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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0764

EvilNominatus Ransomware — BAT-delivered .NET (MSIL) Filecoder attributed to an Iranian developer

lowACTIVE

EvilNominatus (aka NominatusStrike / VirusNominatus) is a low-sophistication .NET/MSIL ransomware family first exposed at the end of 2021 and analyzed by ClearSky in April 2022. It is delivered via heavily obfuscated, large (~650KB) encoded BAT scripts with near-zero antivirus detection (one sample flagged by only two engines, a later sample by none).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0764
Also known asNominatusStrike, Ransom.NominatusStrike, VirusNominatus, EvilNominatusCrypto
SeverityLOW
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows
Nation-state nexusIran
MalwareEvilNominatus, NominatusStrike, Ransom.EvilNominatus.C
ToolsEncoded BAT loader (~650KB)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204 User Execution, T1485 Data Destruction, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1566 Phishing, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
MotivationFINANCIAL
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2022-04-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0764 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: EvilNominatus Recovery Inhibition — Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion

Detects the post-exploitation recovery-inhibition stage: vssadmin/wmic shadowcopy/wbadmin invoked to delete Volume Shadow Copies or the backup catalog (reflected in Kaspersky's 'DelShad' detection name). This destroys local restore points so the '-Locked' encryption cannot be rolled back. High-fidelity ransomware impact precursor.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1490, T1485
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\vssadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\wmic.exe" OR Image="*\\wbadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe")
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| where (match(cmd,"vssadmin.*delete.*shadows") OR match(cmd,"shadowcopy.*delete") OR match(cmd,"wbadmin.*delete.*catalog") OR match(cmd,"win32_shadowcopy") OR match(cmd,"delete.*systemstatebackup"))
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime values(Image) as images values(CommandLine) as cmdlines by host, User, ParentImage
| `ctime(firstTime)`
| where count>0

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe", "wmic.exe", "wbadmin.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "vssadmin" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete" and ProcessCommandLine has "shadows")
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "shadowcopy" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete")
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "wbadmin" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete" and ProcessCommandLine has "catalog")
    or ProcessCommandLine has "Win32_ShadowCopy"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: EvilNominatus Recovery Inhibition via Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion
id: a2d7c4e1-3b96-4f08-8e52-1d9a6c0fb3a4
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies or the backup catalog used by EvilNominatus to inhibit system recovery before/after encryption
references:
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/evilnominatus-ransomware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_vss:
        Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'shadows'
    selection_wmic:
        Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadowcopy'
            - 'delete'
    selection_wb:
        Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'catalog'
    selection_psh:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Backup software performing routine shadow-copy maintenance or catalog cleanup
    - Administrators clearing shadow storage manually
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Backup/imaging products that rotate or purge shadow copies and backup catalogs
  • Scheduled disk-cleanup or maintenance tasks run by administrators

Tuning notes: Exclude known backup-product parent processes and service accounts. Increase severity automatically when this fires within minutes of a burst of '-Locked' file renames on the same host (correlate with SPL-003).

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • EvilNominatus MSIL Payload Execution — VirusNominatus Metadata / Unsigned .NET Filecoder · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Defensive Tool Tampering — DisableTaskMgr / DisableRegistryTools Policy Writes · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Ransom-Note IOC Strings in Process / Command Line · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Encoded Loader Deobfuscation + Ingress Tool Transfer · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Combined Recovery Inhibition + Tool Tampering on One Host · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Filecoder Impact — '-Locked' Stacking + Recovery Inhibition Correlation · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Encoded BAT Loader Execution from User-Writable Path · unlock with TL Creds
  • EvilNominatus Mass File Encryption — '-Locked' Rename Burst · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2022-04-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0764.

Sample indicators (2 of 20)

  • File hash: 0d7a99add139ce8c5da7a6b6fbc52307f3933966b3555a233220776e2eccce50
  • File hash: dca4ecd769253d3b4a165a5bbadbb7ce48aa89451b46eb05185f922e931da156

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

ClearSky attributes the tooling to a young Iranian developer who publicly bragged about it on Twitter and Discord; overall risk was assessed LOW with no known victims at the time of publication.

EvilNominatus is a self-authored ransomware family rather than a professional ransomware-as-a-service operation. ClearSky's research ('Exposing the Iranian EvilNominatus Ransomware', 7 April 2022) began with a malicious BAT file uploaded to VirusTotal from Iran. The BAT — roughly 650KB in its encoded form — acts as a loader/dropper: per ClearSky it can download additional malicious files, delete Volume Shadow Copies, encrypt files, cancel/disable the Windows registry editor (regedit), disable Task Manager (taskmgr), and carry out multiple additional capabilities. The original BAT was detected by only two AV engines on VirusTotal; a second, characteristically similar BAT discovered later was detected by no engines at all, which is the primary reason ClearSky published despite assessing the family as low risk. Files generated by, or contacted by, the BATs were detected by multiple AV engines.

The payload is a .NET / MSIL executable (ESET classifies it as MSIL/Filecoder.EvilNominatus; a public sample carries the internal name VirusNominatus.exe, File/Product Version 1.0.8136.34981, Product Name 'VirusNominatus', Legal Copyright 'Copyright 2022'). On execution the ransomware enumerates user files and encrypts them, appending the extension '-Locked' to each affected file (e.g. '1.jpg' -> '1.jpg-Locked'); because files can be processed more than once, multiple '-Locked' suffixes may stack ('file.jpg-Locked-Locked'). Rather than dropping a text ransom note, it presents a pop-up window. The note text observed reads: 'Ransom.EvilNominatus.C / CryptoVirus Detected! Ransom.NominatusStrike / your files has been encrypted if you enter the wrong key 3 times we will make you see dark side ... Contact Bkhtyaryrwzbh@gmail.com / we deleted your backups, we disabled taskmgr, regedit and more ... Code: [GO AWAY!!]'. The note threatens destructive action after three incorrect key entries, claims backups were deleted (consistent with the observed shadow-copy deletion), and provides the contact email bkhtyaryrwzbh@gmail.com. A static removal/decryption code string ('7HJA817273-zXhsgSUS89-XX98UYHBVZ-9182TEFGIJK') has been documented by removal-guide sources.

ClearSky's report additionally documents the developer's email address and their Discord and Twitter usernames, attributing the tool to a young Iranian author who bragged about its development on Twitter. No victims were known at publication and no CVE is involved; the family's significance is its distinctive BAT-based operation and its very low AV detection rate at the time. Defenders should treat the family as a representative example of low-cost, individually-developed ransomware that leans on script obfuscation and standard recovery-inhibition (shadow-copy deletion, disabling defensive admin tools) rather than novel technique.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Discovery

T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Command and Control

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Isolate affected hosts and identify the scope of files renamed with the '-Locked' extension
  • Block execution of unsigned/obfuscated .BAT scripts from user-writable paths via application control / AppLocker / WDAC
  • Restore impacted files from offline, immutable backups (decryption is not publicly available)
  • Hunt for and block the contact indicator bkhtyaryrwzbh@gmail.com in mail and DLP controls

Workarounds

  • Disable or constrain cmd.exe/wscript execution for non-admin users where feasible
  • Protect Task Manager and Registry Editor policy keys and alert on changes to DisableTaskMgr / DisableRegistryTools

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for mass file modification, shadow-copy deletion, and tampering with DisableTaskMgr/DisableRegistryTools
  • Maintain offline/immutable, regularly tested backups so shadow-copy deletion does not eliminate recovery options
  • Enforce script-block logging (PowerShell) and command-line process auditing to surface obfuscated BAT loaders
  • Restrict the ability of standard users to modify Volume Shadow Copies (vssadmin/wmic/wbadmin)

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints capable of running .NET/MSIL executables and cmd.exe BAT scripts

Timeline

  • The Iranian developer publicly bragged about authoring the ransomware on Twitter and Discord, where ClearSky documented the developer's email, Twitter and Discord usernames.
  • EvilNominatus ransomware first exposed at the end of 2021; the family is developed and self-promoted by a young Iranian developer.
  • A malicious ~650KB encoded BAT loader associated with EvilNominatus was uploaded to VirusTotal from Iran, the artifact that began ClearSky's investigation.
  • ClearSky assessed the family's general level of risk as low, with no known victims at the time of publication and no CVE involved.
  • ClearSky published 'Exposing the Iranian EvilNominatus Ransomware' (7 April 2022) documenting the BAT-based operation, IOCs, and attribution.
  • The .NET/MSIL payload (internal name locked-ioc-6, File/Product Version 1.0.8136.34981, Product Name 'VirusNominatus', Copyright 2022) encrypts files, appends '-Locked', and shows a pop-up ransom note instead of a text file.
  • A second BAT sharing characteristics with the first was discovered and detected by no antivirus engines at all, the primary reason ClearSky decided to publish.
  • The first encoded BAT was detected by only two antivirus engines on VirusTotal; it can download additional files, delete Volume Shadow Copies, encrypt files, and disable regedit and taskmgr.
  • Multiple AV vendors added detections for later samples, e.g. ESET MSIL/Filecoder.EvilNominatus.E, Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.DelShad.gen, Microsoft Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.B!ml, Avast Win32:TrojanX-gen, Combo Cleaner IL:Trojan.MSILZilla.12204.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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