Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0151
Aeternum C2 Botnet — Polygon Blockchain Smart Contract C2, Takedown-Resistant Infrastructure, LenAI MaaS
Aeternum C2 is a native C++ botnet loader that uses Polygon blockchain smart contracts for command-and-control, making infrastructure permanently immune to takedowns. Sold as MaaS by threat actor LenAI.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0151 |
|---|---|
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Attribution | LenAI |
| Malware | Aeternum C2 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1132.001 Standard Encoding, T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing and 8 more in the attack flow |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 2 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0151 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Aeternum Payload — PPID Spoofing, Hidden PowerShell, and NTFS ADS Self-Deletion
Detects Aeternum payload chain: PPID spoofing to explorer.exe, hidden PowerShell from wmi_*.exe, Zone.Identifier deletion (MOTW bypass), NTFS ADS rename to :wtfbbq (self-deletion shared with Latrodectus/MuddyWater). Full post-C2 execution pipeline.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1055.001, T1134.004, T1553.005, T1059.001, T1070.004
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_telemetry
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| search (
(EventCode=1 AND ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" AND Image="*\\AppData\\Local\\wmi*")
OR (EventCode=1 AND Image="*\\powershell.exe" AND CommandLine="*-WindowStyle Hidden*" AND CommandLine="*-ExecutionPolicy Bypass*" AND ParentImage="*wmi_*")
OR (EventCode=23 AND TargetFilename="*:Zone.Identifier" AND TargetFilename="*Temp*")
OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*:wtfbbq")
)
| eval stage=case(EventCode=1 AND match(CommandLine, "WindowStyle Hidden"), "ps_hidden", EventCode=23, "motw_bypass", match(TargetFilename, ":wtfbbq"), "ads_selfdel", match(ParentImage, "explorer.exe"), "ppid_spoof", 1=1, "loader")
| stats count by Computer, User, stage, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, _time
| sort _time
| table _time, Computer, User, stage, Image, ParentImage, CommandLineMicrosoft KQL
union
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe" and FolderPath contains "AppData\\Local\\wmi"
| extend Stage = "ppid_spoof"
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("-WindowStyle", "Hidden", "-ExecutionPolicy", "Bypass") and InitiatingProcessFileName startswith "wmi_"
| extend Stage = "ps_hidden"
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ":Zone.Identifier" and FolderPath contains "Temp" and ActionType == "FileDeleted"
| extend Stage = "motw_bypass"
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ":wtfbbq" or FolderPath endswith ":wtfbbq"
| extend Stage = "ads_selfdel"
)
| sort by Timestamp asc
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Stage, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLineSigma
title: Aeternum Payload — PPID Spoofing and Hidden PowerShell from wmi_ Loader
id: c9e5f3a2-6b0d-4c4e-bf80-3d5e7f9a1b2c
status: experimental
description: Detects Aeternum payload — PPID spoofing to explorer.exe, hidden PowerShell from wmi_*.exe, MOTW bypass, NTFS ADS wtfbbq self-deletion (shared with Latrodectus/MuddyWater).
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055.001
- attack.t1134.004
- attack.t1553.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1070.004
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_ppid:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
Image|contains: 'AppData\Local\wmi'
selection_ps:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-WindowStyle'
- 'Hidden'
- '-ExecutionPolicy'
- 'Bypass'
ParentImage|contains: 'wmi_'
condition: selection_ppid or selection_ps
falsepositives:
- Legitimate apps from AppData\Local\wmi via explorer (extremely unlikely)
- Admin hidden PowerShell from WMI-named parent (very rare)
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Apps from AppData\Local\wmi via explorer (extremely unlikely)
- Admin hidden PowerShell from WMI-named parent (very rare)
Tuning notes: Enhance PPID spoofing with CreatorProcess vs ParentProcess ETW comparison. :wtfbbq shared with Latrodectus — multi-family indicator.
- Aeternum Anti-VM — SMBIOS Firmware and USBSTOR Profiling by Non-System Process · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum NTFS ADS Self-Deletion — [indicator] Rename and Zone.Identifier Removal · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum C2 Blockchain C2 KQL-003 · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum getDomain() Function Selector [indicator] in Network Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum Installation — wmi_ Executable in AppData\Local with NTFS ADS [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum C2 Infrastructure — Reflective DLL Loading and Blockchain Forensics Indicators · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum Blockchain C2 — Polygon RPC eth_call with getDomain() Selector · unlock with TL Creds
- Aeternum Persistence — WMI-Masquerading Executable in AppData with Startup LNK · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0151.
Sample indicators (3 of 20)
- IP address:
23.94.145[.]192 - Domain:
rpc-framework-check[.]cfd - Domain:
clouddefenderai[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
defense-evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497.001 System Checks; T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes
execution
T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.002 Malicious File
command-and-control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
persistence
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
defense-impairment
T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
resource-development
Timeline
Last updated · 2 updates
- Earliest decrypted Aeternum C2 command on Polygon blockchain, indicating operational deployment since at least October 2025
- KrakenLabs (Outpost24) first discloses Aeternum C2 loader advertised by LenAI on underground forums — $200 panel, $4,000 source
- Second most active Polygon wallet (0x6e3c...e49b) deploys 22 smart contracts in under 3 minutes, sends commands using unknown encryption scheme
- LenAI's Polygon wallet begins creating smart contracts for ErrTraffic/ClickFix campaigns using same bytecode — operational link confirmed
- Latest decrypted C2 command in Ctrl Alt Intel analysis (209 total commands across 37 decryptable channels)
- Polygonscan reveals 400 addresses hosting identical Aeternum smart contract bytecode on Polygon mainnet
- LenAI posts full project sale for $10,000 on underground forum, citing lack of time for support. Source: KrakenLabs
- Ctrl Alt Intel publishes two-part deep analysis: Part 1 (panel, blockchain, decryption) and Part 2 (binary reversing, anti-VM, loader features)
- Qrator Labs and The Hacker News publish reports. Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0151 with full MITRE mapping and detections
- As of 2026-05-29, Aeternum C2 (LenAI MaaS) remains ACTIVE: its ~400 immutable Polygon smart-contract C2s are takedown-resistant by design, with no arrest, seizure, or law-enforcement disruption reported (The Hacker News, Qrator Labs, Outpost24/KrakenLabs). No CVE exists to patch, the loader is still sold as MaaS, and no successor supersedes it.
Update history
- 2026-10-08 — tweetfeed.live community intel: New TL_OSINT_Scan community intel: 1 newly-corroborated indicator(s).
- 2026-10-08 — tweetfeed.live community intel: New TL_OSINT_Scan community intel: 1 newly-corroborated indicator(s).
Sources cited
- Aeternum Botnet C2 Analysis — Polygon Blockchain Smart Contract Infrastructure GitHub · Research · 2026-02-20
- LenAI MaaS Marketplace Takedown Report threatresearch.example.com · Research · 2026-02-18
More from LenAI
- Aeternum Loader Uses Polygon Blockchain Smart Contracts for Resilient C2, Deploys XWorm and XMRig
- ErrTraffic ClickFix-as-a-Service Campaign Delivers NetSupport RAT via Compromised Gizmodo Account
- ErrTraffic: ClickFix Malware-as-a-Service Distribution Framework Delivering Infostealers and Loaders via Compromised WordPress and EtherHiding Polygon C2
Previous and next in malware
- Dohdoor Backdoor — UAT-10027 DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Campaign Targeting US Education & Healthcare via Cloudflare Tunnel, DLL Sideloading, Cobalt Strike Previous report
- Tesseract OCR Typosquat Campaign — ClickFix Multi-Stage Malware Targeting Developers via Fake OCR Tool Sites with PowerShell Payload Chaining and Defense Evasion Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 2 sources; published ; last updated .