Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3763
AdFection: Zero-click ad-based delivery of Candiru (Integrity Labs) spyware via Discover-Tech's Controlium/NOAS ad infrastructure
Citizen Lab (Report 195, 2026-10-15) disclosed 'AdFection', in which Israeli ad-tech firm Discover-Tech used real-time-bidding ads carrying script tags that contacted its NOAS servers, which returned exploit code only to pre-selected targets, to deliver Candiru spyware to at least 45 Al Jazeera Windows devices in 2024-2025.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3763 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | AdFection, Controlium, NOAS, DevilsTongue |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (10/11) endpoints and browsers/WebView rendering ads; Programmatic advertising ecosystem Real-time-bidding exchanges and DSPs (Google Ad Manager, Yandex, Vungle, Beeswax, Eskimi, Xandr, Sunteng) |
| Attribution | Caramel Tsunami, Integrity Labs (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Israel |
| Malware | DevilsTongue, Predator |
| Tools | Controlium |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1123 Audio Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1480 Execution Guardrails, T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores and 7 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | news - media, government administration, journalism, civil society, defense, international-organizations |
| Target regions | Middle East, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3763 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 39 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: AdFection NOAS getAd Server Contact — Exploitation Delivery
Detects proxy/web requests from endpoints to Discover-Tech NOAS ('getAd') servers (ppv2/pqv2/noas/infinoas.mtrtb.com, noas/qa-noas/logger.powerium.net, events.myweb3id.io, events.platc-tester.com). In AdFection (Citizen Lab Report 195) a script tag inside a real-time-bidding ad calls NOAS with the device IP and advertising ID, and NOAS returns exploit JavaScript or a binary payload only to selected targets, so any contact indicates the endpoint was reached by the Candiru delivery pipeline. Contact alone is not proof of compromise; escalate when followed by validator or C2 contact.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1189, T1059.007, T1592, T1583.008
- Data sources: proxy, web_gateway, zscaler, palo_alto_traffic
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy earliest=-24h sourcetype IN ("zscalernss-web","pan:traffic","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog","squid:access","stream:http") ```AdFection NOAS getAd contact: Discover-Tech ad infrastructure on mtrtb.com, powerium.net, myweb3id.io, platc-tester.com```
| eval req=lower(coalesce(url, uri, cs_uri, site, dest_host, dest))
| where match(req, "(^|[/.])(ppv2|pqv2|noas|infinoas)[.]mtrtb[.]com|(^|[/.])(noas|qa-noas|logger)[.]powerium[.]net|events[.](myweb3id[.]io|platc-tester[.]com)|/cplatform/getad")
| fillnull value="unknown" src user
| stats count as hits min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(req) as distinct_requests values(req) as requests by src, user
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)Microsoft KQL
let noasDomains = dynamic(["ppv2.mtrtb.com","pqv2.mtrtb.com","noas.mtrtb.com","infinoas.mtrtb.com","noas.powerium.net","qa-noas.powerium.net","logger.powerium.net","events.myweb3id.io","events.platc-tester.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (noasDomains) or RemoteUrl has "/cplatform/getAd"
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Urls = make_set(RemoteUrl, 20), Processes = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 10) by DeviceId, DeviceName
| order by LastSeen descSigma
title: AdFection NOAS getAd Server Contact (Discover-Tech Ad Infrastructure)
id: 3f1c2a64-8b7e-4d1a-9c55-0a1e7b3d2f01
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests to Discover-Tech NOAS (getAd) servers that return exploit JavaScript or payloads only to pre-selected targets in the AdFection zero-click Candiru delivery chain.
references:
- https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-16
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1189
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.t1592
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1583.008
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_host:
cs-host|endswith:
- '.mtrtb.com'
- '.powerium.net'
- 'events.myweb3id.io'
- 'events.platc-tester.com'
selection_path:
c-uri|contains: '/cplatform/getAd'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes replaying AdFection indicators
- Ad-tech analysts browsing Discover-Tech infrastructure
level: high
Known false positives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes replaying AdFection indicators
- Threat-intel enrichment tooling that resolves or fetches IOC URLs
Tuning notes: Confirm the proxy sourcetypes and field names (url, uri, cs_uri, dest_host) match your environment. Discover-Tech was delisted by Google and IAB Europe in October 2026 so traffic may decline; keep the rule for retro-hunting. Extend the domain list as Citizen Lab or Confiant publish new NOAS hosts.
- AdFection NOAS-to-Candiru Validator Temporal Chain · unlock with TL Creds
- Candiru Implant Sample Hash Match — Al Jazeera DLL · unlock with TL Creds
- Implant Connectivity Check to Google and Microsoft by Non-Browser Process · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser or WebView Spawning Script Host or LOLBin — Exploit Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- Microphone or Camera Use by User-Writable Binary or Host Process — Spyware Collection · unlock with TL Creds
- Candiru Validator and Infinite FIFO Profiling Infrastructure Contact · unlock with TL Creds
- COM Hijack Persistence to User-Writable DLL — DevilsTongue Implant · unlock with TL Creds
- Candiru C2 Domain Communication — Web Protocol Beaconing · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 39 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3763.
Sample indicators (3 of 39)
- Domain:
fearevolve[.]com - File hash:
255869de85e2a171993fc5eb8a556d873a1b8966e040f6f55926f2fa2d595cc8 - Domain:
insightenterprisells[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 39 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Between March and June 2026 the same infrastructure placed 3.77 billion bids across 75,373 apps and 120,768 websites in 161 countries.
AdFection is the first publicly confirmed technical case of zero-click mercenary spyware delivered through the programmatic advertising ecosystem. Discover-Tech Ltd (incorporated in Israel in March 2020; CEO Dekel Boni) operates a campaign control panel called Controlium. Spyware partners upload targeting lists (mobile advertising IDs, browser IDs, IP addresses) and purchase ad impressions through Discover-Tech's own DSP ('MyDSP', connected to Google Ad Manager, Yandex, Vungle and Sunteng) and through Beeswax and Eskimi. Controlium modules include a Tag Generator, creative upload, campaigns, targeting lists, bid-request and impression viewers, and an OpSec admin configuration (bidding frequency limits, domain/app allow and block lists, per-country allow and block lists, daily and monthly caps).
Delivery chain: (1) an ad is won in a real-time-bidding auction (the user does not need to see or click it); (2) the ad creative contains a script tag that, on render, calls a 'NOAS' ('getAd') server and submits the device's IP address and advertising identifier; (3) the NOAS server decides eligibility and returns JavaScript (for example an invisible 1x1 iframe registering an event on logger.powerium.net) or a binary payload only to selected targets, while every other device receives nothing; (4) selected targets are redirected to Candiru 'validator' servers, with encrypted targeting data (IP, timestamp, user-agent, ad ID) passed in base64 '?q=' parameters (the 'Ad URL OpSec' feature); (5) if the device matches and a suitable exploit exists, a Windows DLL implant is installed; (6) the implant persists via COM hijacking and beacons to Candiru C2 servers. Citizen Lab observed a temporal signature of Discover-Tech infrastructure contact, then Candiru validator contact, then Candiru C2 contact. The browser/Windows exploit itself was not captured; the JavaScript served from sincereaccertain.com and d1fcoizt7mje85.cloudfront.net was not recovered by Citizen Lab, and no CVE is stated in any source.
A separate 'Infinite FIFO' mass-profiling feature redirected hundreds of thousands to millions of users to Candiru profiling infrastructure (sincereaccertain.com and a CloudFront distribution, April-December 2025; from January 2026 via ppv2.mtrtb.com, with 3,637,213 'eligible users' counted January-June 2026). World-readable Apache Druid instances (druid.mtrtb.com, cn.druid.mtrtb.com) exposed MyDSP bidding data for March-June 2026: 3,770,286,576 bids, 441,954,291 won (11.7%), about 718.7 million bids (~19%) containing NOAS script tags, upstream exchange share of Yandex 67.4%, Google Ad Manager 24.74% and Vungle 7.24%, and top raw-bid countries Yemen, Pakistan, Montenegro and Brazil. Controlium also had a broken authentication design (auth tokens derived from unencrypted user metadata, with JWT validation commented out) and an unauthenticated /csv-download endpoint exposing 128 days of login logs.
The malware sample tied to the Al Jazeera infections (SHA-256 255869de85e2a171993fc5eb8a556d873a1b8966e040f6f55926f2fa2d595cc8) shares traits with the 2021 Candiru DevilsTongue sample: COM-hijack persistence (different DLL), string obfuscation with a 48-byte repeating XOR key and a 'dummy' terminator, and a hardcoded connectivity check against http://www.google.com and http://www.microsoft.com. Public reporting describes DevilsTongue as capable of stealing files, credentials and messages, and one outlet adds microphone and camera access. Citizen Lab also linked Controlium users to Candiru/Integrity Labs presale staff, to mercenary firms Bindecy and Intelos (whose Controlium logins and infrastructure were identified), and to a mass-deanonymization actor it calls DARK CARTOGRAPHER (WebRTC IP leaks and mobile-carrier MSISDN leaks; active since at least 2019; separate report forthcoming). Discover-Tech also had board and shareholder links to the Intellexa-associated network (Eric Banoun, director 2020-2025).
Discover-Tech ads were observed on networks of sensitive organizations including NATO, the UN, EU institutions, the US Department of Defense (per Confiant), the IAEA and the ICC; being reached by an ad is not evidence of compromise. After disclosure Google terminated Discover-Tech access and, with IAB Europe, removed it from registries (early October 2026); Beeswax and Eskimi blocked accounts and domains; Vungle (Liftoff) paused access pending review; Xandr and Sunteng had not responded within the report timeline. Citizen Lab notes a similar technique, 'Aladdin', documented by Amnesty International in late 2025 for Predator (Intellexa).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture
Discovery
T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails
Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Command and Control
Initial Access
Persistence
T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking
Credential Access
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1583.008 Malvertising; T1608 Stage Capabilities; T1608.004 Stage Capabilities
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1590.005 IP Addresses; T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
Remediation
Patches
- Keep Windows, Chrome/Chromium-based browsers and WebView components fully patched (the exploit used was not publicly identified; no CVE is stated)
Immediate actions
- Block Discover-Tech infrastructure domains and the Candiru validator and C2 domains listed in the IOCs at DNS and web gateways
- Hunt proxy, DNS and EDR telemetry for requests to NOAS hostnames (mtrtb.com, powerium.net, myweb3id.io, platc-tester.com) followed by contact with Candiru validator or C2 domains
- Block advertising and tracking systems at organizational gateways and on work devices
- Triage high-risk users (journalists, activists, government staff) for COM-hijack persistence and the SHA-256 of the Al Jazeera sample
Workarounds
- Mandatory ad-blocking on government and newsroom devices
- Restrict script execution from ad domains via DNS filtering
Longer-term hardening
- Disable advertising identifiers and personalized advertising on devices of high-risk individuals through MDM
- Deploy EDR with registry/COM-hijack and unsigned-DLL load detection on Windows endpoints
- Require third-party audits and stricter onboarding of ad-tech vendors; sandbox ad creative code
- Use Lockdown/hardened browser profiles and disable WebRTC leaks for high-risk users
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (10/11) endpoints and browsers/WebView rendering ads
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched Windows browsers/WebView (exploit not disclosed) - Programmatic advertising ecosystem — Real-time-bidding exchanges and DSPs (Google Ad Manager, Yandex, Vungle, Beeswax, Eskimi, Xandr, Sunteng)
Vulnerable versions: Abused as delivery channel
Fixed in: Discover-Tech accounts removed/blocked by Google, Beeswax, Eskimi; Vungle paused access
Timeline
Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source
- Discover-Tech Ltd incorporated in Israel (March 2020); Eric Banoun joins the board in April 2020.
- Discover-Tech added to the IAB Europe Global Vendor List.
- Google certifies Discover-Tech as an external ad vendor.
- Earliest activity of the 305 Candiru validator domains on 319 IPs identified by Citizen Lab (August 2022 - July 2026).
- At least 45 Al Jazeera Media Network devices targeted with Candiru spyware via Discover-Tech ads across 2024-2025 (exact month not given; first-of-year used as approximation).
- Three Candiru-cluster domains registered within hours using the rockhoster registrant.
- Infinite FIFO mass-profiling deployment begins, redirecting users to locked-ioc-9 and a CloudFront distribution (April-December 2025); locked-ioc-9 begins distributing encrypted targeting URLs in May 2025.
- locked-ioc-27 NOAS URL used with Infinite FIFO; 3,637,213 eligible users counted January-June 2026.
- Start of the March-June 2026 window of exposed MyDSP bidding data: 3.77 billion bids, 442 million won, 75,373 apps and 120,768 websites in 161 countries.
- Candiru C&C infrastructure begins gradual retirement in May-June 2026 (per Citizen Lab).
- Unauthenticated Controlium /csv-download endpoint (exposing 128 days of login logs) removed in June 2026; Druid instances shut down in August 2026.
- Exposed Druid instances locked-ioc-22 and cn.locked-ioc-22 shut down (August 2026).
- Google and IAB Europe remove Discover-Tech from registries and terminate access (early October 2026); Beeswax and Eskimi block accounts, Vungle pauses access.
- IAB Europe removes Discover-Tech from its Global Vendor List; Google also removes it from vendor registries in early October.
- Disclosure responses arrive from Adtimizer (Oct 11), Volasim and Vungle (Oct 12), Beeswax (Oct 13) and Eskimi (Oct 14).
- Citizen Lab publishes Report 195 'Exposing AdFection', with Confiant publishing related findings.
- BleepingComputer and other outlets report the campaign.
- SecurityWeek reports that the Israeli ad firm doubled as a zero-click spyware delivery channel for Candiru.
Update history
- 2026-10-27 — AdFection: Zero-Click Candiru Spyware Delivered via Targeted Online Ads (Discover-Tech Controlium): What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution-confidence change; existing values (HIGH / ACTIVE / ACTIVE / MEDIUM) already match the newer report. New indicators (1) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-19 — AdFection: Zero-Click Candiru Spyware Delivered via Targeted Online Ads (Discover-Tech): What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; both records are HIGH / ACTIVE. New indicators (3) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-17 — Discover-Tech 'AdFection': Israeli ad firm used RTB ad auctions as zero-click Candiru spyware delivery channel: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change. The update adds context and indicators only. New indicators (7) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Exposing AdFection: How Discover-Tech Turned Targeted Ads Into a Pipeline for Zero-Click Mercenary Spyware (Citizen Lab Report 195) citizenlab.ca · Research · 2026-10-15
- Hooking Candiru: Another Mercenary Spyware Vendor Comes into Focus (Citizen Lab, 2021) citizenlab.ca · Research · 2021-07-15
- Zero-click attacks used targeted ads to deliver Candiru spyware (BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News · 2026-10-16
- AdFection: How mercenary spyware invades victims' devices through targeted advertising (CyberScoop) cyberscoop.com · News
- Targeted Ads Used to Infect Al Jazeera Devices with Candiru Spyware (Hackread) hackread.com · News
- Israeli ad firm used online ads to spread Candiru spyware, report finds (The Next Web) thenextweb.com · News
- Citizen Lab Says Targeted Ads Delivered Zero-Click Spyware to Al Jazeera (Technology.org) technology.org · News · 2026-10-16
- Citizen Lab uncovers use of online ads to deliver spyware (Digital Watch) dig.watch · News
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .