Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6000
StingyBasilisk espionage group abuses Windows named pipes and SMB to spread malware across isolated government networks (CunningDoor, SilentCOM, TediousLoader, HenMapCaCon)
Positive Technologies incident response findings describe StingyBasilisk, a previously unreported espionage group present in a government agency network since at least April 2022 (about 1,398 days before detection). It uses custom in-memory loaders and agents whose C2 is relayed host-to-host over Windows named pipes, with SMB + Impacket atexec lateral movement from February 2026, and COM hijacking (TreatAs) and a rogue W32Time time provider for persistence. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6000 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | StingyBasilisk, Stingy Basilisk |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (Task Scheduler, COM, W32Time, SMB, named pipes abused) |
| Attribution | StingyBasilisk (low confidence) |
| Malware | CunningDoor, HenMapCaCon, SafeNet, SilentCOM, TediousLoader |
| Tools | Impacket - S0357, Impacket atexec |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1040 Network Sniffing, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1090.001 Internal Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1106 Native API, T1218.011 Rundll32, T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking and 7 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6000 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 31 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: StingyBasilisk CunningDoor rundll32 SafeNet IKEYUI64.dll Side-Loading Launch (Exploitation)
Behaviour-first detection of the observed StingyBasilisk execution step: rundll32.exe running IKEYUI64.dll,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (or eToken.dll / DLPReel.dll REEL_Initialize) so a signed SafeNet library side-loads the malicious iKeyAPI.dll and launches the in-memory CunningDoor RAT. Also flags rundll32 loading DLLs from C:\Windows\Temp, where atexec-delivered payloads are staged (TL-2026-6000).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1218.011, T1574.002, T1036.005
- Data sources: sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\rundll32.exe" earliest=-24h
(CommandLine="*IKEYUI64.dll*ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA*" OR CommandLine="*DLPReel.dll*REEL_Initialize*" OR CommandLine="*eToken.dll*" OR CommandLine="*\\Windows\\Temp\\*.dll*")
| eval sideload_family=case(like(lower(CommandLine),"%ikeyui64.dll%"),"CunningDoor via IKEYUI64.dll / iKeyAPI.dll (T1574.002)", like(lower(CommandLine),"%dlpreel.dll%") OR like(lower(CommandLine),"%etoken.dll%"),"CunningDoor via eToken.dll / DLPReel.dll (T1574.002)", true(),"rundll32 loading DLL from C:\\Windows\\Temp (T1218.011)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host, User, sideload_familyMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "IKEYUI64.dll" and ProcessCommandLine has "ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA")
or (ProcessCommandLine has "DLPReel.dll" and ProcessCommandLine has "REEL_Initialize")
or ProcessCommandLine has "eToken.dll"
or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\Windows\\Temp\\[^\s,]+\.dll"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256Sigma
title: StingyBasilisk CunningDoor rundll32 SafeNet IKEYUI64.dll Side-Loading Launch
id: 6b1f0c2e-5a3d-4e71-9c28-7d4a1e9b3f01
status: experimental
description: Detects rundll32.exe launching the signed SafeNet IKEYUI64.dll export ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (or eToken.dll / DLPReel.dll REEL_Initialize), the observed StingyBasilisk CunningDoor launch command after Impacket atexec delivery.
references:
- https://ptsecurity.com/research/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/apt-stingybasilisk-malware-is-spreading-through-the-pipes/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/13
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1574.002
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.execution
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
selection_ikey:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'IKEYUI64.dll'
- 'ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA'
selection_reel:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'DLPReel.dll'
- 'REEL_Initialize'
selection_etoken:
CommandLine|contains: 'eToken.dll'
condition: selection_img and (selection_ikey or selection_reel or selection_etoken)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate SafeNet Authentication Client invoking its own UI libraries from Program Files
level: high
Known false positives:
- SafeNet Authentication Client legitimately invoking its own UI library through rundll32
- Admin or software-packaging scripts running rundll32 against DLLs staged in C:\Windows\Temp
Tuning notes: Drop the C:\Windows\Temp wildcard branch if your software deployment tooling stages DLLs there; keep the IKEYUI64.dll/ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA branch unfiltered. Replace index=sysmon with your Sysmon index.
- StingyBasilisk SMB-Delivered Loaders and Key Files in Windows Temp (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk TediousLoader Rogue W32Time Time Provider (Post-Exploitation Persistence) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk CunningDoor Named Pipe Pattern from rundll32 or svchost (C2 / Internal Proxy) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk CunningDoor Malicious [indicator] / [indicator] Side-Loaded (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk SilentCOM and TediousLoader DLLs Loaded by svchost (Post-Exploitation Persistence) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk HenMapCaCon TLS-over-Named-Pipe ProProBitOpen (C2 / Internal Proxy) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk SilentCOM COM TreatAs Hijack (Post-Exploitation Persistence) · unlock with TL Creds
- StingyBasilisk Impacket atexec Remote Scheduled Task via atsvc Pipe and GUID Task Name (Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 31 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6000.
Sample indicators (1 of 31)
- File hash:
DD2B6E282712502D3C36B6FEC8B2B9561BC9CEA94586803C889EC9214BCFAC06
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 31 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
StingyBasilisk was named by Positive Technologies (PT ESC) after an incident investigation in early 2026 at an unnamed government agency. Analysis showed the group had been resident in the infrastructure since at least April 2022 and had dwelled in the internal network for 1,398 days before detection. Initial access could not be determined and no known threat group has been reliably linked; PT suspects the operators run their own C2 framework. The assessed goal is cyberespionage, based on the stealth of the operation.
From February 2026 the group became more active inside the network. Malware was copied over SMB to C:\Windows\Temp and executed remotely with Impacket atexec, which connects to the \pipe\atsvc named pipe and calls the Task Scheduler RPC interface (ITaskSchedulerService, SchRpcRun) to create and immediately run a scheduled task. Task names were random GUIDs rather than the default atexec naming (example observed 2026-02-12: \11BBA9EF-3528-C48C-2221-D0D4DD92D971, Event ID 106), followed by rundll32.exe IKEYUI64.dll,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (Event ID 4688).
Three previously unknown DLL loaders deliver the in-house RAT as shellcode that runs only in memory and uses direct syscalls and Ldr functions. CunningDoor is launched through DLL side-loading of signed SafeNet libraries (IKEYUI64.dll loading malicious iKeyAPI.dll; eToken.dll loading malicious DLPReel.dll with the REEL_Initialize export); it decrypts shellcode using three XOR layers (a static key, the key file C:\Windows\Temp\sqlslzgqpukrpd, and the first 32 bytes of C:\Windows\Temp\oluivzdz), and talks over named pipes matching \\.\pipe\[a-z]+.[a-f0-9]{8} with AES-256-CBC framing (the DLPReel.dll variant uses an IP and port instead of a pipe). SilentCOM persists by hijacking the TreatAs keys of the Network List Manager ({DCB00C01-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}) and Network Configuration ({5b035261-40f9-11d1-aaec-00805fc1270e}) COM classes, with proxy DLLs (netprofmprox.dll, netcfgprox.dll, and a third spelled netprogmprox.dll) that forward calls to the real libraries and exit unless running inside svchost.exe -k netsvcs; it communicates over GUID-named pipes, using Curve25519 ECDH key exchange and ChaCha20 with a modified constant. TediousLoader (wgtdgr.dll) registers as a W32Time time provider (TimeProvOpen export) so svchost runs it as Local System at boot; it opens raw sockets (SIO_RCVALL) on each adapter, looks for a magic signature in received packets, and the packet supplies connect/listen/bind parameters; payloads are AES-256-CBC encrypted and run in memory.
HenMapCaCon.dll is a Go (1.18-1.19) component that runs a TLS server (go-winio) over the named pipe \\.\PIPE\ProProBitOpen and exposes /, /qr and /fetch routes; /fetch (parameters key and path) is used to pull files off the host. Infected hosts relay commands to each other so only one node needs external communication, which lets the operators reach network segments with no direct internet access. PT captured and decrypted a payload by monitoring named-pipe traffic for the known name patterns. No hashes, IPs or domains were published in the secondary coverage; the full IOC set is in the original PT report.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
Lateral Movement
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1218.011 Rundll32; T1574.001 DLL; T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Discovery
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1106 Native API
Command and Control
T1090.001 Internal Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography; T1573.002 Encrypted Channel
Persistence
T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking; T1547.003 Time Providers
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for the named pipes, DLLs, CLSID TreatAs entries and W32Time provider keys listed in the IOCs
- Review scheduled-task creation events (Event ID 106) for GUID-named tasks created remotely over \pipe\atsvc
- Restrict and monitor SMB traffic between network segments
Workarounds
- Alert on rundll32.exe launching IKEYUI64.dll,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA
- Alert on new subkeys under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders with unexpected DllName values
Longer-term hardening
- Segment networks and limit SMB/RPC between hosts and isolated zones
- Log scheduled task creation, named pipe creation (Sysmon 17/18) and registry changes to TreatAs and TimeProviders keys
- Hunt for unexpected DLLs in system folders and SafeNet library names loaded from non-standard paths
- Scan process memory for the modified ChaCha20 constant 71 20 2F 78 48 3F D9 14 48 B0 13 DA 02 32 46 88
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (Task Scheduler, COM, W32Time, SMB, named pipes abused)
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- StingyBasilisk present in the victim government network since at least April 2022 (month per PT; day is approximate)
- Compile timestamp of a SilentCOM sample (locked-ioc-7) analyzed by Positive Technologies
- Compile timestamp of a TediousLoader sample (locked-ioc-15) analyzed by Positive Technologies
- From February 2026 the group began active internal spread via SMB file copy to C:\Windows\Temp and remote execution with Impacket atexec (day approximate)
- GUID-named scheduled task (Event ID 106) created remotely, followed by rundll32.exe locked-ioc-11,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA (Event ID 4688) launching CunningDoor
- SecurityLab publishes coverage of Positive Technologies' StingyBasilisk findings (dwell time 1,398 days)
- Positive Technologies ESC IR publishes its technical analysis of StingyBasilisk on Habr.
- Cyber Security News publishes English-language coverage with technical IOCs
Update history
- 2026-11-14 — StingyBasilisk APT: Named-Pipe C2 Malware (CunningDoor, SilentCOM, TediousLoader) for Espionage: What changed No field escalation. Severity HIGH, exploitability ACTIVE and status ACTIVE are unchanged. Its content is additive only. New indicators (9) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Positive Technologies: APT StingyBasilisk malware is spreading through the pipes ptsecurity.com · Research
- Positive Technologies: incident investigation and retrospective analysis results 2025-2026 ptsecurity.com · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking MITRE · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1547.003 Time Providers MITRE · Research
- Impacket (atexec.py) GitHub · Code repository
- StingyBasilisk technical analysis (Habr, Positive Technologies blog) habr.com · Blog
- Hackers Use Windows Named Pipes and SMB to Spread Malware Across Isolated Government Networks (Cyber Security News) cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-11-13
- Шпионы притворялись защитой. Новая APT-группировка почти четыре года сидела в сети госучреждения (SecurityLab) securitylab.ru · News · 2026-10-29
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated . Reviewed .