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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6242

Three Cybercrime Campaigns Targeting US Logistics: HelloFriends, NodeRemote, Fake Freight Portals (MeshCentral/CastleRAT)

highACTIVE

ANY.RUN reports three cybercrime campaigns aimed at US trucking and logistics workflows: HelloFriends (credential, OTP, SSN, EIN and fuel-card harvesting via fake SAFER/Motus portals, exfiltrated to Telegram), NodeRemote (a Node.js backdoor delivered through fake broker documents) and fake TIMOCOM/DAT freight portals (WebDAV shortcut delivering MeshCentral and CastleRAT).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6242
Also known asHelloFriends, NodeRemote
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMultiple US trucking, freight-brokerage and logistics organizations (Windows endpoints, carrier-verification and freight-matching workflows)
MalwareHelloFriends, NightshadeC2 (Windows), NodeRemote
ToolsMeshCentral
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, T1552 Unsecured Credentials, T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorslogistics, transport, trucking, freight-brokerage
Target regionsunited states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6242 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 11 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: WebDAV Shortcut / ClickFix Script Host Execution — Exploitation (HelloFriends, NodeRemote, Fake TIMOCOM/DAT)

TL-2026-6242: detects PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA or cmd started from a WebDAV path (DavWWWRoot / @SSL), the delivery used by the fake TIMOCOM/DAT freight portal shortcut that leads to MeshCentral and CastleRAT, and ClickFix-style download-and-execute command lines launched from explorer or a browser as used by NodeRemote (T1204.002, T1204.004, T1059.001, T1059.005).

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
  (Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe" OR Image="*wscript.exe" OR Image="*cscript.exe" OR Image="*mshta.exe" OR Image="*cmd.exe")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), parent=lower(ParentImage), parent_cl=lower(ParentCommandLine)
| eval webdav_lnk=if(like(cl,"%davwwwroot%") OR like(parent_cl,"%davwwwroot%") OR like(cl,"%@ssl%") OR like(parent_cl,"%@ssl%"),1,0)
| eval clickfix=if(match(parent,"(explorer|chrome|msedge|firefox)[.]exe$") AND match(cl,"(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-restmethod|frombase64string|-enc |-encodedcommand|mshta +http)"),1,0)
| where webdav_lnk=1 OR clickfix=1
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_command_lines by host User Image ParentImage webdav_lnk clickfix
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User ParentImage Image command_lines parent_command_lines webdav_lnk clickfix count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "cmd.exe")
| extend cl = tolower(ProcessCommandLine), pcl = tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| extend WebDavLnk = cl contains "davwwwroot" or pcl contains "davwwwroot" or cl contains "@ssl" or pcl contains "@ssl"
| extend ClickFix = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe") and cl matches regex @"(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|invoke-restmethod|frombase64string|-enc |-encodedcommand|mshta +http)"
| where WebDavLnk or ClickFix
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, WebDavLnk, ClickFix
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: WebDAV Shortcut or ClickFix Script Host Execution (US Logistics Campaigns)
id: 7f3c1a52-4b8e-4d1a-9c6e-2a5d8b1e0f31
status: experimental
description: Script host or shell started from a WebDAV path (DavWWWRoot or SSL UNC) or launched from explorer or a browser with ClickFix-style download-and-execute command lines. Seen in the fake TIMOCOM/DAT portal (MeshCentral, CastleRAT) and NodeRemote campaigns.
references:
  - https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/us-logistics-cyber-threats-3-campaigns/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1204.004
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  selection_webdav:
    - CommandLine|contains:
        - 'DavWWWRoot'
        - '@SSL'
    - ParentCommandLine|contains:
        - 'DavWWWRoot'
        - '@SSL'
  selection_clickfix_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
  selection_clickfix_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'iex '
      - 'Invoke-Expression'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - ' -enc '
      - ' -EncodedCommand'
      - 'mshta http'
  condition: selection_img and (selection_webdav or (selection_clickfix_parent and selection_clickfix_cmd))
falsepositives:
  - Administrators running scripts from an internal WebDAV or SharePoint mapped drive
  - Legitimate software deployment wrappers using encoded PowerShell launched from explorer
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Admins running scripts from an internal WebDAV/SharePoint mapped drive
  • Software deployment wrappers launching encoded PowerShell from explorer

Tuning notes: Exclude known internal WebDAV hosts and deployment tooling by ParentImage and User; keep the DavWWWRoot branch unfiltered for external hosts. Restrict the ClickFix branch to non-admin users first, then widen. Disable the WebClient service where WebDAV is not required.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Lookalike Carrier-Verification / Freight Portal Access — Exploitation (HelloFriends, Fake TIMOCOM/DAT) · unlock with TL Creds
  • NodeRemote Node.js Backdoor Execution and Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Unauthorized MeshCentral Agent Deployment — C2 / Remote Access (Fake TIMOCOM/DAT Portals, CastleRAT) · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClickFix Paste-and-Run via RunMRU — Exploitation (NodeRemote) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Windows Defender Exclusion Configuration Change — Post-Exploitation (Fake TIMOCOM/DAT Portals) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Telegram API Traffic From Non-Browser Process — Exfiltration / C2 (HelloFriends) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Defender Exclusions, BitLocker Key Retrieval and UAC Bypass Commands — Post-Exploitation (Fake Freight Portals, NodeRemote) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Node.js / Script Host Relay Lookups (GitHub, Blockchain RPC) — C2 (NodeRemote) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 11 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6242.

11 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-11-17 the ANY.RUN blog described three distinct cybercrime campaigns that exploit freight and carrier-verification workflows in the US logistics sector. No CVEs, named threat actors, or explicit IOC lists are published in the article; the technical indicators are held in ANY.RUN sandbox sessions and TI reports. This record therefore documents the campaign behaviors the article states and does not attribute the activity to any actor.

HelloFriends is a credential-harvesting campaign. Victims are lured to fake carrier verification portals that impersonate SAFER and Motus and are personalized with the target company's USDOT number to look legitimate. The pages request Social Security numbers, EINs, fuel-card credentials and passwords. Some pages ask for the password twice and present OTP prompts to capture second-factor codes. Harvested data is sent to the attackers via Telegram.

NodeRemote delivers a Node.js-based backdoor. Malicious files are disguised as broker or partner logistics documents and use ClickFix-style copy-and-paste instructions, PowerShell or VBS scripts for execution. The malware establishes persistence on the host and uses a C2 relay configuration involving blockchain, DNS and GitHub. A UAC bypass capability is visible in the control-panel code; ANY.RUN notes that not every capability was confirmed in observed infections.

The third campaign uses fake freight portals impersonating TIMOCOM and DAT. A WebDAV shortcut disguised as a business resource leads to deployment of MeshCentral, a legitimate remote administration tool abused for unauthorized access. Follow-on actions include attempts to obtain BitLocker recovery keys, configuring Windows Defender exclusions, and deploying CastleRAT. ANY.RUN also notes commodity Microsoft 365 phishing and ClickFix activity affecting logistics-related users. Separate public research (Recorded Future, The Hacker News) documents CastleRAT (C and Python variants, RC4-protected custom protocol) and other threat activity abusing freight-matching platforms such as DAT with ClickFix; the ANY.RUN article does not tie these campaigns to that reporting, so it is cited only as context.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture; T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1568 Dynamic Resolution

Privilege Escalation

T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control

Initial Access

T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

Defense Evasion

T1684.001 Impersonation

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Verify carrier and broker portals out-of-band before entering USDOT, EIN, SSN, fuel-card or login data; navigate to SAFER, Motus, TIMOCOM and DAT only via bookmarked official URLs
  • Block or alert on Telegram API traffic from corporate endpoints where not business-required
  • Alert on outbound WebDAV connections to untrusted hosts and .lnk files launched from WebDAV paths
  • Hunt for unauthorized MeshCentral agents and unexpected Windows Defender exclusions
  • Reset credentials and revoke sessions for any user who entered credentials or OTP codes on a lookalike portal

Workarounds

  • Disable the WebDAV client service (WebClient) on endpoints that do not need it
  • Block Run-dialog / Win+R paste execution through policy where feasible
  • Escrow BitLocker recovery keys in a protected directory and restrict access to them

Longer-term hardening

  • Train dispatch, brokerage and back-office staff on ClickFix copy-and-paste lures and fake rate-confirmation or broker documents
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) rather than OTP codes
  • Restrict PowerShell and Windows Script Host execution for non-admin users and enable script block logging
  • Restrict installation of unapproved remote access tools via application control
  • Detonate suspicious documents, links and shortcuts in a sandbox before use

Affected and fixed versions

  • Multiple — US trucking, freight-brokerage and logistics organizations (Windows endpoints, carrier-verification and freight-matching workflows)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; social-engineering driven

Timeline

  • Context: The Hacker News publishes reporting on CastleRAT (C and Python variants), a RAT the ANY.RUN article lists among tools deployed by the fake freight portal campaign.
  • Context: Analysis cut-off of Recorded Future reporting on a separate cluster using ClickFix lures and fake DAT/Loadlink freight-platform accounts against US carriers (not stated by ANY.RUN to be the same activity).
  • ANY.RUN also notes commodity Microsoft 365 phishing and ClickFix activity affecting logistics-related sites and users; the article publishes no CVEs, named actors or explicit IOC lists, with indicators held in ANY.RUN sandbox sessions and TI reports.
  • ANY.RUN describes fake TIMOCOM and DAT freight portals where a WebDAV shortcut disguised as a business resource leads to MeshCentral deployment, BitLocker recovery key retrieval attempts, Windows Defender exclusions and CastleRAT.
  • ANY.RUN describes NodeRemote: files disguised as broker or partner logistics documents use ClickFix-style instructions, PowerShell or VBS to deploy a persistent Node.js backdoor with a blockchain/DNS/GitHub C2 relay configuration; a UAC bypass appears in the control-panel code but was not confirmed in observed infections.
  • HelloFriends fake SAFER/Motus carrier-verification portals, personalized with USDOT numbers, described as harvesting passwords, OTPs, SSNs, EINs and fuel-card credentials with Telegram exfiltration.
  • ANY.RUN publishes its analysis of three cybercrime campaigns targeting US logistics: HelloFriends, NodeRemote and fake TIMOCOM/DAT freight portals.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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