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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3761

DeceptionAds: Malvertising Fake CAPTCHA Campaign Delivering Lumma Infostealer via Monetag and BeMob

highACTIVE

Guardio Labs reported the DeceptionAds malvertising campaign: ads on 3,000+ content sites (1M+ daily impressions) redirect validated visitors, via BeMob cloaking, to fake CAPTCHA pages that copy a PowerShell command to the clipboard and instruct the victim to run it from the Windows Run dialog, installing the Lumma infostealer. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3761
Also known asDeceptionAds
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (Run dialog / PowerShell); Various Chrome, Edge, Firefox and other Chromium browsers (credential and cookie theft targets)
AttributionVane Viper (medium confidence)
MalwareLumma Stealer - S1213
ToolsBeMob
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1583.006 Web Services, T1583.008 Malvertising, T1608.004 Drive-by Target
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, general-public
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3761 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DeceptionAds Fake CAPTCHA - Explorer-Launched PowerShell/MSHTA Download Cradle (Lumma Stealer)

Detects the ClickFix user-execution step of the DeceptionAds malvertising campaign (TL-2026-3761): the victim pastes a clipboard-injected one-liner into the Windows Run dialog, so powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, mshta.exe or cmd.exe is spawned by explorer.exe with a download or Invoke-Expression cradle that retrieves the Lumma Stealer payload. Legitimate CAPTCHAs never require pasting commands into Run.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1059.001, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe","*\\pwsh.exe","*\\mshta.exe","*\\cmd.exe") CommandLine IN ("*http://*","*https://*","*Invoke-Expression*","*iex *","*DownloadString*","*DownloadFile*","*Invoke-WebRequest*","*Invoke-RestMethod*","*irm *") | eval cradle=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)mshta"),"mshta_remote",match(CommandLine,"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression)"),"iex_cradle",true(),"download_cradle") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd by host User Image cradle | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'explorer.exe'
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','mshta.exe','cmd.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('Invoke-Expression','iex','DownloadString','DownloadFile','Invoke-WebRequest','Invoke-RestMethod','irm') or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'(?i)https?://'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: DeceptionAds Fake CAPTCHA Explorer-Launched PowerShell or MSHTA Download Cradle
id: 3f6c1a52-8d47-4b19-9a0e-5c7d21e8b401
status: experimental
description: Detects powershell, pwsh, mshta or cmd spawned by explorer.exe (Run dialog paste) with a download or Invoke-Expression cradle, the user-execution step of the DeceptionAds fake CAPTCHA campaign delivering Lumma Stealer (TL-2026-3761).
references:
  - https://medium.com/@guardiosecurity/deceptionads-fake-captcha-driving-infostealer-infections-and-a-glimpse-to-the-dark-side-of-0c516f4dc0b6
  - https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-ads-push-lumma-infostealer-via-fake-captcha-pages
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/16
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.004
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - 'Invoke-Expression'
      - 'iex '
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'DownloadFile'
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
      - 'irm '
  condition: selection_parent and selection_img and selection_cmd
falsepositives:
  - Administrators or developers pasting installer one-liners (Chocolatey, Scoop, winget wrappers) into the Run dialog
  - Software installers launched from Explorer that invoke PowerShell with a download URL
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators or developers pasting installer one-liners (Chocolatey, Scoop) into the Run dialog
  • Software installers launched from Explorer that call PowerShell with a download URL

Tuning notes: Allowlist known admin/IT accounts and sanctioned installer URLs by User and CommandLine. Requires Sysmon EventID 1 (index=sysmon) or MDE DeviceProcessEvents. Also consider enabling NoRun via Group Policy where feasible.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • DeceptionAds / Lumma Stealer - Non-Browser Access to Browser Credential and Cookie Stores · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds / Lumma Stealer - Browser Store Copies and Script-Staged Archives · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds / Lumma Stealer - Command-Line Copy of Browser Databases or Wallet File Hunting · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds - DNS Resolution of Known Fake CAPTCHA Landing and Community-Observed Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds / Lumma Stealer - Script Engine or LOLBin Network Connection to Abused Cloud Staging Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds - Proxy Traffic to Fake CAPTCHA Landing Pages and BeMob Cloaking Redirects · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds Fake CAPTCHA - Suspicious Command Written to RunMRU (Run Dialog Paste) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DeceptionAds - Obfuscated or Hidden PowerShell Launched from Explorer (Fake CAPTCHA Payload) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3761.

Sample indicators (3 of 21)

  • Domain: cdn-downloads-now[.]xyz
  • URL: hxxp://dedicloadpgeing[.]b-cdn[.]net/dedicated-captcha-page.html
  • Domain: bmtrck[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 21 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

21 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The campaign abused the Monetag ad network and is linked to the actor Infoblox tracks as Vane Viper (Omnatuor).

DeceptionAds is a large-scale malvertising operation documented by Guardio Labs (Nati Tal) in December 2024. Threat actors registered as advertisers on the Monetag ad network (a PropellerAds subsidiary) and bought ad placements that ran across more than 3,000 publisher sites, producing over one million ad impressions per day and, per Guardio, thousands of daily victims. Heavily trafficked publishers included streaming sites (hianime.to, sflix.to, gomovies.sx), media converters (y2mate.com, y2meta.tube), ebook piracy (z-lib.io) and game piracy sites (steamrip.com, 9minecraft.net).

The ad code is obfuscated JavaScript that performs browser fingerprinting, tracking and ad-blocker circumvention, and checks that the visitor looks like a real person. Validated visitors are redirected through a Monetag traffic distribution system and the BeMob ad-tracking platform, which the actors used solely as a cloaking layer: reviewers see a benign destination while real victims are sent to a malicious page. BeMob cloaking URLs followed the pattern xxxx.bmtrck.com and /go/[UUID] on 100+ domains across several networks (e.g. addonclicks, fineclouding, smartlinkoffer).

The landing pages are fake CAPTCHA / 'verify you are human' pages hosted on cheap cloud and CDN storage: Bunny CDN (b-cdn.net), Cloudflare R2 (r2.dev), Oracle Cloud object storage, Scaleway and EXOScale (and Netlify per Rewterz). Page JavaScript silently copies a malicious PowerShell one-liner to the clipboard and instructs the victim to paste it into the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix-style user execution). Guardio observed multiple obfuscation techniques and design variants over the campaign. The command downloads and runs Lumma Stealer, which harvests cookies, credentials, passwords, credit cards and browsing history from Chrome, Edge, Firefox and other Chromium browsers, plus cryptocurrency wallets and files with names such as seed.txt and trezor.txt. Guardio did not publish the PowerShell commands or hashes.

Monetag removed 200+ threat actor accounts on 2024-11-28 (8 days after disclosure) and BeMob removed the cloaking accounts within 4 days, but activity paused only briefly and resumed using Monetag and other ad networks; BleepingComputer observed a resurgence on 2024-12-11. Guardio highlights the fragmented chain of responsibility (advertisers, ad network, tracking service, publishers, hosting) that gives plausible deniability. Infoblox ties Monetag to PropellerAds and AdTech Holding (Cyprus) and tracks the associated malvertising infrastructure as Vane Viper / Omnatuor. Specific network IOCs for this campaign are limited to the landing-page URLs republished by Rewterz; no IP addresses or file hashes were published, so no BeaconBeagle lookups were possible.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Resource Development

T1583.006 Web Services; T1583.008 Malvertising; T1608.004 Drive-by Target

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the listed fake-CAPTCHA landing-page domains/URLs and bmtrck.com cloaking redirects at DNS/proxy
  • Hunt for powershell.exe/mshta.exe/cmd.exe spawned from explorer.exe shortly after a Run dialog (RunMRU) entry
  • If a user ran a pasted command, isolate the host, reset all browser-stored credentials and revoke active sessions/cookies, and move crypto wallet funds

Workarounds

  • Disable the Windows Run dialog via Group Policy (NoRun) where operationally feasible
  • Enable PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and AppLocker/WDAC for non-admin users

Longer-term hardening

  • Train users that legitimate CAPTCHAs never require pasting commands into Run, PowerShell or Terminal
  • Deploy EDR with PowerShell script-block logging and behavioral detection of clipboard-to-Run execution
  • Use DNS filtering and ad/malvertising blocking on managed browsers; restrict access to piracy/streaming sites

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (Run dialog / PowerShell)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints used with ad-supported websites; no software vulnerability, social-engineering technique
  • Various — Chrome, Edge, Firefox and other Chromium browsers (credential and cookie theft targets)
    Vulnerable versions: All versions storing credentials/cookies locally

Timeline

  • Infoblox first documents the Vane Viper / Omnatuor malvertising network (August 2022; exact day not stated), later tied to PropellerAds and AdTech Holding.
  • Per the Guardio report, the campaign is already actively distributing Lumma Stealer via fake CAPTCHA pages in early November 2024 (exact day not stated).
  • Guardio Labs disclosed findings to Monetag and BeMob; date derived from the reported 8-day gap to Monetag's 2024-11-28 account removal.
  • BeMob removes the cloaking accounts within 4 days of disclosure (date derived from the 4-day interval).
  • Monetag removes 200+ threat actor accounts, 8 days after Guardio's responsible disclosure; BeMob removes the cloaking accounts within 4 days of disclosure.
  • BleepingComputer reports the fake CAPTCHA campaign resurging after a brief pause, using Monetag and other ad networks.
  • Guardio Labs (Nati Tal) publishes the DeceptionAds report: 1M+ daily impressions, 3,000+ publisher sites, thousands of daily victims, Lumma Stealer payload.
  • Anti-Malware.ru and other outlets publish coverage of the Guardio findings, noting the abuse of legitimate ad services to seed Lumma Stealer.
  • Infoblox publishes further Vane Viper research (about 1 trillion DNS queries, tied to PropellerAds/AdTech Holding); reported by The Hacker News in September 2025, exact day not stated.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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