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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3597

QuartzLine 'zenith' backdoor disguised as EV-signed PDF viewer

highACTIVE

A Rust-written Windows backdoor ('zenith' module, implant v6.1.3) masquerades as a functional PDF viewer (paperline.exe / QuartzLine_1.x.exe) signed with a Sectigo EV code-signing certificate issued to Guangzhou Guoying Communication Technology Co., Ltd. It checks in to Cloudflare-fronted C2 over HTTPS with a custom obfuscated protocol and supports cmd /C execution and Chromium-family browser profile manipulation.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3597
Also known asQuartzLine, zenith, win.cloudhaze
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows
Malwarewin.cloudhaze, zenith
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1070.004 Indicator Removal, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1132.001 Standard Encoding, T1204.002 Malicious File and 11 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3597 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 47 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - C2 - HTTPS Check-in to Quarry Endpoints and C2 Domains (Splunk SPL)

Detects zenith command-and-control: process-attributed DNS lookups and connections to westbeavers.com, motherotters.com and healskills.com (the last behind Cloudflare), and HTTPS POSTs to the implant's /quarry/vein check-in and /quarry/deposit status endpoints (plus the configured /quarry/stratum, gravel, bedrock, sandstone, seam). Traffic is gzip, chained-XOR, bit-rotated, shuffled and Base64-encoded with the seed in the message, and the implant sends no User-Agent header, which is unusual for desktop software. No community-corroborated sibling infrastructure exists yet, so the domain list is limited to the three reported domains.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1132.001, T1573, T1082, T1583.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, web_proxy, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, dns
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=22 earliest=-24h
    (QueryName="westbeavers.com" OR QueryName="*.westbeavers.com" OR QueryName="motherotters.com" OR QueryName="*.motherotters.com" OR QueryName="healskills.com" OR QueryName="*.healskills.com")
```Row 3a: process-attributed DNS lookups of the three zenith C2 domains (healskills.com sits behind Cloudflare)```
| eval signal="dns_lookup_c2_domain"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(QueryName) as indicator by host, Image, signal
| rename Image as process_or_ua
| append
    [| tstats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen from datamodel=Web.Web where ((Web.http_method=POST AND (Web.url="*/quarry/vein*" OR Web.url="*/quarry/deposit*" OR Web.url="*/quarry/stratum*" OR Web.url="*/quarry/gravel*" OR Web.url="*/quarry/bedrock*" OR Web.url="*/quarry/sandstone*" OR Web.url="*/quarry/seam*")) OR Web.url="*westbeavers.com*" OR Web.url="*motherotters.com*" OR Web.url="*healskills.com*") by Web.src, Web.url, Web.http_user_agent
     ```Row 3b: zenith check-in POST /quarry/vein and status /quarry/deposit over HTTPS (needs TLS inspection or proxy logs), implant sends no User-Agent```
     | rename Web.src as host, Web.url as indicator, Web.http_user_agent as process_or_ua
     | eval signal="https_post_quarry_endpoint_or_c2_domain"]
| table host process_or_ua signal indicator count first_seen last_seen
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let c2_domains = dynamic(["westbeavers.com", "motherotters.com", "healskills.com"]);
let endpoint_hits = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains)
    | project Timestamp, Device = DeviceName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, Indicator = RemoteUrl, SourceIP = LocalIP, Signal = "endpoint_c2_domain_connection";
let dns_hits = DnsEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where Name has_any (c2_domains)
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Device = Computer, Indicator = Name, SourceIP = ClientIP, Signal = "dns_c2_domain_lookup";
let proxy_hits = CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where RequestURL has_any (c2_domains)
        or (RequestMethod =~ "POST"
            and RequestURL matches regex @"/quarry/(vein|deposit|stratum|gravel|bedrock|sandstone|seam)\b"
            and (isempty(RequestClientApplication) or RequestClientApplication == "-"))
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Device = DeviceVendor, Process = RequestClientApplication, Indicator = RequestURL, SourceIP, Signal = "proxy_quarry_post_or_c2_domain";
union endpoint_hits, dns_hits, proxy_hits
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - C2 Check-in to Quarry Endpoints or C2 Domains
id: 5f08b6c2-91ae-4d37-b2c4-8e61a3f7d095
status: experimental
description: Detects QuartzLine 'zenith' backdoor command-and-control over HTTPS. Web proxy requests to the known C2 domains (westbeavers.com, motherotters.com, healskills.com) or POSTs to the implant's /quarry/vein check-in and /quarry/deposit status endpoints. The implant sends system information and implant version 6.1.3 in a gzip, chained-XOR, bit-rotated, shuffled and Base64-encoded JSON body, and sends no User-Agent header. Requires TLS inspection or proxy logging to see the URI.
references:
    - https://rogueauthority.org/quartzline-signed-pdf-viewer-zenith-backdoor
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1132.001
    - attack.t1573
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_domain:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - 'westbeavers.com'
            - 'motherotters.com'
            - 'healskills.com'
    selection_uri_method:
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_uri_path:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '/quarry/vein'
            - '/quarry/deposit'
            - '/quarry/stratum'
            - '/quarry/gravel'
            - '/quarry/bedrock'
            - '/quarry/sandstone'
            - '/quarry/seam'
    condition: selection_domain or (selection_uri_method and selection_uri_path)
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or threat-intel crawlers fetching the C2 domains
    - An unrelated web application that happens to expose /quarry/ POST paths (for example a mining-industry service)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Security researchers or threat-intel crawlers resolving or fetching the C2 domains
  • An unrelated web service that exposes /quarry/ POST paths

Tuning notes: Domain matching is exact and will lapse if the operator rotates infrastructure, so add new domains from follow-up reporting. The /quarry/ URI branches need TLS inspection or proxy/CASB logs, and the SPL branch needs the proxy mapped into the CIM Web data model. If the proxy exposes the User-Agent field, add an empty-User-Agent requirement to the URI branch to cut noise further. Because C2 is Cloudflare-fronted, do not block or alert on Cloudflare IP ranges. For KQL, DeviceNetworkEvents RemoteUrl may be empty for IP-only connections, so rely on the DnsEvents and proxy branches as well.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - Exploitation - Trojanized Viewer Execution (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - Post-Exploitation - cmd /C Execution and Browser Profile Manipulation (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - C2 - HTTPS Check-in to Quarry Endpoints and C2 Domains (Sentinel KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - Exploitation - Trojanized Viewer Execution (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - Post-Exploitation - cmd /C Execution and Browser Profile Manipulation (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - C2 - HTTPS Check-in to Quarry Endpoints and C2 Domains (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - Exploitation - Trojanized Viewer Execution (Splunk SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • QuartzLine zenith Backdoor - Post-Exploitation - cmd /C Execution and Browser Profile Manipulation (Splunk SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 47 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3597.

Sample indicators (3 of 47)

  • Domain: westbeavers[.]com
  • File hash: 7f1db334fd3302cf98dd4afddf6f90e98e2a496fe7e86bf1832b89d02f3d73c3
  • Domain: motherotters[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 47 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

47 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Rogue Authority (Squiblydoo) analyzed a Windows application presented as a PDF viewer under the names paperline.exe and QuartzLine_1.3177.99.exe / QuartzLine_1.9758.76.exe / QuartzLine_1.9740.56.exe. The binary is a 7.9 MB Rust executable using the Slint GUI framework with a working built-in PDF parser, so the visible application behaves legitimately while a hidden module named 'zenith' runs alongside it. The sample is signed with an EV code-signing certificate from Sectigo Public Code Signing CA EV R36 (serial 1b56cb4e99fb9444645a1ce7ffc0a46b, valid April 2026 to April 2027) issued to Guangzhou Guoying Communication Technology Co., Ltd., while the software claims to be 'Paperline Document Viewer' from 'Summit Works' - the signer entity is unrelated to the product. The certificate was later revoked (reason 'Privilege Withdrawn'), with the revocation backdated to issuance.

On launch the implant generates a machine UUID and persists it in %LOCALAPPDATA%\QuartzLine\terrain.dat (line format zenith=<uuid>). It then POSTs system information and the implant version (6.1.3; build ID QNPVXZGJYUSLTREHK; tag QZRT07) to /quarry/vein on its C2 domains (westbeavers.com, motherotters.com, healskills.com, the latter observed behind Cloudflare), followed by short status codes to /quarry/deposit. Additional configured but unobserved endpoints are /quarry/stratum, /quarry/gravel, /quarry/bedrock, /quarry/sandstone and /quarry/seam. No polling timer was found in code; the implant waits for server instructions. Requests carry no User-Agent header, which is atypical for desktop software.

C2 messages are JSON that is gzip-compressed, passed through a chained XOR (each byte XORed with the previous byte, fixed key, random seed), bit-rotated by a seed-dependent amount, Fisher-Yates shuffled using the seed, and Base64 encoded, all over HTTPS. The seed travels at the front of each message, so traffic can be decoded without server cooperation; the analyst decrypted 4 of 7 sandbox sessions. Observed server reply: {"lignite":{"update":false},"schist":{"success":true}}.

Supported capabilities are arbitrary command execution via cmd /C in a hidden window (returning exit code, execution time and output), and read/write/modification of Chromium-family browser profiles (Chrome, Edge and similar): the server supplies the target browser, profile path and files to modify, and the implant can force-close the browser and restart it with the modified profile. Arbitrary file read/write is also reported in the hunt skeleton summary. No live tasking was observed in sandbox runs, so the actual browser file targets, the update mechanism and the operator objective are unknown. Source paths are partly corrupted (mod.rs to mod.rn, main.rs to main.rj).

Attribution: no definitive actor or family attribution is made. KesaKode matched 54% to GeckoStealer, mainly through shared Rust library code. Malpedia associates the report with the family win.cloudhaze. Severity is an analyst estimate; no CVE or CVSS applies.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 Indicator Removal; T1564.003 Hidden Window

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1217 Browser Information Discovery

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Code Signing

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1583.008 Acquire Infrastructure; T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates; T1608.001 Stage Capabilities

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block westbeavers.com, motherotters.com and healskills.com at DNS and web proxy
  • Hunt for %LOCALAPPDATA%\QuartzLine\terrain.dat and 'zenith=' strings on endpoints
  • Hunt for SHA256 7f1db334fd3302cf98dd4afddf6f90e98e2a496fe7e86bf1832b89d02f3d73c3 and the filenames paperline.exe / QuartzLine_1.*.exe
  • Block or alert on the code-signing certificate serial 1b56cb4e99fb9444645a1ce7ffc0a46b
  • Isolate affected hosts and reset credentials/sessions stored in Chromium-family browser profiles on those hosts

Workarounds

  • Restrict installation of unmanaged PDF viewers; standardize on an approved viewer

Longer-term hardening

  • Do not treat a valid EV signature alone as proof of legitimacy; add publisher allow-listing and application control
  • Alert on HTTPS POSTs to /quarry/vein or /quarry/deposit and on outbound HTTP clients that send no User-Agent header
  • Alert on a document-viewer process spawning cmd.exe /C
  • Alert on non-browser processes running taskkill /F against browsers followed by a browser restart with --user-data-dir

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows systems that run the trojanized QuartzLine / Paperline viewer (implant v6.1.3)

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • Sectigo EV code-signing certificate (serial locked-ioc-14) issued to Guangzhou Guoying Communication Technology Co., Ltd., valid April 2026 to April 2027 (source gives month only; day approximated)
  • First sandbox/triage captures of the QuartzLine sample observed (September 16-17, 2026)
  • Additional triage captures; sandbox sessions of about 10 minutes showed check-in to /quarry/vein and /quarry/deposit but no live tasking
  • Expel-observed victim downloads the QuartzLine installer from an AWS S3 bucket after a Google Ads malvertising redirect; the installer creates the QuartzlineUpdateCheck task and begins C2 check-ins.
  • Operator deploys locked-ioc-11, which uploads Chrome history, passwords, cookies and session tokens to the chrome-history-backup S3 bucket.
  • Signing certificate revoked by the CA with reason 'Privilege Withdrawn' (October 2026, month precision; revocation date backdated to issuance)
  • locked-ioc-15 lands on the host and self-deletes within seconds.
  • locked-ioc-24 swaps quartzline.exe for a newer build (also distributed as locked-ioc-32); Expel observes the push across multiple customers.
  • Rogue Authority (Squiblydoo) publishes technical analysis of the QuartzLine 'zenith' backdoor; Malpedia library entry links it to win.cloudhaze
  • Further triage capture and ANY.RUN submission tested on October 9, 2026
  • locked-ioc-31 drops the second-stage RAT caira.exe with the CairaServiceCheck scheduled task.
  • A host resolves three new C2 domains; the IronBark third-stage payload is confirmed in a separate environment.
  • Expel publishes its QuartzLine analysis; Mandiant tracks the malware as CLOUDHAZE.

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated .

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