Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-3855
Heartbreaker: Metamorphic macOS Ransomware (Rust, Self-Rebuilding)
Heartbreaker is an ARM64 macOS ransomware written in Rust that embeds its own source code and attempts to rebuild itself with cargo after source transformation. It encrypts ~/Downloads with AES-256-GCM using one hard-coded key, and was undetected by all VirusTotal AV engines at the time of Objective-See's analysis.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3855 |
|---|---|
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Apple macOS (Apple silicon / ARM64) |
| Malware | Heartbreaker |
| Tools | metacore, mimicore |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.004 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery, T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions, T1491.001 Defacement: Internal Defacement, T1543.001 Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | consumer, general |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3855 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 11 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Heartbreaker macOS Ransomware: Mass .heartbreaker File Encryption in ~/Downloads (Splunk)
Detects Heartbreaker (Rust, ARM64 macOS) encrypting ~/Downloads with AES-256-GCM, renaming files to *.heartbreaker and writing the README.txt ransom note ('Please send 0.003 BTC') to the Desktop. The malware has no C2 channel, so this encryption phase is its primary observable impact.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1486, T1083, T1491.001
- Data sources: osquery:file_events, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceFileEvents, macos_endpoint_security:file_event
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=osquery sourcetype="osquery:results" name="file_events" earliest=-24h
| eval target=coalesce('columns.target_path', target_path)
| where match(target, "(?i)/Users/[^/]+/Downloads/.+[.]heartbreaker$") OR match(target, "(?i)/Users/[^/]+/Desktop/README[.]txt$")
| eval is_enc=if(match(target, "(?i)[.]heartbreaker$"), 1, 0), is_note=if(match(target, "(?i)README[.]txt$"), 1, 0)
| bin _time span=5m
| stats sum(is_enc) as encrypted_files, max(is_note) as ransom_note_written, dc(target) as unique_paths by host, _time
| where encrypted_files>=5 OR (encrypted_files>=1 AND ransom_note_written=1)
| table _time host encrypted_files ransom_note_written unique_pathsMicrosoft KQL
let window = 5m;
let enc = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileRenamed", "FileModified")
| where FolderPath has "/Users/" and FolderPath has "/Downloads"
| where FileName endswith ".heartbreaker"
| summarize EncryptedFiles = dcount(FileName), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), SampleFile = any(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, bin(Timestamp, window);
let note = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "README.txt" and FolderPath has "/Users/" and FolderPath endswith "/Desktop"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName startswith "heartbreaker" or InitiatingProcessSHA256 == "6bdf42a575d2daee3de2530161cb5b1fef6ca78b4abfa74f329d6b6c72890d18"
| summarize NoteTime = min(Timestamp) by DeviceName;
enc
| join kind=leftouter note on DeviceName
| extend RansomNoteSeen = isnotempty(NoteTime)
| where EncryptedFiles >= 5 or RansomNoteSeen
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, EncryptedFiles, RansomNoteSeen, SampleFileSigma
title: Heartbreaker macOS Ransomware Encrypted File Extension in Downloads
id: 3f1c7a52-8d4e-4b6a-9c21-5e7a0d9b1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects files written under a user's Downloads folder with the .heartbreaker extension appended by Heartbreaker, the metamorphic Rust macOS ransomware that encrypts ~/Downloads with AES-256-GCM and drops a README.txt ransom note on the Desktop.
references:
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x8A.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/18
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1486
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1491.001
logsource:
product: macos
category: file_event
detection:
selection_encrypted:
TargetFilename|contains: '/Downloads/'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.heartbreaker'
selection_process:
Image|endswith: '/heartbreaker'
TargetFilename|endswith: '/Desktop/README.txt'
condition: selection_encrypted or selection_process
falsepositives:
- Unrelated software that legitimately uses a .heartbreaker file extension
- Security researchers detonating the Objective-See sample in a lab
level: highKnown false positives:
- Backup, sync or archive utilities that rename many files in ~/Downloads
- Security researchers detonating the Objective-See Heartbreaker sample in a lab
Tuning notes: Threshold of 5 files per 5 minutes is a starting point; raise it on hosts with bulk download managers. Prefer an allowlist of signed backup/sync processes over raising the threshold. The .heartbreaker extension and the Desktop README.txt written by the heartbreaker binary are near-zero-FP signals and can alert at any count.
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware: Untrusted Process Mass-Truncating and Renaming Files in [indicator] (Sentinel/MDE) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware: LaunchAgent Plist Dropped by Process in User-Writable Path (Sentinel/MDE) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware: mimicore/metacore Dependency Fetch via cargo or git (Sentinel/MDE) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware Ransom Popup and Demand Text · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware LaunchAgent Execution at Login · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware Rebuild and Permission Swap Child Processes · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware: LaunchAgent com.network.startup.plist Persistence (Splunk) · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] macOS Ransomware: Metamorphic Rebuild via cargo build --release (Splunk) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 11 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3855.
Sample indicators (1 of 11)
- File hash:
6bdf42a575d2daee3de2530161cb5b1fef6ca78b4abfa74f329d6b6c72890d18
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 11 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Heartbreaker is a Mach-O 64-bit ARM64 (Apple silicon) executable written in Rust, ad hoc signed (adhoc,linker-signed) with identifier heartbreaker-e2c97a640967e3f6. A sample (SHA-256 6bdf42a575d2daee3de2530161cb5b1fef6ca78b4abfa74f329d6b6c72890d18) was uploaded to VirusTotal in May 2025 and identified by Megan Carney. Objective-See (Patrick Wardle) published the analysis on 2026-10-18, noting that no AV engine on VirusTotal detected it at that time. The source states no CVE, no in-the-wild campaign and no attribution.
Encryption: the malware recursively processes ~/Downloads. For each file it reads the whole file into memory, generates a fresh 12-byte nonce with OsRng, and encrypts with AES-256-GCM using a single hard-coded key shared by every file. It truncates the original, writes 12-byte nonce || ciphertext || 16-byte GCM tag, and renames the file with a .heartbreaker extension. A README.txt ransom note is written to the Desktop ("Please send 0.003 BTC"), and a popup reads "HEARTBREAKER WARNING! Your system has been encrypted!". The popup's "Decrypt Files" button does not work. Because the key is embedded in the binary and is universal, victims can in principle recover files.
Persistence: it writes the LaunchAgent ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.network.startup.plist with Label com.myapp.startup and RunAtLoad=true, so it runs at user login.
Metamorphism: the binary embeds its own Rust source (main.rs and build.rs) via include_str!. It calls mimicore::morph() to rewrite the code between the METAMORPHIC_MARKER_START and METAMORPHIC_MARKER_END markers. The transformation randomizes identifiers prefixed r_, generates 15 junk functions with obfuscated names, and removes previously generated func_* functions. It then runs cargo build --release, renames the old executable, copies the new binary into place and updates its permissions. Each generation would therefore carry a different hash and Mach-O UUID with the same behavior. The mimicore dependency (GitHub saaaarwar/mimicore) is unavailable, so rebuilds fail; the related metacore framework remains public on the same account. The metamorphic step also needs a Rust toolchain on the victim and produces conspicuous compilation activity.
Detection and limitations: Objective-See's RansomWhere? detects the sample behaviorally, by watching for rapid creation of high-entropy files by untrusted processes, independent of hashes. The malware only touches ~/Downloads and does not account for macOS privacy protections. Severity is an analyst judgment, since the source gives none.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.004 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery
defense-impairment
T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions
Impact
T1491.001 Defacement: Internal Defacement
Persistence
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.network.startup.plist (Label com.myapp.startup) and remove it, then unload it with launchctl
- Search endpoints for the SHA-256 6bdf42a575d2daee3de2530161cb5b1fef6ca78b4abfa74f329d6b6c72890d18, a binary named heartbreaker, and *.heartbreaker files
- If files are encrypted, preserve the binary: it embeds a single universal AES-256-GCM key, so recovery is feasible (layout: 12-byte nonce || ciphertext || 16-byte tag)
Workarounds
- Maintain offline or versioned backups of ~/Downloads and other user data
- Restrict execution of unsigned or ad hoc signed binaries via Gatekeeper and MDM policy
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy behavioral ransomware detection such as RansomWhere? (entropy-based monitoring of file modification by untrusted processes)
- Alert on untrusted processes invoking cargo build --release on endpoints that are not developer systems
- Monitor creation of LaunchAgent plists by non-installer processes
Affected and fixed versions
- Apple — macOS (Apple silicon / ARM64)
Vulnerable versions: Apple silicon macOS (ARM64 Mach-O build); no specific version stated in source
Timeline
- Sample identified by Megan Carney, per Objective-See (May 2025; day not stated)
- Heartbreaker sample (SHA-256 6bdf42a5...0d18) first uploaded to VirusTotal in May 2025 (source gives month only; day is a placeholder)
- The mimicore GitHub repository (saaaarwar/mimicore) needed for the metamorphic rebuild is unavailable, so self-rebuilding fails; related metacore remains public
- Objective-See reports RansomWhere? detects Heartbreaker through entropy-based monitoring of rapid file modification by untrusted processes
- No antivirus engine on VirusTotal detects the sample at the time of Objective-See's writing
- Objective-See (Patrick Wardle) publishes technical analysis of Heartbreaker, a metamorphic Rust ransomware for Apple silicon macOS
Sources cited
- VirusTotal - Heartbreaker sample 6bdf42a5... virustotal.com · Research
- Objective-See RansomWhere? v2.2.0 GitHub · Code repository
- saaaarwar/metacore - Rust source generation/transformation framework GitHub · Code repository
- saaaarwar/mimicore - morphing dependency (repository unavailable) GitHub · Code repository
- Objective-See macOS malware collection (Heartbreaker sample) GitHub · Code repository
- Heartbreaker | Objective-See (Patrick Wardle) objective-see.org · Blog · 2026-10-18
Previous and next in ransomware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.