Threat reportICS/SCADATL-2026-6010
Six Pre-Auth RCE Zero-Days in Danfoss AK-SM800A Refrigeration Controllers (Remote Root); Related Iran-Attributed Attacks on Exposed Danfoss/Copeland Controllers in France and Europe
Midnight Blue researcher Carlo Meijer disclosed six pre-authentication stack-buffer-overflow RCE zero-days (CVEs pending) in Danfoss AK-SM800A controllers, all firmware up to and including 5.3.2, giving remote root. Separately, from October 11, 2026, attackers hijacked internet-exposed Danfoss and Copeland/Dixell refrigeration controllers in France and Europe, forcing defrost cycles, spoiling food worth tens of millions of euros and causing fires; France attributed the October wave to the IRGC-linked Shahid Kaveh unit. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6010 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Danfoss AK-SM800A pre-auth RCE, French supermarket refrigeration attacks, CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Danfoss AK-SM800A (AK-SM 8xxA series); Danfoss AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 (end-of-life, no longer patched); Copeland / Dixell XWEB / XWEB Pro controllers |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-121, CWE-120 |
| Attribution | Shahid Kaveh - October 2026 France wave only (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Iran |
| Tools | FOFA |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T0831 Manipulation of Control, T0855 Unauthorized Command Message, T0883 Internet Accessible Device, T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1495 Firmware Corruption, T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware, T1565 Data Manipulation, T1595 Active Scanning, T1596.005 Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases |
| Motivation | DESTRUCTION |
| Target sectors | retail, food-and-beverage, cold-chain, health, energy, industrial |
| Target regions | france, Europe, belgium, spain, portugal, poland, germany |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 12 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6010 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Refrigeration Controller Initiating Outbound Internet Connections (Implant / C2 Egress)
Danfoss AK-SM800A units run the web application as root on Danux (Yocto, i.MX6) with secure boot unused, so a remote-root attacker can plant an implant that survives factory reset and firmware update. Controllers have no business initiating sessions to the internet beyond NTP/DNS. Flags connections from the controller VLAN to public addresses, including reverse shells and staged payload downloads after exploitation.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1105
- Data sources: zeek:conn (bro:conn:json), firewall traffic logs (CEF / CommonSecurityLog)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=network sourcetype="bro:conn:json" earliest=-24h
```comment TL-2026-6010 Controller egress. 10.60.0.0/16 is an example controller VLAN: replace with your refrigeration or OT controller subnets.```
| where cidrmatch("10.60.0.0/16",'id.orig_h')
| where NOT (cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",'id.resp_h') OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",'id.resp_h') OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",'id.resp_h'))
| where 'id.resp_p'!=123 AND 'id.resp_p'!=53
| stats count AS conns sum(orig_bytes) AS bytes_out sum(resp_bytes) AS bytes_in dc('id.resp_p') AS distinct_ports values('id.resp_p') AS dest_ports earliest(_time) AS first_seen latest(_time) AS last_seen BY id.orig_h id.resp_h proto
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| sort - bytes_outMicrosoft KQL
let ControllerNets = dynamic(["10.60.0.0/16"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DeviceAction in~ ("allow", "accept", "permitted")
| where ipv4_is_in_any_range(SourceIP, ControllerNets)
| where not(ipv4_is_private(DestinationIP))
| where DestinationPort !in (53, 123)
| summarize Connections=count(), BytesOut=sum(SentBytes), BytesIn=sum(ReceivedBytes), Ports=make_set(DestinationPort, 20), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, DestinationIP, Protocol
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Protocol, Ports, Connections, BytesOut, BytesIn
| order by BytesOut descSigma
title: Refrigeration Controller Outbound Connection To Internet
id: a41e8b77-2c6d-4d59-8f13-9b0c5d7e3303
status: experimental
description: Detects allowed firewall sessions initiated from the refrigeration controller network (Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC, Copeland/Dixell XWEB) to public addresses on ports other than DNS and NTP, a sign of a post-exploitation implant, reverse shell or payload staging after pre-auth RCE.
references:
- https://midnightblue.nl/blog/multiple-rce-danfoss-aksm800a
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-140-03
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cyberattack-shuts-down-refrigerators-at-french-supermarkets/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/13
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: firewall
detection:
selection:
action: 'allowed'
src_ip|cidr: '10.60.0.0/16'
filter_private_dst:
dst_ip|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
filter_infra_ports:
dst_port:
- 53
- 123
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Vendor cloud or remote-monitoring services the controllers legitimately use
- Integrator 4G modem management traffic
level: high
Known false positives:
- Approved vendor cloud monitoring or remote-support endpoints
- Firmware or licence checks performed by integrators
Tuning notes: Replace 10.60.0.0/16 with your controller subnets. Build an allow-list of approved vendor and integrator destinations and exclude them. Any new external destination from a controller should alert; consider blocking egress entirely at the OT firewall.
- Internet Fingerprinting Sweep of Refrigeration Controller Web Interfaces (Recon / FOFA-Style Scanning) · unlock with TL Creds
- Danfoss [indicator] / [indicator] Crash or Segfault (Exploit Attempt Indicator) · unlock with TL Creds
- Controller Firmware or Flash Tampering Commands (Persistence / Brick) · unlock with TL Creds
- Shell Command Injection Patterns in Requests to Controller Web Interface (Code-of-the-Day Bypass Chain) · unlock with TL Creds
- Flash / Firmware Write Tool Execution on Controller or Gateway (Linux Process Creation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Internet-Sourced Access to Refrigeration Controller Management Ports (Exposure Exploited in French Attacks) · unlock with TL Creds
- Danfoss AK-SM800A Pre-Auth Stack Overflow Trigger - Oversized Request from External Source (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Refrigeration Controller Defrost Cycle / Setpoint Manipulation (Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6010.
Technical analysis
Midnight Blue's Carlo Meijer reported six pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerabilities in the Danfoss AK-SM800A (StoreView/AK-SM 8xxA series) refrigeration and HVAC controller after under an hour of manual firmware review, using QEMU user-space emulation of the web task in the monolithic sm_app binary. Five are similar stack-based buffer overflows in one small code segment; the sixth is a pre-authentication memory corruption flaw in sm_fcgi_app, the session-control component, and remains exploitable with strict session control enabled (the default since version 4.0). All firmware up to and including 5.3.2 is affected. Root causes are hundreds of unsafe strcpy() calls in unauthenticated handlers, no stack canaries, no PIE (NX enabled, partial RELRO), and the application running as root on Danux, a custom Yocto Linux for an i.MX6 SoC. Secure boot features of the i.MX6 are not in use per OTP fuse checks. Exact endpoints and exploit techniques are withheld pending coordinated disclosure with Danfoss; CVE IDs are pending and no patch is known.
Because secure boot is unused, a root attacker could plant an implant that survives factory reset and firmware updates, hide activity from logs, or brick the device by wiping flash or pushing malformed firmware, forcing physical replacement and days of freezer downtime. Midnight Blue advises removing internet exposure (VPN, private APN, or strict firewall-enforced IP allowlisting), inventorying exposure including integrator 4G modems, and not relying on patching or strict session control alone.
In parallel, a real-world campaign began overnight October 11-12, 2026. Attackers remotely altered defrost settings on internet-exposed Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC controllers (mostly end-of-life AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355, plus some outdated AK-SM 800A) and, per CERT-FR's updated alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 (October 13), Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB systems. About 700 French retail sites were affected, with at least 15 fires and tens of millions of euros in food losses; defrost cycles were reportedly extended from one hour to up to eight, delaying alarms. A second wave on about November 2 hit stores across Europe. The initial access vector has not been publicly tied to a specific vulnerability, and the article states the six new zero-days are not reported as exploited; public PoCs for earlier Danfoss CVEs reportedly appeared within 48 hours of the first attacks. On November 9, 2026 France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Center attributed the October wave to Shahid Kaveh, an IRGC Electronic and Cyber Center unit (previously linked by US agencies to CyberAv3ngers), citing Farsi-language artefacts, FOFA scanning use, infrastructure overlap with reconnaissance of Schneider Electric equipment, and the CyberbanNews propaganda outlet that publicized the attacks on October 13. The second wave was not attributed. Reuters noted it could not independently verify how officials reached their conclusion.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Impact
T0831 Manipulation of Control; T1495 Firmware Corruption; T1565 Data Manipulation
Impair Process Control
T0855 Unauthorized Command Message
Initial Access
T0883 Internet Accessible Device; T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Persistence
T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
Reconnaissance
T1595 Active Scanning; T1596.005 Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases
Remediation
Patches
- No fix known for the six pending-CVE flaws (firmware <= 5.3.2); coordinated disclosure with Danfoss ongoing
- For earlier issues, upgrade AK-SM 8xxA to R4.2 (CVE-2025-41450) and 4.3.1 (CVE-2025-41451, CVE-2025-41452) per CISA ICSA-25-140-03
Immediate actions
- Inventory all Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC, Copeland XWEB, Dixell XWEB and Eliwell controllers reachable from the internet, including those behind system-integrator 4G modems
- Remove internet exposure of management interfaces; allow access only via VPN, private APN, or tightly scoped firewall-enforced IP allowlists
- Monitor refrigeration temperature and defrost schedules with independent alarms not controlled by the same controller
Workarounds
- A factory reset is not sufficient for compromised end-of-life devices (CERT-FR); a root implant may persist because secure boot is not used
- Take affected controllers offline until access is restricted
Longer-term hardening
- Do not rely on strict session control; it does not block the sm_fcgi_app pre-auth flaw
- Replace end-of-life AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 units that are no longer patched
- Treat IP allowlisting as interim only (CERT-FR) because of configuration drift; geofencing and blacklisting are insufficient
Affected and fixed versions
- Danfoss — AK-SM800A (AK-SM 8xxA series)
Vulnerable versions: All firmware up to and including 5.3.2 - Danfoss — AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 (end-of-life, no longer patched)
Vulnerable versions: Outdated/EOL units targeted in the France attacks - Copeland / Dixell — XWEB / XWEB Pro controllers
Vulnerable versions: Systems named in CERT-FR alert update of October 13, 2026
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Earlier Danfoss AK-SM 800A flaws (auth bypass, path traversal CVE-2023-25914, command injection CVE-2023-25915) documented by Synacktiv and DIVD/HackDefense; Danfoss advisory DSA-2023-08-01.
- CISA publishes ICSA-25-140-03 for Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA (CVE-2025-41450 auth bypass, CVE-2025-41451 command injection, CVE-2025-41452); fixed in R4.2 and 4.3.1.
- Claroty Team82 publishes write-up showing chained RCE on Danfoss AK-SM 800A management interfaces using code-of-the-day bypass and command injection.
- First wave: overnight attacks on internet-exposed Danfoss controllers in France force defrost cycles; about 700 sites and at least 15 fires reported.
- CERT-FR issues first alert on compromised Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers; Paris prosecutor opens an investigation.
- CERT-FR updates CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 to add Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB; CyberbanNews publicizes the attacks. Public PoCs for earlier Danfoss CVEs reportedly appear within 48 hours of the attacks.
- CERT-FR updates its recommendations, warns the campaigns are probably still ongoing, and states that a factory reset alone is insufficient.
- Second wave of attacks on refrigeration controllers across Europe (not attributed by France).
- France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Center attributes the October wave to Shahid Kaveh (IRGC Electronic and Cyber Center); Iran's ambassador summoned, EU sanctions proposed.
- Censys reports hundreds of Danfoss and over 1,000 Copeland/Dixell controllers still internet-exposed.
- Midnight Blue (Carlo Meijer) discloses six pre-auth RCE zero-days in Danfoss AK-SM800A <= 5.3.2, details withheld pending coordinated disclosure; GBHackers reports.
Update history
- 2026-11-15 — Six Pre-Auth RCE 0-Days in Danfoss AK-SM800A Supermarket Refrigeration Controllers (No CVE Assigned) Amid Europe-Wide Refrigeration Attack Waves: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution-confidence change. The newer report lists exploitability as THEORETICAL and attribution confidence as LOW.
Sources cited
- CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-25-140-03: Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series CISA · Government advisory · 2025-05-20
- Multiple RCE vulnerabilities in Danfoss AK-SM800A (Midnight Blue) midnightblue.nl · Research · 2026-11-10
- Freeze the Controller, Defrost the Food: Vulnerabilities in Danfoss Refrigeration Controllers (Claroty Team82) claroty.com · Research · 2025-08-01
- Danfoss Security Advisory DSA-2023-08-01 danfoss.com · Vendor report · 2023-08-01
- Danfoss Security Advisories danfoss.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-13
- Researchers Discover 6 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Danfoss Refrigeration Controllers Allowing Remote Root Access gbhackers.com · News · 2026-11-13
- Cyberattack shuts down refrigerators at French supermarkets (BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News · 2026-10-12
- Supermarket Refrigeration Attack Widens to Copeland, Dixell Controllers (SecurityWeek) SecurityWeek · News · 2026-10-15
- France blames Iranian hackers for supermarket attacks that sparked fires (BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News · 2026-11-09
- France blames Iran for fridge cyberattacks (The Record) The Record · News · 2026-11-09
- France blames Iran for supermarket fridge hacks (Axios) axios.com · News · 2026-11-10
- Unplug your smart fridges: French supermarkets warned after cyberattack (CSO Online) csoonline.com · News · 2026-10-13
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated . Reviewed .