Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0472
DAEMON Tools Lite Supply-Chain Compromise — Trojanized Signed Installers Deploy Multi-Stage Infostealer + QUIC RAT (Disc Soft, April-May 2026)
Disc Soft Limited's build environment for DAEMON Tools Lite (free edition, v12.5.1) was compromised, resulting in digitally-signed trojanized installers (builds 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434) being distributed from the official daemon-tools.cc website between 2026-04-08 and 2026-05-05.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0472 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | DAEMON Tools Lite Supply-Chain Compromise, Disc Soft Build Environment Breach (April 2026), DTHelper Trojanization Campaign |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Disc Soft Limited DAEMON Tools Lite (free edition); Disc Soft Limited DAEMON Tools Pro; Disc Soft Limited DAEMON Tools Ultra; Disc Soft Limited DAEMON Tools Lite (paid edition) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-1357, CWE-494, CWE-829, CWE-506 |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | DAEMON Tools Lite First-Stage Infostealer (Kaspersky-attributed Chinese-speaking actor), DAEMON Tools Lite Second-Stage In-Memory Backdoor, QUIC RAT |
| Tools | Custom QUIC-transport RAT framework with multi-protocol fallback (QUIC primary, suspected HTTPS / DNS fallbacks), DAEMON Tools Lite v12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434 (free edition) |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1055 Process Injection, T1057 Process Discovery, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1106 Native API, T1119 Automated Collection, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise and 13 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | retail, scientific, government, manufacturing, education |
| Target regions | Russia, Belarus, Thailand, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, China |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0472 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 18 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: DAEMON Tools QUIC RAT Outbound C2 + Process Injection — Command and Control Phase
Detects the Stage-3 QUIC RAT C2 pattern: outbound UDP/443 (QUIC) traffic from desktop endpoints to non-CDN destinations originating from a process tree rooted in DTHelper.exe / DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe / DTShellHlp.exe, plus correlated process-injection events (CreateRemoteThread, NtMapViewOfSection, SetThreadContext, APC) sourcing from those binaries into long-lived host processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, services.exe, lsass.exe). Includes the in-memory backdoor C2 indicators env-check.daemontools.cc and 38.180.107.76.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1055, T1071.001, T1571, T1572, T1573.002, T1041
- Data sources: sysmon, edr_network_events, edr_process_events, firewall, dns_query_logs
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" ((EventCode=3 Protocol=udp DestinationPort=443) OR EventCode=8 OR EventCode=22) | eval dt_proc=if(match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(DTHelper|DiscSoftBusServiceLite|DTShellHlp)\.exe$") OR match(SourceImage, "(?i)\\\\(DTHelper|DiscSoftBusServiceLite|DTShellHlp)\.exe$"), 1, 0) | eval ioc_c2=if(match(QueryName, "(?i)env-check\.daemontools\.cc") OR DestinationIp="38.180.107.76" OR DestinationHostname="env-check.daemontools.cc", 1, 0) | eval quic_c2=if(EventCode=3 AND Protocol="udp" AND DestinationPort=443 AND NOT match(DestinationIp, "^(10\.|172\.1[6-9]\.|172\.2[0-9]\.|172\.3[01]\.|192\.168\.|127\.|::1)") AND dt_proc=1, 1, 0) | eval inject=if(EventCode=8 AND match(SourceImage, "(?i)\\\\(DTHelper|DiscSoftBusServiceLite|DTShellHlp)\.exe$") AND match(TargetImage, "(?i)\\\\(svchost|explorer|services|lsass|winlogon|spoolsv|dwm)\.exe$"), 1, 0) | where quic_c2=1 OR ioc_c2=1 OR inject=1 | stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(DestinationIp) as dst_ips values(DestinationHostname) as dst_hostnames values(QueryName) as dns_queries values(SourceImage) as src_imgs values(TargetImage) as tgt_imgs by host, quic_c2, ioc_c2, inject | sort - countMicrosoft KQL
let dt_binaries = dynamic(["DTHelper.exe", "DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe", "DTShellHlp.exe"]);
let long_lived = dynamic(["svchost.exe", "explorer.exe", "services.exe", "lsass.exe", "winlogon.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "dwm.exe"]);
let ioc_domains = dynamic(["env-check.daemontools.cc"]);
let ioc_ips = dynamic(["38.180.107.76"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_binaries)
| where (Protocol == "Udp" and RemotePort == 443) or RemoteUrl has_any (ioc_domains) or RemoteIP in (ioc_ips)
| where not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP)) or RemoteIP in (ioc_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, Protocol, AlertType="DT_QUIC_C2"
| union (
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "ProcessInjectionApiCall", "WriteToLsassProcess", "AsyncRpcWriteProcessMemoryApiCall")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_binaries)
| extend TargetFileName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).TargetFileName)
| where TargetFileName in~ (long_lived) or isempty(TargetFileName)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType, TargetFileName, AdditionalFields, AlertType="DT_process_injection"
)
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: DAEMON Tools QUIC RAT Outbound C2 and Process Injection (TL-2026-0472)
id: 4b8c2c2a-5e91-4d12-9a7e-1f0c0472e003
status: experimental
description: Detects the Stage-3 QUIC RAT C2 pattern from TL-2026-0472 — outbound UDP/443 from DTHelper.exe / DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe / DTShellHlp.exe to non-RFC1918 destinations, hits on the env-check.daemontools.cc / 38.180.107.76 IOCs, and CreateRemoteThread / NtMapViewOfSection / APC injection from those binaries into long-lived host processes.
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/daemon-tools-trojanized-in-supply-chain-attack-to-deploy-backdoor/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/07
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1571
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1573.002
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
quic_c2:
Image|endswith:
- '\DTHelper.exe'
- '\DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe'
- '\DTShellHlp.exe'
DestinationPort: 443
Protocol: udp
ioc_hit:
DestinationHostname|contains: 'env-check.daemontools.cc'
ioc_ip:
DestinationIp:
- '38.180.107.76'
private_dest:
DestinationIp|startswith:
- '10.'
- '172.16.'
- '172.17.'
- '172.18.'
- '172.19.'
- '172.20.'
- '172.21.'
- '172.22.'
- '172.23.'
- '172.24.'
- '172.25.'
- '172.26.'
- '172.27.'
- '172.28.'
- '172.29.'
- '172.30.'
- '172.31.'
- '192.168.'
- '127.'
condition: ioc_hit or ioc_ip or (quic_c2 and not private_dest)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate QUIC traffic to Google / Cloudflare / Akamai CDNs (allowlist by ASN/IP range)
- Browser components launched as child processes of DT binaries during legitimate help links
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Legitimate QUIC/HTTP3 traffic to Google, Cloudflare, or Akamai CDN ranges (allowlist by ASN)
- Browser components briefly spawned by DT binaries when users click vendor help links
- Endpoint security agents performing DLL injection into long-lived processes for monitoring
Tuning notes: Allowlist QUIC destinations to known CDN ASNs (Google AS15169, Cloudflare AS13335, Akamai AS20940) to reduce noise; alert on remaining non-CDN destinations. The env-check.daemontools.cc subdomain and 38.180.107.76 IOCs should fire at critical severity regardless of any other condition. For process-injection logic, exclude EDR / monitoring agents that legitimately inject into svchost.exe. If your SIEM lacks Sysmon EventCode=22 (DNS), substitute Zeek/Suricata DNS logs joined on host. Correlate hits from this rule with detections SPL-001/002 to confirm the full kill chain.
- DAEMON Tools Lite Stage-1 Host-Triage Telemetry Beacon — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Disc Soft Bus Service Lite — Service Install + Run-Key Persistence Anomaly · unlock with TL Creds
- DAEMON Tools In-Memory Backdoor C2 Beacon — env-check.daemontools.cc / 38.180.107.76 · unlock with TL Creds
- DAEMON Tools Lite Compromised Installer Download from [indicator] — Web Proxy Hunt · unlock with TL Creds
- Disc Soft Signed-Binary Anomalous Behaviour — Reflective Loading and Signed Masquerading · unlock with TL Creds
- DAEMON Tools Multi-Protocol C2 Fallback — QUIC + DNS Tunneling + HTTPS Beacon Pattern · unlock with TL Creds
- DAEMON Tools Lite Trojanized Installer Execution — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- DAEMON Tools DT-Process Tree Suspicious Child or Reflective Loading — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 18 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0472.
Sample indicators (1 of 18)
- Domain:
daemon-tools[.]cc
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 18 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Kaspersky researchers identified a multi-stage payload chain: a first-stage infostealer profiling thousands of hosts across 100+ countries, a selective second-stage in-memory backdoor deployed to ~12 high-value retail/scientific/government/manufacturing targets in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand, and a third-stage QUIC RAT with process injection observed at a Russian educational institute. Attribution points to a Chinese-speaking actor; paid Pro/Ultra editions are unaffected and the breach is fixed in v12.6.0.2445.
On 2026-05-05 BleepingComputer disclosed, and on 2026-05-06 vendor Disc Soft Limited confirmed, that the build pipeline for DAEMON Tools Lite (free edition) v12.5.1 was compromised. Three Windows binaries — DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe — were trojanized and re-signed using Disc Soft's legitimate code-signing certificate. The malicious installers carrying these binaries (build numbers 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434) were served from the official daemon-tools.cc download infrastructure beginning 2026-04-08, giving the actor approximately one month of unconstrained, signed delivery to global victims before discovery.
Stage 1 — Infostealer / Triage. On execution, the trojanized binaries deploy a lightweight infostealer that collects hostname, MAC address, list of running processes, list of installed software, and system locale. This telemetry is exfiltrated to actor-controlled infrastructure for triage. Telemetry confirms thousands of infections across 100+ countries, with notable density in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and China.
Stage 2 — Selective In-Memory Backdoor. Approximately twelve high-value hosts (retail, scientific, government, and manufacturing organizations primarily in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand) received a second-stage in-memory backdoor providing arbitrary command execution, file download, and reflective code loading. The second stage is delivered without writing additional files to disk, defeating signature-based AV.
Stage 3 — QUIC RAT. At least one Russian educational institute received a third-stage Remote Access Trojan that uses QUIC (UDP/443) as its primary command-and-control transport with multi-protocol fallback. The RAT uses Windows process injection to migrate execution context out of the Disc Soft binaries and into long-lived host processes, complicating both attribution to the parent installer and incident response.
Attribution. Kaspersky's report attributes the campaign to a Chinese-speaking actor based on language artifacts in the first-stage payload. The actor's selective second-stage targeting of Russian, Belarusian, and Thai government, scientific, and manufacturing entities is consistent with PRC-aligned espionage tradecraft, though Kaspersky has not yet linked the toolset to a named cluster.
Vendor Response. Disc Soft removed the trojanized installers on 2026-05-05 and released DAEMON Tools Lite v12.6.0.2445 the same day. Paid DAEMON Tools Pro, Ultra, and the paid edition of Lite are unaffected because they are built from a separate pipeline. Customers who installed any version in the 12.5.0.2421 to 12.5.0.2434 range during the window must treat their host as potentially backdoored, hunt for QUIC C2 and reflective-loading artifacts, and reimage if second-stage activity is suspected.
Defensive Implications. This incident is a textbook software supply-chain compromise of a freeware utility distributed globally with valid code-signing trust. Detection content should not rely solely on file hashes (the actor controlled signing); detection must focus on behavioural anomalies — outbound QUIC from desktop endpoints to non-CDN infrastructure, reflective loading by DT-process trees, host triage telemetry beacons, and process-injection events sourced from DTHelper.exe / DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe / DTShellHlp.exe.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery; T1614.001 System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
Execution
T1106 Native API; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Collection
initial-access
Initial Access
T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
Persistence
T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
defense-impairment
T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
Resource Development
T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
Remediation
Patches
- Upgrade DAEMON Tools Lite to v12.6.0.2445 or later, released 2026-05-05 by Disc Soft Limited
Immediate actions
- Inventory all hosts where DAEMON Tools Lite was installed between 2026-04-08 and 2026-05-05 and identify any version in the 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434 range
- Treat every host that installed a compromised build as potentially backdoored: capture memory, hunt for outbound QUIC (UDP/443) to non-CDN destinations, and look for reflective code loading initiated by DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, or DTShellHlp.exe
- Block downloads of DAEMON Tools Lite installers older than v12.6.0.2445 at the web proxy
- Reset credentials and rotate browser session cookies for users on confirmed-compromised hosts
- Hunt SIEM telemetry for first-stage triage beacons (hostname + MAC + process list + installed software + locale) sent from endpoints in the affected window
Workarounds
- Uninstall DAEMON Tools Lite entirely on hosts where it is not business-critical
- Block UDP/443 egress from desktop endpoints to anything other than known-good QUIC services until inspection is in place
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict installation of freeware utilities to a vetted, internal software repository with hash-pinning
- Deploy EDR with detection content for reflective loading, process injection, and signed-binary anomaly behaviour
- Implement application allowlisting that validates not only signing-certificate trust but also issuer policy, build provenance (SLSA), and version-range constraints
- Subscribe to vendor security disclosure feeds and CISA known-supply-chain-compromise notifications
- Audit and segment outbound UDP/443 (QUIC) egress; require it to traverse a TLS-inspecting proxy where feasible
Affected and fixed versions
- Disc Soft Limited — DAEMON Tools Lite (free edition)
Vulnerable versions: 12.5.0.2421; 12.5.0.2422; 12.5.0.2423; 12.5.0.2424; 12.5.0.2425; 12.5.0.2426; 12.5.0.2427; 12.5.0.2428; 12.5.0.2429; 12.5.0.2430
Fixed in: 12.6.0.2445 - Disc Soft Limited — DAEMON Tools Pro
Fixed in: all versions unaffected — separate build pipeline - Disc Soft Limited — DAEMON Tools Ultra
Fixed in: all versions unaffected — separate build pipeline - Disc Soft Limited — DAEMON Tools Lite (paid edition)
Fixed in: all versions unaffected — separate build pipeline
Timeline
- Trojanized DAEMON Tools Lite installers (builds 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434) begin appearing on the official locked-ioc-4 download infrastructure, digitally signed with Disc Soft's legitimate code-signing certificate.
- First-stage infostealer activity (hostname, MAC address, process list, installed software, system locale collection) observed across thousands of hosts in 100+ countries, with notable density in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and China.
- Approximately 12 high-value targets in retail, scientific, government, and manufacturing sectors across Russia, Belarus, and Thailand receive a selective in-memory backdoor providing arbitrary command execution, file download, and reflective code loading.
- QUIC RAT with Windows process-injection capability and multi-protocol C2 fallback observed at a Russian educational institute as the third-stage payload.
- Kaspersky researchers identify the campaign during proactive supply-chain hunting and notify Disc Soft Limited.
- Disc Soft removes the trojanized installers from locked-ioc-4 and releases DAEMON Tools Lite v12.6.0.2445; BleepingComputer publishes initial public disclosure.
- Kaspersky publicly attributes the campaign to a Chinese-speaking actor based on language artifacts in the first-stage payload; no named cluster linked at time of disclosure.
- Disc Soft Limited publishes an official incident statement confirming build-environment compromise scoped to the free edition of DAEMON Tools Lite; paid Pro, Ultra, and paid Lite editions confirmed unaffected (separate build pipeline).
- Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0472 with full MITRE ATT&CK mapping, IOCs, detections, and simulation guidance.
- As of 2026-05-29, the malicious distribution channel is contained: Disc Soft secured its build environment, pulled the trojanized v12.5.1 installers, and shipped malware-free v12.6.0.2445, with no reported resurgence. It remains a live concern because the Chinese-speaking actor is unattributed, root cause/vector undisclosed, and in-memory/QUIC-RAT backdoors persist on unremediated victim hosts.
Sources cited
- CISA — Defending Against Software Supply Chain Attacks CISA · Government advisory · 2026-05-07
- Security Incident Affecting DAEMON Tools Lite: What We Know So Far (Disc Soft official statement) daemon-tools.cc · Vendor report · 2026-05-06
- MITRE ATT&CK T1195.002 — Compromise Software Supply Chain MITRE · Research · 2026-05-07
- MITRE ATT&CK T1553.002 — Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing MITRE · Research · 2026-05-07
- MITRE ATT&CK T1620 — Reflective Code Loading MITRE · Research · 2026-05-07
- CWE-1357 — Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component MITRE · Research · 2026-05-07
- DAEMON Tools trojanized in supply-chain attack to deploy backdoor BleepingComputer · News · 2026-05-05
- DAEMON Tools devs confirm breach, release malware-free version BleepingComputer · News · 2026-05-06
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Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.