Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-6238
Credential-harvesting phishing page collecting victim MX records via DNS-over-HTTPS, hosted on Google Cloud Storage
A password-expiry phishing lure leads to a credential-harvesting page hosted on storage.googleapis.com. Besides the password, the kit collects public IP, geolocation, browser info, language and timestamp, plus the MX record of the victim's email domain via a DNS-over-HTTPS lookup to dns.google, and exfiltrates everything through the Telegram Bot API.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6238 |
|---|---|
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Multiple Email users and organizations targeted by the password-expiry phishing lure |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204 User Execution, T1566 Phishing, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1590 Gather Victim Network Information, T1598 Phishing for Information |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6238 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 10 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Password-Expiry Phishing Page on Google Cloud Storage (storage.googleapis.com/alx2/03/1a/we.html) — Exploitation
Behaviour-first detection of the TL-2026-6238 credential-harvesting landing page: proxy requests to the abused storage.googleapis.com host for the reported /alx2/03/1a/we.html object or /alx2/ path, plus a behavioural branch for Google Cloud Storage HTML pages opened from webmail clients. Block by URL path, not by domain, because storage.googleapis.com is legitimate. Maps to Phishing (T1566), User Execution (T1204) and Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services (T1583).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566, T1204, T1583
- Data sources: proxy: index=proxy sourcetype pan:url/zscalernss-web/bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog/squid:access, CommonSecurityLog (CEF web proxy), Sigma logsource category proxy
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:url","zscalernss-web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog","squid:access") earliest=-24h
(url="*storage.googleapis.com/alx2/*" OR url="*/alx2/03/1a/we.html*" OR (url="*storage.googleapis.com/*.html*" http_referrer IN ("*mail.google.com*","*outlook.office.com*","*outlook.live.com*","*mail.yahoo.com*")))
| eval match_type=case(like(url,"%/alx2/03/1a/we.html%"),"exact_ioc_we.html", like(url,"%/alx2/%"),"alx2_path_pattern", true(),"gcs_html_from_webmail")
| stats count as hits min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(match_type) as match_types values(http_referrer) as referrers by src user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - hitsMicrosoft KQL
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "storage.googleapis.com"
| extend MatchType = case(
RequestURL contains "/alx2/03/1a/we.html", "exact_ioc_we.html",
RequestURL contains "/alx2/", "alx2_path_pattern",
RequestURL matches regex @"(?i)\.html#[^/\s]*@[^/\s]+", "email_in_fragment",
"")
| where isnotempty(MatchType)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, SourceIP, SourceUserName, RequestURL, RequestMethod, MatchTypeSigma
title: Password-Expiry Phishing Page on Google Cloud Storage (alx2/we.html)
id: 6f1c2a52-8d0e-4c1b-9a63-2b7d5e0f1a01
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests to the Google Cloud Storage object path /alx2/03/1a/we.html (or the /alx2/ bucket path) serving a credential-harvesting password-expiry phishing page (TL-2026-6238).
references:
- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/33526
- https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/a-phishing-tale-of-doh-and-dns-mx-abuse/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1583
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_host:
cs-host: 'storage.googleapis.com'
selection_exact:
c-uri|contains: '/alx2/03/1a/we.html'
selection_pattern:
c-uri|contains: '/alx2/'
condition: selection_host and 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Google Cloud Storage buckets that happen to use an /alx2/ prefix
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate Google Cloud Storage buckets that use an /alx2/ object prefix
- Users opening legitimate HTML documents hosted on storage.googleapis.com from webmail
Tuning notes: Requires TLS inspection or URL-category logging so the full path is visible. Add the CIM sourcetypes actually used in your proxy tier. The URL fragment (recipient email) is never sent to the server, so rely on the path match. Drop the webmail-referrer branch if it is noisy; allowlist known internal GCS buckets by exact path.
- Email Click-Through to Google Cloud Storage Phishing Page (alx2 / Email in URL Fragment) · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser DoH Query to [indicator] Shortly After Google Cloud Storage Page Access — MX Recon · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser Connection to Telegram Bot API ([indicator]) — Credential Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Screenshot Background Requested by a Google Cloud Storage Page — Phishing Page Render · unlock with TL Creds
- DoH MX Lookup Initiated from a [indicator] Page — Phishing Kit Recon · unlock with TL Creds
- Telegram Bot API Message with 'MX Record' Field — Phishing Kit Data Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser-Side DoH MX Lookup via [indicator]/resolve — Victim Email Infrastructure Recon · unlock with TL Creds
- Telegram Bot API Exfiltration ([indicator]) from Non-Telegram Client — C2/Exfil · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 10 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6238.
Sample indicators (3 of 10)
- Domain:
storage[.]googleapis[.]com - Domain:
dns[.]google - Domain:
thum[.]io
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 10 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
SANS ISC reports the MX data was not used to customize the page.
SANS ISC handler Jan Kopriva analyzed a phishing campaign received over several weeks. The email is a generic 'your password will expire today' lure. The link points to a page on Google Cloud Storage (storage.googleapis.com/alx2/03/1a/we.html) with the recipient's email address in the URL fragment. The page renders a generic login form personalized with the domain of the recipient's address and uses a screenshot of the target organization's website as background, fetched via the thum.io screenshot service. The author notes this background failed for isc.sans.edu but worked convincingly for another domain.
The page code is hidden behind two layers of URL encoding and additional JavaScript obfuscation. After deobfuscation, the kit supports multiple languages and, on submission, collects the password, the visitor's public IP address, geographic location, browser information, language and a timestamp. It also performs a DNS-over-HTTPS lookup for the MX record of the victim's email domain against Google's public resolver (dns.google/resolve, type MX) and adds an 'MX Record' field to the stolen-data message. The data is exfiltrated to the attacker through the Telegram Bot API. The diary does not disclose the bot token or chat ID.
The MX lookup does not appear to customize the page. The author says it could help an attacker identify the target's email infrastructure or prioritize credentials, but this cannot be confirmed. Related prior reporting is Infoblox's March 2025 research on Morphing Meerkat, a phishing-as-a-service operation that used DoH MX queries to select among 114 brand templates, relied on open redirects and compromised sites, and could exfiltrate via a Telegram bot webhook. No link between this campaign and Morphing Meerkat is stated in the source, and no actor, malware family, IP address or hash is reported. Severity and category are analyst-assigned. No confirmed victims are reported.
Defender relevance: the kit abuses trusted cloud and utility services (Google Cloud Storage, dns.google, thum.io, Telegram), so domain reputation alone will not catch it. Useful hunting pivots are browser or proxy traffic to dns.google/resolve with type=MX, requests to api.telegram.org from non-Telegram clients, and storage.googleapis.com URLs carrying an email address in the fragment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Execution
Initial Access
Exfiltration
T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Resource Development
Reconnaissance
T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1590 Gather Victim Network Information; T1598 Phishing for Information
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block or alert on the reported storage.googleapis.com/alx2/ phishing path at the web proxy and email gateway
- Search proxy and DNS logs for dns.google/resolve queries with type=MX originating from user browsers
- Search web proxy logs for api.telegram.org POST/GET requests from non-Telegram clients
- Reset credentials and review sign-in activity for users who submitted passwords to the page
Workarounds
- Use secure email gateway URL rewriting and detonation for links to cloud-storage hosted HTML pages
Longer-term hardening
- Block user endpoints from reaching public DoH resolvers and force use of approved resolvers (per Infoblox guidance)
- Restrict Telegram Bot API and unneeded file-sharing or cloud-storage hosting access where not business-critical
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) so harvested passwords are not sufficient
- Run user awareness training on password-expiry lures
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — Email users and organizations targeted by the password-expiry phishing lure
Timeline
- Infoblox publishes 'A phishing tale of DoH and DNS MX abuse', documenting Morphing Meerkat PhaaS using DoH MX lookups to select phishing templates and Telegram bot webhooks among its collection methods.
- SANS ISC diary 'A phishing page interested in MX records' (Threat level: green) published.
- Kit found to query MX records of the victim domain via locked-ioc-6 DoH and include an 'MX Record' field in the data sent to the attacker via the Telegram Bot API; MX data not used to customize the page.
- Two layers of URL encoding and JavaScript obfuscation removed, revealing multi-language support, locked-ioc-7 background fetching, and data collection logic.
- Phishing page identified on Google Cloud Storage at locked-ioc-3locked-ioc-4 with the recipient email address in the URL fragment.
- SANS ISC handler Jan Kopriva reports phishing emails with a password-expiry lure received over several weeks.
Sources cited
- Infoblox: A phishing tale of DoH and DNS MX abuse (Morphing Meerkat) infoblox.com · Research · 2025-03-27
- SANS ISC Diary: A phishing page interested in MX records isc.sans.edu · Blog · 2026-11-17
- The Hacker News: New Morphing Meerkat phishing kit The Hacker News · News · 2025-03-27
- Security Affairs: Morphing Meerkat phishing kits exploit DNS MX records securityaffairs.com · News · 2025-03-27
- SecurityWeek: Morphing Meerkat phishing kits target over 100 brands SecurityWeek · News · 2025-03-27
- ITWire: Morphing Meerkat spoofs over 100 brands and steals credentials itwire.com · News · 2025-03-27
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.