Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6046
SilentAir and Liminal Panda: Hacked Asian Telcos Used to Intercept Taiwanese Calls and Texts (GTPDoor over GTP-U)
Enea research (published 2026-11-11) names SilentAir, a state-level actor linked with low confidence to China-nexus operations, which used hijacked equipment inside mobile operators in at least six Asian countries to inject SS7/Diameter attacks that intercept calls, texts and 2FA codes, mainly of Taiwanese subscribers. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6046 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | SilentAir, GTPDoor v3, GTP-U-Door |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Various Mobile operator core/signalling networks (SS7, Diameter, GTP-C/GTP-U, IPX interconnect); Various Linux/Unix hosts in telecom core networks (GGSN/SGSN/PGW and SCTP-attached signalling hosts) |
| Attribution | SilentAir, Pepper Typhoon (low confidence) |
| Malware | EchoBackdoor, GTPDOOR, SCTPE, SIGTRANslator |
| Tools | Cobalt Strike, CordScan, Fast Reverse Proxy, SGSNemu (modified), TinyShell |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH, T1036 Masquerading, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1070.006 Indicator Removal: Timestomp, T1090 Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1572 Protocol Tunneling, T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | telecoms, government administration, political |
| Target regions | taiwan, Southeast Asia, East Asia, East Africa, 143 - Central Asia, Middle East, Europe, Africa, Latin America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6046 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door) libpcap AF_PACKET Listener on Linux Core-Network Host
Detects a non-capture binary opening an AF_PACKET raw socket (auditd socket syscall 41, a0=11) on a Linux telecom core-network host. GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door, md5 35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc) captures GTP-U T-PDUs through libpcap, so its listener never appears in netstat/lsof; the raw socket is the only host-side trace. Maps to T1095, T1036 and T1573.001 (default XOR key). Per Enea, Liminal Panda uses it as a backup C2 channel on GGSN/SGSN/PGW-adjacent hosts.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1095, T1036, T1573.001
- Data sources: linux_auditd, index=linux_audit sourcetype=linux_audit
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=linux_audit sourcetype=linux_audit type=SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=41 a0=11 success=yes earliest=-24h
| eval exe_name=lower(mvindex(split(exe,"/"),-1))
| where NOT match(exe_name,"^(tcpdump|dumpcap|tshark|suricata|zeek|snort|dhclient|dhcpd|lldpd|wpa_supplicant|networkmanager|systemd-networkd|keepalived|bird|frr|zebra|ospfd|bgpd)$")
| stats count as hits min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(comm) as comm values(ppid) as ppid values(auid) as auid by host exe
| eval ioc_hint="GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door) libpcap AF_PACKET listener hidden from netstat/lsof; T1095 T1036 T1573.001"
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host exe comm ppid auid hits ioc_hintMicrosoft KQL
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SyslogMessage has 'type=SYSCALL' and SyslogMessage has 'syscall=41' and SyslogMessage contains ' a0=11 ' and SyslogMessage has 'success=yes'
| extend exe = extract(@'exe="?([^" ]+)', 1, SyslogMessage), comm = extract(@'comm="?([^" ]+)', 1, SyslogMessage)
| extend exe_name = tolower(tostring(split(exe, '/')[-1]))
| where exe_name !in ('tcpdump', 'dumpcap', 'tshark', 'suricata', 'zeek', 'snort', 'dhclient', 'dhcpd', 'lldpd', 'wpa_supplicant', 'networkmanager', 'systemd-networkd', 'keepalived', 'bird', 'frr', 'zebra', 'ospfd', 'bgpd')
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, exe, comm
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, Computer, exe, comm, HitsSigma
title: GTPDoor v3 libpcap AF_PACKET Raw Socket Opened by Non-Capture Binary
id: 7c1d5e0a-3b4f-4a6e-9d21-5f0a8b6c1e01
status: experimental
description: Detects a binary other than known capture or routing daemons opening an AF_PACKET raw socket on a Linux telecom core host. GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door) sniffs GTP-U via libpcap so no listening port is visible in netstat or lsof.
references:
- https://www.enea.com/insights/the-enemy-within-tracking-liminal-panda-and-silentair-through-mobile-networks/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/liminal-panda-telecom-sector-threats/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1095
- attack.t1573.001
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1036
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
type: 'SYSCALL'
syscall: 41
a0: '11'
success: 'yes'
filter_capture_and_routing:
exe|endswith:
- '/tcpdump'
- '/dumpcap'
- '/tshark'
- '/suricata'
- '/zeek'
- '/snort'
- '/dhclient'
- '/dhcpd'
- '/lldpd'
- '/wpa_supplicant'
- '/NetworkManager'
- '/keepalived'
- '/bird'
- '/zebra'
- '/ospfd'
- '/bgpd'
condition: selection and not filter_capture_and_routing
falsepositives:
- Packet capture, IDS or DHCP and routing daemons not in the exclusion list
- Vendor monitoring agents and lawful-intercept probes that use libpcap
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate packet-capture, IDS (Suricata, Zeek, Snort) or lawful-intercept probes using libpcap
- DHCP clients and routing daemons (dhclient, keepalived, bird, frr) that open AF_PACKET sockets
Tuning notes: Baseline AF_PACKET users per host role for 14 days and extend the exclusion regex with vendor probes. Syscall 41 / a0=11 is x86_64 only; on aarch64 hosts use syscall 198. Pair hits with the GTP-U flow detection (SPL-003) and the GTPDoor md5 hash rule (SIG-001) to raise confidence.
- SilentAir SS7/Diameter UpdateLocation Redirect Burst from Non-Partner Global Title · unlock with TL Creds
- Suspicious SSH Launched from Temp Path or Non-Interactive Parent on Core Linux Host (GTPDoor Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- Liminal Panda Cobalt Strike Infrastructure ([indicator] and Community-Observed Sibling IPs) · unlock with TL Creds
- GTPDoor v3 and SCTPE (SIGweaver) Known Hash Execution on Linux · unlock with TL Creds
- Liminal Panda Toolset on Linux (TinyShell, Fast Reverse Proxy, CordScan, SGSNemu, SIGTRANslator) · unlock with TL Creds
- Liminal Panda wuxianpinggu507 XOR Key or Proxy Password in Process Command Line · unlock with TL Creds
- Linux Timestomping and Log Deletion on Telecom Core Host (GTPDoor Anti-Forensics) · unlock with TL Creds
- New GTP-U/GTP-C Peer Pair Indicating GTPDoor Covert C2 or SGSNemu Exfil Tunnel · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6046.
Sample indicators (3 of 16)
- Domain:
wuxiapingg[.]ga - File hash:
35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc - File hash:
da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 16 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Enea also reports Liminal Panda using a new GTPDoor v3 Unix backdoor variant that hides C2 in GTP-U; a link between the two groups is possible but unproven.
SilentAir (named by Enea; active since at least early 2025, earlier activity suspected) is assessed by Enea with high confidence to operate at state level and, with low confidence, to align with China-nexus operations. The attribution reasoning is its focus on Taiwan, the absence of Chinese networks and subscribers among its targets, a UTC+8 working-day rhythm with essentially no weekend activity, and pauses around Chinese holiday periods. Enea confirmed an internal compromise: network elements inside infected mobile operators both initiated and received the attack commands, which were injected into the IPX interface. Suspicious SS7/Diameter elements were identified in at least six Asian countries (others suspected), with subscribers targeted in a dozen more countries and territories. Primary targets are Taiwanese subscribers and networks; secondary targets are Southeast and East Asia plus occasional targets in East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe, including political and government VIPs. Activity comes in bursts from a handful to several thousand subscribers per month, separated by months of inactivity. Multiple infected networks sometimes coordinated on the same VIP, implying a single controller.
SilentAir signalling behaviour: information harvesting via SS7 SRI-SM, RestoreData and SendAuthenticationInfo and Diameter AIR; location tracking via SS7 AnyTimeInterrogation and Diameter Insert-Subscriber-Data-Request; and interception via SS7 UpdateLocation and Diameter Update-Location-Request, which redirects a subscriber's SMS and calls to an attacker-controlled node. 2FA codes were seen arriving immediately after interception began, suggesting account-takeover attempts. Enea's activity mix is 18.30% interception (vs 2.07% for typical surveillance vendors), 7.21% information harvesting, 0.22% location tracking and 74.27% other, mainly silent SMS. Silent SMS is submitted through interim SMSCs via MO-FSM, spikes around midnight (mostly against Taiwanese subscribers) and is used in the daytime to confirm that an earlier UpdateLocation redirect is active. The actor uses SCCP Global Titles resembling legitimate network elements and responds correctly to transactions it initiated, but handles later externally-initiated transactions inconsistently (ignored, aborted or acknowledged, sometimes with duplicate responses). The SilentAir binary was not recovered because of strong OPSEC; its behaviour is similar to, but not fully explained by, the SCTPE trojan.
Liminal Panda (CrowdStrike, Nov 2024; low-confidence China-nexus; overlaps with Palo Alto cluster CL-STA-0969 per Enea; previously partly reported under LightBasin) targets telecom providers with custom tooling for covert access, C2 and exfiltration. GTPDoor is a Unix remote-access implant that hides C2 in GTP-C (first publicly analysed by HaxRob in Feb 2024). Enea's GTP firewall began blocking GTPDoor activity at customer operators from Q1 2026, detecting hundreds of covert C2 attempts, and estimates at least 5-10 infected operators (possibly several dozen), concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Observed commands start and stop exfiltration tunnels (modified SGSNemu), encapsulate lateral-movement commands (EchoBackdoor), launch processes including SSH, run health checks, and perform anti-forensics (file/directory deletion, timestomping). Half of tunnels lasted under 21 minutes; a very small number exceeded 24 hours. GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U-Door) carries payload in GTP-U T-PDUs, captures packets with libpcap (so the listener does not appear in netstat/lsof), keeps the same changeable default XOR key as v1/v2, drops v2's ACL feature and is believed to be primarily a backup channel. GTP-U is also reused in 5G, whereas GTP-C is limited to 2G-4G. SCTPE (called SIGweaver by CrowdStrike) is a Linux trojan that injects SS7/Diameter traffic through an existing SCTP connection on the host.
Relationship: SilentAir activity overlapped Liminal Panda infection periods in the same operators, some SilentAir attacks were followed by GTPDoor tunnel attempts from other nodes, and targets overlapped; however Enea does not directly associate the groups and suggests shared access or parallel compromise as possibilities. Enea remediated customers, notified other infected operators (including SilentAir-affected ones) and coordinated with POST Luxembourg's CyberForce team, and assesses both footprints as disrupted but able to return. No CVEs are involved; the intrusion vector into the operators was not disclosed.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Lateral Movement
T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1070.006 Indicator Removal: Timestomp
Command and Control
T1090 Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Credential Access
T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
Initial Access
Resource Development
T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Deploy GTP-C and GTP-U security (firewalling/inspection) and align it with SS7 and Diameter firewalls for cross-protocol visibility
- Treat the IPX interface as untrusted, including DNS and ICMP traffic
- Hunt Linux core-network hosts for GTPDoor and SCTPE by hash (35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc, da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e) and for libpcap-based listeners not visible in netstat/lsof
- Alert on SS7 UpdateLocation / Diameter ULR redirects and on anomalous volumes of silent SMS or MO-FSM submitted via interim SMSCs
Workarounds
- Restrict and log outbound SSH and tunnelling from GGSN/SGSN/PGW-facing hosts
- Notify peer operators when attack sources are identified in their networks
Longer-term hardening
- Monitor internal control-plane protocols (SIGTRAN, SCTP) for C2 and lateral movement
- Integrate signalling security monitoring with IT security operations
- Go beyond industry-baseline signalling checks (e.g. GSMA FS.11 category screening) and detect Global Titles that mimic legitimate network elements
- Reduce reliance on outsourced core networks to preserve investigation capability
Affected and fixed versions
- Various — Mobile operator core/signalling networks (SS7, Diameter, GTP-C/GTP-U, IPX interconnect)
Vulnerable versions: 2G/3G/4G/5G interconnect deployments without cross-protocol signalling and GTP security - Various — Linux/Unix hosts in telecom core networks (GGSN/SGSN/PGW and SCTP-attached signalling hosts)
Vulnerable versions: Hosts compromised by GTPDoor / SCTPE
Timeline
- CrowdStrike reports Liminal Panda activity observed since at least 2020 (month approximate), likely targeting multiple telecom providers in 2020-2021.
- GTPDoor v1/v2 first publicly analysed by HaxRob (month approximate: February 2024).
- CrowdStrike publishes 'Unveiling LIMINAL PANDA', assessing with low confidence China-nexus alignment and documenting its telecom-specific tooling.
- Earliest SilentAir activity Enea confirmed as unusual (early 2025, day approximate); earlier activity suspected.
- Enea's GTP firewall begins detecting and blocking GTPDoor GTP-C activity at customer operators (Q1 2026, day approximate); hundreds of covert C2 attempts observed.
- POST Luxembourg publicly reports GTPDoor GTP-C activity (July 2026, day approximate; per Enea, primary POST advisory not independently located).
- Enea publishes 'The Enemy Within', naming SilentAir and disclosing GTPDoor v3 (GTP-U) and SCTPE hashes.
- Infosecurity Magazine reports the findings; Enea says both groups are set back but conditions enabling them persist.
Sources cited
- Liminal Panda leverage telecom-specific protocols for espionage operations (Singapore IMDA advisory) imda.gov.sg · Advisory
- The Enemy Within: Tracking LIMINAL PANDA and SilentAir through Mobile Networks (Enea) enea.com · Research · 2026-11-11
- Unveiling LIMINAL PANDA: A Closer Look at China's Cyber Threats to the Telecom Sector (CrowdStrike) CrowdStrike · Research · 2024-11-19
- Hacked Asian Telcos Used to Intercept Taiwanese Calls and Texts (Infosecurity Magazine) infosecurity-magazine.com · News · 2026-11-12
- Liminal Panda (Wikipedia) en.wikipedia.org · News
- CL-STA-0969 Installs Covert Malware in Telecom Networks During 10-Month Espionage Campaign (secondary mirror of Unit 42 coverage) briefly-stg.herokuapp.com · News
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.