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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6252

ARTEX open-source agentic AI pentest framework abused by threat actors (Storm-3358, Storm-0940, others) for automated recon and exploitation

highACTIVE

ARTEX, an open-source Go-based agentic AI penetration-testing framework published on GitHub on July 26, 2026, has been weaponized by multiple clusters, including Microsoft-tracked Storm-3358 (financial organizations) and Storm-0940 (ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply chain, IT/software vendors), a Chinese-speaking actor that breached South Korean banks, and operators attacking Japanese companies.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6252, CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619
Also known asARTEX PRO, ScopeWeaver, PHP2Shell
SeverityHIGH
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2026-109618 (added ), CVE-2026-109619 (added )
EPSSCVE-2026-109618: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2026-109619: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsPHP Group PHP; ConnectWise ConnectWise Cloud Backup; Okta / Microsoft / AWS Okta, Entra ID, Amazon Cognito (authentication endpoints probed)
AttributionStorm-3358, Storm-0940 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareAdaptixC2, Cobalt Strike, Storm, VShell, WISP
ToolsARTEX, CLIProxyAPI, CyberStrikeAI, New API
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1018 Remote System Discovery, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1110.003 Password Spraying, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1505.003 Web Shell, T1571 Non-Standard Port and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsfinance, technology, government administration, defense, health, education
Target regionssouth korea, japan, Southeast Asia, North America, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6252 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ARTEX Post-Exploitation: Web Server Process Spawning Shell or Recon Tools (Linux)

Detects Linux web-server and PHP runtime processes (php-fpm, php-cgi, apache2, httpd, nginx, lsphp, FrankenPHP) spawning shells, nmap, curl, wget or interpreters, the behaviour seen after ARTEX agents land webshells via SSRF/file-upload or PHP2Shell flaws. Behaviour over tool names, per the research recommendation (service accounts spawning shells, nmap/curl/wget from unexpected parents).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.004, T1505.003, T1046, T1018
  • Data sources: splunk:index=linux:sourcetype=sysmon:linux, microsoft_defender:DeviceProcessEvents, sysmon_for_linux
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" (EventCode=1 OR EventID=1) earliest=-24h
```TL-2026-6252 ARTEX webshell post-exploitation T1059.004 T1505.003 T1046 T1018```
| eval parent_base=lower(mvindex(split(ParentImage,"/"),-1)), img_base=lower(mvindex(split(Image,"/"),-1))
| where match(parent_base,"^(php-fpm[0-9.]*|php-cgi|lsphp[0-9]*|php[0-9.]*|apache2|httpd|nginx|frankenphp|lshttpd)$")
| where match(img_base,"^(sh|bash|dash|zsh|nc|ncat|socat|nmap|masscan|curl|wget|python[0-9.]*|perl|ruby)$")
| table _time host User ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine
| sort 0 - _time

Microsoft KQL

// TL-2026-6252 ARTEX web server spawning shell or recon tooling
let WebParents = dynamic(["php-fpm","php-cgi","php","lsphp","apache2","httpd","nginx","frankenphp","lshttpd","w3wp.exe","php-cgi.exe","httpd.exe"]);
let SpawnedTools = dynamic(["sh","bash","dash","zsh","nc","ncat","socat","nmap","masscan","curl","wget","python3","perl","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","whoami.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) in (WebParents)
| where tolower(FileName) in (SpawnedTools)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Web Server or PHP Runtime Spawning Shell or Recon Tool (ARTEX Webshell Activity)
id: 2b9e4a7c-51d3-4f68-a3e0-7c18d94f2b52
status: experimental
description: Detects Linux web server and PHP processes spawning shells, nmap, curl, wget or interpreters, consistent with ARTEX agent post-exploitation after webshell deployment.
references:
  - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/
  - https://socprime.com/blog/artex-detection-hunting-the-ai-pentest-framework-turned-attack-platform/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.004
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1505.003
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1046
  - attack.t1018
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_parent_contains:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - 'php-fpm'
      - 'php-cgi'
      - 'lsphp'
      - 'frankenphp'
  selection_parent_endswith:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/apache2'
      - '/httpd'
      - '/nginx'
      - '/php'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - '/dash'
      - '/nc'
      - '/ncat'
      - '/socat'
      - '/nmap'
      - '/curl'
      - '/wget'
      - '/python3'
      - '/perl'
  condition: 1 of selection_parent_* and selection_child
falsepositives:
  - Web applications that legitimately shell out (backup, image processing, mail)
  - Administrators running commands under a web service context
level: high

Known false positives:

  • CMS or application plugins that legitimately invoke curl, wget or shell helpers from php-fpm
  • Administrators troubleshooting under a web service account

Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate web-to-shell parent/child pairs per host and exclude by CommandLine; alert higher when child is nmap, nc or socat or when the command line contains an external IP; extend parent list for Tomcat or Node if used.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Storm-0940 ARTEX-Driven Cloud Identity Password Spray with Successful Sign-In · unlock with TL Creds
  • ARTEX Agent Cloud Permission Testing via AWS EC2 Dry-Run Burst · unlock with TL Creds
  • ARTEX Operator LLM Reseller and Model-API DNS Lookups from Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
  • Web Server Process Writing Script File to Web Root (ARTEX Webshell Upload) · unlock with TL Creds
  • ARTEX Post-Exploitation Toolkit Execution (GodPotato, fscan, FRP, vshell, AdaptixC2, Invoke-TheHash) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Payload Download from ARTEX / PHP2Shell Staging Infrastructure via curl, wget or LOLBin · unlock with TL Creds
  • ARTEX API Recon and PHP2Shell Session-Upload Exploitation in Web Logs · unlock with TL Creds
  • ARTEX Ecosystem C2 and Staging Egress to Known IOCs and Operator Ports · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6252.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 38.244.50[.]120
  • Domain: xcai[.]pro
  • URL: hxxp://45[.]115[.]26[.]26:8000/cCmono

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The FBI issued a FLASH advisory in November 2026.

ARTEX (GitHub: Autumn-27/ARTEX, AGPL-3.0, released 2026-07-26) is an LLM-driven autonomous pentesting framework written in Go with a Next.js console on PostgreSQL, bundling nmap and mitmproxy and syncing assets from the same author's ScopeSentry platform. A Planner agent converts an operator goal (e.g. 'gain admin panel access') into attack intents; Worker agents claim intents, run tools such as nmap, and record results in an asset graph and an exploration graph until the goal is met. It has no model of its own and drives Anthropic, OpenAI or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint; observed abuse used DeepSeek, GLM, Grok, Kimi, Zhipu AI and xAI models, frequently through self-hosted LLM proxies/resellers (CLIProxyAPI, New API) and the reseller domain xcai.pro. Mandiant/GTIG recorded 27 events in 23 seconds and automated error correction used to land webshells. The default console listens on tcp/8787.

CrowdStrike (2026-10-07) reported a likely Chinese-speaking, financially motivated, unattributed actor running ARTEX from 38.244.50.120 (open directory on port 18899; DeepSeek primary model plus Claude Code sessions backed by GLM and Grok) against South Korean finance; a broker-facing loan service and an employee mobile system were breached and data exfiltrated (FBI/press cite Shinhan, KB Kookmin and Hana, ~67,000 people). The author disowned malicious use and removed the repository on 2026-10-08; forks and rebrands (e.g. ScopeWeaver) and a commercial ARTEX PRO persist. Microsoft attributed an ARTEX-driven ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise to China-state-aligned Storm-0940 (sign-in attempts against 2,250+ Microsoft 365 tenants peaking at 2,900/min; privileged cloud access in under three hours in some cases), followed by Wiz-reported Storm-0940 activity against IT/software vendors with Okta, Entra ID and AWS Cognito authentication probing, account-recovery abuse and IP/user-agent rotation. Microsoft (2026-11-06) described Storm-3358, a financially motivated Cambodia-based cluster (per secondary coverage), using ARTEX with conventional tools to find SSRF and anonymous file-upload flaws in internet-facing systems of financial organizations (mainly Southeast Asia), then deploying WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2 RATs and abusing cloud identities. Google/GTIG tracks a related campaign as UNC7228 (overlap with Storm-0940 per secondary reporting); CrowdStrike separately ties VAPOR PANDA to ARTEX infrastructure (secondary reporting, unverified). ARTEX was also seen on servers attacking Japanese companies (API probing and WAF evasion in Japan and South Korea).

Censys counted 1,465 exposed ARTEX consoles on Nov 3-4, 2026 (US 726, Hong Kong 387, China 177, Japan 51), concentrated in PEG Tech AS54600 (493 hosts) and Yancy Limited AS138415 (157), with 32 hosts exposing open directories containing post-exploitation kits (Cobalt Strike, AdaptixC2, Vshell, FRP, NPS, GodPotato, fscan, stagers). Related agentic frameworks (CyberStrikeAI, PentAGI, HexStrike AI, CAIRN) appear on the same hosts. The related PHP2Shell flaws (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619; CVSS v4.0 9.2; unauthenticated RCE in PHP core; fixed in PHP 8.5.12/8.4.27/8.3.36/8.2.35 on 2026-10-21) have public PoCs and the SOC Prime source describes them as the bug class agentic frameworks favor; however, sources disagree on mechanics (SOC Prime: session.upload_progress chain affecting PHP 5.4.0-8.5.11; Arctic Wolf: out-of-memory memory corruption and stale request-state) and Arctic Wolf states in-the-wild exploitation success is not firmly established and no direct ARTEX-to-PHP2Shell link is proven. No CVSS score applies to ARTEX itself. Behavior-based detection is recommended over name-based, since IOCs are perishable.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

Execution

T1059.004 Unix Shell

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1571 Non-Standard Port

Initial Access

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence

T1098 Account Manipulation; T1505.003 Web Shell

Credential Access

T1110.003 Password Spraying

Resource Development

T1588.002 Tool; T1588.007 Artificial Intelligence

Reconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

Remediation

Patches

  • PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35 (released 2026-10-21) for CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619

Immediate actions

  • Patch internet-facing PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35 (or vendor backport) and restart all web workers
  • Hunt for and block egress to ARTEX-associated IOCs, treating them as short-lived
  • Alert on HTTP C2 to direct IPs on uncommon ports and egress to LLM resellers/self-hosted proxies
  • Review Okta, Entra ID and Cognito logs for failed-login bursts, spraying and account-recovery abuse

Workarounds

  • Restrict access to ARTEX-style consoles (tcp/8787) and cloud administration interfaces
  • Review application permissions and authentication logs per FBI FLASH guidance
  • Disable PHP session upload progress tracking where unneeded

Longer-term hardening

  • Rate-limit by account, session and API key rather than IP alone
  • Enforce API authorization server-side and issue short-lived credentials
  • Deploy decoys, honeypots and tarpits to divert autonomous agents
  • Upgrade end-of-life PHP branches and disable upload progress tracking where not needed
  • Detect by behavior (service accounts spawning shells, nmap/curl/wget from unexpected parents) not by tool name

Affected and fixed versions

  • PHP Group — PHP
    Vulnerable versions: 5.4.0 through 8.5.11 (per SOC Prime); PHP-FPM, Apache mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP, LiteSpeed and embedded PHP
    Fixed in: 8.5.12; 8.4.27; 8.3.36; 8.2.35
  • ConnectWise — ConnectWise Cloud Backup
    Vulnerable versions: Targeted in Storm-0940 supply-chain compromise (October 2026)
  • Okta / Microsoft / AWS — Okta, Entra ID, Amazon Cognito (authentication endpoints probed)
    Vulnerable versions: Customer tenants subject to spraying and recovery-flow abuse

Timeline

  • ARTEX (Autumn-27/ARTEX) published on GitHub under AGPL-3.0.
  • Earliest Censys-observed open directory on the host later named by CrowdStrike (locked-ioc-14); FBI states weaponization since at least August 2026.
  • CrowdStrike reports a likely Chinese-speaking actor using ARTEX against South Korean banks, exfiltrating data from a loan service and employee mobile system.
  • ARTEX author disowns malicious use and removes the GitHub repository; forks and rebrands continue to circulate.
  • Amazon MadPot honeypots observe a PHP2Shell exploitation attempt four days before public disclosure (per SOC Prime).
  • Microsoft attributes ARTEX-driven ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise to Storm-0940, with sign-in attempts against 2,250+ tenants peaking at 2,900 per minute; ARTEX also found on servers attacking Japanese companies.
  • PHP ships fixes for CVE-2026-109618/109619 (8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35), a day early after CVE IDs leaked.
  • Storm-0940 ARTEX activity expands to IT and software vendors, probing Okta, Entra ID and Cognito (Wiz Research via SOC Prime).
  • Censys counts 1,465 exposed ARTEX consoles (measured Nov 3-4) and 32 hosts with open directories holding post-exploitation kits.
  • Microsoft publishes Storm-3358 report: financially motivated actor using ARTEX with SSRF/file-upload exploitation and WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2 RATs against financial organizations.
  • FBI releases a FLASH advisory on ARTEX abuse (date inferred from advisory ID 261113; reported 2026-11-15).
  • SOC Prime publishes behavior-based ARTEX detection and hunting guidance.

Sources cited

More from Storm-3358

Other reports on CVE-2026-109618

Other reports on CVE-2026-109619

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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