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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-6177

OAuth Consent Phishing: Password-less Account Takeover via Malicious App Grants (Expel topic; EvilTokens, ConsentFix, FBI PSA)

highTRACKING

Consent phishing tricks a user into approving an attacker-controlled OAuth application on a genuine identity-provider consent screen, giving the attacker a persistent token without ever stealing a password. Access survives password resets and MFA until the grant is revoked. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6177
Also known asConsent phishing, Illicit consent grant, OAuth consent phishing
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft Entra ID / Microsoft 365; Google Google Workspace / Google Account OAuth
MalwareEvilTokens
ToolsConsentFix, MailVault
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1114.002 Remote Email Collection, T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1534 Internal Spearphishing, T1550.001 Application Access Token, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service, T1671 Cloud Application Integration
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorshealth, finance, manufacturing, government administration, technology, individuals
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6177 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 10 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: OAuth Consent Phishing — Broad-Scope Consent Grant (TL-2026-6177)

Detects a user consent to an OAuth application in Entra ID whose payload contains broad delegated scopes (Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, Calendars.ReadWrite, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite). This is the core consent-phishing event: the victim authenticates normally, clicks Accept, and the attacker app receives a refresh token that survives password resets and MFA.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1528, T1566.002, T1204.001
  • Data sources: o365:management:activity (index=o365), Microsoft Purview Unified Audit Log, Entra ID AuditLogs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Consent to application*" earliest=-24h
```TL-2026-6177 T1528 illicit consent grant: keep only user consent events whose payload carries broad delegated scopes```
| eval risky_scope=mvappend(if(match(_raw,"(?i)Mail\.ReadWrite"),"Mail.ReadWrite",null()), if(match(_raw,"(?i)Mail\.Send"),"Mail.Send",null()), if(match(_raw,"(?i)Files\.ReadWrite\.All"),"Files.ReadWrite.All",null()), if(match(_raw,"(?i)Calendars\.ReadWrite"),"Calendars.ReadWrite",null()), if(match(_raw,"(?i)MailboxSettings\.ReadWrite"),"MailboxSettings.ReadWrite",null()))
| where isnotnull(risky_scope)
| eval admin_consent=if(match(_raw,"(?i)IsAdminConsent.{1,40}True"),"true","false")
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(risky_scope) as risky_scopes values(admin_consent) as admin_consent values(ObjectId) as target_app by UserId, ClientIP
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let riskyScopes = dynamic(["Mail.ReadWrite","Mail.ReadWrite.All","Mail.Send","Files.ReadWrite.All","Calendars.ReadWrite","MailboxSettings.ReadWrite"]);
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where OperationName =~ "Consent to application" and Result =~ "success"
| extend Actor = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), ActorIp = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), AppName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName), AppObjectId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| mv-apply p = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties on (
    where tostring(p.displayName) == "ConsentAction.Permissions"
    | extend Permissions = tostring(p.newValue))
| where Permissions has_any (riskyScopes)
| project TimeGenerated, Actor, ActorIp, AppName, AppObjectId, Permissions, CorrelationId

Sigma

title: OAuth Consent Phishing - User Consent to App With Broad Mail or File Scopes
id: 3b7e1c52-6177-4a01-9d1e-0a6c5f2b7a11
status: experimental
description: Detects a successful Entra ID consent grant whose permissions include broad delegated scopes (Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, Calendars.ReadWrite, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite). Characteristic of illicit consent grants and consent phishing that yields a persistent refresh token without a password.
references:
  - https://pushsecurity.com/blog/consent-phishing-the-emerging-phishing-technique-that-can-bypass-2fa
  - https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-oauth-consent-phishing-ai-identity-2026052/
  - https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260901
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1528
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.001
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection_op:
    properties.message: Consent to application
  selection_scope:
    properties.targetResources.modifiedProperties.newValue|contains:
      - 'Mail.ReadWrite'
      - 'Mail.Send'
      - 'Files.ReadWrite.All'
      - 'Calendars.ReadWrite'
      - 'MailboxSettings.ReadWrite'
  condition: selection_op and selection_scope
falsepositives:
  - Sanctioned productivity or CRM apps that legitimately request mail or file scopes
  - Admin-approved enterprise app onboarding
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Sanctioned productivity, CRM or e-signature apps that request mail or file scopes
  • Admin-approved enterprise app onboarding where an admin consents on behalf of the org

Tuning notes: Add an allow-list lookup of approved app display names or AppIds and exclude them. Raise severity when admin_consent=false and the app is unverified or newly registered. Extend the scope matches with organisation-specific sensitive scopes. Ensure the o365 audit feed includes Workload=AzureActiveDirectory.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Device Code Flow Sign-In — EvilTokens Style Phishing · unlock with TL Creds
  • First-Seen OAuth App Bulk Mailbox Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • OAuth Token Redeemed From New IP After Consent · unlock with TL Creds
  • New Service Principal, Credential or Permission Grant for OAuth App Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scripted Bulk SharePoint/OneDrive Download With Application Token · unlock with TL Creds
  • Claude Code Token File ([indicator]) Read by npm or Node Lifecycle Hook · unlock with TL Creds
  • Mailbox Forwarding Rule Created After OAuth Compromise · unlock with TL Creds
  • Internal Spearphishing Burst Through Graph/REST Token · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 10 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6177.

Sample indicators (2 of 10)

  • Domain: microsoftonline[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://microsoft[.]com/devicelogin

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 10 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

10 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

SOURCING NOTE: the Expel blog post that triggered this record ('Consent phishing skips the password and walks in the front door') could not be retrieved; WebFetch returned only the title and WebSearch did not surface it. Nothing below is attributed to Expel. This record is a topic-level synthesis from other fetched sources (Push Security, Cloud Security Alliance, a secondary summary of an FBI IC3 PSA). Severity is an analyst assessment based on the reported scale of related campaigns, not a figure taken from the Expel article.

Attack mechanics: the attacker registers an application with a major identity provider (for example Microsoft Entra ID or Google Workspace) and requests broad delegated permissions. A lure (a shared-document email, or a message on a commercial messaging app) sends the victim to the provider's genuine login and consent page, with a valid domain and certificate. The victim authenticates normally, including MFA, then clicks Accept. The attacker exchanges the returned authorization code for an access token and a long-lived refresh token. Because the app calls APIs with a valid token, sign-in logs look clean, and a password change or MFA enrollment does not end access. Only revoking the grant or deleting the app does. Push Security describes the victim then seeing a generic 'File does not exist' error.

Permissions and abuse: Push Security describes file read/write, send-mail-as-user and mailbox-settings access. The latter allows a forwarding rule that copies all incoming mail to the attacker. Mail sent from the victim's account can be used for further phishing of colleagues. CSA cites Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All and Calendars.ReadWrite as examples of broad scopes to review.

Related 2025-2026 activity reported by CSA (from its research note, not independently verified): the EvilTokens phishing-as-a-service kit (device code phishing, reported to have compromised 340+ Microsoft 365 organizations in five countries, surfacing mid-February 2026); ConsentFix, first documented by Push Security in December 2025, where v3 (May 2026) automates token exchange and reuses an existing Entra ID session so no password or MFA prompt occurs; TA4903 (Proofpoint-tracked, financially motivated) expanding into device code phishing in March 2026; the Salesloft/Gainsight OAuth token campaign; and a Vercel breach pivoting from a persisted Google Workspace OAuth grant to Context.ai. A secondary summary of an FBI IC3 PSA (dated September 1, 2026; identifier inconsistent in the secondary source) describes targeting of prominent individuals, their families and acquaintances via commercial messaging apps, with government, media and event-coordinator pretexts.

No attacker-owned IP addresses, domains or file hashes were published in any fetched source, so no BeaconBeagle C2 correlation was possible.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1114.002 Remote Email Collection; T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Execution

T1204.001 Malicious Link

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token

Lateral Movement

T1534 Internal Spearphishing

lateral-movement

T1550.001 Application Access Token

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link; T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service

Persistence

T1671 Cloud Application Integration

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Revoke the malicious OAuth grant or delete the app on the provider's connected-apps / enterprise applications page first, then reset the password and re-check MFA
  • Check mailbox rules and forwarding for auto-forward rules or rules that hide security alerts, and review sent mail for phishing sent from the victim's address
  • Audit all OAuth apps in Microsoft and Google tenants, prioritizing apps unused for 90+ days, broad-permission apps and unsanctioned apps

Workarounds

  • Restrict users from granting consent to third-party apps, or allow users to request apps for administrator approval
  • Disable the device code flow via Conditional Access where not needed (note: Conditional Access does not stop authorization-code consent phishing)

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce an app allow-list and admin consent workflow for sensitive delegated permissions
  • Monitor OAuth grant state continuously and alert on new authorizations outside approved catalogs
  • Enable Continuous Access Evaluation with risky sign-in signals from Entra ID Protection and use token binding where supported

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft Entra ID / Microsoft 365
    Vulnerable versions: Tenants permitting user consent to third-party apps
  • Google — Google Workspace / Google Account OAuth
    Vulnerable versions: Accounts permitting third-party app grants

Timeline

  • Per Push Security, Microsoft warned (July 2020; exact day not stated) that consent phishing attacks were increasing.
  • Per Push Security, SANS Institute reported being victimized (August 2020; exact day not stated) after an employee was convinced to install a malicious Microsoft 365 add-in.
  • Push Security published its explainer on consent phishing bypassing 2FA, describing the fake file-share lure, Accept click, 'File does not exist' error and persistent access.
  • Per CSA, Push Security first documented ConsentFix (December 2025; exact day not stated).
  • Per CSA, the EvilTokens device-code phishing-as-a-service platform surfaced (mid-February 2026; approximate date).
  • CSA published research on device code phishing hitting 340+ Microsoft 365 organizations; TA4903 reported expanding into device code phishing the same month.
  • CSA research note published; it documents ConsentFix v3 (automated token exchange reusing an active Entra ID session) as reported by BleepingComputer.
  • FBI IC3 PSA on OAuth consent phishing reported by a secondary source (identifier inconsistent between I-090126 and PSA260901; verify on ic3.gov).

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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