Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3771
Lumma Stealer distributed via fake game updates on itch.io and Patreon (nexe-compiled Node.js loader)
G DATA reports a campaign in which newly created itch.io accounts spam comments on legitimate games with templated 'update' messages linking to Patreon-hosted downloads of 'Updated Version.zip'. The archive holds a nexe-compiled Node.js executable (game.exe) that runs six anti-analysis checks and then reflectively loads a LummaStealer payload through a native .node module.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3771 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | LummaC2 itch.io Patreon fake update campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; itch.io itch.io comment sections (abuse of platform); Patreon Patreon file hosting (abuse of platform) |
| Malware | Lumma Stealer - S1213 |
| Tools | Tasklist - S0057, nexe |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1497.001 System Checks and 5 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | gaming, consumer, cryptocurrency |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3771 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Lumma Stealer nexe Node.js Loader (game.exe) and modules.node Stager — Exploitation Phase
Detects the execution stage of the TL-2026-3771 itch.io/Patreon fake game update campaign: game.exe (a nexe-compiled Node.js loader) launched from Downloads, AppData or Temp, the native Node-API stager modules.node written to %TEMP%, or any file event carrying the published SHA256 of game.exe, modules.node or the LummaStealer payload. Behaviour-first: the game.exe/modules.node pairing alone is high fidelity because the loader decodes and drops modules.node before reflectively loading Lumma.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1059.007, T1036, T1140, T1027
- Data sources: sysmon, index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational (EventCode 1, 11), DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\modules.node")
OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\game.exe" (Image="*\\Downloads\\*" OR Image="*\\AppData\\*" OR Image="*\\Temp\\*"))
OR Hashes="*102b99b00a60f33246bd89bd2b3cb9cfae2844d453484e932b3a5ca634fb308c*"
OR Hashes="*1d405b03bc5913b6b43c06550ef0b9b02196b270625e4dc5fa0c37e8a424be25*"
OR Hashes="*a2bacb00dfdb338b496d3128705f76c8ab935e6bd33e06271fb3e34d769d0a2b*")
```Classify which stage of the TL-2026-3771 Lumma nexe loader chain fired```
| eval signal=case(isnotnull(Hashes) AND match(Hashes,"(?i)(102b99b00a60f33246bd89bd2b3cb9cfae2844d453484e932b3a5ca634fb308c|1d405b03bc5913b6b43c06550ef0b9b02196b270625e4dc5fa0c37e8a424be25|a2bacb00dfdb338b496d3128705f76c8ab935e6bd33e06271fb3e34d769d0a2b)"),"known Lumma campaign SHA256", EventCode=11,"modules.node dropped to Temp", true(),"game.exe nexe loader launched from user-writable path")
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen dc(signal) as signal_count values(signal) as signals values(Image) as images values(TargetFilename) as dropped_files values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(CommandLine) as command_lines by Computer, User
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen Computer User signal_count signals images dropped_files parent_images command_linesMicrosoft KQL
// TL-2026-3771 Lumma nexe loader: game.exe from user-writable path, modules.node drop, known SHA256s
let lumma_sha256 = dynamic(["102b99b00a60f33246bd89bd2b3cb9cfae2844d453484e932b3a5ca634fb308c", "1d405b03bc5913b6b43c06550ef0b9b02196b270625e4dc5fa0c37e8a424be25", "a2bacb00dfdb338b496d3128705f76c8ab935e6bd33e06271fb3e34d769d0a2b"]);
union
(DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
| where FileName =~ "modules.node" and FolderPath contains "\\Temp\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Signal = "modules.node dropped to Temp", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "game.exe" and FolderPath has_any ("\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\", "\\Temp\\")) or set_has_element(lumma_sha256, tolower(SHA256))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signal = iff(set_has_element(lumma_sha256, tolower(SHA256)), "known Lumma campaign SHA256", "game.exe nexe loader launched from user-writable path"), FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), SignalCount = dcount(Signal), Signals = make_set(Signal), Files = make_set(FolderPath, 10), Parents = make_set(ProcessName, 10), CommandLines = make_set(CommandLine, 10) by DeviceName, AccountName
| order by SignalCount desc, LastSeen descSigma
title: Lumma Stealer nexe Node.js Loader game.exe Launched From User-Writable Path
id: 4f1a7c52-3b0e-4d6a-9c1e-7a2b5d8e0f31
status: experimental
description: Detects game.exe executing from Downloads, AppData or Temp, or a process image matching the SHA256 of the TL-2026-3771 Lumma Stealer nexe loader, modules.node stager or LummaStealer payload.
references:
- https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2025/12/38310-lumma-stealer-itchio-patreon
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-141b
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-16
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1027
- attack.s1213
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_path:
Image|endswith: '\game.exe'
Image|contains:
- '\Downloads\'
- '\AppData\'
- '\Temp\'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- '102b99b00a60f33246bd89bd2b3cb9cfae2844d453484e932b3a5ca634fb308c'
- '1d405b03bc5913b6b43c06550ef0b9b02196b270625e4dc5fa0c37e8a424be25'
- 'a2bacb00dfdb338b496d3128705f76c8ab935e6bd33e06271fb3e34d769d0a2b'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate portable games named game.exe run from the Downloads folder
- Developers testing nexe or pkg compiled Node.js applications from user directories
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate portable or indie games distributed as game.exe and run from the Downloads folder
- Developers testing nexe/pkg-compiled Node.js executables from user-writable directories
Tuning notes: Exclude known-good game install roots (for example steamapps, Epic Games, GOG) from the game.exe path clause. Raise to critical when the hash clause or the modules.node drop fires. Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 and 11 collection into index=sysmon; adjust the index name to your environment.
- Fake Game Update Archive '[indicator]' Downloaded (Patreon Origin) — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- PowerShell Get-CimInstance Hardware Fingerprinting by Lumma Loader Variant — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser Credential and Cookie Store Access by Non-Browser Process (Lumma Stealer) — Credential Theft · unlock with TL Creds
- Renamed Node.js Runtime (nexe-Compiled Executable) Running From User-Writable Path — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Native Node-API Stager [indicator] Loaded From Temp (Reflective Lumma Load) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Loader Outbound Connection to Public IP (Lumma Exfiltration/C2) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Lumma nexe Loader Anti-Analysis Burst (tasklist /fo csv + WMIC GPU/Disk Queries) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Lumma Stealer Fallback C2 Service Resolution From Loader or User-Path Process — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3771.
Sample indicators (3 of 12)
- File hash:
79250523a057a7dd9a6080099c8c2f83eb683ab9b37ecab149fc73524f7c4bd1 - File hash:
102b99b00a60f33246bd89bd2b3cb9cfae2844d453484e932b3a5ca634fb308c - File hash:
80e538cabade94e1883f9e72bb608dc02f79808aec48136b5bbb00c2a1717f64
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 12 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
In a campaign documented by G DATA (Josemaria Grana, 2025-12-08), newly created itch.io accounts post templated comments across many legitimate indie games claiming to offer an 'official, safe, and fully working' game update with a changelog of bug fixes and stability improvements. The comments link to Patreon URLs that directly download an archive named 'Updated Version.zip'. G DATA characterizes this as a shotgun approach aimed at users unfamiliar with itch.io who may mistake the comments for genuine developer announcements.
Most files in the archive are benign; the exception is game.exe (78.21 MiB), a Node.js application converted to a PE binary with the nexe compiler. G DATA notes that earlier Node.js-based malware generally still needed a separate node.exe runtime, so a nexe-compiled loader appears to be a novel delivery technique. Its heavily minified and obfuscated JavaScript (mains.js, extracted with nexeDecompiler) runs six anti-analysis checks before doing anything malicious: (1) total memory under 4 GB or 2 or fewer CPU cores via os.totalmem()/os.cpus(); (2) the current username (NFC-normalized) against a list of 54+ sandbox-style names such as sandbox, vmware, malware, maltest, virus, wdagutilityaccount, johndoe; (3) 'tasklist /fo csv' output against 80+ analysis tools (IDA, x64dbg, OllyDbg, WinDbg, Frida, DynamoRIO, Pin, Wireshark, Burp Suite, Fiddler, Joe Sandbox and Cuckoo components); (4) 'wmic path win32_VideoController get name /value' for virtual adapters (Microsoft Basic Display Adapter, VMware SVGA 3D, VirtualBox Graphics Adapter, Hyper-V Video); (5) 'wmic path Win32_VideoController get CurrentRefreshRate /value', exiting when no valid rate is found or the maximum is below 29 Hz; (6) 'wmic diskdrive get model /value' for qemu, vbox, vmware, virtuozzo, virtio or 'dady hardiskk'.
If the checks pass, two Base64-encoded payloads are decoded. The first, modules.node, is a native Node-API DLL written to %temp% that exports napi_register_module_v1 and node_api_module_get_api_version_v1 and registers a function named 'PodstilkaBidena' via napi_create_function / napi_set_named_property. The second is the LummaStealer payload, which is passed through that function and reflectively loaded. G DATA assesses a single actor behind the many accounts: downloads from different URLs return different nexe-compiled JavaScript files with varying encodings, but all share the same count of anti-analysis routines and unique string identifiers in the decoded JavaScript. Later variants replace WMIC with PowerShell Get-CimInstance cmdlets to delay detection. G DATA says the actor keeps creating new accounts despite takedowns. The analysis disclosed no C2 infrastructure.
Lumma Stealer (LummaC2) is a subscription-based MaaS infostealer active since at least 2022. Per the joint FBI/CISA advisory AA25-141B it targets browser data (credentials, cookies, extensions), cryptocurrency wallets and 2FA information, and exfiltrates over HTTP POST to C2 servers, with fallback to public services such as Telegram, Dropbox and Steam. In May 2025 the DOJ, Microsoft and partners seized five core LummaC2 domains and over 2,300 related domains, but the operation persists. No CVE, CVSS score or named actor is stated in the sources; severity is an analyst assessment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497.001 System Checks; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Discovery
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.002 Malicious File
Credential Access
T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block or alert on execution of game.exe/node-based PE binaries launched from user-downloaded 'Updated Version.zip' archives
- Hunt for modules.node written to %TEMP% and for the listed SHA256 hashes
- Reset passwords, revoke browser sessions/cookies and rotate crypto-wallet and 2FA secrets for any user who ran the archive
- Report malicious itch.io accounts and Patreon pages to the respective platforms
Workarounds
- Alert on rapid sequences of tasklist /fo csv and wmic Win32_VideoController/diskdrive queries from a single unsigned process
- Use vendor signatures: Win64.Trojan.Agent.Y6OBDP (modules.node), Win64.Trojan-Stealer.LummaStealer.V34XV4 (payload)
Longer-term hardening
- Train users that game updates are delivered only via the developer's official page or launcher, not via comment links
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for infostealers and reflective loading
- Restrict browser credential storage and enforce phishing-resistant MFA
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows systems where users run the downloaded game.exe - itch.io — itch.io comment sections (abuse of platform)
Vulnerable versions: N/A - platform abuse - Patreon — Patreon file hosting (abuse of platform)
Vulnerable versions: N/A - platform abuse
Timeline
- Lumma Stealer (LummaC2) MaaS active since at least 2022 per CISA/FBI AA25-141B (exact start day not stated)
- Start of the period of LummaC2 infections whose IOCs are listed in CISA/FBI advisory AA25-141B (November 2023 - May 2025)
- DOJ, Microsoft and international partners seize five core LummaC2 domains and over 2,300 related domains; Microsoft sinkholes more than 1,300
- CISA and FBI publish advisory AA25-141B on LummaC2 TTPs and IOCs
- G DATA reports new itch.io accounts are still being created and spamming games despite takedowns; later samples swap WMIC for PowerShell Get-CimInstance
- G DATA publishes analysis of the itch.io/Patreon fake game update campaign delivering LummaStealer via a nexe-compiled Node.js loader
Sources cited
- CISA/FBI Advisory AA25-141B: LummaC2 Malware Targeting U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sectors CISA · Government advisory · 2025-05-21
- FBI IC3 PSA/CSA 250521-2: LummaC2 advisory (PDF) ic3.gov · Advisory · 2025-05-21
- Lumma Stealer: Danger lurking in fake game updates from itch.io and Patreon (G DATA) blog.gdatasoftware.com · Vendor report · 2025-12-08
- SOCRadar: Disrupting Lumma Stealer - Microsoft Leads Global Action socradar.io · Research
- AttackIQ: Response to CISA Advisory AA25-141B attackiq.com · Blog · 2025-05-22
- Security Affairs: Law enforcement dismantled the infrastructure behind Lumma Stealer MaaS securityaffairs.com · News
- SecurityOnline: itch.io targeted - Lumma Stealer deployed via fake updates and reflective Node.js loader securityonline.info · News
- Cyberpress: Lumma Stealer malware cyberpress.org · News
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.