Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6189
TGR-STA-0049 (REF7707 / Earth Alux / Ink Dragon) HTTP/3-Powered PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments
Unit 42 reports a cyberespionage campaign by TGR-STA-0049 against Southeast Asian government entities, active since at least July 2025, using two previously undocumented custom RATs: PerfectPioneer (Go) and its modular successor KUKURAT (C++). Both use C2 over HTTP/3 (QUIC/UDP) with HTTP/2 fallback; initial access is mainly unpatched Exchange and web server exploitation with web shells, plus phishing.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6189 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | PerfectPioneer RAT, KUKURAT, Squidoor, FINALDRAFT |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Exchange Server; Various Internet-facing web servers (including IIS) |
| Attribution | TGR-STA-0049 (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | ASPXSpy, FINALDRAFT (ELF), KUKURAT, MimiKatz, PerfectPioneer |
| Tools | ProcDump |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1003.006 DCSync, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1021.006 Windows Remote Management, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows), T1055 Process Injection, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1090 Proxy, T1098.002 Additional Email Delegate Permissions and 8 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, telecoms, defense, education, aviation |
| Target regions | Southeast Asia, 005 - South America, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6189 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 31 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: TGR-STA-0049 IIS/Exchange w3wp.exe Spawning Shell or Recon Child (Web Shell / PerfectPioneer Launch)
TL-2026-6189 exploitation-phase detection. TGR-STA-0049 (REF7707 / Earth Alux / Ink Dragon) compromises unpatched Exchange and IIS servers, drops web shells (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5, Bysunue.aspx) and uses them to launch the PerfectPioneer RAT. A web-server worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning cmd.exe, PowerShell, rundll32, certutil or recon binaries is the behavioural signature of web shell command execution regardless of which shell family is used.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1190, T1505.003
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```TL-2026-6189 SPL-001 web shell / Exchange exploitation: w3wp.exe spawning shell or recon child (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5, Bysunue.aspx, PerfectPioneer launch by TGR-STA-0049)```
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h ParentImage="*\\w3wp.exe"
(Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR Image="*\\whoami.exe" OR Image="*\\net.exe" OR Image="*\\net1.exe" OR Image="*\\tasklist.exe" OR Image="*\\wmic.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\bitsadmin.exe")
| eval parent_pool=if(match(ParentCommandLine,"(?i)MSExchange"),"exchange_app_pool","iis_app_pool")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as child_images values(CommandLine) as child_commands by host User ParentCommandLine parent_pool
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "w3wp.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","rundll32.exe","certutil.exe","whoami.exe","net.exe","net1.exe","tasklist.exe","wmic.exe","cscript.exe","wscript.exe","mshta.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| extend ParentPool = iff(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "MSExchange", "exchange_app_pool", "iis_app_pool")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ParentPool, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: 'TGR-STA-0049 IIS/Exchange Worker Process Spawning Shell or Recon Binary'
id: 3b1f6c2a-8d47-4e0b-9a35-7c21d5e4f801
status: experimental
description: 'Detects w3wp.exe spawning command shells or reconnaissance binaries, the execution pattern of web shells (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5, Bysunue.aspx) used by TGR-STA-0049 to launch PerfectPioneer on compromised Exchange and IIS servers (TL-2026-6189).'
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/custom-rats-target-southeast-asia-governments/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\whoami.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- '\tasklist.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Legitimate web applications that shell out to cmd.exe or PowerShell
- Exchange maintenance and diagnostic scripts invoked from the IIS app pool
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate web applications that shell out to cmd.exe or PowerShell from the IIS app pool
- Exchange health-check and diagnostic scripts launched by w3wp.exe
Tuning notes: Baseline w3wp.exe child processes for 7-14 days and exclude known application command lines. Scope to Exchange servers and internet-facing IIS hosts first. Raise priority when the child is cmd.exe/powershell.exe with whoami, net, tasklist or encoded arguments, or when it is followed by a new unsigned binary or the Cyvera path.
- PerfectPioneer / KUKURAT Dropper Artifacts - Known Hashes, PDF-Disguised Executables and Cyvera Path Masquerading · unlock with TL Creds
- TGR-STA-0049 DCSync Replication Request by Non-Domain-Controller Account · unlock with TL Creds
- KUKURAT PsExec Module Service/Pipe and WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG Watchdog Named Pipe · unlock with TL Creds
- TGR-STA-0049 Web Shell Creation in IIS / Exchange Web Roots (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5, Bysunue.aspx) · unlock with TL Creds
- TGR-STA-0049 Exchange Mailbox FullAccess Grant / ApplicationImpersonation Role Probing · unlock with TL Creds
- TGR-STA-0049 Domain Logon Script (scriptPath) Modification for Mass Propagation · unlock with TL Creds
- TGR-STA-0049 LSASS Dump via rundll32 comsvcs.dll Ordinal #+000024 to MxA.tar / ProcDump · unlock with TL Creds
- PerfectPioneer / KUKURAT C2 - Known Infrastructure and Server QUIC (UDP/443) Egress · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 31 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6189.
Sample indicators (3 of 31)
- IP address:
27.254.164[.]212 - Domain:
www[.]maui-cocktailbar[.]com - File hash:
5f857ff78bfbef2a55a846fc93744e11e07a9b72ee3fc3bc345c32ce9615ddee
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 31 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Unit 42 describes a multi-stage espionage campaign, covering roughly nine months, against Southeast Asian government entities by the cluster it tracks as TGR-STA-0049 (also REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon; Unit 42 previously used CL-STA-0049). The same actor earlier deployed the Squidoor (FINALDRAFT) backdoor against high-value targets from 2023. Check Point's December 2025 'Inside Ink Dragon' research describes the cluster as assessed by several vendors to be PRC-aligned and reports government, telecom and public-sector victims in Southeast Asia, South America and Europe. The Unit 42 article itself does not attribute the group to a nation-state.
Initial access is primarily exploitation of unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers and other web servers to deploy web shells (ASPXSpy and Godzilla variants, Bysunue.aspx, Suo5), which then launch PerfectPioneer for reconnaissance. A secondary vector is phishing with decoy PDFs and lookalike government domains, including executables disguised as PDFs and a decoy impersonating a 2025 Myanmar Union Election Commission notice. Fake setup wizards were also used, in one case installing a legitimate Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect client as cover. No CVE is named in the article.
PerfectPioneer (Go, first seen July 2025) has six variants tracked by project path (RatAAkk-tt, PerfectRat, newhttp3, rat_http3_ls, Pioneer, rat_http3_cc). The HTTP/2-only builds were earliest; later builds use HTTP/3 over QUIC with HTTP/2 fallback, registering via /agent/register, /agent/heartbeat, /agent/tasks and /agent/result. The most complete variant (newhttp3) exposes 32 commands: file transfer, shell execution, process listing/kill/start, shellcode injection (VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread), COM-based process creation, keylogging, screenshots, SOCKS5 proxying and self-update. The Pioneer and rat_http3_cc variants add an isDangerousCommand 'safety switch' that blocks noisy or destructive operator commands, and rat_http3_cc opens a local HTTP monitoring server on port 56793. It runs via three methods: a modified legitimate host binary with XOR-encrypted shellcode plus a loader DLL (DLL side-loading), decoy installers, and PDF-disguised executables. Persistence is an HKCU Run key and a Startup folder shortcut.
KUKURAT (C++, first seen March 2026) is a modular successor introduced into networks already compromised by PerfectPioneer. The core has no post-exploitation code; capabilities are DLL modules loaded in memory from the C2 (BofLoader.dll, ComExec.dll, MyPsExec.dll, SmbBrute.dll, yuze_dll.dll for SOCKS tunneling, plus screenshot, keylogger, portscan and hostscan). It hashes its endpoint names (for example /c8a4e192 for /heartbeat), includes a 'heuristic camouflage' engine producing decoy network, registry and file activity, and a companion watchdog that communicates over the named pipe WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG and relaunches KUKURAT after 15 seconds without a heartbeat. In one case the watchdog was placed in C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\Ransomware\ to blend in with security-product directories. Its PsExecService.exe module installs a service named PsExec with the pipe \\.\pipe\PSEXEC and uninstalls itself after five minutes of inactivity.
Post-exploitation includes LSASS dumping via rundll32.exe and comsvcs.dll invoked by ordinal (#+000024) to \Windows\Temp\MxA.tar, DCSync, Mimikatz, ProcDump, SharpDPAPI and manual SAM/SYSTEM hive dumps. Lateral movement uses malicious domain logon scripts pushed from a compromised domain controller (the main propagation method), PsExec, WMI, WinRM and KUKURAT's SMB brute-force module. The actor abused Exchange by checking for the ApplicationImpersonation role and, failing that, granting a compromised account FullAccess on every mailbox with Add-MailboxPermission. Exfiltrated data were PDF, DOCX, XLSX and PNG files whose names suggested international relations and internal political affairs. Unit 42 states that C2 payload encryption and mutex names are not described in the article.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.006 DCSync; T1110.001 Password Guessing
Lateral Movement
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1021.006 Windows Remote Management
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055 Process Injection; T1574.001 DLL
Persistence
T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows); T1098.002 Additional Email Delegate Permissions; T1505.003 Web Shell; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Collection
T1056.001 Keylogging; T1114.002 Remote Email Collection
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
Execution
Remediation
Patches
- Keep Microsoft Exchange Server and all internet-facing web servers fully patched; the article does not name specific CVEs
Immediate actions
- Block the C2 domains and IP addresses 27.254.164.212 and 27.254.164.209 at DNS, proxy and firewall; hunt historical logs for connections to them
- Inspect Exchange and IIS web roots for unknown .aspx files (ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Suo5, Bysunue.aspx) and review IIS logs for anomalous POST requests
- Audit Exchange ApplicationImpersonation role assignments and FullAccess mailbox permissions granted to unexpected accounts (Get-ManagementRoleAssignment, Get-MailboxPermission)
- Review domain logon scripts (NETLOGON/SYSVOL and user scriptPath attributes) for unauthorized changes
- Hunt for rundll32.exe loading comsvcs.dll by ordinal, files named MxA.tar in Windows\Temp, and a service named PsExec with pipe PSEXEC
- Reset credentials, including krbtgt, for any environment where LSASS dumping or DCSync is confirmed
Workarounds
- Restrict internet exposure of Exchange administrative endpoints and web server management interfaces
- Where QUIC is not business-required, block UDP/443 egress from servers to force fallback to inspectable channels
Longer-term hardening
- Inspect or restrict outbound UDP/443 (QUIC) from servers where it is not required, and add HTTP/3-aware network telemetry, since TCP-centric DPI may not see this C2
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL side-loading, LSASS access and process injection
- Enable LSA protection / Credential Guard and restrict replication permissions to reduce DCSync exposure
- Apply least privilege to Exchange RBAC roles and alert on role or permission changes
- Monitor for executables placed in security-product-like directories such as C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Exchange Server
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched, vulnerable versions (not specified in source) - Various — Internet-facing web servers (including IIS)
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched, vulnerable versions (not specified in source)
Timeline
- Earliest activity of the TGR-STA-0049 / CL-STA-0049 cluster noted (at least March 2023); Squidoor (FINALDRAFT) used against high-value targets from 2023
- Unit 42 publishes Squidoor research on the cluster (later updated March 14 and March 21, 2025), reporting IIS exploitation and web shells against governments and other sectors in Southeast Asia and South America
- PerfectPioneer RAT first observed; campaign active since at least July 2025, with six variants in development during mid-2025
- Check Point Research publishes 'Inside Ink Dragon' on the same cluster (ShadowPad IIS relay network, FinalDraft, SharePoint ToolShell exploitation)
- KUKURAT introduced into networks already compromised by PerfectPioneer; actor begins migrating infrastructure from PerfectPioneer to KUKURAT in early 2026
- Unit 42 publishes 'QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments' documenting PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT
Sources cited
- QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments (Unit 42) Unit 42 · Research · 2026-11-16
- Advanced Backdoor Squidoor (Unit 42) Unit 42 · Research · 2025-02-27
- Inside Ink Dragon: Relay Network and Offensive Operation (Check Point Research) Check Point Research · Research · 2025-12-16
- Malpedia: FINALDRAFT malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de · Research
- LOLBAS: comsvcs.dll lolbas-project.github.io · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK: Mimikatz (S0002) MITRE · Research
- Cobalt Strike Beacon Object Files documentation hstechdocs.helpsystems.com · Vendor report
- GhostPack SharpDPAPI GitHub · Code repository
- MyPsExec (open-source basis of KUKURAT PsExec module) GitHub · Code repository
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.