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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-6188

CVE-2026-84869 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts

criticalACTIVE

Huntress confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), where a guest in a ScreenConnect Support/Access session can trigger file-transfer actions that the technician's host client processes without authorization or confirmation, including running files with elevated rights. Huntress observed a technician workstation fully compromised in about 9 seconds on 2026-11-12 and 688,000+ guest 'run file' requests across 42 MSP servers from 29 IPs since 2026-10-20. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6188, CVE-2026-84869
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2026-84869 (added )
EPSSCVE-2026-84869: 0.6% (51.1th percentile)
Affected productsConnectWise ScreenConnect (host clients and Access agents)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-862, CWE-269
ToolsConnectWise - S0591, ScreenConnect
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1012 Query Registry, T1027.004 Compile After Delivery, T1049 System Network Connections Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.003 One-Way Communication, T1134.002 Create Process with Token, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1218.007 Msiexec and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsmanaged service providers, it services, technology
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6188 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ScreenConnect Client Executing Guest-Pushed Batch File (CVE-2026-84869 Exploitation)

Behavior-first detection of CVE-2026-84869 exploitation: a ScreenConnect host client or Access agent spawns cmd, PowerShell, WScript or mshta against a batch file in the user Temp folder, or a spray filename seen in the wild (update.bat, update_<8hex>.bat such as update_224ac089.bat, Run-Lateral.bat, Sync.bat, svc_payload.cmd, marker.txt, argument xhsdf_wrwerhjf_shhdga). Missing authorization lets a guest trigger run-file with no Host confirmation (T1203, T1199).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1203, T1199, T1059.003
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  (ParentImage="*\\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe")
  (Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe")
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(update(_[0-9a-f]{8})?\\.bat|Run-Lateral\\.bat|Sync\\.bat|svc_payload\\.cmd|marker\\.txt|xhsdf_wrwerhjf_shhdga)"),1,0)
| eval from_temp=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\.*\\.(bat|cmd)"),1,0)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as child_images max(ioc_hit) as ioc_hit max(from_temp) as from_temp by host, User, ParentImage
| where ioc_hit=1 OR from_temp=1
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let ScreenConnectClients = dynamic(["ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe", "ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (ScreenConnectClients)
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
| extend IocHit = ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(update(_[0-9a-f]{8})?\.bat|Run-Lateral\.bat|Sync\.bat|svc_payload\.cmd|marker\.txt|xhsdf_wrwerhjf_shhdga)"
| extend FromTemp = ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\.*\.(bat|cmd)"
| where IocHit or FromTemp
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, IocHit, FromTemp

Sigma

title: ScreenConnect Client Spawns Script Interpreter Running Guest-Pushed Batch File (CVE-2026-84869)
id: 3f1c7a52-8b6e-4d2a-9c41-6e0b5a7d1f10
status: experimental
description: Detects a ScreenConnect host client or Access agent spawning cmd, PowerShell, WScript or mshta against a batch file in Temp or a known CVE-2026-84869 spray filename such as update_<8hex>.bat, Run-Lateral.bat, Sync.bat, svc_payload.cmd or marker.txt. A guest session can trigger run-file actions on the technician client without Host confirmation.
references:
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/cve-2026-84869-screenconnect-technician-exploitation
  - https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1199
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1203
  - attack.t1059.003
  - cve.2026.84869
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
      - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe'
      - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
  selection_ioc:
    CommandLine|re: '(?i)(update(_[0-9a-f]{8})?\.bat|Run-Lateral\.bat|Sync\.bat|svc_payload\.cmd|marker\.txt|xhsdf_wrwerhjf_shhdga)'
  selection_temp:
    CommandLine|re: '(?i)\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\.*\.(bat|cmd)'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child and (selection_ioc or selection_temp)
falsepositives:
  - Technicians legitimately transferring and running a script in a support session
  - Authorized RMM automation that stages .bat or .cmd files through ScreenConnect
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Technicians legitimately transferring and running a script in a support session
  • Authorized RMM automation that stages .bat or .cmd files through ScreenConnect

Tuning notes: Exclude known-good internal script names and technician accounts after baselining; keep the update*.bat / Run-Lateral / Sync / svc_payload / marker names as always-alert. Raise to a page when the parent client version is below 26.6.5. Extend the parent list if your fleet uses renamed ConnectWise Control binaries.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ScreenConnect Client Drops Startup-Folder Payload or Spray Filename (CVE-2026-84869) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Post-Exploitation Recon and Stage-2 Download Chain (reg query, net session, curl MSI, msiexec /a) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rogue Rebranded ScreenConnect Client WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Hidden Relaunch of Guest-Pushed Batch via PowerShell and WScript.Shell · unlock with TL Creds
  • Silent Msiexec Administrative Unpack (wupdate_*.msi to wclient_*) and Runas Trustlevel 0x20000 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Script Interpreter or curl Reporting to Telegram Bot API (Victim Beacon) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Seclogon Service Change, Runas Low-Trust Launch and PowerShell csc Compile Correlation · unlock with TL Creds
  • C2: [indicator] ScreenConnect Relay (Port 8041), [indicator] and Known Spray Guest IPs · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6188.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 194.15.36[.]33
  • Domain: masterdarky[.]com
  • File hash: f8871b1561d5c77c297378a7f49c84de52a01ff297395544f0e95d13ef972841

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

CVE-2026-84869 (CWE-862 Missing Authorization, CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management; CVSS 3.1 9.9, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) was disclosed by ConnectWise on 2026-09-08 in the ScreenConnect 26.6.5 security bulletin and added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2026-09-11 (federal remediation due 2026-09-14). The flaw is in the client, not the server: during an active Support or Access session, a guest can trigger file-transfer and run-file actions that the technician's host client or Access agent processes without authorization or Host confirmation, including running files with elevated rights. ConnectWise states all versions prior to 26.6.5 are affected and that ScreenConnect servers themselves are not affected, so a server-only update does not fix the issue. Huntress observed vulnerable client versions 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 exploited in the wild.

Huntress documented a mass spray beginning 2026-10-20 and still active on three servers at publication (2026-11-16): 688,000+ guest 'run file' requests for update.bat or update_<8 hex>.bat across 42 MSP servers from 29 IPs. The busiest server saw 10 guest sessions from seven IPs make 70,414 requests. The 8-hex suffix appears to be a wave ID rather than a per-victim ID (an earlier wave used update_c99a4b29.bat). Spray sessions often have blank names or default Windows hostnames, a guest version matching the server build (25.8.3.9466 on the busiest server) and empty public keys on about half. 27 spray sessions across 17 servers had the Company property (CustomProperty1) set to 'crypto client'. Earlier, more targeted activity included a near-miss on 2026-10-19 (Run-Lateral.bat pushed seven times at a 24.2 client, 4.3 seconds after the technician disconnected), path-traversal pushes of Sync.bat into technician Startup folders on 2026-10-23, 24 and 27, a hand-operated canary (marker.txt) from 91.224.92.167, and an svc_payload.cmd push from 107.148.223.37.

On 2026-11-12 at 16:46:20-16:46:29 UTC an MSP technician workstation was fully compromised in about 9 seconds. The guest-pushed update_224ac089.bat ran from the client's Temp folder with argument xhsdf_wrwerhjf_shhdga, relaunched itself hidden via PowerShell and WScript.Shell, decoded a Base64-encoded Telegram bot token and chat ID to report the new victim, and performed recon (reg query of the Windows product name and build, a check for its own client, net session for admin rights). It then used curl (with retry and speed-limit flags) to download https://masterdarky.com/WindowsUpdate.msi to %TEMP%\wupdate_224ac089.msi and unpacked it as an administrative image with msiexec /a TARGETDIR=%LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_224ac089 /qn, which leaves no install record. It set the seclogon service to auto-start and started it, launched the payload via runas /trustlevel:0x20000 and PowerShell Start-Process (csc.exe compiled a PowerShell Add-Type), and started a rebranded ScreenConnect client, WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, with parameters h=masterdarky.com&p=8041, connecting to the attacker's relay. No further payloads were described.

Huntress assesses with high confidence that the spray operator and the masterdarky.com operator are the same; no named threat actor is given. This activity is separate from the SCKit worm campaign (rogue clients via a vulnerable third-party server extension, reported 2026-11-11) and the fake crypto-exchange session campaign, though targeting overlapped on at least one technician. Compromise of an MSP technician workstation exposes RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, password-vault and customer admin credentials, creating downstream customer risk. Fix: update all technician host clients and Access agents to 26.6.5 or later. Interim mitigation: remove the TransferFiles permission (formerly TransferFilesInSession) from every role.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1012 Query Registry; T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027.004 Compile After Delivery; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.007 Msiexec; T1564.003 Hidden Window

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Command and Control

T1102.003 One-Way Communication; T1219.002 Remote Desktop Software; T1571 Non-Standard Port

Privilege Escalation

T1134.002 Create Process with Token

Initial Access

T1199 Trusted Relationship

Persistence

T1543.003 Windows Service; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1608.001 Upload Malware

Remediation

Patches

  • ConnectWise ScreenConnect 26.6.5 (bulletin 2026-09-08); on-premises requires 25.4 or later and a license under maintenance; cloud instances are already upgraded but host clients must be reinstalled and Access agents updated

Immediate actions

  • Update all technician host clients and Access agents to ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later (a server-only update does not fix the flaw)
  • If patching is not immediate, remove the TransferFiles permission (formerly TransferFilesInSession) from all roles and session groups under Administration > Security > Roles
  • Hunt server-side in a copy of App_Data\Session.db for RanFiles (EventType 85) or SentFiles (EventType 86) from guest connections (ProcessType = 2) overlapping an open Host connection (ProcessType = 1)
  • Delete blank-named guest sessions that repeatedly request update*.bat, then re-check because they return
  • Block outbound traffic to masterdarky.com and 194.15.36.33, and alert on ScreenConnect relay traffic on port 8041 to unowned domains
  • On a hit: isolate the workstation, kill the rogue client, remove %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<id> and %TEMP%\wupdate_<id>.msi, reset seclogon to its normal start type, and rotate all reachable credentials (RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, password vault, customer admin accounts)

Workarounds

  • Deselect the TransferFiles permission for every role that has it (temporary, not a substitute for patching)

Longer-term hardening

  • Restrict guest session joins and limit web interface and installer access by IP or VPN
  • Do not join unattended sessions you cannot tie to a customer
  • Review users, roles and permissions; remove unrecognized accounts; enforce MFA
  • Deploy EDR detections for ScreenConnect host clients spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe or notepad from Temp, and for msiexec /a administrative installs followed by runas /trustlevel:0x20000

Affected and fixed versions

  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (host clients and Access agents)
    Vulnerable versions: All versions prior to 26.6.5 (NVD CPE: up to but excluding 26.6.5.9742); Exploited in the wild on client versions 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8
    Fixed in: 26.6.5 and later

Timeline

  • ConnectWise discloses CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9) in the ScreenConnect 26.6.5 security bulletin; servers are not affected, the flaw is in host clients and Access agents.
  • CISA adds CVE-2026-84869 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (federal remediation due 2026-09-14).
  • Guest at locked-ioc-22 pushes locked-ioc-8 seven times at a 24.2 client; the technician had disconnected 4.3 seconds earlier.
  • Spray campaign of guest 'run file' requests (locked-ioc-26 / update_<8hex>.bat) against MSP ScreenConnect servers begins; 688,000+ requests across 42 servers from 29 IPs by publication.
  • First of three days (Oct 23, 24, 27) of path-traversal pushes of Sync.bat into technicians' Startup folders, from locked-ioc-17 and locked-ioc-18.
  • Separate SCKit campaign (rogue clients via a vulnerable third-party server extension) reported by Huntress.
  • 16:46:20-16:46:29 UTC: MSP technician workstation fully compromised in about 9 seconds; locked-ioc-7 payload and rebranded ScreenConnect client installed.
  • 16:03 UTC: locked-ioc-6 sprayed at five MSP servers.
  • 01:49 UTC: canary locked-ioc-27 run on a second technician's client from locked-ioc-16 (hand-operated, non-empty key, screenshot).
  • Huntress publishes its analysis; spray still active against three servers.

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2026-84869

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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