Skip to navigation

Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0151

Aeternum C2 Botnet — Polygon Blockchain Smart Contract C2, Takedown-Resistant Infrastructure, LenAI MaaS

criticalACTIVE

Aeternum C2 is a native C++ botnet loader that uses Polygon blockchain smart contracts for command-and-control, making infrastructure permanently immune to takedowns. Sold as MaaS by threat actor LenAI.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0151
SeverityCRITICAL
AttributionLenAI
MalwareAeternum C2
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1132.001 Standard Encoding, T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing and 8 more in the attack flow
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources2 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0151 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Aeternum Payload — PPID Spoofing, Hidden PowerShell, and NTFS ADS Self-Deletion

Detects Aeternum payload chain: PPID spoofing to explorer.exe, hidden PowerShell from wmi_*.exe, Zone.Identifier deletion (MOTW bypass), NTFS ADS rename to :wtfbbq (self-deletion shared with Latrodectus/MuddyWater). Full post-C2 execution pipeline.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| search (
    (EventCode=1 AND ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" AND Image="*\\AppData\\Local\\wmi*")
    OR (EventCode=1 AND Image="*\\powershell.exe" AND CommandLine="*-WindowStyle Hidden*" AND CommandLine="*-ExecutionPolicy Bypass*" AND ParentImage="*wmi_*")
    OR (EventCode=23 AND TargetFilename="*:Zone.Identifier" AND TargetFilename="*Temp*")
    OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*:wtfbbq")
)
| eval stage=case(EventCode=1 AND match(CommandLine, "WindowStyle Hidden"), "ps_hidden", EventCode=23, "motw_bypass", match(TargetFilename, ":wtfbbq"), "ads_selfdel", match(ParentImage, "explorer.exe"), "ppid_spoof", 1=1, "loader")
| stats count by Computer, User, stage, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, _time
| sort _time
| table _time, Computer, User, stage, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine

Microsoft KQL

union
(
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe" and FolderPath contains "AppData\\Local\\wmi"
    | extend Stage = "ppid_spoof"
),
(
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("-WindowStyle", "Hidden", "-ExecutionPolicy", "Bypass") and InitiatingProcessFileName startswith "wmi_"
    | extend Stage = "ps_hidden"
),
(
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName endswith ":Zone.Identifier" and FolderPath contains "Temp" and ActionType == "FileDeleted"
    | extend Stage = "motw_bypass"
),
(
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName endswith ":wtfbbq" or FolderPath endswith ":wtfbbq"
    | extend Stage = "ads_selfdel"
)
| sort by Timestamp asc
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Stage, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: Aeternum Payload — PPID Spoofing and Hidden PowerShell from wmi_ Loader
id: c9e5f3a2-6b0d-4c4e-bf80-3d5e7f9a1b2c
status: experimental
description: Detects Aeternum payload — PPID spoofing to explorer.exe, hidden PowerShell from wmi_*.exe, MOTW bypass, NTFS ADS wtfbbq self-deletion (shared with Latrodectus/MuddyWater).
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1055.001
    - attack.t1134.004
    - attack.t1553.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_ppid:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        Image|contains: 'AppData\Local\wmi'
    selection_ps:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-WindowStyle'
            - 'Hidden'
            - '-ExecutionPolicy'
            - 'Bypass'
        ParentImage|contains: 'wmi_'
    condition: selection_ppid or selection_ps
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate apps from AppData\Local\wmi via explorer (extremely unlikely)
    - Admin hidden PowerShell from WMI-named parent (very rare)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Apps from AppData\Local\wmi via explorer (extremely unlikely)
  • Admin hidden PowerShell from WMI-named parent (very rare)

Tuning notes: Enhance PPID spoofing with CreatorProcess vs ParentProcess ETW comparison. :wtfbbq shared with Latrodectus — multi-family indicator.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Aeternum Anti-VM — SMBIOS Firmware and USBSTOR Profiling by Non-System Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum NTFS ADS Self-Deletion — [indicator] Rename and Zone.Identifier Removal · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum C2 Blockchain C2 KQL-003 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum getDomain() Function Selector [indicator] in Network Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum Installation — wmi_ Executable in AppData\Local with NTFS ADS [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum C2 Infrastructure — Reflective DLL Loading and Blockchain Forensics Indicators · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum Blockchain C2 — Polygon RPC eth_call with getDomain() Selector · unlock with TL Creds
  • Aeternum Persistence — WMI-Masquerading Executable in AppData with Startup LNK · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0151.

Sample indicators (3 of 20)

  • IP address: 23.94.145[.]192
  • Domain: rpc-framework-check[.]cfd
  • Domain: clouddefenderai[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497.001 System Checks; T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes

execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.002 Malicious File

command-and-control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

defense-impairment

T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass

resource-development

T1583.005 Botnet

Timeline

Last updated · 2 updates

  • Earliest decrypted Aeternum C2 command on Polygon blockchain, indicating operational deployment since at least October 2025
  • KrakenLabs (Outpost24) first discloses Aeternum C2 loader advertised by LenAI on underground forums — $200 panel, $4,000 source
  • Second most active Polygon wallet (0x6e3c...e49b) deploys 22 smart contracts in under 3 minutes, sends commands using unknown encryption scheme
  • LenAI's Polygon wallet begins creating smart contracts for ErrTraffic/ClickFix campaigns using same bytecode — operational link confirmed
  • Latest decrypted C2 command in Ctrl Alt Intel analysis (209 total commands across 37 decryptable channels)
  • Polygonscan reveals 400 addresses hosting identical Aeternum smart contract bytecode on Polygon mainnet
  • LenAI posts full project sale for $10,000 on underground forum, citing lack of time for support. Source: KrakenLabs
  • Ctrl Alt Intel publishes two-part deep analysis: Part 1 (panel, blockchain, decryption) and Part 2 (binary reversing, anti-VM, loader features)
  • Qrator Labs and The Hacker News publish reports. Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0151 with full MITRE mapping and detections
  • As of 2026-05-29, Aeternum C2 (LenAI MaaS) remains ACTIVE: its ~400 immutable Polygon smart-contract C2s are takedown-resistant by design, with no arrest, seizure, or law-enforcement disruption reported (The Hacker News, Qrator Labs, Outpost24/KrakenLabs). No CVE exists to patch, the loader is still sold as MaaS, and no successor supersedes it.

Update history

  • 2026-10-08 — tweetfeed.live community intel: New TL_OSINT_Scan community intel: 1 newly-corroborated indicator(s).
  • 2026-10-08 — tweetfeed.live community intel: New TL_OSINT_Scan community intel: 1 newly-corroborated indicator(s).

Sources cited

More from LenAI

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 2 sources; published ; last updated .

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats