Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-1344
AtlasRAT: Four-Stage In-Memory Loader Chain Delivers Commercial RAT via Fake Flash Player Installer (Silver Fox Overlap)
AhnLab ASEC documented AtlasRAT, a modular remote access trojan delivered through a four-stage, largely in-memory loader chain that begins with a Delphi executable disguised as "AGE Flash Player."
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1344 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Atlas RAT, AtlasCross |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Generic Windows endpoints (consumer/enterprise) |
| Attribution | Void Arachne (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | AtlasRAT, MainDll.dll |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1008 Fallback Channels, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows), T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1056 Input Capture and 39 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | consumer, technology, finance, government administration |
| Target regions | china, japan, malaysia, philippines, thailand, indonesia, singapore, india |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-07-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1344 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 61 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: AtlasRAT BFuck/SFuck ChaCha20-over-TLS C2 Handshake — Command and Control
Detects the literal 8-byte handshake marker ('BFuck\0\0\0' or 'SFuck\0\0\0') that opens every AtlasRAT / related Silver Fox Atlas RAT C2 session, plus the spoofed self-signed 'CN=update.microsoft.com' certificate wrapping the ChaCha20 application-layer cipher.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1573.001, T1071.001, T1553.006, T1008, T1095
- Data sources: suricata, zeek, proxy_logs, firewall_logs
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=network sourcetype="stream:tcp" OR sourcetype="suricata"
| eval payload_hex=lower(payload)
| where like(payload_hex, "4246756363%0000%") OR like(payload_hex, "5346756363%0000%")
| eval marker=if(like(payload_hex,"4246756363%0000%"),"BFuck","SFuck")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(dest_ip) as dest_ips by src_ip, marker
| where dest_ip IN ("150.158.50.175","108.187.7.84","116.204.169.70","143.92.32.49","143.92.32.65","143.92.32.72","61.111.250.139") OR count > 0Microsoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in ("150.158.50.175", "108.187.7.84", "116.204.169.70", "143.92.32.49", "143.92.32.65", "143.92.32.72", "61.111.250.139")
or RemoteUrl has "bifa668.com"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: AtlasRAT BFuck/SFuck TLS Handshake Marker and Spoofed Microsoft Certificate
id: 8f2a1c4e-1a2b-4c3d-9e5f-atlasrat1344003
status: experimental
description: Detects AtlasRAT/Silver Fox's 8-byte BFuck/SFuck handshake marker and the self-signed certificate spoofing update.microsoft.com used to wrap ChaCha20-over-TLS C2
references:
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/94478/
- https://hexastrike.com/resources/blog/threat-intelligence/trust-the-tunnel-get-the-trojan-silver-fox-delivers-atlas-rat-via-weaponized-vpn-installers/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-15
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1573.001
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1553.006
- attack.tool.atlasrat
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: any
detection:
selection_handshake:
payload_bytes|startswith:
- '4246756363000000'
- '5346756363000000'
selection_cert:
tls_cert_subject|contains: 'CN=update.microsoft.com'
tls_cert_self_signed: true
condition: selection_handshake or selection_cert
falsepositives:
- Extremely unlikely for the literal 8-byte marker; verify sensor payload-byte parsing accuracy before high-confidence alerting
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Extremely unlikely for the literal 8-byte marker sequence; verify payload-byte parsing accuracy in the sensor before high-confidence alerting
Tuning notes: Also alert on TLS JA3/JA3S fingerprint mismatches for certificates claiming CN=update.microsoft.com that are self-signed rather than chained to a Microsoft root CA; add port 9899/tcp raw-TCP variant used by the related Silver Fox second-stage shellcode download.
- Brand-Impersonation Installer User Execution — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] DLL Injection via [indicator] — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- AtlasRAT ChaCha20-over-TLS C2 Beacon to Known Infrastructure — C2/Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- AtlasRAT Stolen Code-Signing Certificate / EV Cert Abuse — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- AMSI/ETW/CLM/ScriptBlock-Logging Disable via CLR-Hosted PowerShell — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Security-Product Enumeration Sweep + Offline Keylogger Batched Exfil Pattern — C2/Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- AtlasRAT Fake Flash Player Installer Execution — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- AtlasRAT Fileless Loader Reflective Execution + Marker File Drop — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-07-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 61 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1344.
Sample indicators (3 of 61)
- IP address:
150.158.50[.]175 - Domain:
bifa668[.]com - File hash:
3f152103ea35c0f7feb205651a91e3c946b8057d1ea6f046ffc44fa611fd0267
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 61 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The final payload uses ChaCha20-over-TLS C2 communication with a spoofed Microsoft certificate, injects into WeChat, performs offline keylogging, and enumerates 33 security products; ASEC tracked 43 active AtlasRAT C2 servers as of 2026-06-09 and found partial marker overlap ("By@V<") with the Silver Fox threat actor's related "Atlas RAT"/AtlasCross campaigns, though the two variants use different handshake strings (BFuck vs. SFuck).
AtlasRAT is a commercial-grade remote access trojan tracked by AhnLab ASEC in a report titled "Not Every Fox is Silver: Inside an AtlasRAT Loader Chain" (2026-07-15). The infection begins with a Delphi-compiled executable masquerading as an "AGE Flash Player" installer (Stage 1). This dropper decrypts and loads an embedded PE image (Stage 2) entirely in memory, which in turn reconstructs downloader shellcode from eight separately encrypted fragments (Stage 3). The shellcode reflectively maps and executes MainDll.dll, a 32-bit RAT payload, via a technique ASEC labels ServiceRun (Stage 4). No stage other than the initial dropper is written to disk, minimizing forensic artifacts and defeating static AV scanning of intermediate stages.
Once resident, AtlasRAT establishes command-and-control over TLS to 150.158.50.175:443, opening every session with an 8-byte handshake marker "BFuck\0\0\0" (hex 42 46 75 63 6b 00 00 00). The TLS session itself is wrapped in an additional application-layer ChaCha20 stream cipher, and the certificate presented is self-signed but spoofs the subject "CN=update.microsoft.com, O=Microsoft Corporation, C=US" (SHA-256 fingerprint 3f152103ea35c0f7feb205651a91e3c946b8057d1ea6f046ffc44fa611fd0267) to blend into HTTPS traffic logs and evade naive certificate-pinning defenses. ASEC's telemetry identified 43 active AtlasRAT C2 servers as of 2026-06-09, indicating an operationally mature, multi-tenant or affiliate-style infrastructure footprint consistent with a commercially distributed RAT rather than a single-operator tool.
The final-stage payload is built around a modular plugin architecture. Observed capabilities include offline/buffered keylogging (keystrokes cached locally and exfiltrated in batches rather than streamed live, reducing detectable network chatter), DLL injection into WeChat.exe to intercept or manipulate the popular Chinese messaging client, and a security-product inventory routine that fingerprints the presence of 33 distinct security executables on the host — behavior consistent with pre-attack reconnaissance intended to select an evasion profile or abort execution on well-defended hosts. General process/file enumeration and system information collection round out the plugin set. Persistence markers and configuration state are dropped to C:\Users\Public\Documents\ using the filenames offline.ini, MODIf.html, AtlasPro.ini, and Wxfun.dll, giving defenders concrete host-based indicators even though the loader chain itself is fileless.
ASEC's analysis explicitly compares AtlasRAT to previously reported "Silver Fox" activity. Silver Fox (also tracked as Void Arachne, SwimSnake, UTG-Q-1000, and "The Great Thief of Valley") is a Chinese-origin threat actor with a multi-year lineage running from Gh0st RAT derivatives through ValleyRAT, Gh0stCringe, HoldingHands RAT, and Winos 4.0 to the current "Atlas RAT" / AtlasCross family. Independent reporting (Hexastrike, The Hacker News, March 2026) documents a related Silver Fox campaign delivering an "Atlas RAT" via a triple-nested Setup Factory installer trojanizing a stolen Autodesk binary, dynamically resolving APIs via PEB walking, decrypting an embedded Gh0st RAT configuration, and downloading second-stage shellcode over raw TCP (port 9899) to a C2 domain bifa668[.]com (registered 2025-10-27, resolving to 61.111.250.139, ASN 138195 MOACK.Co.LTD, South Korea) fronted by nameservers a.share-dns.com/b.share-dns.net. That campaign's handshake, "SFuck\0\0\0" (hex 53 46 75 63 6b 00 00 00), differs from AtlasRAT's "BFuck" marker but the two samples share the distinct "By@V<" internal marker string, and both ultimately reflectively load a RAT DLL named/labeled as part of an "Atlas" family — the basis for ASEC's assessment of partial overlap without full identity. The related Silver Fox campaign used eleven brand-impersonating delivery domains (Zoom, Signal, Telegram, Surfshark VPN, Microsoft Teams, QuickQ VPN, UltraViewer, Trezor, KeFuBao, WangWang, plus one unattributed) registered in a single wave on 2025-10-27, code-signed installers abusing a stolen Extended Validation certificate issued to a Vietnamese entity (DUC FABULOUS CO., LTD, Hanoi), and native CLR-hosted PowerShell execution that disables AMSI, ETW, Constrained Language Mode, and ScriptBlock logging without ever spawning powershell.exe. Both the AtlasRAT and the related Silver Fox Atlas RAT lineage specifically target Chinese-speaking users and enumerate/disable Chinese security products (360 Total Security/360 Safe, Huorong, Kingsoft, QQ PC Manager), and both inject into or monitor WeChat.
This skeleton is scoped strictly to the ASEC-documented AtlasRAT sample and its 43-server C2 tracking; the related Silver Fox/AtlasCross infrastructure (bifa668[.]com, the eleven typosquat domains, and the stolen Autodesk/Setup Factory delivery chain) is documented here as corroborating attribution/overlap context, sourced independently from Hexastrike and The Hacker News reporting on the broader Silver Fox campaign active November 2025–March 2026.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture; T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging
Command and Control
T1008 Fallback Channels; T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol; T1563.002 Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1036.001 Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Persistence
T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows); T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1197 BITS Jobs; T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Credential Access
T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1106 Native API; T1129 Shared Modules; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
defense-impairment
T1112 Modify Registry; T1553.002 Code Signing; T1553.006 Code Signing Policy Modification; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log
Initial Access
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566 Phishing; T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
Impact
Privilege Escalation
T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Resource Development
T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block C2 IPs 150.158.50.175, 108.187.7.84, 116.204.169.70, 143.92.32.49, 143.92.32.65, 143.92.32.72, and 61.111.250.139 at perimeter firewall/proxy
- Sinkhole or block DNS resolution for bifa668.com and the eleven Silver Fox typosquat delivery domains
- Hunt for host artifacts offline.ini, MODIf.html, AtlasPro.ini, and Wxfun.dll under C:\Users\Public\Documents\
- Revoke trust for/flag the stolen Extended Validation code-signing certificate issued to DUC FABULOUS CO., LTD
- Alert on TLS sessions opening with the 8-byte handshake markers 42 46 75 63 6b 00 00 00 ("BFuck") or 53 46 75 63 6b 00 00 00 ("SFuck")
Workarounds
- Block execution of Setup Factory (SFX 7.0/8.0) extracted binaries from %TEMP%_ir_sf[7|8]_temp_0 paths via application control policy
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with in-memory/reflective-loading detection (ETW-based, not signature-based, since payload is fileless after Stage 1)
- Enforce application allowlisting to block unsigned/renamed installer executables masquerading as Flash Player or Autodesk products
- Monitor and alert on DLL injection targeting WeChat.exe and other messaging clients
- Deploy TLS certificate-transparency / JA3-style fingerprinting to catch spoofed 'update.microsoft.com' self-signed certs
- User awareness training on fake VPN/messaging-app installers as a Silver Fox delivery vector
Affected and fixed versions
- Generic — Windows endpoints (consumer/enterprise)
Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server (general)
Timeline
Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 2× · latest source
- The Extended Validation code-signing certificate for "DUC FABULOUS CO., LTD" (Hanoi, Vietnam) later abused across Silver Fox's related Atlas RAT installers is issued; per Hexastrike the certificate remains valid through 2027-05-15.
- Silver Fox registers eleven brand-impersonating typosquat delivery domains (Zoom, Signal, Telegram, Surfshark, Microsoft Teams, and others) plus the locked-ioc-43 C2 domain in a single registration wave, per Hexastrike analysis of the related Atlas RAT campaign.
- First identified related Atlas RAT standalone executables appear, the start of a four-month wave of roughly twenty Silver Fox Atlas-family DLL samples observed by Hexastrike.
- Silver Fox's AtlasCross RAT campaign targeting Chinese-speaking users is observed extending across Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and India.
- Tax-themed phishing lures targeting Indian users are reported (eSentire, cited via The Hacker News) as part of the broader Silver Fox Atlas campaign.
- Approximate start of ASEC's 180-day VirusTotal retrohunt window (per ASEC's English-language follow-up report) that surfaced the 146 AtlasRAT samples.
- The Hacker News publishes reporting on Silver Fox's AtlasCross RAT campaign and fake domains.
- Infection timestamp recorded inside a dropped Silver Fox Atlas RAT configuration file, per Hexastrike's sample analysis.
- Hexastrike observes the newest related Silver Fox Atlas RAT payload sample, one day before publishing its analysis.
- Dark Lab publishes analysis of Silver Fox's dual-pronged ValleyRAT distribution strategy, documenting continued activity by the actor cluster circumstantially linked to AtlasRAT.
- Hexastrike publishes detailed technical analysis "Trust the Tunnel, Get the Trojan," documenting the Setup Factory/stolen-Autodesk loader chain, SFuck handshake, and locked-ioc-43 C2 infrastructure.
- cybersecuritynews.com publishes coverage of Silver Fox's stolen EV code-signing certificate abuse (DUC FABULOUS CO.,LTD, thumbprint locked-ioc-15) in the AtlasCross RAT campaign.
- locked-ioc-21 PDB path references build/version labels 'atlasPro验证版2026.6.2' / 'atlasPro Trial Version 2026.6.2', confirming the persistence/UAC-bypass module ships from the same versioned builder pipeline as MainDll.dll.
- AhnLab ASEC's telemetry records 43 active AtlasRAT command-and-control servers, the infrastructure-scale data point cited in the eventual ASEC report.
- AhnLab ASEC publishes "Not Every Fox is Silver: Inside an AtlasRAT Loader Chain," documenting the four-stage in-memory loader, BFuck handshake, spoofed Microsoft certificate, WeChat DLL injection, offline keylogging, 33-product security enumeration, and partial marker overlap with Silver Fox's Atlas RAT variant.
- ASEC's 180-day retrospective VirusTotal hunt surfaces 146 unique AtlasRAT-family samples (x86/x64 builder variants), confirming sustained active distribution rather than an isolated incident.
- AhnLab ASEC publishes a follow-up AtlasRAT analysis, identifying the same locked-ioc-43 C2 domain and locked-ioc-48 WeChat-injection tradecraft as the 2026-07-15 report, delivered via a trojanized 'AGE Flash Player' installer (FlashPlay.exe).
Update history
- 2026-07-30 — AtlasRAT: New Modular RAT Distributed via Fake Flash Player Installer Uses Four-Stage In-Memory Loader: What changed No field escalations. Severity (HIGH), exploitability (ACTIVE), status (ACTIVE), and attribution_confidence (MEDIUM) are unchanged.
- 2026-07-28 — AtlasRAT: Modular Multi-Stage In-Memory RAT Targeting WeChat via Trojanized 'AGE Flash Player' Installer (Silver Fox C2 Overlap): What changed No severity/exploitability/status escalation (HIGH/ACTIVE/ACTIVE/MEDIUM-confidence attribution all unchanged).
Sources cited
- Analyzing the Silver Fox tax campaign and the new ABCDoor backdoor Kaspersky Securelist · Research · 2026-05-01
- TA4922: The Suspected Chinese Crime Group is Going Global Proofpoint · Vendor report · 2026-01-01
- Not Every Fox is Silver: Inside an AtlasRAT Loader Chain asec.ahnlab.com · Blog · 2026-07-15
- Trust the Tunnel, Get the Trojan: Silver Fox Delivers Atlas RAT via Weaponized VPN Installers hexastrike.com · Blog · 2026-03-24
- Silver Fox Expands Asia Cyber Campaign with AtlasCross RAT and Fake Domains The Hacker News · News · 2026-03-01
- New Silver Fox Attack Pushes Malware Through Software Update Lures cyberpress.org · News · 2026-02-01
- Silver Fox Deploys ABCDoor Malware via Tax-Themed Phishing in India and Russia The Hacker News · News · 2026-05-01
- Silver Fox group uses new Rust-based MODBEACON RAT scworld.com · News · 2026-04-01
- SilverFox ValleyRAT Campaign Uses Eight-Stage Chain to Deploy Kernel Rootkit cyberpress.org · News · 2026-03-01
More from Void Arachne
- AtlasRAT (Silver Fox / TA4922-linked) C2 Protocol Evolution: SFuck/BFuck Check-ins, XOR, ChaCha20 and TLS with Fake update.microsoft.com Certificate
- SilverFox (Yinhu) Fake Software Download Sites Deliver Per-Request Malware Installers and Weaken Windows Defenses
- Silver Fox Counterfeit Installer Campaign Delivers Persistent, Self-Protecting Implant via Spoofed Vendor Download Sites
- ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) Backdoor Hides in Signed QN Wallpaper Installer via DLL Sideloading
- SilverFox APT Deploys Advanced ValleyRAT Campaign Against Japanese Manufacturer via DLL Sideloading and BYOVD
- SilverFox Deploys ValleyRAT (Go-Based RAT) with Kernel Rootkit AV/EDR Killer
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated .