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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6111

Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report: Data Exfiltration Surges 275.8% to 896.2 TB Among Top 10 Groups; Spam Bombing, Teams Vishing and Quick Assist Abuse

highACTIVE

ThreatLabz (April 2025-March 2026 data) reports that combined exfiltration by the top 10 ransomware groups by leak volume rose 275.8% year over year to 896.2 TB, while leak-site victims fell 3% to 7,366 and known payments fell 15.8% to $327.8M. Intrusions commonly begin with spam bombing plus Microsoft Teams vishing that steers victims into legitimate remote support tools such as Quick Assist. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6111
Also known asThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report, Spam bombing + Teams vishing + Quick Assist
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft Teams (external tenant chat/calls abused for vishing); Microsoft Quick Assist (legitimate remote support tool abused)
MalwareAgendaCrypt, GoGRPC, PLAY Ransomware, embargo, genesis, inc ransom, interlock, payoutsking, pear, rhysida, sinobi, worldleaks
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1482 Domain Trust Discovery, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, health, education, government administration, utilities, sales, operations, human resources, marketing
Target regionsGlobal, united states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6111 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: GoGRPC Persistence: Realtek HD Audio HKCU Run Key to AppData Binary — Post-Exploitation Phase

Fires when the HKCU Run value 'Realtek HD Audio' is set, or any Run value points to %APPDATA%\sekv*.exe. This is the persistence ThreatLabz documents for the GoGRPC staging binary dropped after Quick Assist access.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1036.005, T1059.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" (TargetObject="*\\Run\\Realtek HD Audio" OR Details="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\sekv*.exe") NOT Details="C:\\Program Files*" | eval scripted_writer=if(match(Image,"(?i)\\\\(powershell|pwsh|cmd)\\.exe$"),"yes","no"), masquerade_name=if(like(TargetObject,"%\\Run\\Realtek HD Audio") AND NOT like(Details,"C:\\Program Files%"),"realtek_name_non_driver_path","other") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Details) as run_value_data values(Image) as writer_process values(scripted_writer) as scripted_writer values(masquerade_name) as masquerade_name by host User TargetObject | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey has @"\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "Realtek HD Audio"
    or RegistryValueData matches regex @"(?i)\\AppData\\Roaming\\sekv[a-z0-9]*\.exe$"
| where RegistryValueData !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
| extend ScriptedWriter = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe"), MasqueradesAsRealtek = RegistryValueName =~ "Realtek HD Audio" and RegistryValueData !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, ScriptedWriter, MasqueradesAsRealtek

Sigma

title: Suspicious Realtek HD Audio Run Key Pointing to AppData Binary (TL-2026-6111 GoGRPC)
id: 7b2e9d14-0c3a-5f68-8d1b-4a6c5e2f9d02
status: experimental
description: Detects the HKCU Run value 'Realtek HD Audio' or a Run value pointing to AppData Roaming sekv random named executables, the persistence used to start the GoGRPC staging binary.
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/helpdesk-hijackers-teams-vishing-quick-assist-and-gogrpc-backdoor
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/payouts-king-takes-aim-ransomware-throne
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ransomware-leverage-growing-terabyte-takeaways-threatlabz-2026-ransomware
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CurrentVersion\Run\Realtek HD Audio'
    selection_path:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
        Details|re: '(?i)\\AppData\\Roaming\\sekv[a-z0-9]*\.exe$'
    filter_legit:
        Details|startswith: 'C:\Program Files'
    condition: (selection_name or selection_path) and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Genuine Realtek driver packages that register a Run value from Program Files (excluded by filter)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate Realtek audio driver installers (they normally write from Program Files, which the query excludes)
  • Per-user portable applications that register an AppData Run value with a random-looking executable name

Tuning notes: Extend the Program Files exclusion with your signed driver paths. Alert regardless of path when the value name is exactly 'Realtek HD Audio' and the writer is PowerShell or cmd.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Quick Assist Session Followed by Scripted Download or Persistence — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Payouts King Scheduled Tasks \Mozilla\UpdateTask and \Mozilla\ElevateTask — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • S3Siphon Exfiltration: BackupAgent/1.0 PUT Uploads to Cloud Storage — C2/Exfiltration Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Payouts King Ransom Note / .ZWIAAW Encryption and GoGRPC Log and Staged Binary Artifacts — Impact Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • PowerShell PSReadLine History Deletion — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Shadow Copy Deletion and Event Log Clearing Before Encryption — Impact Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoGRPC Staging: PowerShell Download to AppData, Unblock-File and Realtek HD Audio Run Key — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoGRPC / RevSocket / RSOX C2 and Staging Infrastructure Contact — C2 Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6111.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 5.253.59[.]222
  • Domain: scansec-upd[.]com
  • File hash: 9136ffb749c6cec13b826cd4f25ffdcf170375889feba9fee28dd74c32578f52

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report analyzes ransomware and extortion activity from April 2025 through March 2026. Combined exfiltration by the top 10 groups by reported leak volume increased 275.8% year over year to 896.2 TB (versus 123.8 TB in the 2023-2024 period). Leak-site victims totaled 7,366 (down 3%), 52 newly active groups were identified, and 60% of the top 15 groups by victim volume were new to the rankings. Known ransom payment volume was $327.8M (down 15.8%), recorded payments fell 20.1%, and the average payment rose 5.3% to $431,995. Leak volume per the report's table: WorldLeaks 207.5 TB, Rhysida 112.6 TB, Qilin 110.1 TB, INC Ransom 96.6 TB, Genesis 75.7 TB, Interlock 71.9 TB, Payouts King 62.9 TB, DragonForce 61.1 TB, Sinobi 50.4 TB, Play 47.5 TB. Rhysida and Embargo each averaged at least 1 TB per victim.

Victim targeting is people-centric: 62% of victims held manager-level titles or above and roughly 75% worked in finance, sales, operations, HR or marketing. Intrusions often begin with routine-looking contact such as a support interaction, a Teams message or an IT-themed request. The reported playbook is spam bombing combined with Microsoft Teams vishing, steering the victim to start a legitimate remote support session (Quick Assist and other common remote support utilities), followed by reconnaissance, persistence, lateral movement, data theft and encryption. The report also cites trusted-tool abuse, GenAI-assisted malware development and use of scripting languages to adapt tooling. A companion Zscaler post reports sector shifts (utilities +622% to 65 victims; government -27%, healthcare -24%, education -17%), extortion without encryption (a healthcare victim reportedly paid $2 million without files being encrypted), and attackers citing HIPAA, SEC disclosure rules and GDPR during negotiations.

The summary blog names no families or IOCs. Supporting ThreatLabz research documents the same access pattern in detail. 'Helpdesk Hijackers' (2026-07-27) describes a likely ransomware initial access broker active since January 2026 that uses Teams vishing and Quick Assist, then a PowerShell one-liner that drops a binary to %APPDATA%, sets an HKCU Run key named 'Realtek HD Audio' and deletes PowerShell history. It deploys the Go gRPC backdoor GoGRPC (variants Lep, Giver, Pet, Kind) and follow-on tools BlindDoor, S3Siphon (S3 exfiltration with user agent BackupAgent/1.0), RevSocket, PyGRPC and RSOX. 'Payouts King Takes Aim at Ransomware Throne' (2026-04-16) attributes some spam bombing/Teams/Quick Assist intrusions to Payouts King with high confidence and documents its scheduled-task persistence and SYSTEM elevation, shadow copy deletion, event log clearing and partial encryption (RSA-4096/AES-256-CTR). IOCs below come from those two companion posts; attribution of the report-wide trend to any single actor is not made by the sources.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

Defense Evasion

T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History; T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery; T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing; T1566.004 Phishing: Spearphishing Voice

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Restrict or block Quick Assist and unsanctioned remote support tools via application control where not required
  • Restrict external Microsoft Teams chats/calls from unmanaged or unknown tenants and require allow-listing of trusted external domains
  • Block IOC domains and IPs listed in this record at DNS, proxy and firewall
  • Alert on HKCU Run value 'Realtek HD Audio', scheduled tasks \Mozilla\UpdateTask and \Mozilla\ElevateTask, and S3 PUT with user agent BackupAgent/1.0
  • Hunt for PowerShell downloading executables to %APPDATA% followed by Unblock-File and PSReadLine history deletion

Workarounds

  • Uninstall Quick Assist via 'Remove-AppxPackage' or disable it with policy if not business-required
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and conditional access on Teams and Microsoft 365

Longer-term hardening

  • Train managers and finance/sales/operations/HR/marketing staff on spam bombing followed by IT-impersonation calls; establish a verified helpdesk callback process
  • Deploy inline DLP and SaaS controls to detect and block bulk exfiltration
  • Segment networks to contain lateral movement
  • Maintain tested offline backups and protect shadow copies and event logs
  • Accelerate SOC response with behavioral detection for remote-support-tool abuse

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft Teams (external tenant chat/calls abused for vishing)
    Vulnerable versions: Configurations allowing external-tenant contact
  • Microsoft — Quick Assist (legitimate remote support tool abused)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10/11 with Quick Assist enabled

Timeline

  • Start of the ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report data window (April 2025 through March 2026).
  • Earliest GoGRPC 'Lep' backdoor variant observed; ThreatLabz tracks the associated Teams vishing/Quick Assist initial access broker cluster from January 2026.
  • GoGRPC 'Giver' variant first seen, adding multiple C2 server support.
  • End of the ThreatLabz 2026 Ransomware Report data window.
  • ThreatLabz publishes Payouts King analysis attributing spam bombing, Teams vishing and Quick Assist intrusions to the group with high confidence; GoGRPC 'Pet' variant first seen the same day.
  • GoGRPC 'Kind' variant first seen, with TLS and an obfuscated gRPC protocol definition.
  • ThreatLabz publishes 'Helpdesk Hijackers' detailing the GoGRPC backdoor, S3Siphon, RevSocket, PyGRPC and RSOX toolset used after Teams vishing and Quick Assist.
  • ThreatLabz publishes the 2026 Ransomware Report summary: exfiltration by top 10 groups up 275.8% to 896.2 TB; known payments $327.8M.
  • Zscaler publishes sector analysis: utilities victims up 622% to 65; government, healthcare and education attacks down year over year.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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