Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3755

Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo BadPaw (.NET Loader) and MeowMeow (Backdoor)

highACTIVE

Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo (TL-2026-3755), also tracked as BadPaw, is a high-severity malware campaign, first published 2026-10-16. It is linked to a Russia-nexus actor with medium confidence, affects Microsoft Windows, maps to 14 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1027, T1027.003, T1036), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 23 indicators of compromise.

Severity
HIGHAssessed severity
CVEs
0None referenced
Techniques
14MITRE ATT&CK
Actors
0Not attributed
Detection rules
9SPL · KQL · Sigma
IOCs
23Indicators of compromise

Key facts for TL-2026-3755

Threat ID
TL-2026-3755
Also known as
BadPaw, MeowMeow, MeowMeowProgram
Severity
HIGH
Status
ACTIVE
Category
MALWARE
First published
Last reviewed
Attribution confidence
MEDIUM
Nation-state nexus
Russia
Motivation
ESPIONAGE
Target sectors
government administration, energy
Target regions
ukraine, 151 - Eastern Europe
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
23

Malware and tooling in Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo

Malware and tooling: BadPaw, MeowMeow, .NET Reactor

How Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo works

ClearSky identified a targeted campaign against Ukraine using two new .NET Reactor-packed malware strains. A phishing email links to a ZIP containing an HTA that shows a Ukrainian-language border-crossing-appeal lure while the BadPaw loader is installed, which after C2 contact deploys the MeowMeow backdoor. ClearSky attributes it with high confidence to a Russian state-aligned actor and with low confidence to APT28.

ClearSky Cyber Security reported (March 2026) a targeted campaign against Ukraine that uses two previously undocumented malware families: BadPaw, a .NET loader, and MeowMeow, a .NET backdoor. Secondary coverage describes Ukrainian government and energy-sector targeting with possible regional expansion.

Infection chain: the victim receives a phishing email, reportedly sent from a ukr.net address (lviv_zagin_dpsu@ukr.net is listed in one write-up), containing a link, shortened via cutt.ly, to a ZIP archive. A tracking pixel hosted on infotrackerstatistic.live confirms that the link was opened. The ZIP contains an HTA file disguised as an HTML document. When opened it displays a Ukrainian-language decoy about a border-crossing appeal while the infection proceeds in the background.

BadPaw is a .NET loader packed with .NET Reactor. It runs only dummy code behind a benign GUI (a fake 'Regex Finder' tool) unless started with the -renew parameter. It contacts the C2 domain virtualdailyplanner.pro over HTTP using the paths /getcalendar (returns a numeric response), /eventmanager (landing page titled 'Telemetry UP!', with ASCII-encoded payload delivery in HTML) and /planneractivate. It then stages a VBScript (LibHelperDemo.vbs, later UpdateHelper.vbs) and an image (CAT.png, later HelperLogo.png) under %LOCALAPPDATA%\UpdateHelpers. A PE payload is hidden in the PNG after the marker <STEGO_START> (steganography) and is extracted and run as MeowMeowProgram.exe from %LOCALAPPDATA%\MeowCheck. A scheduled task executes the VBS stage for persistence. Other artifacts reported include config.library-ms in C:\Users\Public\Libraries and WallpapperSet.jpg in the Pictures folder.

MeowMeow is also .NET Reactor-packed and shows a benign decoy (an image of a yawning cat with a 'Meow Meow Meow' message) unless started with the -v parameter. It provides remote PowerShell command execution and file-system read/write/delete. Anti-analysis checks include reading HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\InstallDate and terminating if the OS was installed less than 10 days earlier (sandbox heuristic), VM detection, and termination when Wireshark, ProcMon, Ollydbg or Fiddler are found. Infosecurity Magazine reported that only nine AV engines detected the payload.

Attribution: ClearSky assesses with high confidence a Russian state-aligned actor and with low confidence APT28 (Fancy Bear). Supporting indicators are Ukrainian targeting, abuse of ukr.net (previously abused by APT28), and Russian-language strings in the code (for example a regex with 'работоспособного состояния'). Note that one secondary source describes the APT28 link as 'moderate'; ClearSky's own assessment is low. Limitation: the ClearSky article and PDF could not be fetched directly, so details come from secondary reporting that cites the report. Some artifact names and paths (for example the C:\Users\admin paths) come from sandbox analysis and may differ on victims.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-3755

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.003 Steganography; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.005 Mshta; T1480 Execution Guardrails; T1497.001 System Checks

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Affected products and versions in Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows systems that can run HTA, VBScript, PowerShell and .NET (no specific versions reported)

Remediation for Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo

Immediate actions

  • Block virtualdailyplanner.pro and infotrackerstatistic.live at DNS, proxy and firewall
  • Block or detonate-inspect cutt.ly short links in inbound mail for Ukrainian-targeted users
  • Hunt for MeowMeowProgram.exe, LibHelperDemo.vbs, UpdateHelper.vbs, CAT.png and HelperLogo.png and for the UpdateHelpers and MeowCheck directories under %LOCALAPPDATA%
  • Review scheduled tasks that launch wscript/cscript against VBS files in user-profile directories

Workarounds

  • Remove or disable the .hta file association for non-administrative users
  • Restrict PowerShell with Constrained Language Mode and script block logging

Longer-term hardening

  • Block ZIP-from-link downloads and HTA execution (mshta.exe) for standard users
  • Alert on mshta.exe or wscript.exe spawning .NET processes that make HTTP requests to rare domains
  • Enable attack surface reduction rules against script-launched executable content
  • Train staff to treat unsolicited official-looking emails, including from ukr.net senders, as suspicious

Timeline of Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo

  • Report documents the MeowMeow backdoor (-v parameter), extracted from PNG after the <STEGO_START> marker, with remote PowerShell, file operations and sandbox/analysis-tool checks. The event date is the disclosure date.
  • Report documents the BadPaw .NET Reactor loader (-renew parameter) contacting virtualdailyplanner.pro (/getcalendar, /eventmanager, /planneractivate) and staging a VBS plus CAT.png steganographic image. The event date is the disclosure date.
  • Report documents the delivery chain: phishing email from a ukr.net sender with a cutt.ly link to a ZIP holding an HTA, which shows a Ukrainian border-crossing-appeal decoy. The event date is the disclosure date, not an observed attack date.
  • ClearSky Cyber Security report 'Exposing a Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine Using New Malware Duo: BadPaw and MeowMeow' is in circulation, attributing the campaign with high confidence to a Russian state-aligned actor and with low confidence to APT28.
  • Infosecurity Magazine publishes the earliest dated coverage of the ClearSky BadPaw/MeowMeow report (ClearSky's exact publication day is not stated in the sources; the report is dated March 2026).
  • Daily CyberSecurity (securityonline.info) publishes a detailed technical summary of the campaign and its indicators.

Sources cited for Russian Campaign Targeting Ukraine with New Malware Duo

Detection coverage for TL-2026-3755

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3755 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

9 detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · Blue and above. Compare plans
23 indicators of compromise · Red and above. Compare plans

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