Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6471
Webworm (China-aligned APT) Deploys Custom Rebuilt SoftEther VPN Bridge ('NtMonitor VPN') Against Government Networks
Rapid7 reports a previously unknown custom build of SoftEther VPN Bridge 4.44 (build 9807), tracked as 'NtMonitor VPN' and attributed with moderate confidence to the China-aligned APT Webworm. It provides long-term, low-profile network access in compromised government networks, especially in Europe.
Key facts
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6471 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: NtMonitor VPN Host Artifacts - SEVPNBRIDGE Service, Rebranded Registry, Firewall Rule and Plaintext Config - Post-Exploitation Phase
Detects persistence and host-side artifacts of the Webworm NtMonitor VPN build: installation of the SEVPNBRIDGE service (the entry point still uses the stock SoftEther name), registry keys under Software\SoftEther Project\NtMonitor VPN, Windows firewall rules named 'NtMonitor VPN' created via netsh, and the plaintext config copy %TEMP%\@setting.conf written after the RCEN-encrypted setting.conf is decrypted.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1686.003, T1543.003, T1027.013, T1140, T1027.005
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_system, wineventlog
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```NtMonitor host artifacts - SEVPNBRIDGE service, NtMonitor VPN registry key, NtMonitor VPN firewall rule, plaintext @setting.conf```
(index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045 Service_Name="SEVPNBRIDGE")
OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode IN (12,13) TargetObject="*SoftEther Project*NtMonitor VPN*")
OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\netsh.exe" CommandLine="*NtMonitor VPN*")
OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\@setting.conf")
| eval artifact=case(EventCode=="7045", "service_install_SEVPNBRIDGE", match(EventCode, "^1[23]$"), "registry_NtMonitor_VPN", EventCode=="1", "firewall_rule_NtMonitor_VPN", EventCode=="11", "plaintext_config_at_setting_conf")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(artifact) as artifacts values(Service_File_Name) as service_path values(TargetObject) as registry_keys values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(TargetFilename) as files by host
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)Microsoft KQL
let reg = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has 'NtMonitor VPN' or RegistryValueData has 'NtMonitor VPN' or (RegistryKey has 'SoftEther Project' and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ 'netcapa.exe')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Artifact='registry_ntmonitor', Detail=strcat(RegistryKey, ' ', RegistryValueName), Proc=InitiatingProcessFileName, Cmd=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let fw = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ 'netsh.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'NtMonitor VPN'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Artifact='firewall_rule_ntmonitor', Detail=ProcessCommandLine, Proc=InitiatingProcessFileName, Cmd=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let cfg = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ '@setting.conf' or (FileName =~ 'setting.conf' and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ 'netcapa.exe')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Artifact='ntmonitor_config_file', Detail=strcat(FolderPath, '\\', FileName), Proc=InitiatingProcessFileName, Cmd=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
union reg, fw, cfg
| sort by Timestamp descSigma
title: NtMonitor VPN Plaintext or Encrypted Config File Written
id: 4d9e7a52-8c13-4f60-b2a5-6e1c0d3f8a22
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of the plaintext NtMonitor configuration copy @setting.conf (written to the temp directory after decryption of the RCEN-encrypted setting.conf) and setting.conf written by the NtMonitor or SoftEther bridge executable. Associated with Webworm custom SoftEther VPN Bridge.
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-spying-on-governments-no-malware-custom-webworms-toolkit-softether-bridge
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1027.013
- attack.t1140
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_plaintext:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\@setting.conf'
selection_encrypted:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\setting.conf'
Image|endswith:
- '\netcapa.exe'
- '\vpnbridge_x64.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unrelated software that legitimately uses a file named setting.conf (the encrypted selection requires the bridge image name)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate SoftEther VPN Bridge services (SEVPNBRIDGE) installed by IT
- Administrators creating firewall rules with netsh that happen to contain the string NtMonitor VPN in an internal product name
Tuning notes: Allow-list sanctioned SoftEther hosts for the SEVPNBRIDGE service-install artifact only; keep the NtMonitor VPN registry, firewall and @setting.conf artifacts unfiltered. Requires Sysmon event IDs 1, 11, 12 and 13 and Windows System event 7045 forwarded to Splunk. The rebranding is incomplete (SoftEther Project registry paths and SEVPNBRIDGE persist), so broaden to SoftEther Project registry keys written by non-standard images if the actor changes the NtMonitor name.
- NtMonitor VPN (Webworm SoftEther Bridge) Process Execution via Masqueraded PE Metadata - Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN Host Artifacts - Registry, Firewall Rule and Config File - Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN C2 and Bridge Traffic - Webworm Infrastructure and [indicator] - C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN (Webworm SoftEther Bridge) Process Creation with Masqueraded PE Metadata - Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN Config File Artifacts (@[indicator] / RCEN [indicator]) - Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN Bridge Beaconing and Webworm Infrastructure (Proxy Logs) - C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN (Webworm SoftEther Bridge) Execution via Masqueraded PE Metadata - Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- NtMonitor VPN C2 and Bridge Traffic - [indicator] Beaconing and Webworm Vultr Infrastructure - C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6471.
Sample indicators (3 of 22)
- IP address:
216.238.108[.]22 - Domain:
wamanharipethe[.]s3[.]ap-south-1[.]amazonaws[.]com - URL:
hxxps://github[.]com/anjsdgasdf/WordPress
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 22 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The binary is rebuilt from source rather than trojanized, and Rapid7 found no additional malicious functionality.
Rapid7 (Milan Spinka, 2026-11-19) analyzed a self-contained Windows PE32+ (x64) that is a modified build of SoftEther VPN Bridge v4.44, build 9807 (stock filename vpnbridge_x64.exe). The actor rebuilt it from source on a machine whose PDB path (C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\SoftEtherVPN_Stable\...\src\DebugFiles\pdb\x64_Release\vpnbridge.pdb) was left in the binary. PE metadata was changed to OriginalFileName netcapa.exe, Product 'Network Monitor Software' and Company 'Network Systems Solutions Inc.', while the file version stayed 4.44.0.9807. The binary is about 1.5 MB larger than the official build because the hamcore.se2 archive, reduced to a minimum, is embedded as a PE resource and loaded by a custom resource-directory walk.
The actor replaced 'SoftEther VPN' with 'NtMonitor VPN' in debug banners, service names, registry keys, the HTTP 401 error page and firewall rule names. The renaming is incomplete: the entry point still uses the service name SEVPNBRIDGE, and many registry paths still reference 'SoftEther Project'. The stock HTTP endpoints /vpnsvc/vpn.cgi and /vpnsvc/connect.cgi became /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi. The stock GIF watermark was replaced with a truncated PNG showing a Windows logo (bytes 89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52). As a result stock SoftEther clients and servers cannot handshake with this build, and fingerprinting on the stock GIF watermark fails. The plaintext vpn_bridge.config was replaced by setting.conf, a file beginning with the magic bytes RCEN that holds its own key and is encrypted with a custom RC4-like cipher. Rapid7 found a plaintext copy at %TEMP%\@setting.conf.
Rapid7 attributes the tool to Webworm with moderate confidence. Decrypted configurations bridge a remote network into the local one, and in non-test cases the remote IP sat in AS 20473 (The Constant Company, LLC / Vultr), infrastructure previously linked to Webworm. ESET's May 2026 research documented Webworm's shift from full-featured backdoors to dual-use tools including SoftEther VPN, alongside custom proxies (WormFrp, SmuxProxy, WormSocket, ChainWorm) and Discord and Microsoft Graph backdoors (EchoCreep, GraphWorm). ESET also found that an IP in a SoftEther configuration matched known Webworm infrastructure and that the SoftEther application was staged in a GitHub repository posing as a WordPress fork. Rapid7 found no command-execution backdoor or other malicious functionality in the NtMonitor build. Its value is persistent network bridging and tunneling that blends into legitimate VPN traffic. Only one AV vendor flagged the sample on VirusTotal at analysis time, and the sample has been public since January. Rapid7 states no specific victims, CVEs or exploitation vector.
Detection guidance: with TLS inspection, look for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type image/jpeg whose body starts with the PNG watermark bytes. On hosts, look for NtMonitor branding, the SEVPNBRIDGE service, an RCEN-prefixed setting.conf and the embedded hamcore.se2 resource. Rapid7 expects the actor to change the branding, endpoints and watermark easily, so defenders should baseline normal SoftEther use in government environments and watch for unexpected VPN bridging between networks.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Stealth
T1027.005 Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
Resource Development
T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1608.002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool
defense-impairment
T1599 Network Boundary Bridging
Defense Impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for SoftEther VPN Bridge binaries and the SEVPNBRIDGE service, especially with unexpected filenames or PE metadata such as netcapa.exe / 'Network Monitor Software' / 'Network Systems Solutions Inc.'
- Search endpoints for setting.conf files beginning with the RCEN magic bytes and for %TEMP%\@setting.conf
- Search registry for Software\SoftEther Project\NtMonitor VPN and for firewall rules named with 'NtMonitor VPN'
- Where TLS inspection exists, alert on POST /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type image/jpeg and a PNG-signature body
- Block or investigate traffic to 216.238.108.22 and review egress to AS 20473 (Vultr / The Constant Company) from government and sensitive networks
- Run the Rapid7 YARA ruleset (Webworm_NtMonitor.yar) across endpoints and sample repositories
Workarounds
- Restrict outbound connections to VPS hosting ranges from servers that have no business need
- Alert on creation of Windows firewall rules by non-administrative tooling
Longer-term hardening
- Baseline legitimate SoftEther VPN use and treat unsanctioned SoftEther deployments as suspicious
- Monitor for unexpected VPN bridging between internal networks and external hosts (network boundary bridging)
- Use application allow-listing to prevent unauthorized VPN software from executing
- Do not rely on branding, endpoint or watermark indicators alone, since the actor can change them easily; favor behavioral detections
Affected and fixed versions
- SoftEther Project (abused open-source software) — SoftEther VPN Bridge 4.44 build 9807 (custom rebuilt 'NtMonitor VPN' variant)
Timeline
- Earliest EchoCreep (Discord C2 backdoor) test messages observed by ESET, part of Webworm's 2024 shift from traditional backdoors toward proxy and networking tools
- Webworm WormSocket server locked-ioc-17 (Vultr) first seen, per ESET
- First actual compromise via EchoCreep observed by ESET; SmuxProxy-related server locked-ioc-13 (IT7 Networks) first seen the same day
- WormFrp proxy server locked-ioc-10 (Vultr) first seen, per ESET
- SmuxProxy server locked-ioc-12 (The Constant Company, LLC) first seen, per ESET
- ESET publishes 'Webworm: New burrowing techniques', documenting the group's SoftEther VPN use, custom proxies and Discord/Microsoft Graph backdoors against European governments
- Rapid7 publishes analysis of the custom rebuilt SoftEther VPN Bridge 'NtMonitor VPN' attributed to Webworm with moderate confidence, with IoCs, YARA rules and a config decryptor
Sources cited
- Spying on Governments with Zero Lines of Malware: A Custom SoftEther Bridge in Webworm's Toolkit (Rapid7) Rapid7 · Research · 2026-11-19
- Webworm: New burrowing techniques (ESET Research) ESET WeLiveSecurity · Research · 2026-05-20
- Rapid7 Labs: Webworm NtMonitor IoC list GitHub · Code repository · 2026-11-19
- Rapid7 Labs: Webworm NtMonitor YARA ruleset GitHub · Code repository · 2026-11-19
- Rapid7 Labs: webworm_rcen_decrypt.py config decryptor GitHub · Code repository · 2026-11-19
- Webworm APT targets European government organizations with new backdoors (Help Net Security) Help Net Security · News · 2026-05-20
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.