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Threat reportICS/SCADATL-2026-5186

Second Wave of Attacks on European Supermarket Refrigeration Controllers (Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC, Copeland/Dixell XWEB) Forces Defrost Mode

highACTIVE

Overnight into 2 November 2026 an unattributed actor remotely manipulated Internet-exposed refrigeration controllers at supermarkets in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Ireland and Finland (later reports add Portugal and Italy), forcing defrost cycles or raising setpoints to about 50 C and spoiling food.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-5186, CVE-2025-41450, CVE-2025-41451, CVE-2025-41452
Also known as2026 European supermarket refrigerator hack, Fridge attacks
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
EPSSCVE-2025-41451: 4.4% (91.4th percentile); CVE-2025-41450: 0.9% (61.2th percentile); CVE-2025-41452: 0.9% (60.4th percentile)
Affected productsDanfoss AK-SM 800A; Danfoss AK-SM 800 / AK-SC 355 (end of life); Copeland XWEB / XWEB Pro; Dixell (Copeland brand) XWEB
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-77, CWE-15, CWE-259, CWE-306, CWE-305, CWE-287
AttributionIRGC Cyber-Electronic Command - Shahid Kaveh (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusIran
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT0812 Default Credentials, T0813 Denial of Control, T0815 Denial of View, T0822 External Remote Services, T0826 Loss of Availability, T0827 Loss of Control, T0828 Loss of Productivity and Revenue, T0829 Loss of View, T0831 Manipulation of Control, T0836 Modify Parameter, T0855 Unauthorized Command Message, T0859 Valid Accounts and 13 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsretail, food and grocery, cold chain, logistics
Target regionsEurope, belgium, luxembourg, netherlands, sweden, estonia, ireland, finland, portugal, italy, france
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources13 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-5186 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 35 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC and Copeland/Dixell XWEB Default Admin Login from Internet (Exploitation)

Detects Internet-sourced authentication activity against refrigeration controller web interfaces (Danfoss AK-SM 800A, AK-SM 800, AK-SC 355, Copeland/Dixell XWEB) that shows either repeated failed logons or a successful logon as 'admin'. Lupovis decoys logged 256 attempts from 91 sources, mostly factory-default credentials, and the 2026 waves are reported to use admin plus a default or date-derived password (T1078.001, T0859). No CVE is confirmed as the vector, so this keys on behaviour rather than an exploit string.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1190, T1078.001, T0859
  • Data sources: web:access_combined, reverse_proxy_access_logs, CommonSecurityLog
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=web sourcetype=access_combined (host="*ak-sm*" OR host="*ak-sc*" OR host="*xweb*" OR host="*danfoss*" OR host="*dixell*") (uri_path="*login*" OR uri_path="*auth*" OR uri_path="*session*")
```comment: TL-2026-5186 Internet-sourced logons to Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC or Copeland/Dixell XWEB; flags brute force or a successful admin default-credential logon```
| where NOT (cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",clientip) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",clientip) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",clientip))
| eval failed=if(status==401 OR status==403,1,0), success=if(status>=200 AND status<400,1,0), is_admin=if(lower(user)=="admin",1,0)
| stats count AS attempts sum(failed) AS failures sum(success) AS successes sum(is_admin) AS admin_attempts min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY clientip host
| where failures>=5 OR (admin_attempts>0 AND successes>0)
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table clientip host attempts failures successes admin_attempts first_seen last_seen

Microsoft KQL

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DestinationHostName matches regex '(?i)(ak-?sm|ak-?sc|xweb|danfoss|dixell)'
| where RequestURL has_any ('login', 'auth', 'session')
| where not(ipv4_is_private(SourceIP))
| summarize Attempts = count(), AdminSeen = countif(SourceUserName =~ 'admin'), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, DestinationHostName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where Attempts >= 5 or AdminSeen > 0
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, SourceIP, DestinationHostName, Attempts, AdminSeen

Sigma

title: Refrigeration Controller Login as Admin from External Address
id: 5b1c7a52-0a8e-4c0e-9a41-6f2d3c1e8a01
status: experimental
description: Detects logon requests as admin against Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC or Copeland/Dixell XWEB web interfaces from non-RFC1918 sources, consistent with default-credential abuse in the 2026 European supermarket refrigeration attacks (TL-2026-5186).
references:
    - https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers
    - https://www.danfoss.com/en/service-and-support/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure/danfoss-security-advisories/dsa-2025-08-01/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/03
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1078.001
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t0859
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_host:
        cs-host|contains:
            - 'ak-sm'
            - 'ak-sc'
            - 'xweb'
            - 'danfoss'
            - 'dixell'
    selection_login:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'login'
            - 'auth'
            - 'session'
        cs-username: 'admin'
    filter_internal:
        c-ip|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
    condition: selection_host and selection_login and not filter_internal
falsepositives:
    - Authorised integrator or contractor administering controllers from a known public address
    - External vulnerability scanners
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Authorised refrigeration integrators (for example Sabcobel) or vendor staff logging in from known public IP ranges
  • Internal security scanners or monitoring probes hitting login URLs from a routable address

Tuning notes: Adjust the host patterns to your controller naming or replace them with a controller subnet or asset lookup. Allowlist contractor and VPN egress addresses. Lower the failure threshold of 5 for controllers that should never face the Internet, where any external logon should alert.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Command Injection Metacharacters in Controller Alarm-to-Mail or [indicator] Requests (CVE-2025-41451/41452) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Forced or Extended Defrost Cycles on Refrigeration Controllers (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Single Source Authenticating to Many Refrigeration Controllers (Mass Manipulation / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Internet Access to Refrigeration Controller Management Interface (Exposed Service) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Refrigeration Controller Alarm Suppression, Credential or Lock Changes · unlock with TL Creds
  • Refrigeration Controller DNS Lookup of GitHub or Raw Content Hosts (Tool Staging) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Refrigeration Controller Setpoint Raised to 40 C or Higher (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Refrigeration Controller Outbound Connection to the Internet (C2 / Tool Transfer) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 35 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-5186.

Sample indicators (3 of 35)

  • IP address: 178.83.226[.]215
  • URL: hxxps://github[.]com/msuiche/fromagegate
  • IP address: 37.16.75[.]128

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 35 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

35 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

It followed a first wave on 11 October 2026 that hit up to 700 French stores; no CVE has been confirmed as the vector, and reports point to default credentials, end-of-life units and direct Internet exposure.

On the night of 1-2 November 2026, supermarket chains in at least seven European countries found refrigeration units in defrost mode or with setpoints raised to roughly 50 C (122 F). Reported affected retailers include Ahold Delhaize (about 40 sites in Belgium and Luxembourg), Carrefour Belgium (15 of 700+ stores), Colruyt/Spar, Intermarche, IKEA Belgium, ICA and Coop in Sweden, SuperValu/Musgrave in Ireland (13 of 223 stores), Selver in Estonia, Kesko in Finland and 17+ small Dutch shops. BleepingComputer counted 115+ confirmed stores. Follow-on reporting adds Portugal and Italy. Attackers also locked settings so staff could not change them manually, and in one case shut units down. Stores had to move stock to refrigerated trucks. One Belgian butcher reported about EUR 15,000 of spoiled meat.

The campaign follows a first wave on 11-12 October 2026 against up to roughly 700 French supermarkets, with reported losses above EUR 10 million. CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 named Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC controllers and Copeland/Dixell XWEB supervisory controllers. Danfoss told customers on 13 October to disconnect systems from the Internet, and Copeland/Dixell XWEB was added to the alert the same day. Investigators have not publicly confirmed that the two waves are linked. No group has claimed responsibility, and Belgium's Centre for Cybersecurity said the actor may never be identified.

Initial access is not tied to a specific CVE in any source reviewed. Evidence points to basic weaknesses: web servers reachable on the public Internet, factory-default or trivial credentials without MFA (Sweden NCSC), no IP filtering or segmentation, outdated firmware, and end-of-life models (Danfoss AK-SC 355, end of life 2016; AK-SM 800, May 2021). Lupovis decoy Danfoss controllers logged 256 attempts from 91 sources between 20 and 30 October 2026, peaking on 26 October. Most used publicly documented factory-default credentials. The UK NCSC said the attackers did not use AI and relied on long-known weaknesses.

Related prior research by Claroty Team82 on the Danfoss AK-SM 800A documents an undocumented 'code of the day' authentication path (function check_code_of_day), where a password is derived from the device's current date. This is tracked as CVE-2025-41450 (fixed in 4.2, DSA-2025-03-01, 24 March 2025). The same research documents authenticated command injection via alarm-to-mail fields (CVE-2025-41451) and Nginx headers.conf control (CVE-2025-41452), both fixed in R4.3.1 (DSA-2025-08-01, August 2025). Press and Wikipedia describe the 2026 intrusions as using 'admin' plus the date as password, but no primary source confirms that these CVEs were the actual vector. Claroty found 2,765 exposed AK-SM 800A devices via Censys, and Wikipedia cites about 4,500 vulnerable Danfoss controllers still online after the incident. Sabcobel, a Belgian refrigeration integrator, said the same vulnerability was used in the French and Belgian incidents and that most clients have since moved to secure interconnections. Physical impact in the first wave included temperatures above 80 C, melted equipment and fire.

Defensive priorities: remove controllers from the public Internet and cellular exposure, allow remote access only through VPN, enable MFA where supported, change default credentials, set Danfoss security level to Strict, patch AK-SM 8xxA to R4.3.1 or later, and replace end-of-life AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 units. Monitor for unscheduled defrost cycles (reported around 01:00-02:00 local), abnormal setpoints, defrost durations stretched from one hour to as many as eight, suppressed alarms, and sessions from unknown IP ranges. No network IOCs have been published, so BeaconBeagle correlation was not applicable.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T0812 Default Credentials; T0886 Remote Services

Impact

T0813 Denial of Control; T0815 Denial of View; T0826 Loss of Availability; T0827 Loss of Control; T0828 Loss of Productivity and Revenue; T0829 Loss of View; T0831 Manipulation of Control; T0879 Damage to Property

Initial Access

T0822 External Remote Services; T0883 Internet Accessible Device; T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Impair Process Control

T0836 Modify Parameter; T0855 Unauthorized Command Message

persistence

T0859 Valid Accounts

Inhibit Response Function

T0878 Alarm Suppression

Discovery

T0888 Remote System Information Discovery

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Defense Evasion

T1078 Valid Accounts

Credential Access

T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying

Reconnaissance

T1595 Active Scanning; T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

Remediation

Patches

  • Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA firmware R4.3.1 or later (DSA-2025-08-01; CVE-2025-41450 fixed in 4.2 per DSA-2025-03-01)
  • Apply the latest Copeland XWEB Pro firmware per vendor guidance

Immediate actions

  • Disconnect refrigeration controllers (Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC, Copeland/Dixell XWEB) from the public Internet and cellular exposure
  • Restore remote access only through a secure VPN; temporarily filter contractor IP addresses at the firewall
  • Change all default passwords and enable MFA where supported
  • Audit defrost schedules, setpoints and alarm escalation paths for unauthorized changes

Workarounds

  • Set the Danfoss security level to Strict
  • Place management interfaces on trusted management networks or VPN only

Longer-term hardening

  • Replace end-of-life Danfoss AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 units that no longer receive security updates
  • Segment refrigeration and building-management networks from corporate networks
  • Validate integrator and vendor claims on patching, segmentation and incident response
  • Alert on unscheduled defrost cycles and abnormal setpoints, with independent temperature sensors and alarms

Affected and fixed versions

  • Danfoss — AK-SM 800A
    Vulnerable versions: prior to R4.3.1
    Fixed in: R4.3.1 or later
  • Danfoss — AK-SM 800 / AK-SC 355 (end of life)
    Vulnerable versions: all versions; no longer supported
  • Copeland — XWEB / XWEB Pro
    Vulnerable versions: internet-exposed or default-credential deployments named in CERT-FR alert
    Fixed in: latest vendor firmware
  • Dixell (Copeland brand) — XWEB
    Vulnerable versions: internet-exposed or default-credential deployments named in CERT-FR alert
    Fixed in: latest vendor firmware

Timeline

Last updated · 6 updates · revalidated 6× · latest source

Showing the 20 most recent tracked events.

  • French deployment to Yanbu, Saudi Arabia announced; Sekoia cites it as a possible motive for an Iran-nexus actor (hypothesis, not confirmed by indicators).
  • Censys baseline: 3,004 Danfoss StoreView and 3,708 Copeland/Dixell XWEB hosts exposed to the Internet.
  • First wave: up to roughly 700 French supermarkets have refrigeration controllers set to defrost overnight
  • Paris prosecutor opens an investigation into the French refrigeration attacks.
  • CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 names Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC controllers
  • French case entrusted to the anti-cybercrime office OFAC.
  • Internet scan finds at least 4,500 Danfoss interfaces exposed; French Finance Minister briefs Parliament and CERT-FR expands the alert scope.
  • Overnight 12-13 October: setpoints raised to about 50 C for roughly six hours at up to about 700 French stores, with spillover reported in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain; three French blood bank facilities also reported tampered cooling units.
  • Danfoss advises customers to disconnect systems from the Internet; Copeland/Dixell XWEB added to the CERT-FR alert
  • CERT-FR updates CERTFR-2026-ALE-012, adding affected equipment and refining recommendations; the campaigns are assessed as probably still ongoing. CERT-FR warns a factory reset alone is not enough because vulnerable units will likely be recompromised.
  • Cluster of read_date_time reconnaissance requests (19-25 Oct) against Sekoia Danfoss honeypots, possibly preparation for CVE-2025-41450 exploitation.
  • Lupovis decoy Danfoss controllers begin logging attacks; 256 attempts from 91 sources through 30 October, peaking 26 October, mostly with documented factory-default credentials
  • Four officials tell Reuters the Pentagon is treating the August commissary freezer failures as a suspected cyberattack, with U.S. Cyber Command and Army investigators in contact with French counterparts. Controller brand unconfirmed; link to the European campaign not established.
  • Unauthenticated user-rename request (target ID 1) from locked-ioc-3 and locked-ioc-5 hits all four Sekoia honeypots between 22:00 and 22:30 and is blocked, after a quiet period 26-31 Oct.
  • Second wave overnight into Monday: stores in Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Ireland and Finland (later also Portugal and Italy) report defrost mode, setpoints raised to about 50 C and locked settings
  • Belgian and Swedish authorities comment; Belgium's Centre for Cybersecurity says the perpetrator may never be identified; no group claims responsibility
  • The French Blood Establishment confirms attacks on blood bank refrigeration via equipment providers supplying its facilities.
  • Censys sitrep: exposed Danfoss StoreView hosts fall from 3,004 to 708 (-76%) and Copeland/Dixell XWEB from 3,708 to 2,420 (-35%); the decline may reflect provider action or owners disconnecting devices.
  • CISA, the FBI and partners urge critical infrastructure operators to harden industrial refrigeration and cold-chain monitoring systems: identify internet-accessible systems, remove unnecessary remote access, secure required access, enforce strong authentication and patch.
  • French authorities attribute the operation to IRGC 'Shahid Kaveh' (CERTFR-2026-CTI-009); Sekoia notes no technical indicators confirm the link.

Update history

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2025-41450

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 13 sources; published ; last updated .

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