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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0741

NFCShare Android Banking Malware Steals EMV Card Data and PINs via Weaponized European Banking Apps (com.modol.nap)

highACTIVE

NFCShare is an Android banking trojan distributed as fake versions of legitimate European banking apps through phishing sites and a GitHub repository disguised as a school project. It abuses the device NFC reader (android.nfc.tech.IsoDep) and EMV APDU commands to extract payment card data (PAN, type, label, expiry), then harvests the cardholder PIN through a fake WebView verification screen and exfiltrates both over a WebSocket C2 channel for use in NFC relay cash-out fraud.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0741
Also known asNFCShare, PhantomCard
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsGoogle Android (NFC-enabled devices); Intesa Sanpaolo Mobile banking customers (impersonated); CaixaBank Mobile banking customers (impersonated)
MalwareNFCShare
ToolsOkHttp WebSocket
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1056 Input Capture, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1102 Web Service, T1119 Automated Collection, T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1204 User Execution, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1566 Phishing, T1573 Encrypted Channel and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinancial, banking, consumer, retail-payments
Target regionsEurope, Italy, Spain, Germany
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0741 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: NFCShare Sideloaded Weaponized Banking-App Install Lure — Exploitation

Detects initial access for the NFCShare Android banking trojan: download and/or install of a weaponized fake banking APK (IntesaCarte/NexiCarte/CaixaBank, package com.modol.nap) delivered as a 'mandatory update' via a phishing redirect (tinyurl.com/Intesa-Carte), a bank-impersonation domain (areaclienti-intesa.com), or the abused GitHub repo (github.com/antoniocastaldo1998/app-scuola). Flags the proxy/web-gateway or MDM telemetry showing the lure download chain or sideload from unknown sources. Maps to spearphishing-link delivery, impersonation, and malicious-file user execution.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.002, T1656, T1189
  • Data sources: proxy, stream:http, DeviceNetworkEvents, mdm_app_inventory
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy sourcetype="stream:http" OR sourcetype="squid" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic"
| eval url=coalesce(url, uri, dest_url)
| search (url="*tinyurl.com/Intesa-Carte*" OR url="*areaclienti-intesa.com*" OR url="*github.com/antoniocastaldo1998/app-scuola*" OR (url="*.apk" AND (url="*IntesaCarte*" OR url="*NexiCarte*" OR url="*CaixaBank*")))
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(url) as urls by src_ip user http_user_agent
| `ctime(firstSeen)` | `ctime(lastSeen)`
| eval reason="NFCShare weaponized banking-app lure download / sideload referrer"

Microsoft KQL

let lure_hosts = dynamic(["areaclienti-intesa.com","nfck.loseyourip.com"]);
let apk_markers = dynamic(["IntesaCarte","NexiCarte","CaixaBank","app-scuola","Intesa-Carte"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (lure_hosts) or RemoteUrl has_any (apk_markers) or (RemoteUrl endswith ".apk" and RemoteUrl has_any (apk_markers))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| summarize Count=count(), Urls=make_set(RemoteUrl, 25) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName

Sigma

title: NFCShare Weaponized Banking-App Sideload Lure (Exploitation)
id: 8b2c1d44-0741-4a01-9e11-aa1f2c3d4e51
status: experimental
description: Detects download or sideload of NFCShare weaponized banking APKs via phishing redirect, bank-impersonation domain, or the abused GitHub repo.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nfcshare-android-malware-spreads-via-fake-banking-app-updates-on-github/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_url:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'tinyurl.com/Intesa-Carte'
            - 'areaclienti-intesa.com'
            - 'github.com/antoniocastaldo1998/app-scuola'
    selection_apk:
        c-uri|endswith: '.apk'
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'IntesaCarte'
            - 'NexiCarte'
            - 'CaixaBank'
    condition: selection_url or selection_apk
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers intentionally retrieving samples
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Security researchers or threat-intel analysts intentionally downloading samples for analysis
  • Legitimate GitHub traffic unrelated to the app-scuola repository

Tuning notes: Tune the .apk URL match to your mobile fleet; exclude known sandbox/researcher source IPs. Add additional brand-specific APK names as new NFCShare variants appear. Where MDM app-inventory is available, alert specifically on package com.modol.nap installed from a non-store source.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • NFCShare Malicious APK by Known Hash / Package — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare NFC IsoDep Use Paired with WebView PIN Prompt — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare Ampersand-Separated Card/PIN Exfil over WebSocket — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare GitHub/Phishing APK Delivery Chain — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare Anti-Analysis APK Packaging — Post-Exploitation/Defense Evasion · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare Two-Message Card-then-PIN WebSocket Exfil — C2/Lateral · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare Code-Namespace & Channel Marker Drop — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFCShare WebSocket C2 Beacon & Card/PIN Exfiltration — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0741.

Sample indicators (3 of 25)

  • IP address: 38.47.213[.]197
  • Domain: nfck[.]loseyourip[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://tinyurl[.]com/Intesa-Carte

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

NFCShare is a financially motivated Android malware family first documented in January 2026 by D3Lab researcher Andrea Draghetti, initially impersonating Deutsche Bank. Beginning 14 May 2026 the campaign pivoted and expanded to target customers of multiple Italian and broader European financial institutions, including Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Sella, Fideuram, Nexi, Mooney, BCC Roma, Klirway and the Spanish bank CaixaBank.

The infection chain begins with phishing websites that mimic legitimate bank portals (e.g. areaclienti-intesa.com impersonating Intesa Sanpaolo). After a victim enters credentials, the site instructs them to perform a "mandatory update" of their banking application, delivering a malicious APK. Payloads are hosted both on the phishing infrastructure (via shortened links such as tinyurl.com/Intesa-Carte) and on a GitHub repository, github.com/antoniocastaldo1998/app-scuola, created on 10 April 2026 and disguised as a school project ("app-scuola"). As of early June 2026 the repository contained 57 commits and 56 unique APK payloads, demonstrating an aggressive rebuild-and-republish cadence.

Once installed, the application (primary package com.modol.nap; internal namespace nfc.share.itnamteis) displays a fake card-verification screen that prompts the victim to tap their physical payment card against the phone. NFCShare uses Android's IsoDep interface and standard EMV protocol commands — including PPSE (Proximity Payment System Environment) selection and EMV APDU exchanges — to read the card number (PAN), card type, label and expiry date directly from the contactless chip. A subsequent fake WebView screen with a progress indicator and PIN prompt captures the victim's 4-digit PIN.

Captured data is assembled into a simple ampersand-separated string and transmitted, with card data and PIN sent separately, over an OkHttp-based WebSocket channel to attacker command-and-control servers. Observed C2 endpoints are ws://38.47.213.197:7068/ (earlier builds) and ws://nfck.loseyourip.com:8001/ (more recent builds). The stolen EMV data is intended for NFC relay / card-emulation cash-out schemes consistent with the broader NGate, SuperCard X and RelayNFC ecosystem, though NFCShare uses distinct code, libraries and architecture and is tracked as a separate family (also referenced as PhantomCard/NFCShare).

Newer builds show deliberate anti-analysis tradecraft: an increased DEX count (10 versus 8), hardcoded obfuscation keys, and intentionally malformed ZIP entries with poisoned file paths designed to break naive extraction tooling while sophisticated analyzers such as JADX and apkInspector still function. Distinctive hunting markers include the nfc.share.itnamteis namespace, the CardInfoitmanteis card-info model class, and MQTT-style channel enumerations CARD_INFO_CHANNEL and SEND_CHANNEL.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1566 Phishing

Execution

T1204 User Execution

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1587 Develop Capabilities

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

stealth

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block C2 indicators at the perimeter: 38.47.213.197:7068 and nfck.loseyourip.com:8001 (WebSocket ws://)
  • Block phishing domain areaclienti-intesa.com and the tinyurl.com/Intesa-Carte redirect
  • Alert customers to only install banking apps from official app stores; banks never ask users to tap their card against the phone to 'verify' it
  • Report and request takedown of github.com/antoniocastaldo1998/app-scuola and associated APK payloads

Workarounds

  • Disable installation from unknown sources on Android devices
  • Use Google Play Protect and keep it enabled
  • Do not enter card PINs into any app outside the official bank application

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy mobile threat defense (MTD)/EDR with behavioral detection for sideloaded APKs that combine NFC IsoDep usage with WebView credential prompts
  • Enforce 'block install from unknown sources' policy on managed Android fleets
  • Bank-side: monitor for NFC relay / card-present-anomaly transaction patterns and add velocity/geo controls
  • Customer education on phishing-driven 'mandatory update' social engineering

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Android (NFC-enabled devices)
    Vulnerable versions: Android devices with NFC and sideloading enabled
  • Intesa Sanpaolo — Mobile banking customers (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: Targeted brand
  • CaixaBank — Mobile banking customers (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: Targeted brand

Timeline

  • NFCShare first documented by D3Lab researcher Andrea Draghetti, with initial targeting limited to Deutsche Bank customers in Germany.
  • GitHub repository github.com/antoniocastaldo1998/app-scuola created, disguised as a school project ('app-scuola') to host malicious APK payloads.
  • Targeting concentrates on banking customers primarily in Italy and Spain via brand-specific weaponized apps (e.g. IntesaCarte, NexiCarte, CaixaBank).
  • Recent wave of attacks begins: campaign pivots and expands to Italian and broader European banks (Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Sella, Fideuram, Nexi, Mooney, BCC Roma, Klirway, CaixaBank), routing phishing-site victims to the GitHub repo for the malicious APK.
  • Newer NFCShare builds add anti-analysis tradecraft: increased DEX count (10 vs 8), hardcoded obfuscation keys, and intentionally malformed ZIP/APK entries with poisoned file paths to break naive extraction tooling.
  • GitHub repository observed hosting 57 commits and 56 unique APK payloads, demonstrating an aggressive rebuild-and-republish cadence.
  • BleepingComputer publishes reporting on NFCShare spreading via fake banking app updates hosted on GitHub.
  • Further public reporting (Cyber Security News, GBHackers, CyberPress, Reconbee) details NFCShare NFC/EMV TTPs, IOCs, WebSocket C2 channels and anti-analysis packaging.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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