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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6656

VirusTotal Verified-Encryption Ransomware Detection Surfaces .k404 Python Locker Missed by All 75 AV Engines (0/75)

highACTIVE

VirusTotal and Google Threat Intelligence added a sandbox-verified `encrypts-files` tag (CAPE, Zenbox, macOS Mirage) that confirms real document encryption during execution. It flagged system_update.pyw, a Python locker from a .k404 extortion campaign, at 0/75 static AV detections, along with K404T_Fidye.exe (10/75), lkd.exe (3/75) and INC Ransom (.INC, INC-README.txt).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6656
Also known asK404T, K404T Fidye, WindowsSystemUpdate locker
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (user documents on endpoints; .k404, .lkd and .INC lockers); Apple macOS (Apple Silicon; Heartbreaker sample in the same VirusTotal verification set)
MalwareAnyDesk, Gootloader, INC Ransomware - S1139, K404T, Supper, inc ransom
ToolsAnyDesk, GootLoader, Impacket atexec.py, Rclone - S1040
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.006 Python, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1560.001 Archive via Utility, T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1569.002 Service Execution and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorshealth, general enterprise, consumer
Target regionsGlobal, North America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6656 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: K404T Python Locker (system_update.pyw) Executed via pythonw.exe from WindowsSystemUpdate Path — Execution

Detects the .k404 extortion campaign's Python locker (TL-2026-6656): pythonw.exe running system_update.pyw or a .pyw from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\, plus execution of the companion K404T_Fidye.exe and lkd.exe lockers or any of the four published SHA-256 hashes. The sample scored 0/75 static AV detections, so behaviour- and artifact-based process telemetry is the reliable signal. The script self-deletes after encrypting Desktop documents, so process-creation logs may be the only surviving evidence.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.006, T1036.005, T1070.004
  • Data sources: sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, EventCode 1), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents)
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ((Image="*pythonw.exe" (CommandLine="*WindowsSystemUpdate*" OR CommandLine="*system_update.pyw*" OR (CommandLine="*AppData*Roaming*" CommandLine="*.pyw*"))) OR Image="*K404T_Fidye.exe" OR Image="*\\lkd.exe" OR Hashes="*fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354*" OR Hashes="*3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700*" OR Hashes="*a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087*" OR Hashes="*d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(Hashes) as hashes by host, User, Image | eval firstTime=strftime(firstTime,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), lastTime=strftime(lastTime,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where (FileName =~ "pythonw.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has "WindowsSystemUpdate" or ProcessCommandLine has "system_update.pyw" or (ProcessCommandLine has "AppData" and ProcessCommandLine has "Roaming" and ProcessCommandLine has ".pyw"))) or FileName in~ ("K404T_Fidye.exe", "lkd.exe") or SHA256 in~ ("fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354", "3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700", "a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087", "d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256 | order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: K404T Python Locker Executed via pythonw.exe from WindowsSystemUpdate Path
id: 7c1e9b52-3a4d-4f0e-9a6b-1d2c8e5f7a31
status: experimental
description: Detects the .k404 campaign Python locker (system_update.pyw run by pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\), the companion K404T_Fidye.exe and lkd.exe lockers, and the published sample hashes.
references:
    - https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/11/catching-ransomware-introducing.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pyw:
        Image|endswith: '\pythonw.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'WindowsSystemUpdate'
            - 'system_update.pyw'
    selection_bin:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\K404T_Fidye.exe'
            - '\lkd.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354'
            - '3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700'
            - 'a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087'
            - 'd243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software that installs a folder named WindowsSystemUpdate
    - Internal Python GUI tools launched with pythonw.exe
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Internal Python GUI utilities launched via pythonw.exe from a user profile
  • Third-party updaters that legitimately create a WindowsSystemUpdate folder

Tuning notes: Allowlist known internal .pyw tools by hash or signer. On hosts with no Python install, alert on any pythonw.exe execution. Replace index=sysmon with your Sysmon index. The hash terms match the four published SHA-256 values; add new variants as they are published.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • INC Ransom Encryptor Execution from perflogs/ProgramData/Public with --sup --hide --mode Switches — Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Defender Tampering and EDR-Killer ([indicator]) Activity Before Encryption — Defense Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • Data Staging and Exfiltration Tooling: rclone, MEGAsync, Restic and 7-Zip Archiving — Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • pythonw.exe Running a .pyw Script from a User-Writable Path (Python Locker Behaviour) — Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Remote Execution of Payloads via Scheduled Task, WMI, PsExec or atexec-Style Commands — Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • AnyDesk Silent Install or Unattended-Access Configuration — Command and Control · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Encrypted-File Extensions ([indicator]/[indicator]/[indicator]) and Ransom Note Drops — Impact · unlock with TL Creds
  • INC Intrusion Infrastructure: [indicator], AnyDesk C2 IP, Community-Related IPs and RDP Logons from Them — Command and Control · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6656.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 213.111.185[.]108
  • Domain: throughoutes[.]net
  • File hash: fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-11-20 VirusTotal (Karl Hiramoto) published 'Catching Ransomware: Introducing encrypts-files and Stricter MITRE ATT&CK T1486'. The update has three parts: (1) a new `encrypts-files` tag (search `tag:encrypts-files`, trait `behaviour_tags:encrypts_files`, Livehunt constant `vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES`) emitted by CAPE Sandbox, Zenbox and macOS Mirage only after dynamic analysis confirms real encryption of realistic user documents; (2) stricter CAPE T1486 mapping, which cut platform-wide T1486 false positives by 97.6% (7,238 to 171 files per day); (3) real-time Livehunt support. Verification uses cipher-agnostic content checks (destroyed document structure, elevated entropy, non-text bytes), coordinated extension renames of user documents, and exclusions for benign churn (installers, archives, compilers, browser caches, logs). A ransom note drop or crypto API calls alone do not trigger the tag. Since 2026-11-17, 328,257 newly submitted unique files were analyzed and the tag matched 55 of them, with no benign false positives in manual review.

Samples surfaced include system_update.pyw (SHA-256 fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354), a Python locker tied to a .k404 extortion campaign. It scored 0/75 static AV detections at analysis (a figure caption in the post says 0/59, which conflicts with the text and table). It runs under pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\, deletes itself, and rewrites Desktop documents to .k404. Companion samples are K404T_Fidye.exe (10/75; .k404, drops k404t.txt and read_me_restore.txt) and lkd.exe (3/75; .lkd extension, read_me_restore.txt, labeled ransomware.bugbugo). A K404T-Release.zip (4/75) also drops k404t.txt. The same post lists INC Ransom (SHA-256 d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645, 36/75), which uses IOCP to encrypt files to .INC and drops INC-README.txt. Other verified samples in the post's table include HotCrypt.exe (1/75, .aes, WindowsSecurityUpdater persistence), Medusa, BlackWizardLock (.BLWZ), a macOS Heartbreaker sample (.heartbreaker), LockBit 3.0 and WannaCry.

INC Ransom context (secondary sources): Microsoft reported in September 2024 that Vanilla Tempest (formerly DEV-0832, Vice Society) used INC ransomware against US healthcare, with access from Storm-0494 via Gootloader, the Supper backdoor, AnyDesk, the MEGA sync tool, RDP and WMI Provider Host for lateral movement. Huntress (2026-09-25) documents varied INC intrusions: valid accounts/RDP, PsExec/WMI and scheduled-task lateral movement, Defender tampering, BYOVD EDR killers, exfiltration via 7-Zip, MEGAsync, Restic and rclone, Impacket atexec.py to launch the encryptor, and notes INC-README.txt and DATALEAK_PRESS_RELEASE.txt. Huntress cautions that an INC note or extension alone does not prove the same operator performed the intrusion. The article gives no attribution for the .k404 campaign; the Vanilla Tempest link applies only to INC.

Defender takeaways: the 0/75 score reflects the sample at analysis time and does not prove every endpoint product would miss it. A missing `encrypts-files` tag is not a clean verdict: samples needing arguments or passwords, VM-check exits, long sleeps, unreachable C2 key servers, or DLLs needing custom exports may not encrypt in the sandbox. Hunt with `entity:file tag:encrypts-files p:10-` and Livehunt rule HUNT_Evasive_Ransomware_LowAV_EncryptsFiles.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 File Deletion

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.006 Python; T1569.002 Service Execution

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools

Collection

T1560.001 Archive via Utility

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for pythonw.exe executing .pyw scripts from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\ and for files with the .k404, .lkd and .INC extensions
  • Search for ransom-note files read_me_restore.txt, k404t.txt, INC-README.txt and DATALEAK_PRESS_RELEASE.txt
  • Run VirusTotal hunts: entity:file tag:encrypts-files p:10- and Livehunt vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES
  • Do not treat 0 AV detections as a clean verdict; detonate suspicious scripts and low-detection executables in a sandbox

Workarounds

  • Block Python/pythonw execution from user-writable profile paths on hosts that do not need Python
  • Use application control to prevent unsigned executables from running out of C:\perflogs, C:\ProgramData and C:\Users\Public

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral ransomware detection (mass document rewrites, rapid extension renames, self-deleting scripts)
  • Maintain offline, immutable backups and test restores
  • Restrict RDP, remote-management tools (AnyDesk) and unapproved cloud-sync tools (MEGA, rclone, Restic)
  • Enable tamper protection for endpoint security and block vulnerable drivers (BYOVD)

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (user documents on endpoints; .k404, .lkd and .INC lockers)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific
  • Apple — macOS (Apple Silicon; Heartbreaker sample in the same VirusTotal verification set)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific

Timeline

  • INC Ransom affiliates begin targeting victims (since July 2023 per BleepingComputer; Huntress places emergence around August 2023).
  • Microsoft discloses Vanilla Tempest (DEV-0832) using INC ransomware against a US healthcare organization, with access via Storm-0494 and Gootloader.
  • Huntress publishes its INC ransomware threat-library entry covering incidents from 2023 to September 2026, including Impacket atexec.py, BYOVD and EDR-killer deployment.
  • VirusTotal begins counting newly submitted files for the encrypts-files tag evaluation (328,257 unique files analyzed; tag matched 55); the HUNT_Ransomware_EncryptsFiles Livehunt rule is dated this day.
  • locked-ioc-10 (.k404 Python locker) submitted to VirusTotal (submitted November 17-18) and scored 0/75 static AV detections at analysis; Zenbox observed encryption of Desktop documents.
  • VirusTotal blog 'Catching Ransomware: Introducing encrypts-files and Stricter MITRE ATT&CK T1486' published, announcing the tag, stricter CAPE T1486 gating (97.6% fewer false positives) and Livehunt support.
  • Cyber Security News reports the update and the 0/75, 10/75 and 3/75 samples (locked-ioc-12, locked-ioc-17), plus INC Ransom (.INC, locked-ioc-14).

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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