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Threat reportData BreachTL-2026-6042

Apify Internal Systems Breach – Compromised Credential Chain Exposes Customer Accounts; API Tokens Rotated, 2FA Resets Prompted

highACTIVE

On 9-10 November 2026 an unauthorized third party used a compromised credential to obtain further account credentials and access related accounts in Apify's internal systems; Apify detected it on 11 November at 12:13 UTC. Apify rotated internal secrets and customer API tokens/Proxy passwords, reset sessions, revoked some OAuth connections (including GitHub), and told notified customers to reset 2FA.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6042
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsApify Apify platform (Console, API, Actors, Apify Proxy, OAuth integrations)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078 Valid Accounts, T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1552 Unsecured Credentials
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, data-analytics, ecommerce, software-development
Target regionsGlobal, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6042 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 8 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Apify API / Proxy Access From Non-Approved Source (Pre-Rotation Token Abuse) — Exploitation

Flags web/proxy traffic to api.apify.com or proxy.apify.com from sources that are not on the organisation's approved Apify client list. After the 9-10 Nov 2026 Apify breach (TL-2026-6042) an attacker may replay stolen Apify API tokens or Proxy passwords (T1078.004, T1528); no attacker IPs were published, so detection is behaviour-first: any unexpected client reaching the Apify API/Proxy is reviewed.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1078.004, T1528, T1078
  • Data sources: splunk_cim_web_datamodel, proxy_web_gateway_logs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.url="*api.apify.com*" OR Web.url="*proxy.apify.com*") by Web.src Web.user Web.http_user_agent Web.url
```comment("TL-2026-6042 Apify breach: flag API/Proxy clients not in the approved source lookup")```
| rename Web.* as *
| lookup tl_apify_approved_sources src OUTPUT approved
| where isnull(approved)
| eval first_seen=strftime(firstTime,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(lastTime,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table first_seen last_seen src user http_user_agent url count

Microsoft KQL

let approved = _GetWatchlist('ApifyApprovedSources') | project SearchKey;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl in~ ("api.apify.com", "proxy.apify.com")
| where DeviceName !in~ (approved) and LocalIP !in (approved)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort

Sigma

title: Scripted Client Access To Apify API Or Proxy
id: 3f6a1c52-8b7e-4d19-a0c4-6e2d5b91f301
status: experimental
description: Detects non-browser/scripted clients reaching api.apify.com or proxy.apify.com, a hunting pivot for replay of Apify API tokens exposed in the Nov 2026 Apify breach
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/apify-rotates-api-tokens-prompts-2fa-resets-after-breach/
    - https://status.apify.com/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/14
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_host:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - 'api.apify.com'
            - 'proxy.apify.com'
    selection_ua:
        c-useragent|contains:
            - 'python-requests'
            - 'curl/'
            - 'Go-http-client'
            - 'node-fetch'
            - 'axios'
            - 'okhttp'
            - 'apify-client'
    condition: selection_host and selection_ua
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Apify automation and CI jobs
    - Developer testing of Actors
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Developers or CI runners that legitimately call the Apify API but are not yet in the approved-sources lookup
  • Newly onboarded scraping workers or cloud functions with new egress IPs

Tuning notes: Populate the tl_apify_approved_sources lookup (field: src) with known scraper hosts/egress IPs. Schedule over the last 24h and back-search from 2026-11-09. Raise priority when the user field is a service account or the user agent is a scripted client.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Apify API Token Exposed In Process Command Line — Exploitation Prerequisite · unlock with TL Creds
  • Bulk Apify Storage Reads (Datasets / Key-Value Stores) From One Source — Post-Exploitation Collection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Sign-In From New IP With MFA Satisfied By Token Claim — Credential Chain / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • Apify / Google Sign-In Lookalike Domain Resolution — Phishing Follow-On · unlock with TL Creds
  • GitHub Repository Clone Via OAuth Token From Unapproved Source — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Apify Proxy Connection From Script Or LOLBin Process — Proxy Credential Abuse · unlock with TL Creds
  • GitHub OAuth Authorization Activity For Apify Application — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Security-Info (MFA) Registration Or Removal Burst — Credential Chain / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 8 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6042.

8 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Apify later confirmed customer personal information or stored data was accessed.

Apify, a Czech web scraping and automation cloud platform (about 80,000 customers per Apify's company page as cited by BleepingComputer; about 91,000 per SecurityWeek), disclosed through its public status page that an unauthorized third party gained access to parts of its internal systems on 9 and 10 November 2026. The activity was detected on 11 November 2026 at 12:13 UTC, at which point Apify cut off access and started an investigation. The first status entry was posted on 11 November at 20:46 CET.

Initial messaging said Apify had found no indication that account data stored on the platform was affected. On 12 November Apify updated its status page: the attacker 'used a compromised credential to obtain a number of account credentials and accessed related Apify accounts'. Apify closed that access path, reported no further attacker activity since 11 November, notified the relevant authorities, and emailed customers whose personal information or stored data was accessed. Customers who received no email have not been identified as affected so far. The initial compromised credential and the means of its compromise have not been disclosed.

Response actions reported by Apify: internal credentials invalidated and 'various critical internal secrets' rotated; API tokens rotated and all active sessions reset; Apify API tokens and Apify Proxy passwords rotated for impacted customers (sample notice seen by BleepingComputer); some OAuth connections to external integrations, including GitHub, revoked as a precaution (Apify says its investigation did not find those connections were an attack vector); added monitoring. On 13 November Apify said API tokens are now stored only as hashes, added network restrictions between internal services and stronger internal authentication, and began a review of its whole stack. A root-cause post-mortem was promised within a week and the incident was still listed as unresolved at the time of research.

Customer guidance: follow instructions in any Apify email; reset 2FA through the Apify Console because 2FA codes may have been exposed (Apify states passwords remain safe); reconnect GitHub for Actors built from private GitHub repositories (Actor > Change provider > GitHub, once per account/organization); reconnect integrations if prompted; set Settings > General resource access to Restricted, since anyone who knows a storage ID can read that storage while access is open; be wary of phishing, as Apify says it will never ask for passwords, 2FA codes, or payment details.

Data exposure is reported inconsistently. SecurityWeek, citing a breach notification a customer shared on Reddit (not confirmed by Apify in the article), lists names, email addresses, billing details, account activity, IP addresses, salted password hashes, 2FA recovery codes, phone numbers, authentication tokens tied to Google and GitHub sign-ins, and limited card data (cardholder name, expiry, last four digits; no full numbers or security codes). Apify has not published an exact data list or the number of affected accounts. No threat actor, malware, CVE, or technical indicators have been published. The customer names in BleepingComputer's report (Microsoft, Samsung, T-Mobile, Accenture, Siemens, European Commission, Roche) come from Apify's marketing page and are not stated to be affected.

Defender relevance: organizations that use Apify should treat any Apify API tokens, Proxy passwords, storage IDs, and GitHub/Google OAuth links as potentially exposed, rotate them, audit Apify-linked GitHub repositories and Actor runs for unexpected activity, and watch for phishing that references the incident. Apify also disclosed an unrelated security incident on 6 March 2026 (employee GitHub account compromised in a known malware campaign; malicious commits force-pushed to non-default branches); no link between the two incidents has been reported.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Collection

T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Follow the instructions in any email received from Apify; customers not emailed have not been identified as affected so far
  • Reset 2FA in the Apify Console and regenerate 2FA recovery codes
  • Replace any Apify API tokens and Apify Proxy passwords that were not already rotated, and update them in all consuming systems and CI/CD secrets
  • Reconnect GitHub for Actors built from private GitHub repositories (Actor > Change provider > GitHub) and reconnect other integrations when prompted
  • Set Settings > General resource access to Restricted so storages are not readable by anyone who knows a storage ID
  • Audit GitHub and Google account activity and OAuth grants linked to Apify for unexpected access

Workarounds

  • Treat Apify-held credentials, storage contents, and linked OAuth tokens as potentially exposed until the Apify post-mortem is published

Longer-term hardening

  • Inventory third-party SaaS API tokens and OAuth grants and keep a tested rotation runbook
  • Store third-party tokens in a secrets manager with scoped, short-lived credentials
  • Prefer phishing-resistant MFA over recoverable codes where the vendor supports it
  • Brief staff on phishing that references the Apify incident; Apify states it will never ask for passwords, 2FA codes, or payment details

Affected and fixed versions

  • Apify — Apify platform (Console, API, Actors, Apify Proxy, OAuth integrations)
    Vulnerable versions: SaaS - accounts notified by Apify as of 2026-11-12
    Fixed in: Internal secrets, API tokens and sessions rotated 2026-11-11 to 2026-11-13

Timeline

  • Separate earlier Apify incident: an employee GitHub account was compromised in a known malware campaign and malicious commits were force-pushed to non-default branches; Apify reported no customer data affected. No link to the November incident has been reported.
  • An unauthorized third party gains access to parts of Apify's internal systems (activity window 9-10 November 2026).
  • Unauthorized access continues; the attacker uses a compromised credential to obtain further account credentials and access related Apify accounts.
  • Apify detects the activity at 12:13 UTC, cuts off the attacker's access, begins an investigation and rotates credentials; first status-page notice posted at 20:46 CET.
  • BleepingComputer reports API token and Proxy password rotation, session resets, GitHub OAuth revocation and 2FA reset guidance.
  • Apify states the attacker used a compromised credential to obtain account credentials, closes that access path, rotates critical internal secrets, notifies authorities, and emails customers whose personal information or stored data was accessed.
  • SecurityWeek reports, from a customer-shared notice, exposure of salted password hashes, 2FA recovery codes, phone numbers, Google/GitHub sign-in tokens and partial card data; not confirmed by Apify.
  • Apify reports API tokens now stored only as hashes, network restrictions between internal services, stronger internal authentication, and a full-stack security review; promises a post-mortem within a week.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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