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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-3557

BRIDGEHEAD: npm typosquatting campaign crosses from WSL into Windows to deploy Rust crypto-wallet stealer

highACTIVE

CloudSEK reports 40 typosquatted npm packages (v1.0.0) imitating chalk, axios, commander, lodash, react and typescript, published and unpublished on 2026-08-16. Install hooks detect Windows/WSL, bridge into the Windows host via hidden PowerShell, and run an in-memory Rust stealer (main.exe) that targets cryptocurrency wallets, Chromium browser data and Telegram sessions, uploading to gofile.io. First disclosed .

Key facts for BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer

IdentifiersTL-2026-3557
Also known asBRIDGEHEAD
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Exploitation statusExploited in the wild
Affected productsnpm registry users 40 typosquatted npm packages (chalk, axios, commander, lodash, react, typescript lookalikes); Microsoft Windows and Windows Subsystem for Linux developer hosts
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-829
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.002 Software Packing, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1497.001 System Checks, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, cryptocurrency, finance
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage for BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer

As of 2026-10-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3557 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: BRIDGEHEAD Exploitation (Splunk SPL)

Detects the BRIDGEHEAD npm typosquat install hook executing: Node.js or WSL interop launching hidden PowerShell (-WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass) to download and start main.exe from %TEMP%, Node.js spawning %TEMP%\main.exe directly on native Windows, or either known main.exe SHA256. main.exe is the Rust wrapper that decrypts and runs the wallet stealer in memory (campaign TL-2026-3557, 40 typosquats of chalk, axios, commander, lodash, react and typescript).

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 | eval ps_bridge=if(match(Image,"(?i)(powershell|pwsh)[.]exe$") AND match(ParentImage,"(?i)(node|wsl|wslhost)[.]exe$") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)-(w|windowstyle)[ ]+hidden") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)-(ep|executionpolicy)[ ]+bypass") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)main[.]exe|Invoke-WebRequest|[$]env:TEMP"),1,0), temp_main=if(match(Image,"(?i)AppData.Local.Temp.main[.]exe$") AND match(ParentImage,"(?i)(node|powershell|pwsh)[.]exe$"),1,0), ioc_hash=if(match(Hashes,"(?i)6f088ade49456db2422c3edfbb9998f4a3e9cce7c4c00a7279fb45d672a82b7d|6888d4c54ef2b5bf23889f9637c2efe77e1d2af4724d315b73d646cf5547dc73"),1,0) | where ps_bridge=1 OR temp_main=1 OR ioc_hash=1 | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_command_lines max(ps_bridge) as ps_bridge max(temp_main) as temp_main max(ioc_hash) as ioc_hash by host User ParentImage Image | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let BridgeheadHashes = dynamic(["6f088ade49456db2422c3edfbb9998f4a3e9cce7c4c00a7279fb45d672a82b7d","6888d4c54ef2b5bf23889f9637c2efe77e1d2af4724d315b73d646cf5547dc73"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| extend IsPsBridge = (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "wsl.exe", "wslhost.exe")
        and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)-(w|windowstyle)\s+hidden"
        and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)-(ep|executionpolicy)\s+bypass"
        and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("main.exe", "Invoke-WebRequest", "$env:TEMP"))
| extend IsTempMain = (FileName =~ "main.exe"
        and FolderPath has @"\AppData\Local\Temp"
        and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe"))
| extend IsIocHash = SHA256 in~ (BridgeheadHashes)
| where IsPsBridge or IsTempMain or IsIocHash
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, IsPsBridge, IsTempMain, IsIocHash
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: BRIDGEHEAD npm Install Hook Spawns Hidden PowerShell or Temp main.exe Stealer
id: 3b7e1a52-6c40-5d1e-9a8f-2f4c7d1e0a01
status: experimental
description: Detects the BRIDGEHEAD npm typosquat install-hook behaviour. A Node.js or WSL parent launches powershell.exe with -WindowStyle Hidden and -ExecutionPolicy Bypass to download and start main.exe, or Node.js launches %TEMP%\main.exe directly on native Windows. main.exe is the Rust wrapper that decrypts and runs the wallet stealer in memory.
references:
    - https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/bridgehead-npm-typosquatting-wsl-windows-crypto-wallet-stealer
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
author: AII-Detector — ThreadLinqs Intelligence
date: 2026/10/14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1027.002
    - attack.t1620
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ps_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wslhost.exe'
    selection_hidden:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)-(w|windowstyle)\s+hidden'
    selection_bypass:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)-(ep|executionpolicy)\s+bypass'
    selection_payload:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'main.exe'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - '$env:TEMP'
    selection_temp_main:
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\main.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_ioc_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - '6f088ade49456db2422c3edfbb9998f4a3e9cce7c4c00a7279fb45d672a82b7d'
            - '6888d4c54ef2b5bf23889f9637c2efe77e1d2af4724d315b73d646cf5547dc73'
    condition: (selection_ps_image and selection_hidden and selection_bypass and selection_payload) or selection_temp_main or selection_ioc_hash
falsepositives:
    - Build scripts that legitimately launch hidden PowerShell from Node.js with an execution policy bypass
    - Developer tooling that stages a helper named main.exe in the user Temp directory
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Build or CI scripts that legitimately launch hidden PowerShell from Node.js with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
  • Developer tools that stage a helper binary named main.exe in the user Temp directory

Tuning notes: Restrict to developer and build hosts first. Allowlist signed internal tooling by command line or hash. Confirm Sysmon EventCode 1 is collected with ParentImage, CommandLine and Hashes. On hits, check package-lock.json, yarn.lock and pnpm-lock.yaml for the 40 BRIDGEHEAD package names such as chalk-core, axious-core, commandor-cli and typescirpt-core.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • BRIDGEHEAD Exploitation (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD Post-Exploitation (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD C2 and Exfiltration (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD Post-Exploitation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD C2 and Exfiltration (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD Post-Exploitation (Splunk SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BRIDGEHEAD C2 and Exfiltration (Splunk SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise for BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer

As of 2026-10-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3557.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 193.70.34[.]101
  • Domain: upload[.]gofile[.]io
  • File hash: 6f088ade49456db2422c3edfbb9998f4a3e9cce7c4c00a7279fb45d672a82b7d

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

How BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer works

The operator C2 at 193.70.34.101:20099 was still answering at time of analysis.

In August 2026 an operator published 40 disposable npm packages, each a misspelling of a heavily installed library: chalk (4 packages), axios (2), commander (9), lodash (7), react (1) and typescript (16), plus one test package (testingsmthb1g). All were version 1.0.0 and carried a scripts/postinstall.js install hook. Per CloudSEK the packages were published 2026-08-16 between 02:28 and 02:56 UTC and unpublished between 04:07 and 04:12 UTC, about 84 minutes of exposure. They were spread across five throwaway npm accounts with generated names.

The install hook holds XOR-encoded arrays (key 'stf2026'; array names ADDON_ENC, BRIDGE_LAUNCHER_ENC, BRIDGE_SCRIPT_PRE_ENC, BRIDGE_SCRIPT_POST_ENC) that decode to the payload URL, the PowerShell bridge commands and the download logic. It first sends an install beacon to the C2 (POST http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote) carrying only a coarse OS label (Windows, MacOS or Linux). It then runs a WSL gate: the WSL_DISTRO_NAME and WSLENV environment variables, and /proc/version and /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease checked for 'microsoft' or 'WSL' (function isVirtualizedLinux). Only Windows and WSL hosts get the payload. From WSL it calls powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass to run Invoke-WebRequest into $env:TEMP\main.exe followed by a hidden Start-Process. On native Windows, Node's HTTPS client downloads main.exe to %TEMP% and spawns it detached with no shell.

The payload is a release asset on GitHub, not in npm: https://github.com/bebraz1/qPzM50V1AKG0rVlH/releases/download/null/main.exe. The bebraz1 account was created 2026-06-20 and its name and bio were literally 'null'. The release was published 2026-08-15 and downloads rose from 119 to 173 between 2026-08-17 01:50 and 18:49 UTC. GitHub removed the account by 2026-08-17 23:12 UTC. The payload therefore survived the npm takedown by roughly 39 hours.

main.exe is a 22,969,344-byte Rust-compiled PE32+ GUI executable with a zeroed PE timestamp. About 98.7% of it is .rdata, which holds a single run of about 22.6 million hex characters. That run decodes to an 11,319,296-byte (0xACB800) encrypted blob. The wrapper decrypts it with a ChaCha20 variant whose constant is deliberately mutated ('expad 232-byte k' instead of 'expand 32-byte k'), then runs it in-process with no disk write and no child process. It has a timing-based anti-analysis loop of 552,054 iterations that sleeps 500 ms if it finishes in 9 ms or less. Embedded strings include 'ez_run_', '.exe', '.exe.config' and the log string '[LOG] Payload unpacking and decryption completed in'.

The decrypted stealer imports DPAPI and crypto libraries (crypt32, dpapi, cryptbase, bcryptprimitives) and uses raw Winsock sockets. It resolves api.ipify.org to fingerprint the victim's public IP, then about 0.18 s later contacts upload.gofile.io, an anonymous public file host, to upload stolen data. CloudSEK's sandbox saw TLS certificate validation reject both connections, so no exfiltration was observed. It also collects CPU, GPU and RAM telemetry. Targets are 26 desktop wallet paths (Electrum-DASH, Electron Cash, ElectrumSV, Exodus, Copay/BitPay, Specter, OneKey, KeepKey, SafePal, Trezor Suite, Wasabi, Jaxx Liberty, Coinbase Wallet, Infinity Wallet, Daedalus, Blockstream Green, Bybit and others), Microsoft Edge and Brave profile data (Local State, Web Data, History, Cookies), and Telegram Desktop tdata directories. The run lasts about 33 seconds and the process then exits with no persistence.

The source gives no attribution; the cryptocurrency focus suggests a financial motive. Severity HIGH is an analyst assessment: no CVE or CVSS exists, the payload steals wallet and credential material from developer hosts, and the C2 was live.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.002 Software Packing; T1497.001 System Checks; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Remediation for BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer

Immediate actions

  • Search developer hosts and WSL environments for %TEMP%\main.exe and hidden PowerShell spawned from node/npm
  • Purge all 40 BRIDGEHEAD package names from package-lock.json, yarn.lock and pnpm-lock.yaml, private npm mirrors and CI/CD caches
  • Block 193.70.34.101:20099 at the perimeter
  • Rotate browser-stored credentials and sessions for affected Windows users and move funds out of desktop wallets on affected hosts

Workarounds

  • Disable WSL interoperability (appendWindowsPath/interop) on hosts that do not need it
  • Install dependencies with --ignore-scripts in untrusted contexts and verify package names before install

Longer-term hardening

  • Alert on package-manager install hooks spawning powershell.exe with -WindowStyle Hidden / -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
  • Alert on install hooks writing executables to %TEMP% and launching them without a shell
  • Add a behavioral rule for a process contacting api.ipify.org followed within about 0.2 s by upload.gofile.io
  • Scan executables for the mutated ChaCha20 constant 'expad 232-byte k' and for PEs with .rdata above 90% of file size holding a hex run over 1,000,000 characters
  • Track npm accounts publishing multiple typosquats and watch GitHub for repositories with null-style names and hex release names

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm registry users — 40 typosquatted npm packages (chalk, axios, commander, lodash, react, typescript lookalikes)
    Vulnerable versions: 1.0.0 of each listed package
  • Microsoft — Windows and Windows Subsystem for Linux developer hosts
    Vulnerable versions: Hosts where a listed package was installed with lifecycle scripts enabled

Timeline of BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer

  • GitHub account locked-ioc-25, later used to host the payload, is created; its name and bio are literally 'null'
  • A repository named '123' is created under the locked-ioc-25 account
  • Payload repository qPzM50V1AKG0rVlH is created and locked-ioc-23 is released as a GitHub release asset at about 03:19 UTC
  • All 40 packages are unpublished between 04:07 and 04:12 UTC, about 84 minutes after publication
  • All 40 typosquatted npm packages (v1.0.0) are published between 02:28 and 02:56 UTC from five throwaway npm accounts
  • CloudSEK analyzes the payload; GitHub release downloads rise from 119 to 173 during the day; the locked-ioc-25 account is removed by 23:12 UTC
  • C2 locked-ioc-16:20099 (/vote) is still answering at the time of CloudSEK's writing
  • CloudSEK publishes the BRIDGEHEAD analysis with IOCs and detection guidance
  • Secondary coverage (OffSeq Threat Radar) summarizes the campaign and the roughly 39-hour gap between npm takedown and GitHub payload removal

Sources cited for BRIDGEHEAD npm wallet stealer

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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