Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3783

Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via Brunhilda Dropper (Hybrid SMS + Phone Call Social Engineering)

highACTIVE

Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via (TL-2026-3783), also tracked as Brunhilda dropper, is a high-severity malware campaign, first published 2026-10-16. It has no confirmed attribution, affects Google Android, maps to 16 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1406, T1417.001, T1417.002), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 33 indicators of compromise.

Severity
HIGHAssessed severity
CVEs
0None referenced
Techniques
16MITRE ATT&CK
Actors
0Not attributed
Detection rules
9SPL · KQL · Sigma
IOCs
33Indicators of compromise

Key facts for TL-2026-3783

Threat ID
TL-2026-3783
Also known as
Brunhilda dropper, TOAD campaign
Severity
HIGH
Status
ACTIVE
Category
MALWARE
First published
Last reviewed
Attribution confidence
LOW
Motivation
FINANCIAL
Target sectors
finance, consumer
Target regions
Europe, North America, Middle East, south africa, united kingdom, india, japan
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
33

Malware and tooling in Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via

Malware and tooling: Brunhilda, Vultur, VNC, ngrok - S0508

How Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via works

Fox-IT (NCC Group) reported a new Vultur Android banking trojan version delivered by the Brunhilda dropper, a trojanized McAfee Security app (com.wsandroid.suite), via telephone-oriented attack delivery (SMS plus phone call). New capabilities include Accessibility Services-based remote control, file management, app blocking, keyguard bypass, 7 new C2 methods and 41 new FCM commands.

Fox-IT (NCC Group) analyzed a March 2024 Vultur campaign that begins with an SMS claiming an unauthorized transaction and directing the victim to call a number. During the call the fraudster sends a second SMS containing a link to a modified McAfee Security app (package com.wsandroid.suite) that carries the Brunhilda dropper framework. Brunhilda is offered as a dropper-as-a-service and previously reached victims through Google Play dropper apps posing as authenticator and productivity tools. Distribution domains observed follow the pattern mcafee.NNNNNN.com.

The dropper registers the device with its C2 (endpoint /ejr/, method application.register, campaign tag dropper2, device model, Android version and Base64-encoded installed-app list) and then decrypts and deploys three Vultur payloads in sequence: two APKs and one DEX. Payload #1 prompts the victim, with custom HTML, to enable an Accessibility Service and installs Payload #2. Payload #2 provides remote access through AlphaVNC and ngrok, uses a spoofed com.google.android.marvin.talkback Accessibility Service name, stores configuration in encrypted SharedPreferences, and decrypts Payload #3 (AES/CFB/NoPadding). Payload #3 (DEX) implements all C2 methods and the FCM command handlers. Payloads #1 and #2 are decrypted by native C/C++ code (AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding) with keys derived from embedded Base64 strings.

C2 communication uses JSON-RPC style methods (for example vnc.register, vnc.status, vnc.apps, vnc.keylog, vnc.config, vnc.overlay, vnc.overlay.logs, vnc.snapshot, vnc.urls, crash.logs, vnc.syslog) sent AES-encrypted and Base64-encoded over HTTPS to /ejr/. New methods are vnc.pattern, vnc.blocked.packages, vnc.fm and installer.config. Files and screen recordings go to /upload/, and ngrok is fetched from /version/app/?filename=ngrok&arch={arch}. Firebase Cloud Messaging carries the C2-to-device commands. There are 41 new FCM commands covering back/home/recents, click, scroll, swipe, set text, screen recording, wake lock with keyguard disable and swipe unlock, keyboard visibility, storage and unknown-sources permission handling, power menu long press, black-screen overlay, WebView display, custom notifications, C2 domain update (announcement), blocked-package retrieval and file manager operations (download, upload, delete, install, find).

Samples reference banking and other apps including pt.novobanco.nbapp, pt.santandertotta.mobileparticularese, sa.alrajhibank.tahweelapp, sa.com.sctpay, uk.co.hsbc.hsbcukmobilebanking, uk.co.metrobankonline.mobile.android.production, uk.co.santander.santanderUK, uk.co.tescomobile.android, se.swedbank.mobil and us.zoom.videomeetings. Press coverage reports Vultur variants targeted 122 banking apps across 15 countries by end of 2023, with victims primarily in Europe and North America and also India and Japan. Fox-IT assigned no CVE or CVSS; severity is analyst-assigned.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-3783

Defense Evasion

T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1633.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks; T1655.001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

Credential Access

T1417.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1417.002 Input Capture: GUI Input Capture

Discovery

T1418 Software Discovery; T1420 File and Directory Discovery; T1426 System Information Discovery

Command and Control

T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1521.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography; T1544 Ingress Tool Transfer

Collection

T1513 Screen Capture

defense-evasion

T1516 Input Injection

Execution

T1575 Native API

Exfiltration

T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access

T1660 Phishing

Affected products and versions in Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via

  • Google — Android
    Vulnerable versions: Devices where the user sideloads the trojanized app and grants Accessibility Service

Remediation for Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via

Immediate actions

  • Block the C2 domains safetyfactor.online and cloudmiracle.store and the mcafee.NNNNNN.com distribution domains at DNS and proxy
  • Alert on and block Android sideloading of com.wsandroid.suite from outside Google Play
  • Instruct customers and staff that banks and McAfee never send app links during a phone call following an SMS fraud alert
  • Hunt MDM/EMM inventory for the listed package names and SHA-256 hashes

Workarounds

  • Remove the app, revoke Accessibility and Device Admin permissions, factory reset if infection is confirmed, and change banking credentials from a clean device
  • Banks should apply behavioral fraud detection for remote-access (VNC/ngrok) driven sessions

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce Play Protect and block installation from unknown sources on managed devices
  • Restrict Accessibility Service grants to allow-listed apps via MDM
  • Deploy mobile threat defense detecting accessibility abuse, overlays and screen recording
  • Run customer awareness on telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD)

Timeline of Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via

  • ThreatFabric first documented Vultur (March 2021; day approximate)
  • Brunhilda dropper adopted AES string obfuscation (October 2022; day approximate)
  • Vultur observed distributed via Google Play dropper apps posing as authenticator and productivity tools (late 2022; day approximate)
  • By end of 2023 Vultur ranked among the top 10 active banking trojans; nine variants targeted 122 banking apps in 15 countries per press reporting (day approximate)
  • Fox-IT observed new Vultur version delivered via SMS plus phone call with a trojanized McAfee Security app (March 2024; day approximate)
  • Fox-IT (NCC Group) published 'Android malware Vultur expands its wingspan' with IOCs
  • The Hacker News and other outlets covered the Vultur update (day approximate)

Sources cited for Vultur Android Banking Malware Expands Capabilities via

Detection coverage for TL-2026-3783

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3783 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 33 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

9 detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · Blue and above. Compare plans
33 indicators of compromise · Red and above. Compare plans

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