IO to 207.148.112.166:3000 and was also seen at nid.weffm.p-e.kr, a free Korean DNS domain that mimics NAVER's login domain. It registers hostname, OS and architecture, and supports command execution, directory browsing, file upload and download, file and folder deletion, folder compression and exfiltration, and screen streaming. Traffic is encrypted with AES-256-GCM using the hardcoded key 12345678901234567890123456789012, so captured traffic can be decrypted. The client identifier matches the upload path used by the September 28 document stealer, and a developer comment suggests per-target builds.

Three XenoRAT variants share AssemblyTitle 'MSOfficeServer', TypeLib GUID 200b1ad6-f1ff-49de-aa9c-b07d2615cdec and a custom encryption key that differs from the public XenoRAT project. All use port 443. Variant 1 (invo.exe, mutex v8SXeXXXKSDFr5fJgfDIYrcMxjgtjBj5) and variant 2 (Updater.exe, mutex IbfXgQPt20kszwAzuy85BJIKr0IrJUs2) use C2 103.81.116.10. Variant 3 (Updater.exe, same mutex as variant 2) uses 211.223.14.75.

Attribution: GSC assesses Kimsuky with moderate confidence. Supporting links are a Dropbox account tied to a similar anotepad-linked case that uses a Gmail address also used in 2025 phishing against people working on North Korea issues, a NAVER MYBOX phishing page layout that matches a 2024 page hosted on 185.27.134.0/24 (inmain.22web.org, owna.loveslife.biz) that GSC previously attributed to Kimsuky in December 2024, the shared XenoRAT build and custom key, victim-ID reuse, and a preference for free hosting (Dothome, a Korean free DNS service). GSC cautions that public services make third-party imitation possible, that Korean strings may be a false flag, that some stages may be missing, and that actor affiliations can change. The total victim count and any confirmed compromises are not stated. The article carries no publication date; its images are dated November 9, 2026 and the campaign activity spans June to October 2026.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the listed IPs and domains (103.81.116.10, 211.223.14.75, 207.148.112.166, epaper.dothome.co.kr, oppsite.dothome.co.kr, nid.weffm.p-e.kr) and alert on outbound Socket.IO traffic to port 3000
  • Hunt for the scheduled task CommonMaintenanceHost, C:\Users\Public\Music\njs, teamview.js, unins000.dat, UPA.ps1 and %APPDATA%\zybJ0F.txt and isolate any host that has them
  • Search for hidden MEGAcmdServer.exe on hosts that do not normally use MEGA
  • Rotate credentials and review account activity for users who opened the honorarium lure
  • Preserve endpoint telemetry of the initial LNK execution before the LNK self-deletes

Workarounds

  • Show file extensions in Windows Explorer so .hwp.lnk files are not mistaken for documents
  • Block or detonate LNK files inside ZIP archives at the mail gateway
  • Restrict execution of node.exe from user-writable paths such as C:\Users\Public

Longer-term hardening

  • Correlate LNK execution, cmd to PowerShell, curl.exe fetches, scheduled task creation and periodic public note-page access into one attack flow
  • Alert on PowerShell that repeatedly fetches a public note page and runs the result with iex on a short interval
  • Judge Node.js, MEGAcmd and curl.exe by parent process, install path, scripts run and task registration rather than by trusted name
  • Avoid blanket blocking of Dropbox, MEGA, note services and free hosting; use the accessing process, command line and follow-on behavior
  • Train users to treat unexpected honorarium or document requests from officials as suspicious and to confirm through a separate channel
  • Watch for NAVER-themed phishing and for reuse of the identified Gmail and Dropbox accounts

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints that run PowerShell, curl.exe and Task Scheduler
  • Hancom — Hangul Word Processor (HWP) users, spoofed as LNK lure
    Vulnerable versions: Not applicable: social-engineering lure, no vulnerability exploited

Timeline

  • Earliest observed note-page payload: a XenoRAT variant loaded in memory via Assembly.Load, with C2 at locked-ioc-18:443.
  • The National Assembly-related seminar attended by the targeted recipient takes place; the actor later used it as the pretext.
  • Reply-based spearphishing begins (September 12-13): first an attachment-less honorarium form request, then a ZIP with the HWP.LNK lure after the victim replied.
  • Three per-victim collection scripts (labeled A/B/C) delivered via the note page, exfiltrating system and file information to the Dropbox API.
  • Collection script variant delivered that exfiltrates through MEGAcmd to mega.nz.
  • Four samples delivered: three collection scripts with new Dropbox app keys and a document stealer uploading to locked-ioc-9.
  • NodeLinkRAT delivered via the note-page poller: installs Node.js v24.21.0 in locked-ioc-8 and connects via Socket.IO to locked-ioc-15:3000.
  • Genians Security Center report on NodeLinkRAT published (the article states no date; its images are dated November 9, 2026).

Sources cited

More from Kimsuky

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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