Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3749

XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal and DLL hijack (versions up to 7.4) with public PoC

highACTIVE

XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal (TL-2026-3749), also tracked as XWorm 7.4 C2 panel RCE, is a high-severity malware campaign, first published 2026-10-16. It has no confirmed attribution, affects XCoderTools / XCoder (malware author) XWorm RAT C2 panel (controller), maps to 16 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1055, T1056.001, T1059.001), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 17 indicators of compromise.

Severity
HIGHAssessed severity
CVEs
0None referenced
Techniques
16MITRE ATT&CK
Actors
0Not attributed
Detection rules
9SPL · KQL · Sigma
IOCs
17Indicators of compromise

Key facts for TL-2026-3749

Threat ID
TL-2026-3749
Also known as
XWorm 7.4 C2 panel RCE
Severity
HIGH
Status
ACTIVE
Category
MALWARE
First published
Last reviewed
Attribution confidence
LOW
Motivation
FINANCIAL
Target sectors
technology
Target regions
Global
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
17

Malware and tooling in XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal

Malware and tooling: NoCry, XWorm

How XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal works

An independent researcher, Mootoo, published a PoC for an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in the XWorm RAT C2 panel (versions up to 7.4). Anyone with the panel address, port and communication key can impersonate an infected client and run code on the operator's host. SecurityWeek reports limited-scale exploitation; the flaw was found on October 4, 2026.

XWorm is a commodity, modular .NET remote access trojan sold to criminal operators. Its operator-side C2 panel (the controller GUI) receives connections from infected clients on a configurable TCP port. The PoC repository describes a default panel port of 1723 and a default key of <V74PV74PV74PV74P> for version 7.4. Traffic is encrypted with AES-128-ECB using a key derived from the MD5 of the communication key. Because the panel accepts any client that can encrypt with that key, there is no real authentication of the peer.

The PoC emulates an infected client. It sends an INFO packet with crafted victim metadata to complete the handshake. It then opens a FileM (file manager) session whose directory argument is '..' and sends a 'downloadedfile' packet naming ../FastColoredTextBox.dll. The panel's file-receive logic does not validate the path, so the upload lands in the panel's root directory and overwrites the legitimate FastColoredTextBox.dll, a .NET syntax-highlighting library. Finally the fake client sends a 'Compiler' command, which makes the panel open its compiler interface and load the attacker-supplied DLL. This runs attacker code on the C2 host with no operator action beyond the panel running. The PoC classifies the bug as CWE-23 (relative path traversal) combined with CWE-427 (uncontrolled search path element). No CVE has been assigned.

Mootoo, an independent researcher in Oman, found the flaw while reverse-engineering an XWorm sample used in an attack against them. They reportedly used it to compromise infrastructure tied to the person behind that attack (SecurityWeek). SecurityWeek assesses exploitation as limited in scope, but the public PoC lowers the barrier for other actors, including defenders, rival criminals and researchers. An earlier RCE in XWorm V5.6 and earlier, exploitable with the C2 encryption key, was also publicly disclosed. The V6 line was marketed as 'RCE-fixed', and V6 changed the default key from <123456789> to <666666>.

Defender relevance: this is a vulnerability in attacker tooling, not in a victim product. The defensive value is for hunting, takedown and attribution work. Organizations running XWorm panels (including researcher-operated honeypots or sinkholes) should know the panel is itself exploitable. Defenders can use the known XWorm client behavior, such as Run key persistence, RegSvcs.exe injection, the plugin DLLs and AMSI bypass, for endpoint detection. The sources reviewed did not publish any panel hostnames, hashes or victim-side IOCs for the exploitation itself.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-3749

Defense Evasion

T1055 Process Injection; T1218.009 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvcs/Regasm

Collection

T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture; T1185 Browser Session Hijacking

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Persistence

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Command and Control

T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

stealth

T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL

Resource Development

T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Affected products and versions in XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal

  • XCoderTools / XCoder (malware author) — XWorm RAT C2 panel (controller)
    Vulnerable versions: up to and including 7.4

Remediation for XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal

Patches

  • No vendor patch applies. XWorm is criminal malware and the affected panel is up to version 7.4

Immediate actions

  • Treat any host running an XWorm 7.4-or-earlier panel as exploitable by anyone who knows the panel address, port and key
  • Hunt for XWorm client activity (Run key persistence, RegSvcs.exe injection, plugin DLLs such as Shell.dll and FileManager.dll) and isolate affected endpoints
  • Block and monitor outbound connections to known XWorm C2 endpoints such as 94.159.113.64:4411

Workarounds

  • Researchers or defenders running panel sinkholes should not expose them to untrusted networks and should monitor for FastColoredTextBox.dll modification in the panel directory

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for fileless .NET RAT loaders, AMSI bypass and process injection
  • Enforce email attachment and script-execution controls (JavaScript/WSH) to block the phishing delivery chain

Weaknesses (CWE) in XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal

CWE-23, CWE-427

Timeline of XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal

  • XWorm first observed in the wild in 2022 (SecurityWeek). Only the year is stated, so the date is a placeholder for the year.
  • A cracked XWorm builder was released publicly in June 2025 (SecurityWeek). Day not stated.
  • XWorm V6 was released by the account 'XCoderTools' and marketed as re-coded and RCE-fixed. The one-time lifetime price was reportedly $500 (Picus).
  • XWorm reached 35 supported plugins in July 2025 (SecurityWeek, The Hacker News). Day not stated.
  • Source code for XWorm v6.4 leaked in August 2025 (SecurityWeek), followed by a surge in activity. Day not stated.
  • Picus Security published a technical analysis of XWorm V6, covering its plugins, AMSI bypass, RegSvcs.exe injection, Ransomware.dll and observed C2 94.159.113.64:4411.
  • SecurityWeek reported XWorm at 46 plugins, with new surveillance plugins (Maps, Microphone, HBrowser, Webcam) and over 1,200 incidents across 100 organizations in Q3. Day not stated.
  • Mootoo reportedly used the flaw to compromise infrastructure tied to the person behind the attack. The date of use is not stated; 2026-10-04 is the discovery date.
  • Researcher Mootoo discovered the unauthenticated RCE in the XWorm C2 panel while reverse-engineering an XWorm sample used in an attack against them (SecurityWeek).
  • SecurityWeek reported the Mootoo PoC (github.com/mootoo11/xworm-7.4-RCE-PoC) and assessed exploitation as limited in scope.

Sources cited for XWorm RAT C2 panel unauthenticated RCE via path traversal

Detection coverage for TL-2026-3749

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3749 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

9 detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · Blue and above. Compare plans
17 indicators of compromise · Red and above. Compare plans

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