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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6156

Google Project Zero Shortens Vulnerability Disclosure Windows Toward 30 Days Due to AI-Assisted Exploitation

MONITORING

Project Zero ended its 30-day post-patch grace period on November 13, 2026 and now publishes vulnerability details 90 days after reporting, whether or not a fix exists. The window shrinks to 60 days on February 2, 2027 and 30 days on January 3, 2028, citing LLM-accelerated vulnerability discovery and exploitation.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6156
Also known asProject Zero Full X disclosure policy, Full 90 / Full 60 / Full 30
SeverityINFO
First disclosed
Affected productsMultiple vendors Any product reported to Google Project Zero
MalwareSpectre
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1587 Develop Capabilities, T1588 Obtain Capabilities
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, software vendors, enterprise it
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6156 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 9 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Web Server Worker Spawning Shell, Downloader or Recon Tool — Exploitation of Public-Facing Apps (T1190)

Behaviour-first detection for TL-2026-6156 (Google Project Zero Full X disclosure policy, 90/60/30-day windows). As unpatched bug details become public sooner and LLM-assisted patch diffing shortens n-day weaponisation, exploitation of internet-facing apps (T1190) is the most likely consequence. Fires when an IIS/Apache/nginx/PHP/Tomcat worker spawns cmd (T1059.003), PowerShell (T1059.001), a download utility such as certutil, bitsadmin or curl (T1105), scripting hosts or recon tools, and labels each hit with the matching technique.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1190, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
(ParentImage="*\\w3wp.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\httpd.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\nginx.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\php-cgi.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\tomcat*.exe")
(Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR Image="*\\bitsadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\whoami.exe" OR Image="*\\net.exe" OR Image="*\\net1.exe" OR Image="*\\nltest.exe" OR Image="*\\systeminfo.exe")
```A web server worker spawning an interpreter, downloader or recon tool is the classic post-exploit signal for T1190 on unpatched public-facing apps```
| eval behaviour=case(match(Image,"(?i)powershell|pwsh"),"T1059.001_powershell", match(Image,"(?i)cmd\.exe$"),"T1059.003_cmd", match(Image,"(?i)certutil|bitsadmin|curl"),"T1105_ingress_tool_transfer", match(Image,"(?i)wscript|cscript|mshta"),"T1059_script_host", true(),"T1190_post_exploit_recon")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(behaviour) as behaviours values(Image) as child_images values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host ParentImage ParentCommandLine User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User ParentImage behaviours child_images command_lines count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("w3wp.exe","httpd.exe","nginx.exe","php-cgi.exe","tomcat9.exe","tomcat10.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe","whoami.exe","net.exe","net1.exe","nltest.exe","systeminfo.exe")
| extend Behaviour = case(
    FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe"), "T1059.001_powershell",
    FileName =~ "cmd.exe", "T1059.003_cmd",
    FileName in~ ("certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe"), "T1105_ingress_tool_transfer",
    FileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe"), "T1059_script_host",
    "T1190_post_exploit_recon")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Behaviour, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Web Server Worker Process Spawning Shell, Downloader or Recon Tool (TL-2026-6156 Exploitation)
id: 6f1c2a54-3b7e-4d0a-9a51-1c8e5b7d2f01
status: experimental
description: Detects IIS, Apache, nginx, PHP or Tomcat worker processes spawning command interpreters, download utilities or recon utilities, the typical outcome of exploiting an unpatched public-facing application (T1190). Relevant as the Project Zero Full X disclosure policy shortens the window between bug details and weaponised n-day exploits.
references:
    - https://projectzero.google/2026/11/disclosure-policy.html
    - https://projectzero.google/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html
    - https://www.securityweek.com/google-project-zero-sets-course-for-30-day-disclosure-deadline/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\tomcat9.exe'
            - '\tomcat10.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
    - Web applications that legitimately shell out for maintenance or deployment scripts
    - Administrators running diagnostics through a web-based management console
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Web apps that legitimately shell out for deployment or maintenance tasks
  • Admin diagnostics run through web-based management consoles

Tuning notes: Exclude known-good ParentCommandLine / app-pool names and scripted deployment accounts. Scope to hosts tagged as internet-facing. Add further app server parents (e.g. java.exe for specific services) if used in your estate. Prioritise the T1105 behaviour label, which usually means a payload is being staged.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Client Application Spawning Script Host or LOLBin — Client Exploitation (T1203) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Repeated Memory-Corruption Crashes of Exposed Applications (T1190, T1203, T1210) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Patch Diffing / Exploit Development Tooling on Non-Research Hosts (T1587.004, T1588.005) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Linux Web Server Spawning Shell or Download Utility — Web Shell / Exploitation (T1190, T1505.003) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Kernel Driver Loaded from User-Writable Path or Known-Vulnerable Driver (T1068, T1562.001, T1543.003) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Non-Browser Access to [indicator] Disclosure Source (T1588.005, T1596) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SYSTEM Shell from Non-Service Parent or Potato-Class Tool — Local Privilege Escalation (T1068, T1134.001) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Network-Facing Service Spawning Shell or Proxy-Execution LOLBin — Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 9 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6156.

9 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On November 13, 2026, Google Project Zero (Natalie Silvanovich) announced a new 'Full X' disclosure policy. Since 2021 the policy had been '90 + 30': up to 90 days for the vendor to remediate plus a 30-day soak period for patch rollout. Under the new policy, details are disclosed X days after the report reaches the vendor, regardless of whether a fix has shipped. X is 90 now, 60 from February 2, 2027, and 30 from January 3, 2028. Most special cases, including the grace period and the variant policy, are removed. Severity is no longer a disclosure decision factor, and Project Zero will keep tracking fix status but will not treat it as a decision point.

Project Zero's stated rationale is AI-driven. LLMs speed up vulnerability discovery and exploitation and raise the likelihood that several parties, including malicious ones, find the same bug. Attackers can reverse engineer patches quickly, so soak time gives a false sense of secrecy. Project Zero now reports several vulnerabilities a week instead of a few a year, and negotiating fix status and grace periods has become unmanageable. The policy aims to encourage faster remediation, reduce patch gap, and allow automation. SecurityWeek adds that the phased transition addresses users' exposure to unpatched flaws, vendors rushing new fixes while overlooking older, more severe bugs, and vendors that cannot meet the new timelines. Silvanovich described the goal as a schedule that is 'challenging but realistic'.

Exceptions: vulnerabilities exploited in the wild follow Google's vulnerability disclosure policy, which sets disclosure after 7 days. If details are already public from others, Project Zero may publish its own. Details are published earlier if the vendor requests it. Hardware exceptions are rare (Spectre and Meltdown); the policy page says exceptions have been granted five times in 12 years. A related Project Zero post (October 6, 2026, 'How to fix a bug in a fix') urges vendors to build emergency patching capabilities (feature flags, filtering, alternate delivery channels, hotpatching) and states that LLMs let a wider range of actors carry out novel attacks more quickly, so vendors should plan for active exploitation.

This is a policy change, not a vulnerability, malware family or actor campaign. There is no CVE, no PoC and no attributed actor. Defender relevance: the time between a vendor patch and public technical detail is shrinking, and unpatched bug details will become public 90 days after report (later 60 and 30), so patch-management and compensating-control processes must be able to react faster. IOCs listed are entities and sources only; there are no network or file indicators.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Execution

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Resource Development

T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities

Remediation

Patches

  • No specific patch; apply vendor fixes promptly as they ship

Immediate actions

  • Track Project Zero's Reporting Transparency page for vendors and products with open reports
  • Prioritize vendor patches for products with open Project Zero reports as the 90-day deadline approaches
  • Subscribe to vendor security advisories for products in your estate

Workarounds

  • Use virtual patching and mitigations when details are public and no vendor fix exists
  • Reduce exposure of internet-facing services running products with unpatched disclosed bugs

Longer-term hardening

  • Shorten internal patch SLAs to match 90, 60 and 30-day disclosure windows
  • Automate patch deployment and testing pipelines
  • Build emergency remediation capabilities: feature flags, filtering rules, hotpatching and alternate update channels
  • Prepare compensating controls (segmentation, WAF/IPS virtual patching, EDR behavioral detection) for disclosed-but-unpatched bugs

Affected and fixed versions

  • Multiple vendors — Any product reported to Google Project Zero
    Vulnerable versions: Unpatched products at the disclosure deadline
    Fixed in: Vendor-issued fixes

Timeline

  • Project Zero adopts the '90 + 30' policy: 90 days to remediate plus a 30-day grace period for patch rollout (policy in effect since 2021).
  • Project Zero publishes 'How to fix a bug in a fix', urging vendors to build emergency patching capabilities and stating LLMs let more actors exploit vulnerabilities faster.
  • Natalie Silvanovich announces the 'Full X' policy. The grace period ends and Project Zero discloses 90 days after reporting whether or not a fix exists.
  • SecurityWeek reports the policy change and its AI-assisted exploitation rationale.
  • Scheduled move to 'Full 60': disclosure 60 days after reporting.
  • Scheduled move to 'Full 30': disclosure 30 days after reporting.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.

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